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Aquaculture Law and Policy
Aquaculture is a rapidly expanding industry predicted to play an increasingly
important role in meeting demand for fish. The essays in this volume focus on
getting a “good governance” grip on the aquaculture industry, which is facing
major environmental and social challenges.
The book highlights the numerous law and policy issues that may need to be
addressed in the search for effective regulation of aquaculture. Those issues include,
among others: the equitable assignment of property rights; the design of effective
dispute resolution mechanisms; adoption of a proper taxation system for aquacul-
ture; resolution of aboriginal offshore title and rights claims; recognition of inter-
national trade law restrictions such as labeling limitations and food safety
requirements; and determination of whether genetically modified fish should be
allowed and, if so, under what controls.
The main themes running through the book are the need to understand and
address major limitations in existing aquaculture laws and policies, particularly the
“free-market” leasing/licensing approach and lack of integrated coastal planning
processes; and the need to rethink national aquaculture laws and institutional
arrangements in light of international environmental principles, such as integration,
precaution, public participation, community-based management, intergenerational
equity and indigenous rights developments.
While previous books on this topic have tended to be descriptive and narrowly
focused on just one country, Aquaculture Law and Policy attempts to be prescriptive
and comparative in its analyses, suggesting ways in which aquaculture legislation
might be reformed in light of sustainable development principles and drawing on
global and other national experiences.
David L. VanderZwaag, Canada Research Chair in Ocean Law and Governance at
Dalhousie Law School, is a member of the Commission on Environmental Law
(CEL) and the World Conservation Union (IUCN), and presently co-chairs the
IUCN Specialist Group on Oceans, Coasts and Coral Reefs. Gloria Chao practices
environmental and energy law with the Vancouver office of Blake, Cassels &
Graydon LLP. Prior to joining Blakes, Gloria obtained a Master of Laws degree in
marine environmental law and completed a clerkship with the Supreme Court of
Canada.
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The oceans and seas of the world are at a critical juncture in their history.
The pressures of development brought about by the globalization of the
world economy continue to intensify through the major sectors of ocean use.
In parallel, marine management and policy issues become larger, more
numerous and more urgent. The response of this series is to provide in-
depth analysis of ocean development, management and policy from a multi-
disciplinary perspective, encompassing a wide range of aspects of
interrelationships between the oceans and seas on the one hand, and mar-
itime human activities on the other. Several strands run through the series:
• Studies of the development and management of major ocean industries
and uses including shipping and ports; strategic uses; mineral and
energy resources; fisheries and aquaculture; the leisure industries; waste
disposal and pollution; science and education; and conservation.
• Inter- and multidisciplinary perspectives provided by the natural sci-
ences, geography, economics, sociology, politics, law and history.
• Responses to the need to devise integrated ocean policies and management
measures which cover the deep oceans, the bordering seas and coastal zones.
• Regional studies at a variety of geographical scales from large ocean
regions to regional seas.
The series is of interest to all concerned professionally with the oceans and
seas, ranging from scientists and engineers to surveyors, planners, lawyers
and policy-makers working in the public, private and voluntary sectors. It is
also of wider public interest to all those interested in or having a stake in the
world ocean and its bordering seas.
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Foreword
When I was first exposed to aquaculture as an adviser to the Nova Scotia
Department of Fisheries, the province had recently passed an Act respecting
aquaculture and it was my job to brief the federal government. Off to
Ottawa I went, where I spent a very unpleasant day hearing from the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans lawyers why the province had no con-
stitutional jurisdiction to do what the Act says we may.
Twenty years later, things are a bit better but we continue to struggle
with the ongoing challenge of providing a workable and cooperative gover-
nance structure for an industry whose development, and the issues associated
therewith, have dramatically outpaced our law and policy capacity. Aquacul-
ture is heralded by its proponents as part of the solution to the world’s food
shortage and as an alternative to the dwindling wild fisheries. Aquaculture
opponents cite pollution, food health, animal welfare, conflict of use and
plain old NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) as reasons for expending phenom-
enal energy opposing any form of aquaculture.
This book is a thoughtful and comprehensive synthesis and analysis of the
plethora of social, economic, environmental and legal issues that must be
addressed in order to ensure that the world’s growing aquaculture industry
is sustainable into the future. There are no perfect resolutions to the tensions
surrounding aquaculture. Every country will have nuances in its governance
regimes, and every aquaculture site will require different considerations,
depending on the ecosystem in which it resides.
This book provides an excellent source document for anyone interested in
understanding the issues facing one of the most rapidly growing and
complex areas of the global food basket. The authors also have the courage to
provide some well-reasoned recommendations that should move through
currently acrimonious debates to a more constructive dialogue.
Peter C. Underwood
Deputy Minister
Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources
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Introduction
Aquaculture law and policy: struggling in
the wake of the blue revolution
David L. VanderZwaag
Rapid growth of aquaculture developments around the globe has been
likened to a blue revolution.1 Aquaculture contributions of fish, crustaceans
and mollusks have grown from 3.9 percent of total world production by
weight in 1970 to 29.9 percent in 2002.2 Aquaculture has grown at an
average rate of 8.9 percent per year since 1970, compared to 1.2 percent for
capture fisheries.3 Aquaculture is predicted to play an increasingly import-
ant role in meeting food fish demands in light of world population growth,
rising per capita incomes, urbanization trends4 and the depletion of many
wild fish stocks.5
In the wake of aquaculture expansions, a host of environmental, social,
economic, health and ethical issues are raised. For example, marine finfish
farming carries numerous potential environmental effects, including
eutrophication, sedimentation and stimulation of harmful algal blooms from
nutrient and organic matter enrichment caused by uneaten food pellets and
feces.6 Spread of diseases and parasites from farmed fish to wild stocks7 and
potential adverse effects of escaped fish on wild fish through competition
and interbreeding are further concerns.8 The environmental impacts of
chemicals, such as drugs used to treat sea lice and antibiotics targeting
infectious diseases, are largely unknown.9
Social conflicts are also prevalent. Traditional fishers and boaters may be
unhappy at the prospect of losing access to marine spaces. Coastal residents
and tourism operators may be upset over aesthetic interferences. Who in
society should be given priority for aquaculture site access, particularly in
offshore marine areas where common property regimes have dominated, is
another contested question.10 Lower prices for farmed fish may also give rise
to animosity from fishers faced with going out of business because of the
aquacultural market glut.11
Economic questions, having social and cultural dimensions, also abound.
How far should governments limit corporate control and ownership of aqua-
culture operations? How should taxation of aquaculture profits be handled,
and what level of fees should be imposed for leasing and licensing privileges?
Complex health issues surround aquaculture products. Elevated levels of
organic contaminants, such as dioxins and PCBs in farmed salmon, originating
from contaminated feeds, have spawned both advisories against consuming
large amounts of farmed fish12 and advocacies regarding the overall positive
health benefits of consuming farmed salmon.13 The potential human health
impacts of using antibiotics in aquaculture have received little study.14
Ethical dimensions also loom over aquaculture developments. Persons
having ecocentric viewpoints may be distraught over the very notion of
“farming” the wild seas, and in particular the morality of taking fish from
the ocean food chain to supply fishmeal for intensive aquaculture
operations.15 The prospect of genetic modification of fish to maximize aqua-
culture profits – for example, from faster-growing fish – perhaps most
starkly raises the ethical policy choices.16 Whether to limit aquaculture to
native species is a further question.17 Fish welfare and avoidance of cruelty
also lurk as issues.18
The governance of aquaculture, especially in the marine and coastal
context, has largely lagged behind the pace of development pressures. Many
countries, not having specifically tailored aquaculture legislation, have
struggled to control aquaculture access and operations through dated and
marginally relevant legislation such as old fisheries acts, navigable waters
protection laws and general environmental protection statutes.19 Environ-
mental impact assessment processes are often not applied to established
aquaculture operations and proposed shellfish projects20 even though they
may carry possibly significant environmental consequences.21 Effective regu-
lation has also foundered as a result of limited governance capacity and lack
of political will in light of the short-term benefits offered by rapid aquacul-
ture development.22 Regional agreements and arrangements have tended to
focus on transboundary fisheries and pollution challenges23 and have gener-
ally neglected transboundary threats of aquaculture such as transborder
disease transfers and the impacts of escaped fish.24
Further developing and strengthening national aquaculture governance is
likely to involve substantial social and political struggles. With no global
treaty specific to aquaculture, countries have wide latitude to establish their
own environmental and health standards,25 the setting of which is almost
certain to spark interest and value conflicts among multiple actors interacting
to reflect their viewpoints.26 Working out the appropriate mix of the three
main modes of governance27 – hierarchical governance, self-governance and co-
governance – and sorting out the roles of science, public opinion and bureau-
cratic expertise in decision-making are likely to be other areas of tension.28
To assist countries with law and policy assessments and reforms in
support of ecologically and socially sustainable aquaculture,29 various prin-
ciples have emerged from international agreements,30 declarations31 and
codes.32 Those principles include, among others, the precautionary approach,
public participation, integration, intergenerational and intragenerational
equity, the ecosystem approach and the “polluter pays” principle.33
Perhaps one of the greatest struggles in coming decades will be over how
to translate principled coastal/ocean governance into practice.34 Many of the
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principles are still subject to considerable interpretive controversies,35 and
governance implications and details have yet to be fully fleshed out.36 Mul-
tiple meanings of principles37 and the interrelationship between/among
principles are added challenges.38
The need for ensuring legal frameworks supportive of sustainable aqua-
culture has been widely recognized. For example, the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries urges states
to establish and maintain an appropriate legal and administrative framework
that facilitates the development of responsible aquaculture.39 The Bangkok
Strategy for Aquaculture Development, adopted at an international confer-
ence in February 2000 involving some 540 participants from sixty-six coun-
tries and more than 200 governmental and non-governmental organizations,
urges countries to develop “comprehensive and enforceable laws, regulations
and administrative procedures that encourage sustainable aquaculture” and
to clarify “legal frameworks and policy objectives regarding access and user
rights for farmers.”40
This book highlights the numerous law and policy issues that must be
addressed in the search for effective regulation of aquaculture. Those issues
include, among others, the equitable assignment of property rights; the
design of effective dispute resolution mechanisms; clarification of what mar-
itime laws apply to aquaculture (for example, are injured aquaculture
workers covered by special maritime compensation legislation or traditional
workers’ compensation legislation?); adoption of a proper taxation system for
aquaculture; resolution of aboriginal offshore title and rights claims; recog-
nition of international trade law restrictions, such as labeling limitations
and food safety requirements; and determination of whether genetically
modified fish should be allowed and, if so, under what controls.
This volume explores principled aquaculture law and policy approaches
and challenges through a five-part format. Part I includes two chapters pro-
viding global overviews. Chapter 1, by William Howarth, discusses aqua-
culture regulatory challenges and diversities. Chapter 2, by Nathanael
Hishamunda, highlights the two categories of legal priorities, addressing
the “supply side” of aquaculture, for example, through secure access rights
and clean water protections – and the “demand side” – for example, through
aquatic food safety standards (Nathanael Hishamunda, Chapter 2).
The five chapters in Part II describe Canadian experiences and challenges
in implementing sustainability principles in relation to aquaculture. Chapter
3, by David VanderZwaag, Gloria Chao and Mark Covan, gauges how ade-
quately the federal government, British Columbia and the four Atlantic
provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New-
foundland and Labrador) have implemented four key principles: integration,
precaution, environmental impact assessment and public participation
(including social equity). The chapter concludes by suggesting ways forward
for ensuring more principled decision-making in Canadian coastal/ocean
governance, including the need to strengthen public participation in
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environmental impact assessment of aquaculture proposals and to fully
incorporate sustainability principles into provincial aquaculture laws,
particularly the presently ignored principle of social equity. In Chapter 4,
Phillip Saunders and Richard Finn summarize Canada’s limitations in
applying a principled approach to property rights in aquaculture and high-
light a critical flaw in ensuring secure access to marine aquaculture
sites, namely the lack of federal legislation legitimizing interferences with
public rights to fish. Chapter 5, by Moira McConnell, explores the nature of
aquaculture siting conflicts and, drawing from Norwegian and Canadian
experiences, concludes that a strategic sea-use planning process is necessary
for aquaculture to achieve its full potential. In Chapter 6, Aldo Chircop
examines the largely unexplored relationship between mariculture activities
and maritime law, also referred to as admiralty law. The legal status of mar-
itime installations, mariculture workers and safety standards applicable to
offshore work sites is reviewed. Chapter 7, by Faye Woodman, discusses the
appropriateness of the agricultural model of taxation to aquaculture opera-
tions and looks at non-income taxes, including sales taxes and property
taxes, and the appropriateness of aquaculture leaseholder fees and license
fees.
Part III covers the largely unaddressed issues of how indigenous rights in
the offshore may interact with aquaculture access and operations. In Chapter
8, Diana Ginn focuses on whether the doctrine of aboriginal title, developed
by the courts in relation to land, could also apply to submerged marine
areas, and she speculates on how the concept of aboriginal title might be rec-
onciled with existing common law rights, such as navigation and fishing
rights, and international rights such as the right of innocent passage for
shipping. In Chapter 9, Ronalda Murphy, Richard Devlin and Tamara
Lorincz review Canadian jurisprudence on the duty to consult with aborigi-
nal communities and the potential impacts of the duty on proposed aquacul-
ture developments. Chapter 10, by Douglas Sanders, surveys international
developments relating to indigenous rights to lands, fisheries, the foreshore
and the offshore and briefly reviews the still incomplete attempts of Aus-
tralia, Canada and New Zealand to resolve indigenous rights that complicate
the granting of secure tenures.
Part IV highlights some of the international trade law and policy dimen-
sions in aquaculture. In Chapter 11, Ted McDorman and Torsten Ström
examine how far countries may utilize trade measures to protect the health
and safety of citizens from imported aquaculture products without violating
international trade rules. Chapter 12, by John Phyne, Richard Apostle and
Gestur Hovgaard, tracks the evolution of European Union food safety pol-
icies and emphasizes the potential consequences for salmon exports from
coastal communities, using case studies from Norway and the Faroe Islands.
Douglas Moodie, in Chapter 13, summarizes the international legal frame-
work for addressing genetically modified aquatic organisms and reviews the
adequacy of Canadian regulatory approaches.
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Part V provides a comparative perspective on how three developed coun-
tries have approached aquaculture governance. The legal frameworks applic-
able to mariculture in the United States (Jeremy Firestone, Chapter 14),
Australia (Marcus Haward, Chapter 15) and New Zealand (Hamish Rennie,
Chapter 16) are reviewed and critiqued.
Through global and national comparative perspectives, with an emphasis
on Canadian approaches and challenges in moving towards principled aqua-
culture governance for coastal and offshore areas, this monograph is aimed at
partially filling the relative vacuum in aquaculture law studies. Existing
books with an aquaculture law and policy focus are either quite dated41 or
largely focused on a single country.42
The overall reality that emerges from the multiple chapters that follow is
that Canada and other countries are still struggling to modernize law and
policies in the wake of fast-paced aquaculture developments.43 Major chal-
lenges include, among others, the need to overcome a “free-market” mental-
ity to aquaculture leasing and licensing;44 to place aquaculture developments
within the context of integrated coastal/ocean management processes;45 to
develop clear regulatory standards for aquaculture operations to ensure
environmental and social health;46 and to forge political, bureaucratic and
industry awareness and willingness to change existing laws in light of sus-
tainability principles.47
One of the greatest challenges may be to reach societal consensus on what
appropriate aquaculture policies should be48 – for example, whether trans-
genic fish should be allowed to be produced and marketed49 and whether the
farming in open cages or pens of non-native carnivorous fishes, requiring
high feed inputs, releasing wastes and carrying disease, parasite and escape
threats, should be encouraged.50 Lessening ecosystem impacts may occur
through better management practices for non-enclosed systems,51 but the
transition to enclosed and recirculating systems seems likely to hasten in
light of growing demands to follow precautionary and ecosystem approaches
and to minimize impacts of every kind.52
Building a boat while navigating rough seas is an image portrayed in the
concluding chapter of this volume by Arthur Hanson. That picture amply
captures the law and policy struggles facing many countries in the wake of
the blue revolution.
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ing an overall aquaculture policy through public consultation, applying
strategic environmental assessment to a proposed aquaculture policy and
holding a referendum on a proposed policy.
49 See Chapter 13 (Moodie) in this volume.
50 The great challenge is that many of these species currently farmed also have the
greatest market value, and substantial investments in equipment have already
been made. See Jane Lubchenco, “The Blue Revolution: A Global Ecological
Perspective,” (2003) 34(4) World Aquaculture 8 at 10.
51 Better management practices may include, for example, better siting to ensure
proper water circulation, using polyculture, improving utilization of feeds and
reformulating feeds. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra
note 20 at 26.
52 For advocacy for such a transition, see Secretariat of the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity, supra note 20 at 26.
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Part I
Aquaculture law and
policy at the millennium
Global trends and challenges

1 Global challenges in the
regulation of aquaculture
William Howarth
Introduction: food from land
Perhaps the greatest and most enduring challenge for humanity is that of
feeding itself. Since the dawn of time, human beings have struggled to find
a balance between the extremes of surplus and shortage found in nature.
That struggle continues today, with an alarmingly large proportion of the
world still suffering food shortages.
Insofar as security of food supplies is the greatest challenge for humanity,
agriculture might be seen as its greatest achievement. On the timescale of
humanity, we have progressed relatively recently from being hunters and
gatherers of our food, dependent entirely upon the bounties and vagaries of
nature, to forming societies that know how to feed themselves by growing
the crops and keeping the livestock that provide the bulk of our food sup-
plies. Security of food supplies has provided the bedrock upon which all sub-
sequent technological and other development has been made possible.
The triumph of agriculture, however, deserves a moment’s reflection.
How did this come about? Certainly by thousands of years of trial and error
by individuals and communities, which long predated modern “scientific”
knowledge about the most productive methods of cultivating plants and
rearing animals. The techniques of agriculture are an ancient heritage of
hard-learned lessons from persons who faced starvation because of their mis-
takes and cherished their successes for good reason.
Equally, agriculture is a lesson in the way that human beings must organ-
ize their activities for mutual benefit. There could have been no incentive for
people to plant crops, without the expectation that after months of painstak-
ing work tending them, they would be assured the end product at the time
of harvesting. Agriculture is possible only on the basis of a system of land
tenure that allows its participants a sufficient degree of ownership over the
products of their labor. Where there is a surplus of suitable land this may
not be problematic, but in almost all societies of which we have knowledge,
the need for defined land rights is a precursor to almost any kind of produc-
tive agricultural activity. The achievements of agriculture rest upon the
ability to define and protect property interests as much as they have
depended upon the development of practical farming techniques. Without
the former, the latter would have been futile.
Having noted these fundamental points about the dependence of agricul-
ture upon well-defined property rights, this chapter will contrast the rather
embryonic state of legal regimes for aquaculture, where tensions between
public and private rights have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Focusing
on the role of regulation in realizing sustainable development, the chapter
draws on examples from Scotland that may have broader relevance to the
international community. Within the United Kingdom, Scotland has
experienced the most precocious and extensive aquaculture development,
particularly in the farming of salmon. Many of the environmental and regu-
latory issues that have been identified have direct counterparts in other juris-
dictions that have engaged in similar kinds of development. Hence, some
general lessons are to be learned about the need for regulatory integration,
precaution and community-based management. The purpose of the chapter
is to outline the main environmental concerns and to indicate possible regula-
tory responses, alongside issues of implementation and enforcement, in the
broader context of securing a more sustainable aquaculture industry.
Food from waters
Turning from the production of food from land to the production of food from
waters, the primitiveness of our present situation is apparent. Technological
advancement has preceded, rather than followed, organizational development.
Sufficient fishery know-how has been acquired to denude the world’s oceans of
almost every fish that it is commercially worth catching. What has only
recently come to be generally appreciated is that the first come, first served
approach to fishery resources may not be genuinely conducive to the long-term
interests of humanity. Moreover, to the extent that it is not conducive to those
interests, humanity is only in the relatively early stages of establishing a
system of rights that is appropriate for protecting the continuing productivity
of the sea against the ravages of excessive exploitation. In short, common
resources provided by nature need to be subjected to legal regimes that allo-
cate rights of exploitation to ensure that sustainable yields are not exceeded
and that those yields are equitably shared for the general benefit.
The warning was issued in 1968 with the publication of Garrett Hardin’s
famous essay “The Tragedy of the Commons,” in which he envisaged that
“the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy” by
maximizing individual gain to the collective detriment so that “freedom in a
commons brings all to ruin.”1 The validity of this thesis is hotly disputed,
but in the case of fisheries, common property in natural resources has
enabled a ruinous decline in global fisheries to take place. It would be good
to think that humanity has the good sense to address this by mutual self-
regulation, but many would take the view that the response has been too
little too late.
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Although it is encouraging to see recent international cooperation on
fisheries, and particularly the need to address conservation of migratory
stocks of fish which move between waters within the jurisdiction of different
states,2 much more needs to be done. International fisheries regulation is on
the cusp of moving from pure hunter-gathering into a new era of managed
international natural resource regulation. The fact remains that most terres-
trial agriculture passed through this point of development several thousand
years ago.
The birth of aquaculture
Where does aquaculture feature on this scale of development? Certainly it
has undergone massive scientific and technological advancement in an aston-
ishingly short space of time. Although awareness that containment of fish
within ponds was a means of securing supplies in times of shortage can be
traced back to ancient times,3 the capacity to breed and culture fish, and
more significantly to enhance natural productivity, is a modern discovery.
Within a few decades, developed countries have surmounted the problems of
rearing fish in marine waters and have transformed salmon from a luxury
product to a relatively cheap source of food, at least in developed countries.
The cultivation of shellfish has developed unrecognizably in the space of a
few years and, again, products have become available with a security that
would not have been previously imagined. The prospects for the future look
to be even more encouraging, with the increasing sophistication of culture
techniques and installations, and the prospect of farming an increasing range
of species.
The remarkable success story evidenced by the recent development of
aquaculture provides convincing evidence that this is the route for future
development. The shortcomings of capture fisheries and the progressive
decline in catches, despite increased fishing effort, are capable of being per-
ceived as the last throes of an industry that is in the process of being gradu-
ally superseded. The vision for the future is of seas that will be “farmed,”
with progressive reductions in reliance upon purely natural fish stocks. This
prospect is likely to be rather too futuristic for some, at the present at least,
but if the analogy with agriculture is a fair one, it may not be entirely
fanciful.
The recent achievements in aquaculture have been nothing short of
miraculous. Compared to the thousands of years that farming took to evolve
to its present state, the farming of fish and shellfish has developed
“overnight.” However, while the achievement should not be diminished,
neither should it be overlooked that it has come at a cost. The dazzling tech-
nical achievement of aquaculture has been followed by a more reflective
period of assessing the impacts and costs, and perhaps a skeptical feeling in
the minds of some spectators that the achievement is simply too good to 
be true.
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The skeptical observer does not need to look too hard for a downside.
Aquaculture inevitably involves an intrusion into the natural environment
that leads into a catalogue of environmental quality and ecological adversi-
ties. Any perception that aquaculture involves “something for nothing” may
be swiftly dismissed. The evidence substantiating a range of actual environ-
mental, economic and social adversities is considerable, and the evidence for
a range of other potential harms is at least plausible, if presently lacking in
substantiation by research. The second-wave issues are about how the
balance of benefits and costs is most appropriately drawn.
The role of regulation
Lawyers always have to tread carefully when wading into this kind of exer-
cise. Many of the issues are most centrally placed within the remit of
environmental scientists, who must make expert determinations as to the
extent and gravity of environmental impacts. Insofar as the benefits and
impacts of aquaculture development can be properly assessed, they provide
boundaries that need to be reflected in regulation. The task of the lawyer is
that of trying to reflect the balance of costs and benefits in regulation that
facilitates the development of the industry while providing the safeguards
that are needed against unacceptable environmental and other kinds of
intrusion. The knee-jerk reaction to any kind of adversity, that “there ought
to be a law against it,” should be avoided. Even where regulation provides
an appropriate response to a problem, it must be appreciated that laws are
capable of being formulated in an infinite variety of ways. The test of a good
law is how well it reflects the balance of interests involved in defining the
boundary between the permissible and the impermissible.
Clearly, there is conviction that the free-for-all in respect of capture
fishery resources that has prevailed until fairly recent times should not serve
as a model for a free-for-all in respect of aquaculture development. The
present focus is upon regulation that facilitates the new industry, to allow it
to provide the substantial benefits to humanity that are within its potential,
but ensures that its environmental and social impacts are brought within
acceptable bounds.
Sustainable development
Inevitably, since the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in
1992 it is necessary to look to the regulatory touchstone provided by the
imperative of “sustainable development.” The Brundtland Report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development defines it as “devel-
opment which meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”4
The critics of, and skeptics towards, sustainable development have drawn
attention to the open-ended and obscure nature of the international impera-
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tive, and their observations are difficult to refute. Nonetheless, in the
absence of anything better, we are stuck with the concept of sustainable
development as a guide to the way in which we should regulate all kinds of
developmental activity to ensure that they take place at an acceptable
environmental cost. What is useful about the concept is that it recognizes
that development has a cost, as well as a benefit, and that this cost should be
minimized and not allowed to exceed the value of environmental goods that
are lost as a result of development.
Elaboration of sustainable development
The concept of sustainable development, however, should always be seen as a
starting point rather than a point of destination. The concept needs to be
reinterpreted by each nation in the specific context of its developmental
needs. Within nations, the reinterpretation needs to be taken a stage further
in identifying what the concept means for each sector of activity, including
fishery and aquaculture development.
Some important international work has been done in reinterpreting sus-
tainable development in relation to aquaculture activities. The Food and
Agriculture Organization’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries5 (FAO
Code) is a valuable, though largely voluntary, global statement of principles
addressed to governments, organizations and individuals engaged in fishery
activities, which seeks to encourage adherence to principles and standards
conducive to sustainability in the conservation, management and develop-
ment of fisheries.
Article 9 of the FAO Code, concerned specifically with aquaculture devel-
opment, encourages states to promote sustainability in aquaculture by the
use of strategic planning to take account of, and minimize, adverse environ-
mental and social impacts and to adopt a cooperative approach towards
transboundary impacts. At a national level, this involves conservation of
genetic diversity and integrity of ecosystems by encouragement of appropri-
ate practices and procedures. At the operational level, promotion of respons-
ible aquaculture should involve encouragement, and, in some respects, the
regulation of chemical inputs that are hazardous to human health and dam-
aging to the state of the environment. Not least important are the need to
prevent aquaculture practices that are actually harmful to the aquaculture
industry itself, such as practices that give rise to disease transmission, and
the need to ensure food safety in aquaculture products. The potentially
catastrophic implications of failure to ensure protection against these
matters will be self-evident to all who are involved.
Further elaboration of the practical implications of the general principles
set out in the FAO Code is provided in FAO’s Technical Guidelines for
Responsible Fisheries.6 In addition, further international guidance on sus-
tainability in aquaculture is provided by the Holmenkollen Guidelines for
Sustainable Aquaculture,7 which are addressed to governmental authorities
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and those actively involved in aquaculture, and identify key issues needing
to be addressed in securing greater sustainability. Also, the Bangkok Decla-
ration and Strategy for Aquaculture Development beyond 20008 offers
insightful observations as to key policies that states should pursue to
enhance sustainability in aquaculture.
However, it is in the nature of international guidelines that they must be
couched as generally formulated approaches to the environmental, ecological
and social problems, approaches that may be misread as indicating all-
purpose solutions for a diversity of national and local situations and activ-
ities. This diversity in practice is clearly a practical strength of aquaculture,
providing widely different responses to meet different local needs. Hence,
internationally established principles and proposals must always have their
limitations insofar as they are drafted remotely from the actual circum-
stances and activities that need to be influenced or regulated. The inter-
national guidance always needs to be reinterpreted in the light of local
conditions and in the context of the particular activities that are being
undertaken.
Developmental relativity
Arguably, the valuable work undertaken by international organizations
might be seen as posing, rather than answering, the pertinent questions that
individual states must address in organizing their relevant activities. The
point needs to be stressed that no two nations are at an identical state of
development and the environmental balance sheet needs to be the subject of
national introspection. As a generality, sustainable development implies that
more developed countries should place a greater weight upon environmental
goods than less developed countries, but how this balance sheet should be
drawn up is a matter for each state to determine.
I was fortunate to be engaged to work with the legal staff of the Food and
Agriculture Organization a couple of years ago on a project looking at the
regulation of shrimp farming in developing countries.9 The team of us who
were involved in the project sought information about the state of regula-
tion of aquaculture in some twenty different countries in Asia, East Africa
and South America to identify some pointers towards best practice in the
sector and to offer some suggestions as to regulatory and administrative
measures that might be seen as desirable in developing countries.
The shrimp legislation project was revealing, showing the spectrum of
approaches adopted by a range of countries that, within limits, might be
seen as being at comparable states of development. Each of them had a press-
ing need for the economic benefits provided by shrimp farming, but also had
legislation reflecting varying levels of concern as to the extent to which eco-
nomic benefits should be allowed to damage their natural environments. It
was encouraging to see that some states had taken account of the need for
sustainable development in formulating policies and legislative measures
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that sought to facilitate shrimp farming development, but in a way that
minimized environmental and ecological harm. Even where seriously
limited resources were available to particular states, it was seen to be appro-
priate to devote these resources to mitigating environmental impacts.
In developed countries, such as Canada or the United Kingdom, environ-
mental expectations should be all the higher. Generally, sustainable devel-
opment envisages that strong economies are expected to take the lead on
matters of environmental performance. Adverse environmental and ecolo-
gical impacts, which might be justified by extreme developmental needs in
developing countries, should not be acceptable in developed countries,
where the threat of poverty and starvation cannot be provided as a justifica-
tion for environmental damage. Hence, developed countries should be
aiming for the highest environmental standards.
The environmental checklist
The “checklist” of possible environment impacts that may arise from aqua-
culture and need to be addressed is not too difficult to ascertain by examin-
ing the issues covered by the international initiatives. Key general issues
include environmentally or ecologically destructive land use; unacceptable
impacts on water resources, either through abstraction or through the release
of contaminated discharges; damaging ecological impacts upon natural
resources through the excessive removal of specimens from the wild or the
release of farmed species into the wild; the transmission of disease to farmed
stocks and natural ecosystems by the unrestrained movement of farmed
stocks; and a range of intrusions upon water and land uses which conflict
with legitimate interests of others.10
Again the international literature needs to be read with caution.
Although useful as a checklist of the problems that may need to be
addressed, it needs to be equally appreciated that aquaculture activity is
remarkably diverse. Small-scale, low-intensity fish farming operations in
developing countries are capable of having almost negligible environmental
or ecological impacts, and need to be regulated accordingly. Where eco-
nomic circumstances preclude the use of pesticides and chemicals in aqua-
culture, or the importation of non-native species, it may not be necessary to
devise elaborate systems of regulatory control to address a problem that does
not exist in practice.
However, the intensive and large-scale approach to aquaculture taken in
developed countries is likely to place it in a different regulatory category.
The onus is upon each state to ascertain to what extent the potential environ-
mental problems associated with aquaculture are actually evidenced as con-
sequences of the kinds of operations that take place within its jurisdiction.
Large-scale sea cage installations, perhaps farming non-native species and
subjecting stocks to sophisticated programs of medication, give rise to a
wide range of potential environmental and ecological risks. Clearly, the
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extent to which risks are capable of being converted into harms requires
extensive investigation and research to be undertaken. Where research of
this kind has not been undertaken, legislation may be justified on preventive
or precautionary grounds.
The regulatory response
The central issue is the role of the law in seeking to provide for a balance
between aquaculture development and environmental protection. On this, a
personal conviction has to be expressed that the best kind of regulation is
self-regulation. A belief that something should be done because it is right to
do it is always more effective than a mandatory legal prohibition backed by
a sanction. In the field of aquaculture, the paths of self-regulation and self-
interest follow close parallels. It is not in the interests of fish farmers to con-
taminate the waters upon which their livelihood depends, to allow their
stock to become tainted by pesticides or other chemicals, or to alienate their
consumers by engaging in anything less than environmentally exemplary
performance. In all the main respects, commercial good sense and environ-
mental good sense run along the same lines.
It is evident that the interests of the aquaculture industry as a whole may
not be the same as the interests of particular fish farmers who must compete
for commercial advantage against their fellow producers. The incentive to
secure greater profitability is capable of motivating individual fish farmers to
“cut corners” at the expense of the environment, but the obvious first-resort
mechanism to address this is through measures imposed by the industry
upon its members.
The role of producer groups in securing cohesion within the aquaculture
industry is fundamental. Uniformly high standards may be facilitated
through self-education and through product and practice standards, perhaps
by the establishment of codes of practice that determine what activities all
participants should adhere to.11 The incentive for adherence to those stand-
ards by particular fish farmers is that their product will be seen to have the
certifiably high quality stipulated by the industry as a whole. The counter-
part of this is that producer groups should have the power to exclude from
their membership any producer who is not willing to adhere to the stand-
ards set by the industry for itself. Given recent experiences of “food scares”
in diverse sectors, the desirability of any food producers’ group taking meas-
ures to safeguard the quality of its products seems justifiable. It takes only
one fish farmer misusing chemicals in treating stock to blight the industry
as a whole, and the power to dissociate the non-compliant farmer from the
quality assurance standards promulgated by the industry as a whole seems
justifiable.
A good illustration of the benefits that may be secured by cohesion
within the aquaculture industry is to be seen in the “Scottish Quality
Salmon” quality assurance scheme. This scheme requires members to be cer-
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tified as complying with both product standards and environmental man-
agement schemes that are independently accredited to international stand-
ards, such as ISO 14001.12 Hence, the benefits to producers of a recognized
status being attached to a product entail a commitment to adhere to high
environmental standards throughout the production process. In addition,
the Scottish aquaculture industry is in the process of developing a Code of
Best Practice (covering disease control, welfare, and health and safety), and
within that a Code of Best Environmental Practice. It was intended that
every licensed aquaculture operator would formally subscribe to these codes
by 2004, and compliance is to be externally monitored and audited.13
Alongside action taken at an industry-wide level, significant benefits can
be achieved by local cooperation between individual fish farmers. An
example of such cooperation in Scotland is the increasing coordination of
restocking, medication and fallowing operations. It is recognized that break-
ing potential disease cycles, by minimizing the risk of cross-infection and
preventing “souring” of the seabed beneath cages requires areas to be left
fallow for periods. However, for this to be effective, close liaison between
neighboring fish farms is needed. The indications are that voluntary man-
agement agreements have been successfully reached between neighboring
fish farmers to reduce the possibilities of adverse interaction. These inter-
company agreements have produced mutual benefits to operators and have
reduced environmental impacts.14
Education and the formulation of standards or codes of practice should
involve close collaboration between producers’ groups and government. A
code of practice promulgated by government has an additional status in that
it can be used as a prerequisite for other kinds of action. For example, an
undertaking that a prospective fish farmer will adhere to the terms of the
code might be required as a condition for having a license for a particular
operation or as a prerequisite for some kind of grant or fiscal advantage
being made available to a particular fish farmer. Hence, it is possible to
interlink a code with other kinds of benefit to enhance its importance.
Self-regulation by producers’ groups or in cooperation with government,
though important, is not without its limitations. The issue remains as to
what legal response is needed at the point where self-regulation runs out, or
perhaps where legislation is seen as an important means of bolstering
support by self-regulation. When it comes to regulation, properly so called,
it is not a simple matter of prohibiting, and providing sanctions for, each
activity that is perceived to be problematic and not adequately addressable
by self-regulation. In each instance, the task is that of identifying a legal
response that is appropriate and proportionate as the most likely mechanism
to secure the desired policy objective. The diversity of possible regulatory
approaches deserves careful consideration.
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Regulatory diversity
From the outset, it must be appreciated that law is a remarkably flexible
control mechanism. In each instance, a wide range of regulatory approaches
is possible, and the determination of which of these is appropriate requires a
range of factors to be weighed in the balance. Legislation may be used com-
prehensively to prohibit an activity; to restrict the manner in which the
activity is undertaken; to license, permit or authorize the activity to enable
it to be undertaken in limited circumstances (perhaps subject to locally for-
mulated conditions); to require the registration of an installation where an
activity is conducted; or positively to compel (rather than prohibit) an activ-
ity to be undertaken. Moreover, legal foundations are frequently needed for
information-based measures that facilitate research, monitoring, investiga-
tion, and educational measures that allow for the financial or technical
support in relation to an activity.
This wide spectrum of potential legal responses needs to be stressed
because of the misplaced tendency to suppose that the use of the law means,
necessarily and exclusively, the banning and punishment of unacceptable
practices. In fact, it facilitates a diverse range of possible requirements,
backed by a variety of sanctions and incentives, and important issues arise in
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the different legal
responses that are possible.
In light of the potential flexibility of the legal response, the task for
national authorities is that of relating the gravity of environmental problems
generated by aquaculture to the appropriate level of legal coercion that is
needed to address them. Broadly, it may be supposed that the most damag-
ing environmental practices need to be made subject to the greatest degree
of legal stringency, assuming that a legal response is found to be necessary to
address the problem in the first place. At the other extreme, a range of issues
may be better addressed by non-mandatory mechanisms. Education and
training are arguably as valuable as law in directing fish farmers towards
good practice, and economic incentives that are made conditional upon good
environmental performance may provide a greater incentive for avoiding
environmental damage than the threat of legal proceedings and punishment.
Initial controls
Categorized according to the point of impact, legal controls upon aquacul-
ture may be subdivided into “initial” and “continuing” forms of control.
Initial controls are concerned with the procedures that determine whether an
aquaculture installation may be established at a particular location, whereas
continuing controls are those measures that apply to subsequent activities
that take place at the installation following its establishment. For good
reasons, the questions, first, where a fish farm should be located, and second,
how it should conduct its operations, are best approached sequentially.15
22 William Howarth
The issue of rights to land covered by water is of considerable legal com-
plexity, particularly where marine waters are at issue. Insofar as the seabed is
not the subject of private ownership, it will be necessary to acquire a lease or
similar authorization from the public body with responsibility for seabed
operations. “Development licensing” is capable of taking diverse legal forms,
but essentially these all involve a system of public land-use control that
seeks to subsume particular lease determinations to broader strategic policies
for development of areas or sectors of activity.16
The mechanisms for regulating developments of the seabed have recently
been reconsidered in Scotland. Presently, it is necessary for a prospective fish
farmer to obtain both development consent and a license from the Crown
Estate Commissioners, who administer the Crown Estate, including the
seabed.17 In the future, it is envisaged that responsibility for development
control will pass to local authorities, which will also have responsibility for
environmental impact assessment where this is required. The involvement of
the Crown Estate Commissioners will continue, in that a lease for the site
will be needed from the Commissioners. However, the move represents a
shifting of control away from a body that, in the past, has been seen to be
too closely associated with the commercial aspects of authorizing a develop-
ment, insofar as the Commissioners would be entitled to rent under any
lease that was granted. Under interim arrangements, local planning authori-
ties will advise the Commissioners on fish farm applications.18
It is for government, or perhaps regional or local licensing authorities, to
determine strategic policies for land use, but this needs to be done as a result
of open deliberation and widespread consultation about the issues to be
taken into account. Aquaculture frequently has special requirements for
suitable marine areas, perhaps because of the need to ensure sufficient water
flows but to avoid excessive exposure under storm conditions. The difficulty
is often that the areas that are sought by prospective fish farmers are also
most valued for traditional fishing, recreation or conservation, or need to be
kept free of obstructions for the purposes of navigation. Insofar as it is pos-
sible to do so, an integrated development planning exercise will be needed
for marine areas to identify those areas that are most suitable for the differ-
ent kinds of activity and minimize the conflicts that are likely to arise
between activities that compete for water space.
An illustration of a strategic approach to aquaculture planning is to be
seen in the Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department’s
recently revised Locational Guidelines for the Authorisation of Marine Fish Farms
in Scottish Waters.19 The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide guidance
on the factors to be taken into account in considering proposals for fish
farms and to encourage local authorities to prepare non-statutory marine fish
farming framework plans, as a guide to the location of future fish farms.
Drawing upon a range of recent ecological information, the Guidelines reaf-
firm a presumption against fish farm developments on the north and east
coasts of Scotland. Elsewhere, three categories of area are envisaged on the
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basis of nutrient loading and benthic impact: first, where fish farms will only
be acceptable in “exceptional circumstances”; second, where areas are at the
limits of their carrying capacity, so that further development will result in
these areas being placed in the first category; and third, where there is a
“better prospect” of satisfying nutrient loading and benthic impact require-
ments. In summary, only those areas in the third category are likely to be
acceptable for new fish farm development. Even then, for applications in cat-
egory three areas it is stated that the circumstances will need to be carefully
considered before permission will be given, and proposals are likely to
succeed only where they involve a package of measures designed to reduce
environmental impact. Such measures, for example, will include feeding
techniques that minimize food wastage and integrated sea lice management
practices that reduce the use of chemical treatments.
Although strategic zoning approaches of this kind are helpful in guiding
development towards areas that are seen to be least problematic, actual
determinations of whether a particular project should be allowed in a
particular zone need to be decided against a background of specific informa-
tion about the nature of the project and its foreseeable impacts. Although
the developer must provide much of this information, the determination
process should seek to maximize involvement in the decision-making
process by encouraging representations to be made by relevant public
bodies, organizations and members of the public. Where representations of
this kind are made, it should be the responsibility of the decision-making
body to take these into account in the final decision.
For example, in Scotland the consultation process surrounding an applica-
tion for development consent for a fish farm is an important mechanism for
securing the opinion of the statutory nature conservation and landscape pro-
tection body, Scottish Natural Heritage. Scottish Natural Heritage is well
placed to advise on a range of implications for flora and fauna of fish farm
applications. Notably in this respect, substantial areas of land are subject to
conservation designation in accordance with national provisions or legisla-
tion adopted at European Community level, and it is important that aqua-
culture should be steered away from these areas. Another relevant aspect is
the need to minimize adverse impacts on predator species of seabirds and
mammals. In this respect, Scottish Natural Heritage is able to advise on
avoidance of such conflicts, though it is also notable that the industry and
conservation organizations have agreed to a Code of Practice on the Inter-
action of Fish Farming and Predatory Wildlife.20
In particular determinations as to whether an aquaculture installation
should be allowed at a particular location, environmental impact assessment
has proved to be an invaluable tool in many jurisdictions. Essentially, the
process requires the prospective developer to provide information about the
intended project and to anticipate the range of impacts that it will have
upon the surrounding environmental media and ecosystems, and on other
activities that are conducted in the vicinity. The final determination is made
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on the basis of this information, and should seek to incorporate mechanisms
to ensure that the adverse impacts are minimized to an extent that is accept-
able, or that the application is declined where sufficient mitigation is not
possible. Hence, an eventual authorization is likely to be hedged around
with a list of conditions that seek to minimize adverse environmental
consequences.
In the United Kingdom, regulation is provided for under Environmental
Impact Assessment (Fish Farming in Marine Waters) Regulations 199921 and associ-
ated guidance, which implements European Community requirements for
environmental impact assessment.22 The regulations apply where any part of
the development is within a “sensitive area,” where the development is
designed to hold a biomass of 100 tonnes or greater, or where the proposed
development will extend to 0.1 hectare or more. Nonetheless, there are con-
cerns that environmental impact assessment is not functioning as well as it
might in Scotland because of the relatively variable standard of environmental
statements submitted in relation to fish farm applications and their failure to
identify cumulative impacts of developments and discharges.23
Development licensing, in conjunction with environmental assessment,
is, therefore, a very flexible legal tool, which may be applied with different
degrees of rigor and sophistication depending upon national and local needs.
In an extreme case, development licensing may allow the most comprehen-
sive investigation of all environmental and social impacts to which a project
may give rise. The licensing authority will have before it all the information
that it needs to ascertain whether the project is consistent with the require-
ments of sustainable development. Accordingly, it may impose conditions of
a preventive or precautionary kind where it feels that there are special risks
that need to be secured against. Not least important is that development
licensing procedures provide a public forum for considering the potential
adverse environmental and social effects of a proposed aquaculture installa-
tion. These adversities must be assessed against the economic and develop-
mental benefits that the project will be likely to secure. All parties with an
interest in a aquaculture proposal have the opportunity to express their
views, and the determining body should strive to take these views into
account in the final decision.
Continuing controls
Development licensing and environmental assessment serve as invaluable
mechanisms for evaluating projects before the commencement of an aqua-
culture operation. However, they have limitations in regulating the various
subsequent activities that may take place at the site, and that need to be reg-
ulated by various kinds of continuing control. The kinds of continuing
control that are needed will depend upon the nature of the installation and
the location, but typically the following might be regulated by separate
licensing requirements.
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Water-use licensing will be required, for example, where a land-based oper-
ation is involved, to allow a sufficient quantity of water, of sufficient quality,
to be drawn from available sources. Again, this kind of licensing is capable
of being controversial in giving rise to conflicts with other water users who
seek to use the same water for other purposes such as agriculture, industry or
drinking water supply. License applications will need to be openly con-
sidered so that scarce water resources are seen to be fairly allocated according
to competing needs.
Wastewater discharge licensing is necessary when it is recognized that fish
farms have the capacity to produce large amounts of waste products of
various kinds that are capable of having seriously detrimental effects upon
environmental quality and surrounding ecosystems. Equally, the discharge
of poor-quality effluent from an aquaculture installation may have a damag-
ing impact upon other installations in the locality through transmission of
contamination or disease, particularly where fish farms share a common
watercourse or marine area. In relation to terrestrial fish ponds, with a dis-
crete point of outflow, monitoring is relatively straightforward, but in rela-
tion to cage culture in open marine waters, monitoring of effluent, and
setting license conditions, may be more problematic because it is not always
clear what the “discharge” refers to.
In Scotland, the difficulties of setting discharge consents for operations
that involve treatment of fish for veterinary purposes, and inevitably involve
natural dispersion of the chemicals involved, have been recognized by the
environmental regulatory authority, the Scottish Environment Protection
Agency. The approach adopted in Scotland is to adopt environmental
quality standards for the receiving waters, which are set at a level to ensure
that concentrations of compounds are below that at which adverse ecological
effects are detectable.24 Similarly, the problem of waste accumulating as
bottom sediments below fish cages, and consequent “site souring,” has
necessitated a modified approach towards the setting of fish farm consents.25
Control of this problem requires a limitation of the biomass of fish cages to
match the dispersive characteristics of the site, so that assimilative capacity
is not exceeded. This process forms part of the assessment carried out by the
Agency when determining discharge consent applications or reviewing
existing consents.26
Chemical use licensing is another approach to the control of adverse impacts
upon water quality. Various chemicals used in aquaculture for veterinary,
pest control or disinfection purposes, may need to be specifically controlled
to avoid contamination of surrounding waters, by more direct mechanisms
than wastewater discharge licensing. Hence, for control of particularly haz-
ardous kinds of chemicals, restrictions may usefully be specifically imposed
upon those chemicals. However, even where a risk is identified, a spectrum
of legal responses is possible depending upon the gravity of the risk. In an
extreme case, it is possible to impose total prohibition upon the possession
of a particular chemical for use in aquaculture by creating appropriate crimi-
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nal offenses, extending perhaps to the importing, distribution or sale of the
chemical for aquaculture purposes. For less hazardous chemicals, it is pos-
sible to enact less severe control measures by making use subject to licensing
requirements, veterinary prescription requirements or the adherence to
requirements relating application of the substance, such as the certification
of users or a code of practice governing use.
Fish movement licensing may be an appropriate response to a range of con-
cerns that arise from aquaculture operations. First, the collection of stock,
particularly shellfish stock, from the wild may have a detrimental impact on
natural stocks and ecosystems. Second, the escape of a farmed species into
the wild may adversely impact upon local ecosystems through adverse
genetic impacts upon native stocks or through invasive habitat competition.
This may be seen as especially problematic where non-native species are
involved and adverse ecological impacts are particularly difficult to assess.
Finally, there is the significant threat of disease transmission, which is
capable of having devastating economic consequences for the aquaculture
industry as a whole. Equally important is the possibility of disease being
transmitted from farmed to wild species.
For this range of reasons, control over fish movements is generally
regarded as a legal essential for all but the most local, low-intensity aquacul-
ture operations. Inevitably, controls must take the form of prohibitions or
restrictions upon certain categories of fish movements, which will need to be
made the subject of criminal offenses. General prohibitions or restrictions
upon movement will, however, need to be subject to a facility for allowing
particular movements to be individually licensed where, after veterinary and
ecological investigation, sufficient safeguards can be provided against the
potential hazards that have been noted.
Fish movement licensing is invaluable as a means for securing prior
assessment of risks and mitigation measures. Equally, it is of general benefit
to the aquaculture industry in that it enables all significant movements to be
recorded and information communicated to the relevant authority as a
license condition. The monitoring of movements is important because it
allows diseased stock that has been the subject of recent movements to be
traced to other locations that may be infected. This enables swift action to
be taken to contain the spread of the disease by imposing quarantine or
slaughter requirements upon infected stocks. Officials will clearly need to be
empowered to take whatever action is appropriate in a particular case.
However, without information from fish movement licensing, there may be
formidable difficulties in preventing or reducing the major hazard that
disease represents to the aquaculture industry.
Fish movement licensing also has an important role in relation to the
problem of escapes from fish farms. In Scotland, a working group from the
Scottish Executive was set up to review the situation. It was concluded that
there would always be circumstances, such as extreme weather conditions,
that would result in escapes, but that improvements could be made in
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containment. In particular, the adequacy of site-specific containment meas-
ures should be incorporated into the environmental assessment process, and
contingency plans for escapes should be included in development applica-
tions. Assessments of the suitability of containment measures should include
a review of likely weather extremes and proposed net maintenance regimes
in the light of operations to be conducted at a site. Pursuant to this, the
industry has formulated a Code of Practice on the Containment of Farmed
Fish.27 The Scottish Executive is also considering whether regulation is
necessary to achieve minimum standards of cage design, equipment and
maintenance, and to allow for prosecution for negligent acts or omissions
resulting in escapes.28
Although the problem of escapes from fish farms has been recognized for
some time, the extent of the problem has previously been rather speculative,
insofar as there has been no formal mechanism to record such incidents. In
respect of Scotland, this position has recently been addressed by the enact-
ment of regulations to require fish farmers to provide information about
escapes. The Registration of Fish Farming and Shellfish Farming Businesses
Amendment (Scotland) Order 200229 amends existing requirements for the reg-
istration of fish farms to require the Scottish ministers to be notified of the
circumstances of any escape of fish, the number of fish involved and the
number recovered. For the future, this allows the extent of the problem of
fish escapes to be quantified, and for information to be gathered about the
reasons for escapes. Nevertheless, the assessment of the impact of escapes
remains a somewhat speculative exercise that may not be entirely dependent
upon the numbers involved. The need, formally, to declare escapes is, at
least, a beneficial first step in evaluating the ecological problem.
Licensing of genetically modified organisms may seem a little futuristic to
some, but the technical capacity for modification of fish species, perhaps to
enhance growth rates or to improve disease resistance, is already on the
horizon. Clearly, this is a matter of intense international controversy, raising
profound environmental, ecological and developmental concerns, and the use
of stock of this kind must be subject to the most careful scrutiny. Although
fish movement licensing might be seen as an adequate mechanism for
enabling thorough prior assessment of projects involving genetically modi-
fied fish, it may be thought more appropriate to deal with the issues under a
separate system of controls that allows for more extensive and detailed
scrutiny. Legislation that fully reflects the breadth of environmental and
public health concerns would seem to be more appropriate than regulation
within the sphere of aquaculture in isolation.
It may also be relevant to note that, for the future, the regulation of
genetically modified organisms will need to be considered in the context of
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(2000).30 The Biosafety Protocol aims at protecting biodiversity and con-
sumers from any adverse impacts that could arise from transboundary move-
ments of living modified organism and products derived therefrom. The
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protocol has important implications for internationally traded products in
requiring the exchange of information between exporting and importing
countries. Again, the gravity of the international issues that arise may be a
sound reason for adopting a specialized national regime for genetically mod-
ified organisms, rather than attempting to deal with them in sector-specific
legislation.
Product quality licensing is also a regulatory essential insofar as fish prod-
ucts need to be regulated under public health legislation to avoid any poten-
tial hazard to the health of consumers. In times gone by, there may have
been a tendency for food safety issues to be addressed at the point of con-
sumer sale; increasingly, the trend is to follow the food chain back into the
distribution, harvesting and production processes. The vital importance of
ensuring safety of aquaculture products throughout the production chain
hardly needs to be re-emphasized. A small number of contaminated prod-
ucts from a single producer are capable of having a devastating impact upon
the industry as a whole.
To some extent, measures such as those directed at the misuse of chemi-
cals in aquaculture may have important public health implications in pre-
venting the presence of unacceptable residue levels in the final product. For
the most part, however, public health is a technical and specialized area of
regulation, one that extends well beyond fish products. Food safety issues
need to be addressed within a code of national law that extends to food prod-
ucts of all kinds, so that common principles can be formulated, and consis-
tent implementation and enforcement mechanisms applied. Not least
important in this respect is the need for enforcement to be undertaken by an
inspectorate with the specialized technical expertise needed to identify food
safety issues in practice.
It needs also to be noted that food safety may give rise to specific concerns
in relation to aquaculture insofar as products are intended for export. In
particular, it may be necessary for national legislation to meet the require-
ments of the European Community Directive on Fish Products (91/493, as
amended) “laying down the health conditions for the production and placing
on the market of fishery products” or the requirements of the US Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system concerning procedures
for the safe and sanitary processing and importing of fish and fishery prod-
ucts.31 Depending upon the intended export market, these measures will be
of critical importance in determining the national standards for food safety
in relation to aquaculture products. This issue is illustrative of the growing
trend towards internationalization of aquaculture legislation.
On licensing generally, the point is properly made that licensing systems
are only as effective as the mechanisms that exist for inspection and checking
that license conditions are being adhered to, and the capacity of the enforce-
ment authority to take action where they are not. The issue of enforcement
will be returned to later in this chapter.
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Consolidated regulation and integrated strategy
From the perspective of a prospective fish farmer, regulation can seem an
insuperable obstacle, and the range of possible approaches to licensing that
has been provided should leave no doubt as to the potential complexities
involved. The range of potential impacts of aquaculture leads into a range of
distinct fields of regulation, each with its own peculiarities and intricacy. An
important issue to be addressed is the extent to which laws governing aqua-
culture are capable of being consolidated into a single statute, or at least a
small number of legal provisions. In an ideal world, it might be thought
possible to bring all aquaculture operations within a comprehensive regime
that allowed for a single license or authorization governing all kinds of
impacts. Such an approach would avoid the need for multiple applications to
different licensing authorities for slightly different purposes, with corre-
sponding multiplication of the bureaucracy involved.
Although consolidated or codified legislative provision for aquaculture
seems a generally desirable policy goal, the reality is that it would be
tremendously difficult to achieve. Environmental quality issues, public
health concerns and activities such as the cultivation of genetically modified
species are not matters that are unique to aquaculture, and they need to be
addressed consistently across different sectors of activity. For this reason, an
“all-purpose aquaculture license” would be formidably difficult to achieve
for anything but the most low-intensity small-scale project. Nonetheless,
there should be scope for the administrative coordination of activities of reg-
ulatory authorities. This might be achieved by “one-stop” licensing,
whereby the key authority to which an application is submitted has the
responsibility of liaising with other regulatory bodies that are involved, to
ensure that the full range of authorizations are secured. From a fish farmer’s
point of view, this approach has obvious attractions in minimizing adminis-
trative complexity and requiring regulators to sort out different kinds of
regulatory requirements between themselves.
Whether or not regulatory or administrative consolidation can be
achieved, it is essential that governments provide an overall strategy for
aquaculture, which plots out the development of the industry and the
mechanisms by which development is to be accomplished. Clearly, national
strategies will be largely determined by national circumstances and percep-
tions of priority. However, an illustrative example of a national strategy is to
be seen in the Scottish Executive’s recently produced draft Strategic Frame-
work for Scottish Aquaculture.32 This document seeks to formulate the respec-
tive roles of government, the industry and other stakeholders in aquaculture
development across a wide range of issues. The shared vision is that
Scotland will have a sustainable, diverse competitive and economically
viable aquaculture industry, of which its people can be justifiably proud.
It will deliver high quality, healthy food to consumers at home and
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abroad, and social and economic benefits to communities, particularly in
rural and remote areas. It will operate responsibly, working within the
carrying capacity of the environment, both locally and nationally and
throughout its supply chain.
Revealingly, the draft strategy reports the contention of the industry that
costs are higher than those of competitors in other countries because of inef-
ficiencies of scale resulting from regulatory constraints.33 The Scottish Exec-
utive is considering undertaking comparative research to assess the extent to
which regulation actually does place Scottish aquaculture at a competitive
disadvantage.
It is also notable in the UK context that strategy is a matter that will
increasingly need to be addressed at a regional international level, and a stra-
tegic position on aquaculture is being developed by the European Commun-
ity. The European Commission has recently published a communication
document, A Strategy for the Sustainable Development of European Aquaculture,34
which builds upon previous Community initiatives that have provided
support for the sector. The document affirms the potential for aquaculture
development but also notes problems in relation to health protection
requirements, environmental impact and market instability. The fundamen-
tal issue is perceived to be the maintenance of competitiveness, productivity
and durability for the sector, recognizing that further development must
take a more integrated approach to farming technologies, socio-economics,
natural resource use and governance. Specific legislation relating to aquacul-
ture does not exist at the Community level, though many measures at
Community level have significant implications for aquaculture. However,
reliance upon national legislation has been alleged to lead to competition
distortions, suggesting that this is an area in which the Community might
seek to legislate comprehensively at some stage in the future.
Implementation and enforcement
Despite the general coincidence between sustainability and aquaculture that
has been previously referred to, there have been regrettable examples of bad
practice where aquaculture has damaged itself through pollution, inadequate
disease control and practices that have harmed the food safety reputation of
aquaculture products generally. Regulation is needed to outlaw the activities
of the small number of participants who might wish to secure short-term
gains at the expense of the reputation of the industry as a whole, both to
protect the environment that it depends on and to secure the quality of its
products.
In respect of those activities that are sufficiently serious to be subject to
prohibition, the most vital consideration is that of enforceability. There is
little point in enacting laws that cannot be enforced in practice, or enacting
laws without careful prior consideration of the allocation of responsibilities
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for enforcement. On this, the relatively specialized nature of aquaculture
legislation should be recognized. Aquaculture law is different from laws
governing agriculture or fishery activities, or laws governing water quality
generally. The counterpart of this is that enacting legislation implies a
commitment to the establishment and support of specialized inspection and
enforcement agencies that are necessary to ensure proper implementation.
The problem, all too frequently, is that legislators are inclined to make
laws without giving sufficient thought to the resources and costs that are
necessary for their implementation and enforcement. Arguably, the thinking
process should be put in reverse, since there is little point in enacting regu-
lation if, in practice, the means to ensure that it will be properly applied are
lacking. Moreover, the cost of implementing and enforcing legislation
should be put into perspective by comparison with the potential costs of
failing to enforce legal requirements effectively, especially where this has the
result of inflicting massive economic damage upon the industry itself
through the failure to control disease or to achieve product control require-
ments because of contamination.
The highly specialized nature of aquaculture legislation should be
emphasized. Controls upon fish movements, for example, are generally
thought necessary to prevent the transmission of disease between fish farms
and to prevent the introduction of non-native species that are likely to give
rise to ecologically damaging habitat competition or loss of genetic integrity
of native stocks. However, the practicalities involved in securing actual
control of individual fish movements are not to be underestimated.
Unavoidably, a fairly complex administrative structure is required to secure
the registration of origins and destination of fish stocks in relation to all rel-
evant fish movements. The enactment of regulation presupposes the exist-
ence, or provision, of fairly intricate administrative structures to ensure that
the legal requirements operate effectively. Without such controls, legislation
has little prospect of fulfilling its objectives.
Implementation of regulation needs to be considered before laws are
enacted, rather than afterwards. The process of prior regulatory appraisal has
rapidly gained ground in many jurisdictions, involving an explicit attempt
by legislators to assess the continuing administrative and enforcement costs
to which regulation will give rise and to confirm that these costs will actu-
ally be met. It is suggested that the prior regulatory appraisal process has
much to commend it in the context of aquaculture legislation, given the
particularly specialized nature of administration and enforcement require-
ments that are entailed.
Beyond regulatory impact appraisal, reflection is needed upon the status
and powers of the agency or authority that is responsible for implementa-
tion. The importance of providing an appropriate level of resourcing of a
regulatory agency has been noted, but another important consideration is
the degree of independence with which the agency operates. Clearly. con-
flicts of interest between regulators and regulated bodies must be avoided,
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but also it might be seen as desirable to secure some degree of independence
between regulatory authorities and government. The role of government is
to formulate policies for the development and promotion of the aquaculture
sector and to provide the resources necessary to realize those policy object-
ives. The role of a regulatory authority is to enforce laws effectively and
impartially. For this reason, some degree of separation of powers between a
government and an aquaculture regulatory authority might be seen as a
desirable feature.
In the UK context, there are various mechanisms that do secure a degree
of insulation between government and the practical regulation of fish farms.
It is fair to note that some regulatory functions are exercised through
government departments. In particular, the responsibilities for ensuring that
works in tidal waters do not constitute a hazard to navigation35 are allocated
to transport ministries.36 Similarly, responsibilities for measures concerning
fish health37 are allocated at the central government level.38 These provisions
concern registration of fish farms and provide for actions to be taken in rela-
tion to notified diseases.39
However, perhaps the most important regulatory powers in relation to
fish farms in Scotland are allocated to the Scottish Environment Protection
Agency. The Agency has the key power to determine applications for dis-
charge consents for fish farms and may impose conditions to minimize
adverse environmental impacts. Such consents are determined against a
general duty to promote the cleanliness of waters and to have regard to the
need to conserve flora and fauna. The significant point here is that the
Agency has its powers and duties determined by statute, but actually has a
fair degree of independence from government in determining any particular
discharge consent application.
Similar observations could be made about the role of the nature conserva-
tion authority, Scottish Natural Heritage, which, again, has a reasonable
degree of independence from government in making representations about
the appropriateness of fish farm development applications in respect of
nature conservation and landscape impacts. Also, the transfer of land-use
planning powers to local authorities, which is imminent in Scotland in rela-
tion to fish farm applications, will give local authorities quite a degree of
autonomy from central government in making individual determinations.
The transfer of these powers to bodies that operate with some degree of
independence from government has the consequence that any pro-
development tendencies of government are capable of being moderated by
bodies with specialized sectoral remits.40
Concluding observations
Successful aquaculture regulation involves reconciling the interests of aqua-
culture participants, the communities in which they are based, the con-
sumers of their products and those who advocate vigilance over the
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environment in which aquaculture takes place. These interests are not
necessarily coincident, but should be capable of reconciliation. The consen-
sus is that aquaculture is an activity with such tremendous potential 
for human benefit that mechanisms have to be found to facilitate its devel-
opment in a way that respects the competing concerns that have been
referred to.
The function of regulation in the development of aquaculture should be
neither over- nor understated. Various examples have been provided of
information or education-based management mechanisms, which fulfill an
important role in aquaculture development by tapping into the self-interest
of the industry in ensuring the soundness of its practices and products.
Where self-regulation serves as a mechanism for improvement, it should be
fully utilized, with the full participation of all involved: producers, adminis-
trators and communities. Where self-regulation is not sufficient, or needs to
be bolstered, regulatory approaches need to be adopted. However, appropri-
ateness and proportionality are the key imperatives, and, from among the
array of legislative mechanisms that have been outlined, flexibility and
workability must be paramount concerns. Integration of regulation, precau-
tion and responsiveness to community interests needs also to be carefully
weighed in the balance in adopting legislation. The overall goal of sustain-
ability necessitates the maintenance of incentives for the development of
aquaculture, but also the drawing of a national and local balance to prevent
unacceptable environmental consequences.
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Aquaculture is the fastest-growing sector of the animal food producing
sectors. Between 1970 and 2000, the sector grew at an average annual rate
of about 9 percent, compared to 1.4 percent for capture fisheries and 2.8
percent for terrestrial farmed meat production systems.1 The United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that aquaculture con-
tributions of fish, crustaceans and mollusks have grown from 3.9 percent of
total world production by wieght in 1970 to 29.9 percent in 2002.2
In many parts of the world, this development was rendered possible by a
number of factors including, but not limited to:
• the increasing demand for aquaculture products as a result of the
decrease or status quo of the supply from capture fisheries;
• the scientific breakthroughs in production technologies; and
• governments’ will and determination to establish enabling policies and
legal and regulatory frameworks.
Policy and legal coherence is an essential ingredient in aquaculture, as it
acts as a compass to its development. When contemplating this enormously
large topic, it is useful to address two main questions: “What is the global
trend in the use of law and policy in aquaculture today?” and “What is the
way forward?”
Global trends in aquaculture law and policy
The first question is, “What is the global trend in the use of law and policy
in aquaculture today, and what are the main elements covered?” It is diffi-
cult to provide an exhaustive answer to this question. In an attempt to
answer the question, we can, perhaps arbitrarily, classify aquaculture laws
and policies into two categories:
• those dealing with the “supply side” of aquaculture; and
• those related to the “demand side” of the industry.
Supply-side legal aspects of aquaculture
Globally, aspects of law looking at the supply side of the industry tend to
contain or examine the following three main elements: the secure right to
land, the secure right to clean water, and permit and licensing systems. Each
will be examined in turn.
First, let us examine the secure right to land. Most nations have come to
understand the importance of the aquaculture farmer being able to secure a
legal right to the lands on which the farm is located, be it through owner-
ship, a lease or similar legal arrangements. What has been found important
is to obtain a right to the necessary lands that is sufficiently secure to allow
the farm to be financed, to flourish over an extended period and to enable
other people to be excluded from the property.
Unfortunately, such is not always the case. In many countries, especially
in the developing world, land rights are not clearly defined, which often
leads to serious disputes. In other cases, the land acquisition process is
usually long and fraudulent, which deters investors, thereby hampering the
development of aquaculture.
The second element is the secure right to clean water. It is generally
understood, especially in developed countries, that an aquaculture farmer
must also obtain the right to an adequate supply of good-quality water and
be able to protect it from the claims of other users. However, most
economically disadvantaged countries lack modern legislation for the alloca-
tion of water resources, especially during dry seasons or other times of water
shortage, and for the control of water pollution that can be enforced at the
instance of the farmer.
The third element commonly encountered in the legislative texts of the
supply side of aquaculture is the permit and licensing systems. A common
feature of aquaculture regulation is the obligation to acquire permits or
licenses to establish a farm. On the one hand, the governments’ argument
for requiring prospective farmers to have permits is that permits enable
them to assess the environmental sustainability of aquaculture proposals and
to impose conditions that require the farms to be operated in a sustainable
manner. On the other hand, permits provide farmers with clear rights to run
aquaculture facilities as long as they comply with the terms of the permits,
the relevant environmental laws and any applicable codes of aquaculture
practices. While permit requirements are often a rule in developed coun-
tries, it is only recently that governments in developing countries have
introduced policies to require aquaculture farmers to have permits before
establishing aquaculture farms. The reason seems to be the emergence of
large-scale/commercial farms in these regions. Traditionally, aquaculture
was limited to backyard, small-scale fish culture in ponds.
Where permits are required, the permit system generally deals with
siting and environmental impact assessment (EIA), control of water quality
and control of exotic aquatic species intended for aquaculture. However,
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most fail to regulate genetically modified organisms and the codes of practice
in aquaculture. Codes of practice, often referred to as technical guidelines, are
not normally legally enforceable. However, in order to ensure that proper
standards for aquaculture operations are adhered to by farmers, the FAO sup-
ports inclusion of such codes of practice or technical guidelines in the legisla-
tion governing aquaculture so that applicable rules are available to all.
Demand-side legal aspects of aquaculture
On the “demand side,” existing laws in many countries deal with aquacul-
ture on one count: the exclusive right to the fish under cultivation. The fish-
eries laws of most countries consider fish not to belong to anybody until
they are captured. In many countries, legislation establishes that operators of
fish culture facilities have the exclusive right to the fish under cultivation. In
many others, however, aquaculture legislation fails to be specific on this
issue.
Supply-side policy aspects of aquaculture
Macro-level policy trends
In addition to legal arrangements, which are established to ensure an orderly
development of aquaculture, there are policies whose role is to provide direc-
tions for this development. On the supply side, policies tend to follow two
paths. The first path concerns the formulation of policies at the macro level.
At this level, we can identify a number of common features.
First is the setting of aquaculture as a priority area for economic develop-
ment. Faced with ever-increasing pressure on fisheries resources, rising
demand for fish and fishery products, as well as the need for employment
and income-generating activities for both rural and urban populations, many
countries with aquaculture potential have made it a priority on their eco-
nomic agenda. They have defined their goals, set targets and established
guiding strategies to achieve them. As a result of this and other policy and
non-policy factors, aquaculture development recovered from stagnation or
took off in many parts of the world.
The second common policy is the “promotion of sustainable aquaculture
development.” To the FAO, sustainability of aquaculture has economic,
social, environmental and even legal aspects. Economically, aquaculture
operations must offer the prospects of competitive and stable profits over the
long term. Socially, the farmed species and the farming methods must be
acceptable and meet general, cultural, gender and social norms. In addition,
the sector’s benefits should accrue to a wide socio-economic spectrum as
opposed to being retained exclusively by a small elite. Environmentally, sus-
tainability requires intergenerational equity, which necessitates that the
environment-derived potential well-being of future generations should at
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least be as high as that of the present generation. This implies that environ-
mental assets need to be at least maintained over time. Finally, from the
viewpoint of law and legal institutions, the conditions that enable aquacul-
ture to occur must be continued over time if the industry is to flourish in
the long run.
The third common policy is to establish a good administrative framework
for aquaculture management. Where aquaculture has expanded or taken off in
recent years, most countries have understood the importance of having a good
administrative framework for aquaculture management that provides for the
orderly development of the sector. What is apparent, however, is that, in many
instances, aquaculture administration falls under the jurisdiction of more than
one department. This situation has led to duplication, rivalry and waste.
Compounding the problem of overlapping administrative jurisdiction is
the frequent lack of a legislative framework specific to aquaculture. This
might be because aquaculture is still in its infancy in many countries and
plays only a minor role in the countries’ economies.
The fourth commonly used policy is the establishment of an aquaculture
investment-friendly climate. This refers to various activities affecting the
establishment of a successful aquaculture business. In many instances,
government policies have proven to have a profound impact on investment
in aquaculture. These policies occur in terms of:
• removal of institutional constraints;
• facilitating reasonable access to credit and, sometimes, providing loans;
and
• providing financial incentives, extension and advisory services, and
hatchery-produced stocking material.
These and other services are often provided by the government until such
time as they are made available by the private sector.
The fifth commonly encountered policy is the supply of good supporting
infrastructure and an emphasis on research, technological development and
information dissemination. Aquaculture development in the past two
decades has been strongly backed by research, technological development,
education, training and extension in many countries. Recognizing science
and technology as one of the most important drivers of productivity, several
governments, including some in developing countries, have placed a high
value on aquaculture technological development. Genetics and ecological
pools of freshwater and marine species were identified and cataloged, new
breeding and culture techniques were developed, production units of artifi-
cially formulated quality feed were encouraged, and fish health management
was better understood and improved. Research aimed at improving the effi-
ciency of production by reducing production costs made the difference
between marginal and profitable investments. However, progress in these
areas remains limited to certain countries and regions.
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The sixth common policy consists of continuous adjustments in the struc-
ture of the aquaculture sector. Government policies and other interventions
have greatly contributed to the rapid development of aquaculture. However,
as the industry developed, it soon became apparent that there were serious
inherent structural problems that needed to be addressed if the industry
were to continue growing. In some areas, purely as a result of management
practices, fish diseases broke out and spread rapidly, for example in the
shrimp industry, which negatively affected the efficiency of the sector and
depressed producers’ incomes. In other cases, the use of antibiotics and other
production inputs was abusive, leading to negative environmental externali-
ties and threatening the image of, and markets for, farmed fish.
In these cases, the industry was self-defeating. Some governments reacted
by creating leading agencies with responsibility for the implementation of
public policies that were established with the aim of guiding a long-term
development of the sector. Producers’ organizations were also encouraged to
look after farmers’ interests and to ensure implementation of self-regulating
management codes. The rationale was that because unsound management
practices by a farmer could affect that farmer’s and others’ output, each
farmer needed to have an incentive to produce responsibly.
Micro-level policy trends
The second path to discussing global trends in aquaculture policies on the
supply side of the industry is the micro level. We have already touched on
some of these trends when discussing the macro-level policies used at
the farm level, and it is often difficult to draw a clear distinction between
the two categories of policies. Nonetheless, government interventions at the
farm level tend to fall into three policy directions: start-up, expansion and
export promotion.
START-UP POLICIES
In many countries, governments may provide financial assistance to jump-
start the industry. There are two arguments to support the provision of
start-up funding in the early stages of aquaculture development. First, there
is the inability of potential entrepreneurs in infant industries to afford initial
investment through their own equity or to obtain private funding. Financial
institutions are naturally prudent. Faced with biological, market and other
uncertainties, they are generally unwilling to provide credit until risks are
known. Without their own equity or bank loans, either the country’s aqua-
culture potential will not be realized at all, or it will be realized partially
and the development will be slow. The government must intervene with
start-up funding.
The second argument is that, as an infant industry, aquaculture may need
support until it reaches a stage at which costs are competitive. If industries
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learn by doing, costs will decline with experience, and, so the argument
goes, such industries need government assistance in their early years. 
Start-up assistance may be in the form of costs to cover research. Assistance
can also be provided in the form of tariff and non-tariff protection, or cash
grants to farmers. An alternative is to issue bonds.
In many developing countries, access to initial investment capital is also
often complicated by the lack of collateral accessible to farmers and by exces-
sively high interest rates on loans. The lack of knowledge by farmers of the
modalities of applying for loans and, on the part of lenders, the lack of, or
limited information on, successful aquaculture enterprises in the country or
in the region also limit access to capital. In these countries, government pol-
icies have encouraged group lending, village banks and solidarity groups
that do not require collateral. The use of titled land and moveable property,
which in many cases has called for legal and regulatory reforms, is encour-
aged. When affordable, government loan guarantees and subsidized interest
rates are used.
EXPANSIONARY POLICIES
Once aquaculture has taken off, farmers often find it difficult to expand. In
most cases, constraints to expansion consist of unavailability and/or high
costs of essential inputs, namely feed, seeds and capital. The absence or
limited availability of necessary inputs may prove a serious impediment to
aquaculture development. Often it is more critical than cost. Government
policies that are aimed at assisting farmers to overcome these issues target
the increase in supply of the limited or the lacking input.
A policy that is frequently used to develop the feed industry is to encour-
age the establishment of large farms. By their size, large farms guarantee
enough demand for profitable feed production and thus feed companies have
an incentive to develop. An alternative policy is to encourage livestock com-
panies to diversify into aquaculture and/or into fish feed production. Where
feed can be imported, but at the cost of foreign exchange, import substitu-
tion policies are sometimes used.
As with feed production, the availability of stocking material (seed)
generally faces the issues of quantity and quality. To ensure enough supply
and to maintain high-quality seeds, governments induce a number of
farmers to specialize in seed production and train them in modern hatchery
techniques. Initially, several government stations are used for this purpose,
but, increasingly, private operations replace government stations as a source
of seeds.
The problem of capital input has been discussed earlier. To increase the
accessibility of farmers to bank loans, one policy is to demonstrate to
bankers that aquaculture can be financially viable. By demonstrating the
actual profitability of aquaculture, the intention is to create awareness of the
sector and encourage lending. The banks targeted are those with high loan
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portfolios in agriculture and those that are responsive to alternative
agriculture.
A complementary policy is to have business plans evaluated for their
technical merits by government officials. This reassures bankers who lack
aquaculture expertise. If financial institutions remain reluctant to lend,
government loan guarantees are used, where possible. If the high cost rather
than availability of inputs is a principal constraint on aquaculture develop-
ment, policies that lead to increased supply may also lessen this problem.
Another policy that has been commonly used or advocated is the provi-
sion of subsidies. The argument is that with the high costs of inputs, the
industry may lack absolute and competitive advantage, and therefore fail to
flourish. However, the high fiscal cost of subsidies, the investment disincen-
tive they create for the private sector and the resulting distortions are
forcing their curtailment worldwide.
EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES
Increasingly, aquaculture is becoming an international business, targeting
export markets. This trend may cause a dynamic evolution of market shares
internationally. Though globally insignificant, policy assistance is selectively
provided to producers to help them compete internationally. These policies
consist of tax holidays and tax exemptions on imported production inputs,
including equipment, machinery, broodstock, feed and fertilizers, exemp-
tions from permit fees, as well as holidays and/or exemptions from sales and
other local taxes.
Demand-side policy aspects of aquaculture
At the micro level, governments intervene on the demand side of aquacul-
ture by kick-starting aquaculture through marketing policies. Some opt to
establish market structures that permit hygienic handling and selling of
farmed fish. Others hold taste tests at government functions, produce recipe
booklets and organize cooking demonstrations on radio and television.
Others provide transport and ice for the big buyers. The guiding rationale
behind these initiatives is to increase demand by developing new markets
and/or expanding existing ones through market promotion and development
of new, value added products, thereby triggering more supply. However, as
the industry develops, these government facilitation activities decline, with
marketing and provision of transport infrastructures increasingly falling to
the private sector.
Governments also intervene on the demand side of the industry through
regulation of aquatic food safety and the regulation of aquaculture drugs and
feed used in the production of fish. Governments may issue special regula-
tions for the processing and handling of aquaculture products, specifically on
detailed requirements for food safety and prevention of human health
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hazards in the processing and packaging of aquatic products. The aim of
these measures is to control the business environment of the industry in the
interest of both consumers and producers.
The way forward
The second question to consider when discussing global trends and chal-
lenges facing aquaculture law and policy is: “What is the way forward?”
First, let me underline that in the FAO, we believe that capture fisheries
will expand only slowly, if at all, during the coming decades. At the same
time, we expect demand for fish to continue to grow globally as a result of
population increase, economic growth and shifts in eating habits, among
other factors. Because demand creates supply, we are convinced that, glob-
ally, aquaculture is set to grow in order to meet the expected demand for
fish. In fact, the FAO’s recent forecasts indicate that aquaculture output
could reach about ninety million tons in 2030 compared to forty-five million
tons in 2000.3 This increase in output is expected to come from the introduc-
tion of aquaculture in countries with aquaculture potential that has not yet
taken off, expansion of farmed areas where aquaculture already exists, and from
the use of intensive technologies and other technological breakthroughs.
A lesson that could be learned from this is that unless an adequate legal and
regulatory structure is put in place, there could be unregulated, uncontrolled
aquaculture development in many parts of the world, which, in turn, could
cause immeasurable harm to the environment and lead to the industry’s self-
destruction. Thus, the challenge is for each country with aquaculture potential
that it wishes to develop to have such a framework. The challenge is also to
have this structure for the benefit of the industry and society.
Of the many constraints to aquaculture development in most parts of the
world, the legal and environmental restrictions to starting an aquaculture
venture are among the most significant. In many instances, requirements to
obtain permits are very rigid: public regulations are many and varied, and
may demand a considerable investment in time and money before the pro-
posal actually starts, which often deters investors. The challenge for policy-
makers is to establish simplified and coordinated permit procedures that
expedite the processing of permit applications. The further challenge is to
eliminate overlapping administrative jurisdictions.
In a world of globalization, economies must open doors to foreign
markets. There are also movements of goods, including live aquatic animals,
which are sometimes uncontrolled. Where they occur, uncontrolled move-
ments of aquatic animals often produce unintended effects on the industry.
In some places, the industry has nearly collapsed. The challenge is for each
country with the desire to develop aquaculture to have a national integrated
aquatic animal health program that, inter alia, provides routine fish health
services to the industry, monitors the movement of aquatic animals, and
monitors and responds to health emergencies in the aquaculture sector.
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One of the most important questions that a farmer has to answer when
making a decision to farm is what species to grow. Often the choice has to
be made between indigenous and alien species. Today, technology offers
farmers a third choice: the use of genetically modified aquatic organisms
(GMAOs). While most countries have regulations covering the importation
of live aquatic organisms and the introduction of exotic species, legal, regu-
latory and policy frameworks to guide the use of GMAOs by both producers
and consumers seem limited and incomplete, as most focus on the economic
interests of producers. Information available to the FAO reveals that, so far,
no GMAOs are farmed, at least commercially. But there is no reason to
believe that this trend will continue. Like introduced species, GMAOs may
become a pest, damaging the environment and even the farming of other
species.
In addition, consumers’ response to genetically modified organisms, in
general, has been unfriendly. Policy-makers would perhaps find it to be in
their best interest and that of the industry and the public to join forces with
all stakeholders, including industry representatives and consumer organi-
zations, and agree on a protocol on the cultivation and consumption of
GMAOs. Once agreed upon, the protocol should become an integral part of
national aquaculture legislation worldwide.
Once legal and policy frameworks are in place, countries, at least develop-
ing countries, often face the issue of implementing the start or expansion of
aquaculture activities. Faced with this issue, governments have turned to the
use of economic and other incentives that can be seen, wrongly or rightly, as
subsidies. The use of financial transfers and other instruments to enhance the
competitive position of the fishing industry is a very controversial issue
among World Trade Organization members. Because of the globally increas-
ing presence of aquaculture products in international markets, strong argu-
ments against the use of subsidies and other economic incentives in
aquaculture can be expected in the near future. The salmon aquaculture
industry has already been accused of dumping, which opponents relate to
alleged subsidies.4 The challenge for policy-makers, at this stage, will be to
anticipate the growing international opposition to direct government trans-
fers to producers and the use of other forms of instruments aimed at shield-
ing them against foreign competition. Rather, they must propose policies
and other arrangements that will regulate the use of these instruments inter-
nationally, while allowing aquaculture to grow harmoniously.
Policy-makers and regulators will also need to anticipate the increase in
the use of tariff and non-tariff barriers by countries as a weapon to protect
their domestic aquaculture industries against foreign competition. Policy-
makers will face the challenge of suggesting countervailing measures, such
as the development of internationally agreed-on guidelines for the elabora-
tion of transparent and non-discriminatory certification procedures and the
harmonization of aquaculture quality standards.
The implementation of good legal, regulatory and policy instruments
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requires a solid and sufficient pool of qualified personnel for all aspects of
aquaculture. Unfortunately, this requirement remains one of the most
serious stumbling blocks to aquaculture development in developing coun-
tries. Several policies, which include plans for vocational training and formal
educational curricula in harmony with the expanding needs of the industry,
have been suggested. In most cases, however, these policies remain difficult
to implement in the context of countries’ financial austerity. The challenge
for the industry as a whole, including policy-makers and regulators, is to
come up with a strategy for overcoming this pivotal issue. Perhaps emphasis
could be given to further South–South cooperation and networking at subre-
gional, regional and bilateral levels for information exchange and technology
transfer in the aquaculture sector.
Conclusion
Aquaculture is poised to grow globally, and therefore needs adequate legal
and policy frameworks to guide its development. But it is only when the
appropriate legal, regulatory and policy instruments are implemented that
the industry will achieve its full potential. We can then look forward to
improved food security, more employment opportunities, higher incomes,
better nutrition, and enhanced and diversified economies all over this planet.
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Gauging the law and policy tides and
charting a course
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Introduction
This chapter examines Canadian law and policy that addresses marine aqua-
culture proposals and operations, in light of four key principles:1 integra-
tion, precaution, environmental impact assessment, and public
participation.2 The first part assesses the extent to which the federal govern-
ment, the province of British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces (New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and
Labrador) have applied the four principles. The second part provides recom-
mendations for charting a clearer course for sustainable aquaculture and
raises key questions that need to be considered, such as whether adequate
legal foundations exist for integrated coastal/ocean planning.
Gauging the tides: sustainable development principles in
Canadian aquaculture law and policy
Introduction to Canadian aquaculture law and policy
Getting a firm grip on the Canadian approach to incorporating sustainability
principles into domestic law is especially difficult in light of the complex con-
stitutional division of powers allowing both federal and provincial regulatory
powers.3 The federal government has the power to legislate in relation to sea
coast and inland fisheries, allowing it to protect and preserve both marine and
freshwater fisheries.4 Other relevant federal heads of power include shipping
and navigation;5 trade and commerce;6 interprovincial and international
matters;7 Indians and lands reserved for Indians;8 and federal works and under-
takings and matters declared to be within federal jurisdiction.9 Provincial gov-
ernments also play an important role in aquaculture regulation pursuant to two
main constitutional heads of power. The farming of aquatic organisms may be
subject to the provincial powers over property and civil rights within the
province10 and matters of a merely local or private nature in the province.11
A key issue, partly unresolved, is the question of how far offshore
provinces may control aquaculture developments. Provincial offshore juris-
diction has been recognized through case law as extending to marine waters
inter fauces terrae (between the jaws of land), such as some inlets, bays and
estuaries,12 and to marine areas considered to be the part of a province at the
time of Confederation.13 The exact boundaries of provincial jurisdiction thus
remain quite uncertain, especially on the east coast of Canada, where
provinces may rely on various historical exertions of jurisdiction.14
It is important to distinguish between “legislative” jurisdiction and “ter-
ritorial” jurisdiction. As will be noted below, the federal and provincial gov-
ernments have chosen to address jurisdictional questions in the development
of aquaculture in a manner that does not decisively determine territorial
boundaries. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on the agreements that
have been reached and on each government’s legislative jurisdiction, rather
than territorial jurisdiction.
Aboriginal rights, especially title claims and the right to be consulted,15
add further complexity to the jurisdictional questions raised by aquaculture
development. As issues that warrant detailed discussion in their own right,
they are beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Integration
Although the integrative principle can be confusing given its various mean-
ings, this chapter will focus on how Canada has implemented the principle
of integration in three of its main manifestations:16 vertical (cooperation
among levels of government – national, provincial, local); horizontal
(coordinating sectoral government departments/agencies, such as agricul-
ture, fisheries, tourism, transport, energy, environment, defence and com-
munications); and integrated coastal area management (managing multiple
land and sea uses in the coastal zone).
Integration: federal
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Governments have attempted to address issues of vertical integration in two
major ways: the delegation of administrative power; and integration by non-
legislative agreement.
Federal administrative power has been delegated to provincial levels of
government by the transfer of federal control over freshwater fisheries to the
provincial governments,17 and by transferring a number of fish hatcheries to
the provinces.18 The federal government has also signed several memoranda of
understanding (MOUs) on aquaculture with provinces and territories, includ-
ing British Columbia, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
and Newfoundland and Labrador.19 In general, these MOUs set out the areas
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of exclusive jurisdiction and the areas of cooperation between the two levels of
government.20 The MOUs also include provisions creating management com-
mittees (or coordinating committees, in the case of Prince Edward Island).
The Canadian Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers (CCFAM),
composed of federal, provincial and territorial ministers, was formed as
another vertical integration initiative, to discuss national and global issues
affecting the fisheries and aquaculture sectors and to identify shared policy
objectives and principles. In 1999, the members of CCFAM signed the
Agreement on Interjurisdictional Cooperation with Respect to Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture. Under the agreement, both levels of government commit to working
together to contribute effectively, with sector stakeholders, to the develop-
ment of ecologically sustainable and economically viable fisheries and aqua-
culture resources, habitats, and industries.21
Although the delegation of administrative powers and the signing of
agreements has led to some degree of regulatory coordination between the
two levels of government, much constitutional uncertainty still surrounds
the regulation of aquaculture. First, the ad hoc delegation of administrative
powers has led to inconsistencies in administration between one part of the
country and the other.22 Legislative provisions governing aquaculture have
been enacted by both federal and provincial levels of government over an
extended period of time, often on a species – or geography – specific basis,
and typically as part of fisheries regulation.23 This fragmented approach was
identified by the Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development
as a critical area for reform if Canada is to ensure a sustainable aquaculture
industry.24
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
With at least seventeen federal departments and agencies delivering pro-
grams and services to the aquaculture industry, horizontal integration
remains a considerable challenge in Canada.25 Some of the principal depart-
ments/agencies include the Canadian Environment Assessment Agency
(responsible for administering the federal environmental assessment process
applicable to most marine finfish aquaculture proposals), the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (responsible for monitoring molluskan shellfish for
marine biotoxins and testing aquaculture products for drug residues),
Environment Canada (lead department for conducting sanitary surveys of
shellfish-growing areas and regulating toxic substances and ocean dumping)
and Health Canada (responsible through the Veterinary Drugs Directorate
for approving the use of veterinary drugs on aquaculture and through the
Pest Management Regulatory Agency for regulating pest-control products
such as sea lice therapeutants).26 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO),
through its Aquaculture Management Directorate, is the lead federal depart-
ment of aquaculture and acts as both a regulator and an enabler of the aqua-
culture sector.27 With the Canadian Coast Guard becoming as a Special
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Operating Agency within DFO effective 1 April 2005,28 Transport Canada
has become the responsible authority for ensuring that navigational impacts
of aquaculture projects are assessed and addressed.29
Besides a broad attempt to coordinate federal roles in ocean resource
development and management through an Interdepartmental Committee on
Oceans,30 horizontal integration in relation to aquaculture has primarily
occurred through two avenues. The federal environmental assessment review
process, discussed in the section “Environmental impact assessment” (p. 68)
encourages sharing of departmental viewpoints regarding proposed aquacul-
ture prospects. DFO has established the Interdepartmental Committee on
Aquaculture (ICA) to conduct federal interagency meetings where
coordination and governance issues can be discussed.31
INTEGRATED COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT
The Oceans Act is the most important federal statute that includes potential
integration requirements for the aquaculture industry.32 Sections 31–33 of
the Act require that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans facilitate the devel-
opment and implementation of plans for the integrated management of all
activities affecting Canadian estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters.
Integrated management is intended to bring together interested parties,
stakeholders and regulators to reach general agreement on the best mix of
conservation, sustainable use and economic development of coastal and
marine areas for the benefit of all Canadians.33
Canada is still largely at the “pilot project” stage in developing integrated
management plans. A Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated Manage-
ment of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine Environments in Canada34 sets out a goal
of eventually establishing integrated management plans for all of Canada’s
offshore waters,35 and proposes two main categories of planning from large
scale to small scale – specifically, large ocean management areas (LOMAs) to
coastal management areas (CMAs).36 Canada’s Oceans Action Plan, released in
May 2005, confirms that five priority LOMAs will be focused upon initially:
Placentia Bay/Grand Banks, the Scotian Shelf, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the
Beaufort Sea and the Pacific North Coast.37
Given the early stages of integrated planning initiatives, it is difficult to
assess how adequately aquaculture will be addressed through planning
processes. DFO has reported initiating twenty-one CMA efforts, but no spe-
cific implementation details were provided in a departmental progress
report.38 The most advanced large marine area planning process, the Eastern
Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Initiative, has chosen to focus
initially on addressing ocean use and management issues beyond the twelve-
nautical mile territorial sea.39 The draft management plan, setting out over-
arching human use and ecosystem objectives and institutional components
for further planning purposes, simply recognizes aquaculture as an existing
coastal use and places priority on developing strategies to address commer-
52 D. L. VanderZwaag, G. Chao and M. Covan
cial fishing, oil and gas exploration/development and ship-source pollu-
tion.40 The plan notes the eventual need to develop complementary coastal
management plans.41
Integrated planning for the Pacific coast of Canada promises to be espe-
cially complex in light of the Wild Pacific Salmon Policy, released in June
2005.42 The policy proposes to establish a new integrated strategic planning
process for wild salmon conservation but leaves the details to be further
worked out through consultations with First Nations, provincial and territo-
rial governments, communities, and stakeholders.43 Local planning commit-
tees for subregions are suggested,44 but how they would relate to marine use
planning limitations is left unclear.45
Integration: British Columbia
British Columbia ranked as the fourth largest producer of farmed salmon in
the world, with some 131 salmon aquaculture sites producing 72,700
tonnes in 2003, behind Chile, Norway and Scotland, and produced 8,600
tonnes of shellfish (oysters, clams, scallops and mussels) in 2003.46
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
The key document setting out a framework for vertical integration between
Canada and British Columbia is the Canada/British Columbia Memorandum of
Understanding on Aquaculture Development,47 signed in 1988. The MOU con-
firms the division of powers as set out in the Constitution Act, 1867, and
identifies a number of coordination duties.48 Section 10 and Schedule A
of the MOU provide for the formation of a management committee to co-
ordinate such efforts and duties, and to resolve disputes. Since September
2000, British Columbia and the federal DFO have worked together to
prepare a harmonized guidebook for finfish aquaculture management appli-
cations.49 In 2003 the Canada–British Columbia Committee on Regulatory
Reform started conducting several pilot projects in support of the
Canada–British Columbia Agreement on Fish Habitat Management, signed in
2000.50
Vertical integration has been attempted through a number of
federal–provincial fora. They include the Salmon Aquaculture Implementa-
tion Advisory Committee,51 the Deputy Minister’s Harmonization Commit-
tee,52 the Project Review Team,53 the Fish Health Working Group54 and the
Technical Advisory Group.55
Furthermore, the federal government has participated in a number of
integrative management initiatives with the British Columbia government.
These include the Georgia Basin Ecosystem Initiatives,56 the Pacific Marine
Heritage Legacy,57 DFO’s local “sustainability” initiatives,58 and the Burrard
Inlet Environmental Action Program and Fraser River Estuary Management
Program (FREMP).59
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More coordination attempts are in the works. For example, the British
Columbia Ministry of Agriculture and Lands (BCMAL) is developing a
provincial code of practice with the shellfish farming industry in British
Columbia. The code will outline standards for shellfish aquaculture that are
consistent with provincial and federal acts and regulations. It is expected
that the code will be incorporated into mandatory operational standards that
will become a condition of holding a shellfish aquaculture license.60
In September 2004, Canada and British Columbia signed a Memorandum
of Understanding Respecting Implementation of Canada’s Oceans Strategy on the
Pacific Coast.61 The MOU pledges the development of further subagreements
on implementation measures for, among other things, a marine protected
areas framework, integrated coastal and oceans management planning,
sharing of information related to offshore oil and gas resources, and stream-
lining and harmonizing regulatory decision-making for aquaculture.62
Despite the various initiatives to formalize vertical integration, the
coordination of aquaculture continues to be a challenge, partly as a result of
differing policy viewpoints. For example, the Auditor-General of British
Columbia has identified federal–provincial disagreement on salmon farm
siting criteria as a problem.63 Among the key issues are how to determine
“sensitive habitats” in need of protection and what are adequate distances for
buffer zones, such as the distance farms should be from wild salmon streams.64
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
Getting a firm grip on horizontal integration in the aquaculture approval
system in British Columbia has been difficult for at least two reasons. First,
the two statutes governing the issuance of property rights, the Land Act65
and Fisheries Act,66 require multiple approvals,67 with little administrative
guidance provided in the past. This opens the door to considerable discre-
tion in application review processes.68 Second, following a change in govern-
ment in June 2001, the public service underwent major reorganization, and
a new Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management was created. However,
following another government reorganization in June 2005, the Ministry of
Sustainable Resource Management has been reintegrated within the Min-
istry of Environment.69 As a result, governance approaches and mechanisms
continued to evolve.
The control of aquaculture activities occurs primarily through four routes
having different statutory authorities: Integrated Land Management Bureau
(ILMB) (assuming the Crown land tenure responsibilities of the previous
Land and Water BC Inc. (LWBC);70 the Ministry of Agriculture and
Lands;71 the Resource Management Division of the Ministry of Environ-
ment;72 and the Water, Land and Air Protection Programs of the Ministry of
Environment.73
Integration efforts have occurred in various ways. In 2001, the BC Assets
and Land Corporation signed an MOU with selected provincial agencies74 to
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clarify the principles and process for Land Act application referrals and to
establish dispute resolution steps.75 ILMB, having subsequently assumed the
land tenure responsibilities, helps ensure that institutional perspectives are
considered in tenure approvals.76 Aquaculture management plans, required for
both commercial finfish77 and shellfish,78 provide a common information base
for both provincial and federal agencies to review site-specific plans in accord
with regulatory mandates. In 2002, provincial agencies entered into an agree-
ment for coordinating compliance and enforcement activities relating to aqua-
culture. The Ministry of Agriculture and Lands has a lead role in monitoring
compliance, and the Ministry of Environment is the leading agency for inves-
tigation and enforcement efforts.79
INTEGRATED COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT
Integrated coastal area management is a relatively new principle in British
Columbia law and policy. The BC Coastal Resources Strategy Study Steering
Committee’s 1993 “Towards a Coastal Resource Strategy” was an early
provincial initiative that outlined the possible contents of a provincial integ-
rated coastal management strategy. The subsequent 1998 BC Coastal Zone
Position Paper80 set out the province’s position with respect to the federal
Oceans Act initiatives.
The Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) was created in 1994 to serve
as the central agency for land-use planning in British Columbia. LUCO no
longer exists. Its activities were largely passed to the Resource Management
Division of the Ministry of Environment, and then moved recently to the
ILMB.81
British Columbia has focused its coastal planning on the “nearshore” and
“intertidal” (foreshore) areas under provincial jurisdiction.82 Plans “are
intended to address tenuring and conservation/protection opportunities in
theses areas, rather than marine resource management, which is primarily a
federal responsibility.”83 The British Columbian government has identified
two levels of coastal zone planning: strategic-level coastal plans (e.g. at
1:250,000 scale) designed to identify broad goals, objectives and strategies
for coastal and marine resources; and local-level coastal plans (e.g. at
1:50,000 to 1:5,000 scale).84
One of the largest plan areas in the province is the Central Coast Land
and Resource Management Plan, covering about 4.8 million hectares of
marine, foreshore and upland area on the west coast of British Columbia.85
The plan includes forestry and commercial fishing activities; some sixty-
eight of British Columbia’s coastal salmon farm tenures have been located in
this area, and are accordingly affected by the planning process.86 The plan-
ning process began in 199687 and the process continues to evolve as the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Lands has announced its intent to integrate the
planning of the Central and North Coasts into a single Land and Resource
Management Plan.
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Local plans fall into three general types:88
1 integrated coastal plans – identify land tenure opportunities including
aquaculture, conservation, commercial recreation (e.g. the Nootka Sound
Plan, Chatham Sound, Malaspina Complex, North Island Straits);89
2 issue resolution plans – attempt to resolve a particular issue or coast land
use/activity conflicts (e.g. the Baynes Sound Coastal Plan for Shellfish
Aquaculture, Cortes Island Coastal Plan for Shellfish Aquaculture);90 and
3 special management plans – which aim to “provide more detailed direc-
tion for management of specific uses or distinct areas.”91
Generally, these initiatives are developed on a flexible and “as needed” basis.
The ministry does not advocate one use over another but attempts to balance
the interests of each group to formulate a sustainable planning process.92
In February 2002, DFO, the province of British Columbia, the 
Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council and local governments announced the
launch of the West Coast Vancouver Island (WCVI) Aquatic Management
Board.93 The pilot project involves a board of eight government and eight
non-government members. The board is to develop recommendations for
managing aquatic resources and is specifically asked to address issues in
aquaculture and community economic development issues.94
Integration: the Atlantic provinces
Aquaculture has become important in all the Atlantic provinces of Canada. In
2003, New Brunswick led the Atlantic provinces in aquaculture production
with a total of 36,453 tonnes – 33,650 from finfish and 2,803 tonnes from
shellfish.95 Nova Scotia produced 5,590 tonnes of finfish and 1,852 tonnes of
shellfish for a total production of 7,893 tonnes.96 Prince Edward Island’s aqua-
culture sector produced twenty-four tonnes of finfish and 19,862 tonnes of
shellfish.97 Newfoundland and Labrador’s production was lowest, at 3,900
tonnes, with 2,600 tonnes from finfish and 1,300 tonnes from shellfish.98
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
In the Atlantic provinces, vertical integration has occurred through delegation
of authority and through coordinated assessment of aquaculture applications.
Since 1928, pursuant to an agreement between Prince Edward Island (PEI)
and the Dominion of Canada, aquaculture leasing has been the responsibility
of the federal government. The 1987 Canada/PEI Memorandum of Under-
standing (Canada/PEI MOU)99 subsequently confirmed that the Aquaculture
Division of the federal DFO is the lead agency for the administration of aqua-
culture leasing in PEI. However, the PEI Department of Fisheries, Aquacul-
ture and Environment exercises certain rights and obligations pursuant to
both the 1928 agreement and the Canada/PEI MOU.
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In Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador, the
federal government has largely delegated the administration of aquaculture
to the provincial governments through MOUs.100 For example, the
Canada/Nova Scotia MOU provides that Nova Scotia (NS) is responsible 
for issuing and administering provincial licenses and leases, inspecting
aquaculture facilities, and coordinating the approval process for licenses and
leases.
The federal government has also largely delegated to the provincial gov-
ernments the responsibility for ensuring compliance with federal legislation.
For example, the Canada/NS MOU provides that “Nova Scotia will conduct
periodic on site inspections of aquaculture facilities . . . and will advise the
appropriate federal authority of any breach of applicable federal legislative or
regulatory requirements.”101
All four MOUs address the responsibility for monitoring the health of
caged stock. In Nova Scotia, the province is primarily responsible for site
inspection, including inspection under the federal Fisheries Act.102 The
federal government is left to administer the Fish Health Protection Regula-
tions103 and to continue “its national and regional role in the surveillance,
detection, prevention, control and eradication of fish diseases in Nova
Scotia.”104 In New Brunswick, the MOU provides that both the province
and the federal government are to conduct periodic inspections of sites to
determine compliance with their “respective Acts.”105 The Canada/PEI
MOU does not identify an inspection obligation, although it does provide
that Canada “shall continue its role in the prevention, control and eradica-
tion of fish disease” in PEI.106 The Canada/Newfoundland MOU (Canada/NF
MOU) also identifies this function as primarily a provincial responsibility,
stating that Newfoundland “shall” conduct periodic on-site inspections of
aquaculture facilities and that Canada “may” do so as well.107
While the four MOUs require that sites be inspected and comply with
federal and provincial law, the adequacy of inspection is questionable. For
example, under the Canada/NS MOU, Nova Scotia is responsible for moni-
toring the health of aquaculture stocks.108 However, while Nova Scotia pro-
vides veterinary services to respond to requests for assistance from
aquaculturalists,109 it appears that formal inspection is undertaken only in
relation to fish hatcheries and prior to the transfer of aquaculture stock from
an aquaculture site, both within the province and interprovincially.110
In each of the Atlantic provinces, vertical integration occurs through the
coordinated assessment of aquaculture applications. Both federal and provin-
cial government departments have input at the initial application stage of
the process. In PEI, a steering committee was formed in the early 1980s to
facilitate the leasing application process by developing an aquaculture
zoning system. The committee comprised representatives from DFO, the
Coast Guard, Public Works Canada, Environment Canada, Parks Canada,
the PEI Department of Fisheries, the PEI Department of Environment, and
Tourism PEI. This effort led to the PEI Aquaculture Zoning System, which
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identifies potential conflicts between recreational and commercial uses,
wildlife sanctuaries, environmental legislation and aboriginal rights.111
The Aquaculture Leasing Management Board (ALMB) is another example
of vertical integration in PEI. The Board is made up of federal and provin-
cial representatives, as well as members of industry.112 ALMB is responsible
for the overall management of aquaculture in PEI by approving priorities
and developing business and financial plans “associated with the implemen-
tation and ongoing management of the PEI Aquaculture Leasing
Program.”113 The ALMB also provides management and policy advice to yet
another panel, the Leasing Referral Committee (LRC), the members of
which are drawn from both levels of government.114 The LRC assesses lease
applications for compliance with ALMB policy (such as habitat, navigation,
water quality, public fishery, use conflict and zoning policy), helps resolve
contentious issues, develops recommendations and advises on policy
amendments.115
The other three Atlantic provinces similarly involve federal departments
in evaluating aquaculture applications.116 In New Brunswick, DFO co-chairs
the federal–provincial Aquaculture Site Evaluation Committee (ASEC),
which makes recommendations to the provincial minister with respect to
site applications.117 However, the province has, on some occasions, ignored
recommendations made by DFO staff “against allowing certain sites based
on fish habitat considerations.”118 This highlights the difficulty of obtaining
effective vertical integration where roles and responsibilities are not clearly
delineated.
In Nova Scotia, the Canada/NS MOU requires the province to refer aqua-
culture license and lease applications to DFO and “other relevant federal and
provincial departments and agencies in conformity with their respective
jurisdiction relating to such aquaculture matters.”119 For instance, the
approval of Transport Canada is required for any aquaculture project that
may substantially interfere with navigation through water. Most suspension-
type aquaculture operations in Nova Scotia require such approval. The
provincial government also consults with the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency when considering aquaculture license and lease applications.
In Newfoundland and Labrador, DFO also plays a role in the review of
aquaculture applications, as set out under the Canada/NF MOU. Once the
Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture
(NLDFA) receives an application for an aquaculture license, it distributes
the application to a number of referral departments at both levels of govern-
ment, typically including DFO and Environment Canada.120
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
In the Atlantic provinces, the lead departments charged with licensing
aquaculture sites are required to consult with various other departments
within the province’s government. However, in each province this process is
58 D. L. VanderZwaag, G. Chao and M. Covan
limited only to consultation, since the non-lead departments cannot veto
any prospective decision made by the lead department.
Nova Scotia provides the most glaring example. Before making a decision
on any application, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries must consult
with the departments of Environment (now the Department of Environment
and Labour), Housing and Municipal Affairs (now Service Nova Scotia and
Municipal Relations), and Natural Resources, as well as any additional
boards, agencies and commissions prescribed by regulation.121 However, in
at least two reviewed files the concerns of Natural Resources officials were
largely ignored, suggesting that absent a veto power, horizontal integration
will not be achieved merely through consultation. For example, in an aqua-
culture expansion proposal for Northwest Cove, NS, an official with the
provincial Department of Natural Resources suggested rejection based on
the project’s planned use of bird nets in close proximity to an active double-
crested cormorant colony:
After reviewing this proposal I have a wildlife concern that must be
addressed. This project is planned to operate within approximately 50
meters of Horse Island in Northwest Cove. Horse Island has an active
double-crested cormorant colony and possibly Great Blue Herons
nesting there as well. Raising any type of finfish in close proximity to
such a congregation of fish-eating seabirds would be unwise. The propo-
nent has stated that “bird nets” will be used. I cannot comment on the
effectiveness of such devices. . . . Based on the aforementioned factors I
cannot support this proposal because of its present location and recom-
mend that it be denied.122
The concerns of the official were apparently not taken seriously. The North-
west Cove expansion was approved,123 subject to fifty-three operating con-
ditions.124 This also occurred in a project review involving a mussel
cultivation proposal for St. Ann’s Harbour, Cape Breton. A report by
Natural Resources staff recommended that since the project monopolized
such a large portion of a shared resource, it should be rejected unless sup-
ported by the community at large. Notwithstanding the lack of community
support, the minister approved the project on 5 April 2002. The operating
conditions of the project’s lease and license only superficially accounted for
many of the concerns underlying the community’s lack of support.125
In New Brunswick, the ASEC assesses applications for aquaculture sites,
and comprises federal and provincial agencies “with regulatory authority rel-
ative to the marine environment.”126 The ASEC consults with the Aquacul-
ture Environmental Coordinating Committee (AECC), which considers
aquaculture–environment issues and makes recommendations on a variety of
topics, including siting decisions and research priorities. However, as in
Nova Scotia, final decisions rest with the minister.127
In Newfoundland and Labrador, the Department of Fisheries and
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Aquaculture is the key regulator in the aquaculture industry and adminis-
ters the Aquaculture Act128 and the Aquaculture Regulations.129 Although an
aquaculture application must be examined by a number of provincial referral
departments and agencies, this examination process is reasonably well integ-
rated. The Aquaculture Registrar’s Office of the Department of Fisheries and
Aquaculture acts as the “one-stop aquaculture licensing office,” working
with referral departments and agencies, as well as industry, in order to
streamline the licensing process by reducing duplication.130 The various
referral departments and agencies include the Department of Environ-
ment,131 the Department of Municipal and Provincial Affairs,132 the Depart-
ment of Tourism, Culture and Recreation133 and the Department of
Government Services and Lands.134
Each referral department or agency has thirty days to review an applica-
tion and provide comments,135 and if no response is received within that
period, NLDFA will assume there are no objections.136 When all of the rele-
vant information is received, the Aquaculture Registrar’s Office forwards
this information to the Aquaculture Director for review and recommenda-
tion by the Aquaculture Licensing Committee.137 The committee in turn
reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the Minister of
Fisheries and Aquaculture, who then makes the final decision.138
In PEI, horizontal integration is achieved by managing fisheries and the
environment within one government department. However, as already
noted, the federal DFO is the lead agency for the administration of aquacul-
ture leasing in PEI.
INTEGRATED COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT
Although various integrated coastal management efforts have been initiated
by the Atlantic provinces, most if not all of these initiatives either have been
terminated short of their goals or have yet to be implemented. Few of the
integrated coastal management initiatives have specifically addressed aqua-
culture.
In 1997, Nova Scotia had close to twenty statutes relating to the oceans
sector, administered by eight provincial departments.139 The Coastal 2000
program attempted to coordinate these efforts under one umbrella. The
program was based on four key principles: sustainable development, partner-
ships between community groups and government, integrated and efficient
delivery of government services, and community-based decision-making.140
However, the status of Coastal 2000 is unclear. There is nothing to indicate
that these principles are nearing the implementation stage, nor does the
program make specific mention of aquaculture. While an integrated resource
management process has been developed for provincially managed Crown
lands in Nova Scotia, this process has not been used for aquatic lands.141
The Guysborough County Sustainable Aquaculture Initiative (GCSAI)
represents a smaller-scale attempt to create an integrated coastal area man-
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agement program in Guysborough County, NS. The Guysborough County
Regional Development Authority is tasked with the mandate of economic
development of the county, and has completed what it calls the “Guysbor-
ough County Sustainable Aquaculture Initiative.” Finalized in August 2004,
the goal of this initiative is to create a “comprehensive information tool” to
help decision-makers balance environmental concerns (site characteristics,
carrying capacity, etc.), user conflicts, product safety and other factors in
designating sites for future development.142
While New Brunswick has identified the need for coastal zone manage-
ment planning,143 it has yet to formalize integrated coastal planning. The
province has developed A Coastal Areas Protection Policy for New Brunswick144
that divides the coastal area into three sensitivity zones (core, buffer and
transition). A coastal designation order under the Clean Environment Act is
proposed, which will provide a framework for managing activities in the
coastal area, including designation of prohibited and allowed activities.145
Given the aim of the policy to primarily address land-based coastal uses,
proposals and operations, its effect on aquaculture is likely to be minimal.
Integrated coastal area management is a relatively new concept in New-
foundland and Labrador. Some integrated coastal interests have been
mapped on an ad hoc basis, but such mapping is difficult, since many coastal
interests (including tourism and lobster fishing) are seasonal and do not
necessarily use all of the land that they occupy.146
Despite the lack of formalized integrated coastal area management plans,
it is important to note that Newfoundland and Labrador law and policy
require that aquaculture is developed in a manner that does not preclude the
development of other coastal activities. In particular, one of the stated pur-
poses of the Aquaculture Act is to “minimize conflicts with competing inter-
ests and uses.”147 Furthermore, the Aquaculture Licensing Policy and Procedures
Manual acknowledges that the coastline must be shared with other coastal
interests, such as traditional fisheries, other marine resource user groups, and
environmental, social, and public health and safety concerns.148
In 1998, the federal and Newfoundland and Labrador governments
together commissioned a study to examine the underlying sources of
resource-based conflict in the aquaculture industry and the strategies that
should be used to resolve them.149 The study examined Green Bay South and
Bay d’Espoir, two areas in Newfoundland and Labrador in which the aqua-
culture industry has expanded rapidly, creating considerable resource-based
conflict. In fact, the conflict in Green Bay South reached the point where the
Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture placed a moratorium on new license
applications for the area until the conflict could be examined.
The study yielded forty-two recommendations. With respect to integ-
rated planning, the study recommended that NLDFA should coordinate
workshops for fishers in areas where aquaculture is or will be occurring; that
proposed sites should be discussed in stakeholder meetings with one or two
representatives of each interest group, rather than in large public meetings;
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and that the Community-Based Coastal Resource Inventory should be con-
tinued in order to identify and quantify coastal resource uses and avoid,
resolve or mitigate conflicts between competing resource users.150
Apart from the PEI Aquaculture Zoning System referred to earlier, there
have been no recent integrated coastal management initiatives that directly
address aquaculture in PEI.
The federal government has attempted to promote integrated coastal area
management in the Atlantic provinces through the Atlantic Coastal Action
Program (ACAP), which was initiated by Environment Canada in 1991. The
program is based on the principle that coastal zone management plans must
be community driven in order to succeed. There are currently fourteen sites




While most federal statutes do not expressly adopt the precautionary
approach, it is emerging in federal legislation and policy. For example, the
approach is one of three principles guiding the Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans Canada in the implementation of the Oceans Act and is defined in the
preamble as “erring on the side of caution.” In addition, s. 4 of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act was amended in 2003 to state that one of the
purposes of the act is to “ensure that projects are considered in a careful and
precautionary manner before federal authorities take action in connection
with them, in order to ensure such projects do not cause significant adverse
environmental effects.”152 The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999
(CEPA)153 also adopts precaution as a guiding principle through various pro-
visions, including the preamble, which recites the Rio Declaration
version,154 and s. 2, which imposes an administrative duty to follow the pre-
cautionary principle in implementation of the Act. The Pest Control Products
Act155 somewhat marginalizes the precautionary principle by only requiring
the principle to be taken into account in the course of reevaluation or special
review of a pest-control product.156
Several federal or national environmental policy documents cite the pre-
cautionary approach as an important guiding principle.157 For example,
Canada’s Oceans Strategy reaffirms the federal government’s commitment to
wide application of the precautionary approach, pledges priority to main-
taining ecosystem health and integrity in cases of uncertainty, and notes that
the strategy will be governed by the government’s ongoing policy work.158
DFO’s Aquaculture Policy Framework adds a specific commitment to develop
aquaculture in accordance with the precautionary approach.159 The National
Code on Introduction and Transfers of Aquatic Organisms160 also urges a precau-
tionary approach to the introduction of exotic organisms to natural habitats.
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The Government of Canada’s Framework for the Application of Precaution in
Science-Based Decision Making about Risk,161 adopted in 2003 through an interde-
partmental process in order to provide overall guidance on application of pre-
caution through ten principles, supports a rather weak version of precaution.
The framework suggests restricting application of the precautionary approach
to situations where there is a “sound” scientific basis,162 fails to take a firm
stance on the burden of proof in decision-making163 and highlights the need for
precautionary measures to be cost-effective and minimally trade-restrictive.164
Likely to be an especially contentious issue area for application of the pre-
cautionary approach is whether transgenic fish should be permitted for com-
mercial use and, if so, under what conditions. CEPA and its regulations have
been criticized for not being very precise about risk assessment requirements
in relation to the potential effects of modified organisms on biodiversity.165
Through a May 2004 MOU with Environment Canada and Health Canada,
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has agreed to be responsible for risk
assessment under CEPA should there be any applications for aquatic organ-
isms with novel traits.166 DFO is in the process of drafting regulations for
aquatic products of biotechnology167 but the regulations have yet to be
released for public comment. Section 109 of CEPA grants the Minister of
Environment considerable discretion to approve animal biotechnology prod-
ucts following information assessments,168 and such discretion raises con-
cerns whether a strong precautionary approach will be followed.169
The Expert Panel Report on the Future of Food Biotechnology170 was prepared
by the Royal Society of Canada at the request of Health Canada, the Cana-
dian Food Inspection Agency and Environment Canada. Although the report
is not a policy document per se, it will likely be considered by the three agen-
cies that commissioned it, should the federal government allow the commer-
cial production of transgenic fish. The Expert Panel concluded that there
were significant scientific uncertainties about the potential effects of genetic
and ecological interactions between transgenic and wild fish, and about the
mitigative utility of rendering genetically modified fish sterile in aquatic
facilities. The Expert Panel made a number of recommendations in order to
implement the precautionary approach, including a moratorium on the
rearing of genetically modified fish in aquatic netpens.171
Precautionary approach: British Columbia
The approach is not explicitly identified as a guiding principle in existing
environmental and aquaculture legislation. Sustainability principles,
designed to guide provincial resource management and approved by cabinet
in May 2002, did not include precaution.172 General principles governing
the exercise of authority to issue a salmon aquaculture license include fair-
ness, transparency, efficiency and accountability but not precaution.173
However, a number of aquaculture decisions and initiatives in British
Columbia are moving towards a more precautionary approach. Between 1995
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and 2002, the province decided to impose a moratorium on new salmon
farms, and capped coastal salmon farm tenures at 121.174 The province has
approved experimental technology farm sites where closed containment
systems with waste recovery, alternative feeds and other “greener” technolo-
gies will be tested.175 The provincial Escape Prevention Initiative, led by the
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (as it was then), has established a
long-term goal to achieve zero escapes across the aquaculture industry.176
Pursuant to the Aquaculture Regulation,177 various precautionary measures have
been imposed to prevent escapes. These measures establish minimum break-
ing strengths for net-cage mesh and require jump nets where net-cages do
not have a permanently attached mesh top or similar barrier. In addition, a
major amendment to the British Columbia Fisheries Act was introduced by a
private member’s bill that would limit licenses for finfish aquaculture to
closed containment operations;178 however, that amendment was not passed.
The decision to lift the marine salmon moratorium fueled further precau-
tionary debates in British Columbia. In 2002, the British Columbia govern-
ment announced that it would accept applications for new salmon
aquaculture sites given improved provisions for siting and relocations,
research and development, and fish escapes, health and waste.179
Various voices lamented the lack of precautionary approach to aquaculture
regulation in British Columbia. Stuart Leggatt, a former judge of the British
Columbia Supreme Court, undertook an inquiry into salmon farming with
funding from a non-governmental organization, the David Suzuki Founda-
tion. He noted that, despite the government moratorium on new salmon
farms, production levels expanded substantially through intensified produc-
tion allowed at existing farms.180 The Leggatt Inquiry, among other things,
recommended application of the precautionary principle to salmon farming
regulation,181 and urged removal of all net-cage salmon farms from the
marine environment by 1 January 2005.182 West Coast Environmental Law,
in a first-year review of the BC Liberal government’s environmental perform-
ance since the Cabinet’s swearing in on 5 June 2001, was critical of the low
standards established for aquaculture, including the proposed Finfish Aquacul-
ture Waste Control Regulation (now in force),183 which would focus on only one
pollutant – sulphide – and “set standards at levels that are more than double
those found to be harmful by scientists.”184
Precautionary approach: Atlantic provinces
None of the Atlantic provinces specifically adopts the precautionary
approach in legislation or government policies directly relating to aquacul-
ture. Furthermore, with the exception of Nova Scotia’s Environment Act,185
none of those provinces specifically adopts precaution in environmental leg-
islation that may indirectly apply to aquaculture operations. Each Atlantic
province has largely failed to accept precaution in setting standards, pre-
venting escapes and controlling food consumption.
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SETTING STANDARDS
Precaution appears to mandate adherence to standards suggested by scient-
ific evidence. However, there are few such standards in the aquaculture leg-
islation and policies of the Atlantic provinces,186 and where they do exist,
they are based upon a reactive or adaptive approach to environmental con-
cerns, rather than a proactive one.187
The outbreak of infectious salmon anemia (ISA) virus in New
Brunswick’s Bay of Fundy region provides an excellent example of a reactive
approach to the environmental concerns of aquaculture. In 1998, New
Brunswick aquaculturalists followed in the footsteps of the Scottish and
Norwegian salmon aquaculture industry188 by slaughtering thousands of
Atlantic salmon in an effort to stop the spread of ISA.189 Despite these meas-
ures, twenty-one New Brunswick fish farms were infected in 1999, and a
total of fifty-five farms were eventually found to be infected.190 In 2002, ISA
was detected at Cobscook Bay, near the Maine border, where most of that
state’s salmon pens are located. Farmers were forced to destroy over 2.5
million fish.191
The New Brunswick government responded to the outbreak of ISA, and
the resulting closure or fallowing of many infected sites, with the Bay of
Fundy Aquaculture Site Allocation Policy (Fundy SAP).192 However, this
policy does not embrace a strong precautionary approach, but leaves applica-
ble standards largely to departmental decision-makers.193
Nova Scotia has also failed to adopt firm standards against which to assess
both initial applications and ongoing aquaculture operations.194 For
example, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries requires that aquaculture
license applicants complete a Marine Finfish Development Plan (MFDP).
The contents of the MFDP are not prescribed by legislation, but rather are
determined by Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (NSDAF) staff.195
The NSDAF has adopted a highly generalized, subjective self-assessment
approach to the provision of information in the MFDP. For example, the
MFDP does not address chemical treatments directly, but asks the propo-
nent to “describe your fish health management plans.”196 Furthermore, none
of the “recommended standards”197 found in the MFDP is binding on the
applicant. Failure to meet any one of the recommended standards will not
necessarily result in rejection of the application, which depends on the per-
sonal views of the reviewer. No minimum standards are prescribed by the
NSDAF in reviewing an MFDP.198
Excessive reliance on consultants in the Nova Scotia license application
process further indicates a lack of precaution. Proponents often use consul-
tants to prepare the MFDP and to provide any other information required by
the various government departments. Since there is no set form or formula
for such reports, the NSDAF may also place considerable reliance on such
consultants in addressing the environmental impacts and other aspects of the
proposed aquaculture project.199 Although past consultants have looked to
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the Nova Scotia Environmental Codes of Practice for Finfish Aquaculture
Operations in preparing environmental assessments, the codified provisions
themselves lack clear standards.200
Nova Scotia also shows a lack of precaution in its regulation of ongoing
aquaculture operations. The Nova Scotia Aquaculture License and Lease Regula-
tions201 require that license holders keep records on a number of activities
relating to the aquaculture site, which must be made available to an inspec-
tor or the Registrar of Aquaculture upon request.202 This information
includes the origin, transport, transfer and introduction of live aquacultural
produce, the presence of diseases, the type of medication, dosage, treatment
date, and duration of veterinary treatments, and the type and amount of food
used in relation to aquacultural produce. However, there are no prescribed
limits or standards for those activities that are to be recorded. For example,
there are no limits placed on the type or amount of medication used or the
frequency of such treatment. Nor is there any requirement to report the
presence of diseases. The licensee must merely make a record.
In PEI, the PEI Leasing Referral Committee evaluates potential aquacul-
ture sites on the basis of criteria that include overall site size and dimen-
sions, water depth, existence of natural shellfish populations, proximity to
local commercial fishing, navigation concerns, etc.203 However, there are vir-
tually no regulatory and policy standards for these various factors.204 For
ongoing operations, aquaculturalists need only provide the information con-
tained in their annual lease report, such as harvest information, the number
of shellfish remaining on site after harvest, the quantity of seed placed on-
site, the time spent operating the lease, any “problems encountered” and any
enhancements to bottom culture sites.
Although the Newfoundland and Labrador Aquaculture Act and its regula-
tions include a number of measures that could be seen as precautionary,
industry-wide standards have not been formally specified. For example, the
Act states that the minister may set a number of specific conditions or
standards for aquaculture licenses and operations.205
Although the permissive nature of this power diminishes its overall pre-
cautionary scope, there are specific examples of standards set by departmen-
tal policies that emphasize precaution. For instance, the Shellfish Culture
License Policy states that a regular commercial license will only be granted
after a one-year “developmental license” has been issued.206 This period is
used to determine whether the required biological and environmental con-
ditions are present for commercial operations. During this time, the pro-
posed site must undergo regular water testing as required by the Canadian
Shellfish Sanitation Program.207 The NLDFA may also require up to six
months to assess the carrying capacity and the needs of other water resource
users in a specified geographic area.208
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ESCAPES
The federal DFO has concluded that “the potential for negative interactions
warrant application of the Precautionary Approach for management of Mar-
itime salmon stocks and their interaction with escaped farmed salmon.”209
However, neither the NSDAF nor the New Brunswick Department of Agri-
culture, Fisheries and Aquaculture assesses the likelihood of fish escapes
from particular aquaculture sites, nor do these departments assess the ecolo-
gical consequences of an escape in light of a site’s proximity to wild stocks
or potential competition for habitat.
However, license/lease operating conditions may closely regulate the type
of enclosure used by fish farms. For instance, Nova Scotia License No. 1169
stipulated that “[t]he cage design and anchoring system will be suitable for
the wave action climate expected at the site and certified by a professional
engineer.” Condition 33 of the license stated that the containment nets must
be constructed of heavy twine (210/120), and that the mesh size cannot
exceed 1  inches.210
In PEI, aquaculture licenses dictate what enclosure may be used in light
of the species being reared. For instance, Arctic char can only be held in
land-based systems with specific effluent screening requirements. Saint John
River strain Atlantic salmon may be held either in lake cages with proper
screening requirements on the outflow to the lake, or in land-based facilities
with proper effluent screening.211
In Newfoundland and Labrador, the DFA mandates the inspection of
aquaculture facilities when a new site is established, an aquaculture facility
changes owners, there is a change in status (from developmental to commer-
cial), fish health is a concern, gear and marker buoys are placed on-site (ini-
tially), and at any other time deemed necessary by the department.212 In
addition, the Newfoundland and Labrador Aquaculture Act allows inspectors
to inspect a site where escapes may be a threat.213 Inspectors may inspect
aquaculture operations if reasonably necessary having regard to the measures
taken to prevent the escape of cultured aquatic plants or animals; the pres-
ence or likelihood of disease; and compliance with the terms, conditions and
provisions of the aquaculture license, the Aquaculture Act and its regulations.
The Act also permits an aquaculture inspector to direct a licensee to take
measures to prevent escapes and the development or spread of disease or par-
asites. To this end, an inspector may even order the destruction of stock and
the disinfection of gear and facilities. The Aquaculture Act also requires that a
person who wishes to transfer live aquatic plants or animals from one body
of water or aquaculture facility to another must obtain prior written
approval of the minister.
FOOD CONSUMPTION CONTROL
None of the Atlantic provinces specifically regulates the quantity or type of
feed provided to aquaculture stock. However, the operating conditions of a
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lease or license may establish some control in this respect. For example, Nova
Scotia License No. 1169 required that a feed camera must be installed and
used to minimize feed waste. A further condition prohibited the use of
mechanical feeding from 8p.m. to 8a.m.214 The economic implications of
good husbandry practices may also entice aquaculturalists to feed their stock
appropriately. Poor husbandry practices, such as low-quality or excessive feed-
ings, may involve higher financial costs to deal with sick and moribund fish.215
Environmental impact assessment
Environmental impact assessment: federal
The federal statute setting out the environmental impact assessment process
for aquaculture is the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).216
Under the CEAA, certain acts of designated federal agencies or departments,
also known as “federal authorities,” with respect to a particular “project,”
trigger an assessment of the potential environmental effects of the project.217
An environmental assessment may also be triggered if there are risks that
the project may cause “significant transboundary effects.”218
Most aquaculture operations involving the construction of aquatic facilities
of a permanent or semi-permanent nature will be considered as “projects” pur-
suant to the CEAA.219 The most likely trigger of the CEAA assessment process
is the issuance of a subsection 5(1) Navigable Waters Protection Act (NWPA)
approval by Transport Canada. NWPA approval is required when a “work”
may substantially interfere with navigable waters. Other possible triggers
include the issuance of an authorization for the harmful alteration, disruption
or destruction of fish habitat pursuant to subsection 35(2) of the Fisheries Act
by the Habitat Management Division of Fisheries and Oceans Canada.
Once it is determined that the CEAA process applies to a given aquacul-
ture project, the process follows the procedure outlined in the Regulations
Respecting the Coordination by Federal Authorities of Environmental Assessment
Procedures and Requirements.220 These regulations require that the federal EIA
process is timely and predictable, and that only one federal EIA is conducted
for a project. Once the process is initiated, the federal authorities involved in
the process are referred to as the “responsible authorities” (RAs).221
There are four types of environmental assessment that may be under-
taken: screening, comprehensive study, mediation or panel review. There
have been several hundred aquaculture records listed on the CEAA environ-
mental assessments registry as being initiated and/or completed.222 The reg-
istry listing of aquaculture records is not intended to be a comprehensive
archival collection; therefore, many more projects have undergone or are in
the process of undergoing an environmental assessment.223
The level of assessment performed with respect to aquaculture projects
has consistently been screening.224 Screenings are self-directed processes in
which RAs have the discretion to decide how the assessment is to be con-
68 D. L. VanderZwaag, G. Chao and M. Covan
ducted, including the extent to which public participation, if any, will be
required.225 Generally, RAs have frequently decided to allow the proponent’s
environmental impact statement to serve as the screening document to be
evaluated; however, screenings for aquaculture have almost always required
significantly more detail beyond the environmental impact statement.226
Where the RAs are of the opinion that the information provided is not ade-
quate to enable them to take a course of action, they shall ensure that any
necessary studies and information are undertaken or collected.227
In addition to the screenings of individual projects, s. 19 of the act allows
for the possibility of class screenings for projects that are repetitive in nature
and whose environmental effects are well understood. Following the five-
year review of the act, the Minister of the Environment identified the
general increased use of well-defined class screenings as a priority.228 The
Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development has also identified
class screenings as a potential means of simplifying the CEAA procedure.229
Fisheries and Oceans Canada is developing a streamlined approach to
CEAA assessments of aquaculture based on the scoping of multiple projects
into fewer screening reports in order to better address cumulative effects of
multiple aquaculture operations.230 Fisheries and Oceans Canada is in the
process of drafting a CEAA screening reference manual that includes
information on how to scope projects and assess cumulative effects based on
tables of valued ecosystem components (VECs).231 VECs include fish habitat,
marine water quality and wild fish habitat, etc.232
Following a screening, the RAs may exercise any power or perform any
duty or function that would permit the project to be carried out, or, where
circumstances warrant, they should refer the project to the minister for a
referral to a mediator or a review panel in accordance with se. 29. Pursuant
to s. 38(1), all forms of environmental assessment may also be subject to
monitoring and a follow-up program where appropriate.
The Species at Risk Act (SARA)233 could make special environmental
assessment requirements applicable to aquaculture proposals. Pursuant to s.
79 of the act, if a project is likely to affect a listed wildlife species234 or its
critical habitat, the proponent must identify any adverse effects. If the
project is carried out, the proponent must monitor effects and take measures
to avoid or lessen the adverse impact.235
The federal strategic environmental assessment (SEA) process, set out in a
Cabinet directive,236 is meant to apply to policy, plan and program initi-
atives bound for Cabinet or to ministerial approval, and thus could have
importance to aquaculture. However, a 2004 audit by the Commissioner of
the Environment and Sustainable Development237 found that Fisheries and
Oceans Canada did not have most of the management system elements in
place for SEAs.238 The audit was also very critical of the department’s failure
to conduct a strategic environmental assessment for the development of the
Aquaculture Policy Framework even though the policy document contained a
foreword signed by the department’s minister.239
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Environmental impact assessment: British Columbia
Currently, aquaculture activities are not captured as reviewable projects
under the provincial Environmental Assessment Act.240 In most instances,
neither shellfish nor finfish farms are required to obtain a project approval
certificate under the Act,241 and therefore they are not subject to provincial
environmental impact assessments.242 There are some possible exceptions: for
example, groundwater extraction and surface water diversion projects in
association with salmon aquaculture may be reviewable under the act.243 In
general, however, the only environmental assessment process for proposed
shellfish or finfish sites is that under the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act, as detailed earlier. This lack of provincial EIA process is in fact an indi-
cation of a degree of vertical integration, as the federal government and the
Province of British Columbia entered into an agreement in 1997 and are
currently renegotiating an agreement to harmonize their environmental
processes.244
Environmental impact assessment: Atlantic provinces
None of the Atlantic provinces clearly requires environmental assessments of
proposed marine aquaculture developments. Rather, they rely on the federal
CEAA process. However, certain activities may trigger such a review.
In Nova Scotia, an aquaculture operation is subject to the environmental
assessment process (EAP) of the Nova Scotia Environment Act (NSEA) only at
the discretion of the Minister of Environment (MOE). The Nova Scotia EAP
applies to “undertakings” as determined by the MOE or as prescribed in the
regulations. Since marine aquaculture is not likely to be caught under the
regulations as a “wetland” undertaking, the only possible trigger for an
aquaculture EAP would be qualification as “such other undertaking as the
Minister may from time to time determine.”245 This may occur if sufficient
public concern warrants.
Assuming the Nova Scotia MOE has the will to activate the EAP, the
assessment process itself would involve extensive ministerial discretion.
Once the minister orders an environmental assessment for an aquaculture
operation, the Environmental Assessment Regulations give him or her discretion
to determine whether the undertaking is a Class I or Class II undertaking.246
The only mandatory step in the EAP for Class I undertakings is registration
pursuant to the NSEA.247 After that, the minister has wide discretion in
deciding whether to require additional information, a focus report and/or an
environmental assessment report. The minister also has discretion to deter-
mine whether all or part of the undertaking will be referred to alternative
dispute resolution, whether the undertaking will proceed absent further
information, or whether it will be rejected because of the likelihood that it
will cause unmitigated adverse environmental effects. On the other hand,
Class II undertakings require registration, terms of reference, an environ-
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mental assessment process and a referral to the Nova Scotia Environmental
Assessment Board.248
In New Brunswick, aquaculture operations are prima facie exempt from
the environmental assessment provisions of the Clean Environment Act
(CEA)249 and its associated regulations. Although the CEA broadly defines
“environment” and “environmental impact,”250 an aquaculture project must
meet two thresholds to trigger an environmental assessment. First, the
project must fall within the definition of “undertaking”; and second, the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council must designate the project as the kind of
undertaking that “may result in a significant environmental impact.” This
class of undertaking is defined by an inclusive list in the Environmental Impact
Assessment Regulation.251 Subsection (u) of this list defines “undertaking” as
including “all enterprises, activities, projects, structures, works or programs
affecting any unique, rare or endangered feature of the environment.” Since
aquaculture has the potential to affect already fragile wild populations of
Atlantic salmon, this definition could trigger environmental assessment for
aquaculture projects. Indeed, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
and the National Marine Fisheries Service have listed wild Atlantic salmon
as endangered in eight Maine rivers,252 and inner Bay of Fundy salmon have
been listed as endangered under Canada’s Species at Risk Act.253
However, as in Nova Scotia, even if an environmental assessment is trig-
gered under the New Brunswick CEA, the Minister of Environment and
Local Government retains discretion at all stages. For example, even if an
aquaculture project is determined to be an “undertaking” within the
meaning of the CEA, the minister retains discretion to obviate the need for
environmental assessment.254 Furthermore, even where an environmental
assessment is required, the minister retains broad discretion as to the sub-
stance, scope and conduct of the assessment.255 No environmental assess-
ments have been performed under provincial legislation for marine
aquaculture sites in either Nova Scotia or New Brunswick.256
In PEI, the Environmental Protection Act (EPA)257 casts a wide net for the
types of activities subject to environmental impact assessment. The Act
states that “[n]o person shall initiate any undertaking unless that person files
a written proposal with the Department and obtains written approval from
the minister to proceed with the proposed undertaking.” The EPA defines
“undertaking” broadly to include any industry, operation or project that will
or may (i) discharge any contaminant into the environment; (ii) affect any
unique, rare or endangered feature of the environment; (iii) significantly
affect the environment; or (iv) cause public concern because of its perceived
effect on the environment.
While aquaculture operations may constitute “undertakings” within the
EPA’s broad definition, as in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the PEI EPA
has not yet been used to assess the environmental impacts of marine aqua-
culture operations.258 This may be due to the fact that the Minister of Fish-
eries, Aquaculture and Environment has broad discretion to decide whether
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persons initiating “undertakings” need to carry out an environmental impact
assessment, submit an environmental impact statement or provide addi-
tional information.259
Newfoundland and Labrador also does not generally subject marine aqua-
culture proposals to environmental impact assessment. The province’s
Environmental Protection Act gives the Minister of Environment discretion to
decide whether to subject proposed undertakings to environmental assess-
ment review.260 Furthermore, the Environmental Assessment Regulations, 2000
only guarantee environmental assessment registration for fish farms or shell-
fish production undertakings that have shore-based facilities other than
wharves and storage buildings.261 Thus, marine aquaculture proposals have
generally not been subject to provincial environmental impact assessment.262
Public participation
Public participation: federal
The principle of public participation appears in federal law and policy on
both macro and micro levels. On the macro level, the federal government
has, on a number of occasions, attempted to canvas public opinion on rele-
vant federal strategies263 and legislation. On a micro level, with respect to
the assessment and development of individual aquaculture projects, the
public has been limited to the CEAA assessment process as a means for par-
ticipating in the decision-making process. However, consultation with abo-
riginal communities is mandatory for aquaculture projects in British
Columbia.264 Subsection 55(1) of the CEAA requires that a public registry
be established in a manner that will ensure public access to information on
every project that has undergone an environmental assessment.
Public participation at the screening stage of a CEAA assessment is
generally limited. The responsible authority is given discretion to determine
whether public participation in the screening of a project is appropriate
under the circumstances.265 Guaranteed public participation is only found in
the other three levels of assessment: comprehensive studies, mediation and
panel reviews. For comprehensive studies, members of the public have the
right to make written comments on the study report; for review panels,
public hearings are required.
Public participation: British Columbia
On a macro level, the finfish industry has been subject to comprehensive
public review on a number of occasions from the mid-1980s to the late
1990s. These include the 1986 Inquiry into Finfish Aquaculture in British
Columbia; the 1988 Ombudsman Public Report No. 15; Aquaculture and the
Administration of Coastal Resources in British Columbia; the 1993 Wild and
Farmed Salmon and Interactions: Review of Potential Impacts and Recommended
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Action; the 1996 Environmental Effects of Salmon Net Cage Aquaculture in
British Columbia; and the 1995 Salmon Aquaculture Review.
One of the most recent public reviews, the Salmon Aquaculture Review, was
initiated in July 1995 to comprehensively review all salmon aquaculture
legislation and policy. Conducted by the British Columbia Environmental
Assessment Office, this review made several recommendations that were
approved by the provincial government in 1999 and incorporated in a new
salmon aquaculture policy.266 The policy was devised through various forms
of public participation, including oral and written submissions, open houses,
and online disclosure of working session briefs. The Salmon Aquaculture
Implementation Advisory Committee was established “to involve First
Nations, coastal communities, environmental organizations, industry and
the federal and provincial governments in the implementation of regula-
tions, policy development, and the strategic development of the salmon
farming industry.”267
In enacting new regulations, the British Columbia government has made
an effort to consult with members of the public most affected by possible
changes in regulations. For example, before passing the 2002 Aquaculture
Regulation, the BC government “consulted extensively with salmon farmers,
equipment manufacturers, stakeholders and ministry staff.”268 Also, the new
Finfish Aquaculture Waste Control Regulation was crafted with significant
stakeholder and public participation through the Salmon Aquaculture
Implementation Advisory Committee.269
The developing Shellfish Code of Practice is another provincial initiative
that promoted substantial public participation. Approximately 500 letters
of invitation to the community stakeholder meetings were sent to shellfish
farmers, First Nations, local government, and community and environ-
mental stakeholders.270 Although there was a relatively low turnout from
First Nations, most meetings were attended by those actively interested in
the process.271
On a micro level, public participation may be available through the
application processes. An applicant for the necessary lease or license of occu-
pation under the Land Act272 may be required to publish a notice of applica-
tion in a local newspaper or Gazette.273 The Aquaculture Land Use Policy,
revised in October 2005,274 notes that at the time of application, provincial
staff will notify applicants if advertising is required. The Policy states that
all new finfish applications will require public consultation which will most
often be conducted through an open house session in a local community near
the area under application.275 The Policy provides that where an application
for shellfish tenure covers an area which may affect an existing shellfish
tenure’s ability to expand, the applicant will have to notify neighboring
tenure holders by registered letter. The Policy indicates that provincial staff
will advise applicants if an upland owner’s consent is needed in case of ripar-
ian right interferences. The Policy pledges that consideration will be given
to integrated resource planning processes and other advisory processes,
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where they exist, in tenure allocation decisions.276 Section 63 of the Land Act
enables any individual to make a formal objection on a land tenure applica-
tion. If an objection is filed, the minister has the absolute discretion to
appoint an individual to hold a hearing concerning the issue(s) raised. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the person appointed will submit a recommenda-
tion to the minister. This recommendation will be considered by the minis-
ter in making a final order.
Finfish Aquaculture Licensing Policies and Procedures for Applications, revised
in November 2005,277 remain quite general regarding public participation.
Section 7 of the document states that reasonable efforts are to be made to
notify affected parties and to provide them with an opportunity to comment
on the application. The section also provides that the Minister of Agricul-
ture and Lands may require the applicant to provide public notice of the
proposed application in a manner that is acceptable.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Lands has adopted tenure siting criteria
for finfish aquaculture.278 Tenure will not be granted where it “would pre-
empt important Aboriginal, commercial or recreational fisheries as deter-
mined by the province in consultation with First Nations and DFO.”279
A proposed site must be one kilometer in all directions from a First
Nation reserve (unless consent is received from the First Nation).280
New sites must be set at least three kilometers from any existing finfish
aquaculture site, or in accordance with a local area plan or coastal zone man-
agement plan.281 Other provisions provide for the protection of various
public interests.
The Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm) Act282 is another process that
allows for public input. Under s. 1(h) of this Act, “farm operation” includes
“aquaculture as defined in the Fisheries Act if carried on by a person licensed,
under Part 3 of that Act, to carry on the business of aquaculture.”283
Although the Act sets out a number of “right to farm” provisions, it also
allows a person who is “aggrieved by any odor, noise, dust or other distur-
bance resulting from a farm operation” to make a complaint to the Farm
Practices Board.284 If the chair of the board is satisfied that a settlement of
the complaint is unlikely, a panel of the board will be established to hear the
complaint.285
These policy and legislative changes are direct responses to the Salmon
Aquacultural Review Committee’s criticisms of the past methods employed
to garner meaningful public participation as newspaper advertisement and
referral to a few selected groups were ineffectual and inconsistently applied,
and resulted in an increase of local opposition.286 The committee was also
critical of the past consultation with First Nations, as those interests were
not equitably represented, resulting in negative impacts and conflicts.287
The most recent inquiry into salmon farming, the Leggatt Inquiry, also
recommended increased “involvement of Communities, especially First
Nations, in consultation, partnership and ownership of salmon farming
operations.”288 Both the federal and the British Columbia governments have
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been making efforts to enhance aboriginal participation in aquaculture
decision-making. As mentioned earlier, on p. 72, aboriginal consultation is
mandatory for all environmental assessments of aquaculture in the
province.289
Public participation: Atlantic provinces
Among the Atlantic provinces, Nova Scotia has the most comprehensive
legislative provisions for facilitating public participation in the decision-
making process. In reviewing aquaculture license/lease applications, Nova
Scotia’s Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries is required to consult with a
number of government departments, boards and agencies.290 However, the
minister may also refer the matter to a private-sector Regional Aquaculture
Development Advisory Committee (RADAC) for comment and recommen-
dation.291 RADACs are formed in areas that have a potential for aquaculture
development and are made up of individuals “who may be affected by the
installation of an aquaculture site,” including waterfront landowners and
business operators.292 There are ten such committees in Nova Scotia.293
After consulting with the various government departments, boards and
agencies, the minister may refer the matter to public hearing.294 There is no
set formula used to determine which applications are referred to public hear-
ings. Rather, the matter is one of ministerial discretion based upon the cir-
cumstances of the application and any perceived opposition within the
community. Such opposition may be generated as a result of the public
advertisements required by the Nova Scotia Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act
1996 (FCRA).295 NSDAF files indicate that many aquaculture applicants are
unhappy with the public meeting component of the application process.
The minister may also refer contested issues to alternative dispute resolu-
tion (including conciliation, negotiation, mediation or arbitration) at which
virtually any person would have standing.296 This process may also be used
as a substitute for a hearing, for conflict resolution generally, or for resolving
disputes over the issuance, cancellation or suspension of a license or lease.297
The alternative dispute resolution process has yet to be used.298
Subject to the Nova Scotia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act,299 all information held by NSDAF must be available to the public and
maintained in a public registry.300 Furthermore, decisions and orders of
NSDAF employees may be appealed to the minister, whose decisions may be
appealed to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.301 Appeals to the minister
and to the court may only be brought by a “person aggrieved by” the
decision.
In New Brunswick, the opportunity for public participation is consider-
ably more limited. Although the minister is required to give public notice
of an application for an aquaculture occupation permit302 in any two local
newspapers,303 there is no provision for public meetings or other fora. Gener-
ally, a thirty-day period for the filing of written comments is allowed, and
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any written submissions must be acknowledged by the Registrar of Aqua-
culture.304 The registrar must then communicate the final decision,305 and
residents within 100 meters of the proposed site receive personal notice.306
Although the applicant must file a site development plan that can be viewed
by the public, information about financing, fish health reports and records,
and production levels are confidential.307 Furthermore, only applicants are
permitted to appeal the minister’s decision,308 and there is no provision for
alternative dispute resolution.
Under the PEI Aquaculture Zoning System, an aquaculture applicant can
only apply for a lease in a favorably zoned area. The presumption that zoning
decisions have already accounted for the public interest has effectively elimi-
nated most forms of public participation from the aquaculture leasing
process. Although the PEI aquaculture division may revise the zoning policy
from time to time after consultations with the Leasing Management Board
and other stakeholders, there is no legislative or policy mechanism in place
to require public involvement in this process.
In PEI, only those members of the public who appear to be directly
affected by an aquaculture site (in other words, landowners with riparian
rights) receive notice of a proposed aquaculture site.309 Even so, there is no
formal process for receiving comments from such affected persons.310 Follow-
ing the site evaluation process, the application is then forwarded to the
Leasing Referral Committee. The committee has the discretion to seek input
from other parties potentially affected by the proposed site. However, no
person other than the applicant is permitted to appeal this decision,311 and
there is no provision for alternative dispute resolution.
Since aquaculture is a relatively new and small industry in Newfoundland
and Labrador, there has not been much of an opportunity to obtain public
input in aquaculture regulation on a macro level. However, public input was
sought and deemed essential in passing the new Environmental Protection
Act312 and the Water Resources Act.313
On a micro level, when an application for an aquaculture facility has been
received, an advertisement must be placed in one local and three regional
newspapers, notifying the general public and special interest groups.314 This
notice must further advise that information related to the project is available
on request, and that written responses regarding any concerns will be con-
sidered within twenty working days.315 Newfoundland and Labrador’s Aqua-
culture Act requires that the registrar keep records of aquaculture licenses,
leases and environmental preview reports and impact statements, for inspec-
tion by the public. However, information deemed “confidential” is not avail-
able to the public.316
When the Aquaculture Licensing Committee (ALC) refers a proposal to
different government departments and agencies for review, it also forwards a
copy of the application and development/research plan to other non-
governmental groups who have an interest in the proposal.317 The ALC then
forwards written submissions identifying any potential adverse effects to the
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Aquaculture Development Officer, who considers and attempts to resolve
realistic concerns.318
In cases where the aquaculture application concerns a “site congested
area,” the NLDFA may require up to six months to assess the carrying
capacity and/or the needs of other water resource users in the area.319 In these
cases, the NLDFA consults with the Aquaculture Industry Association, pro-
vides written notice to the operators in the area of the assessment’s details
and possible licensing restrictions, and gives public notice of the assessment
in one local and three regional newspapers.320
Other Newfoundland and Labrador legislation provides a number of addi-
tional opportunities for public participation. The Environmental Protection Act
states that during an environmental assessment, interested persons may have
the opportunity to submit written comments and that the project’s propo-
nent must provide an opportunity for a public meeting at a place adjacent to
or in the geographical area of the undertaking, or as the minister may deter-
mine.321 Members of the public may also play a limited role in the water
license application under the Water Resources Act.322 This Act allows the
Minister of Environment to post public notices of a license application, pre-
sumably to allow the public to comment on the application. Once the
license is granted, the Act allows a person to make a written complaint to
the minister if the license holder fails to keep works in a proper and safe
condition, or to comply with the terms of a license, or with the Act.323
Charting a course
Getting a clear picture of future Canadian law and policy reforms likely to
be adopted in relation to sustainable aquaculture is difficult, for various
reasons. First and foremost, federal government legal reviews and policy/
discussion documents to date have been thin on suggesting specific legal and
institutional changes. The 2001 Legislative and Regulatory Review of Aquacul-
ture in Canada324 highlights numerous law and policy issues, but deferred
proposals for new legislation and amendments to a second phase of legal
review. Canada’s Oceans Strategy325 re-emphasizes commitment to the prin-
ciples of sustainable development, integrated management and the precau-
tionary approach, but leaves legislative and regulatory discussion at a
general and aspirational level. The strategy pledges to “improve existing
legislation and guidelines on marine environmental protection,”326 to
“support new legislation, regulations and policies and programs aimed at
protecting marine species at risk,”327 and to “examine regulatory regimes to
ensure effective environmental protection and streamline regulations.”328
DFO’s Aquaculture Policy Framework329 gives only broad commitments to
reviewing and modernizing laws and regulations and to developing opera-
tional policies for existing regulatory responsibilities.330
The 2004 aquaculture governance recommendations by the Commis-
sioner for Aquaculture Development, while including a few specific
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regulatory reform suggestions,331 focused largely on non-legal initiatives332
and possible future institutional changes. Three institutional scenarios were
suggested for consideration: giving responsibility for aquaculture develop-
ment to Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada; establishing an aquaculture
agency to provide program and research support to the aquaculture industry;
and continuing DFO lead agency responsibility for aquaculture but opening
up relevant Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada programs to aquaculture.333
A second difficulty in predicting future law/policy reforms is the com-
plexity and state of flux of provincial aquaculture approaches. For example,
the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Offices’ Salmon Aquaculture
Review made forty-nine recommendations relating to aquaculture governance
reform.334 Provinces are at various stages in developing aquaculture policies
and strategies where legal and institutional directions could be clarified.335
A third difficulty in predicting future law and policy developments on,
for example, how strict and perhaps prohibitory regulatory measures should
be is the still limited scientific understanding of the seriousness of risks
posed by marine aquaculture operations and the lack of science-based criteria
for siting decisions and operational standards. A 2004 report of the Com-
missioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of
Commons336 highlighted the significant gaps in scientific knowledge of the
risks and potential effects of salmon aquaculture on wild salmon, particu-
larly in the areas of diseases, sea lice and escapes of farmed salmon from
aquaculture sites.337 All three recent audits relating to salmon aquaculture
emphasized the continuing absence of science-based criteria for site
approvals and waste deposit controls.338
A fourth factor making future law and policy predictions problematic is
the lack of a common societal vision of what sustainable aquaculture
means,339 which is fueled by differing moral and political views.340 Voices for
deregulation and smart regulation,341 along with advocacies for allowing the
aquaculture industry to be substantially subject to self-regulation342 and
market principles,343 are clashing with calls by NGOs, environmentalists
and others for more and stricter controls.344
Whether there should be a new federal aquaculture Act is an especially
charged political issue. While the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Fisheries and Oceans in 2003 recommended enactment of a federal Aqua-
culture Act,345 several committee members expressed dissenting views.346
The Department of Fisheries and Oceans did not respond enthusiastically to
the recommendation and instead noted the need to fully explore the advan-
tages and disadvantages, and various issues such as federal–provincial juris-
dictional interactions and whether the Fisheries Act could be an adequate
basis for developing aquaculture regulations.347
Although there are difficulties in foreseeing the precise nature of future
aquaculture law and policy reforms, the four principles of sustainable devel-
opment discussed in this chapter – integration, precaution, environmental
impact assessment and public participation – do suggest general directions
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for strengthening the legal framework for Canadian aquaculture. While the
details of law and policy reforms will depend on future review initiatives and
political debates, some directions are clear and a number of critical questions
need to be addressed.
Integration
The most likely avenue for enhancing vertical integration between the
federal government and provinces/territories will be the development of a
new framework agreement on aquaculture cooperation, followed by updated
and modernized bilateral aquaculture agreements with each jurisdiction. In
2004, the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development recommended such
an approach.348 Discussions on a national Framework Agreement on Aqua-
culture (FAA) are continuing under the auspices of the Canadian Council of
Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers and their Task Group on Aquaculture.
A target completion date has been set for 2007.349
Integrated coastal planning activities, presently quite fragmented, ad hoc
and particularly limited in Atlantic Canada,350 could be enhanced by further
federal-provincial agreements to cooperate in implementing Canada’s
Oceans Strategy and Action Plan, with one of the four key pillars being
integrated ocean management. Fisheries and Oceans Canada has indicated a
desire to enter into further such agreements, as has already occurred for
British Columbia with the September 2004 signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding Respecting Implementation of Canada’s Ocean Strategy on the Pacific
Coast.351
Regardless of where integration in its various dimensions progresses in
Canada, two fundamental limitations on provincial jurisdiction to regulate
offshore marine aquaculture developments must be faced. Provinces may be
substantially restricted in their offshore jurisdiction to be able to validly
license aquaculture operations only within waters inter fauces terrae and
marine waters historically considered to be part of the province.352 As will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 by Phillip Saunders and Richard Finn,
previous case law places a further potential hurdle in the way of provincial
aquaculture licensing. In the case of A.G. British Columbia v. A.G. Canada
(Re B.C. Fisheries),353 the Privy Council decided that the federal government
has the exclusive right to legislate in relation to the public right of fishing
in the sea, and no public right to fish could be taken away except pursuant
to federal legislation. While provinces can grant property rights over the
beds of tidal waters falling within the province, any such grants that inter-
fere with public rights of fishing would have to be authorized by federal
legislation.354
In light of such provincial jurisdictional restrictions, if Canada wishes to
continue supporting offshore marine aquaculture development, it should
proceed to adopt federal aquaculture legislation for both preparatory and
peremptory reasons.355 With offshore aquaculture technologies quickly
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progressing356 and provincial interests beginning to be expressed over seeing
aquaculture move further offshore,357 Canada should be legislatively pre-
pared to control aquaculture operations beyond provincial boundaries.
Federal legislation authorizing aquaculture operations to interfere with
existing public fishing rights would also likely serve to pre-empt legal chal-
lenges from private parties displaced or hindered in their fishing activities.
Numerous practical questions would need to be addressed in developing
new federal legislation. Whether a stand-alone federal Aquaculture Act358 or
a more comprehensive reform effort – for example, a modernized Aquacul-
ture and Fisheries Act or an expanded Oceans Act – should be adopted is one
key issue.359 How new legislation should be “nested” within the existing
complex array of federal and provincial laws needs to be considered. How
exactly federal–provincial jurisdiction should be addressed is perhaps the
most difficult question, with various options being possible. Those options
include recognizing provincial jurisdiction over aquaculture leasing/
licensing out to 3 nautical miles (historical territorial sea), or 12 nautical
miles (present territorial sea) with federal permits required for significant
interferences with navigation and fishing; federal aquaculture licensing for
areas beyond the territorial sea;360 developing joint aquaculture licensing and
approval arrangements, perhaps modeled on the existing joint
federal–provincial offshore petroleum boards in Atlantic Canada, which were
created by joint accord legislation;361 and leaving jurisdictional details to be
negotiated through federal–provincial MOUs.
Some key questions must also be faced regarding integrated planning. Does
the Oceans Act provide an adequate federal foundation for promoting integrated
management planning? The Act is not clear on how integrated plans might be
given legal force and does not provide incentives or guarantee funding for
provincial and local involvement.362 Is new coastal zone management legisla-
tion needed at the provincial level? Such legislation might ensure clear plan-
ning mandates, adequate funding and enforceable decisions.363
Precaution
Three realities presently stand out in Canada in relation to precaution. First,
the broad statement of federal governmental interpretation of the precau-
tionary approach supports a weak version of the precautionary approach by
not calling for a reversal in the onus of proof in decision-making processes
and by requiring scientific information and evaluation in order to trigger the
approach.364 Second, the federal government has not strenuously sought to
further clarify and discuss implications of the precautionary approach to the
aquaculture sector but has largely given lip service to the principle and been
content to rely on the general federal governmental framework.365 Third, the
provinces have been less than enthusiastic about addressing precaution in
the aquaculture context, with no aquaculture legislation explicitly adopting
the approach, and the principle largely ignored in discussion documents.366
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Perhaps one of the greatest challenges, therefore, is how to open up
bureaucratic and public discussions and debates over some of the numerous
questions raised by the precautionary approach. Those questions include:
1 What is the appropriate role for risk assessment in aquaculture-related
decision-making? The federal Commissioner for Aquaculture Develop-
ment suggested that risk assessment is fundamental to an effective pre-
cautionary approach.367 However, given the limitations of risk
assessment created by scientific uncertainties,368 the assessment of
alternatives arguably should become an aquaculture “mantra.” The focus
might shift towards assessing technological alternatives, to better ensure
ecological, economic and social sustainability.369
2 Who should decide final approval for aquaculture proposals, and who
should ensure that precautionary measures are taken seriously? At both
the federal and provincial levels in Canada, aquaculture approvals are
largely left in the hands of departments that have the conflicting roles of
promoting economic development and ensuring environmental protec-
tion.370 There are a number of possible routes to avoid “capture by
industry” and perceptions of conflict of interest, including the establish-
ment of independent aquaculture licensing boards,371 and ensuring mul-
tiple “checkpoints” by giving veto powers to environmental and health
agencies.
3 What are the appropriate roles for scientific, social and ethical perspec-
tives in precautionary decision-making?372 A number of voices in
Canada are calling for “science-based” decision-making.373 Yet such calls
may be viewed suspiciously by those who are not committed to a tech-
nocratic worldview.374
4 To what extent should government officials rely on learning by doing
(or “adaptive management”), as opposed to prohibiting developments
until applicants can prove that a proposed project will cause no signific-
ant environmental or social harm?
Future discussion on law and policy implications of precaution should be
considered through various fora. For example, DFO might convene work-
shops on the precautionary approach and aquaculture in line with the many
workshops that have already been held in the fisheries management field,375
although greater involvement by NGOs, industry, the public and others
should be encouraged.376 Policy discussions could also be enhanced through
application of strategic environmental assessment to proposed aquaculture
strategies at the provincial level and eventual revision of aquaculture policy
at the federal level.377 Academic institutions in Canada might also play a
greater role in aquaculture law and policy reform discussions, with perhaps
the Ocean Management Research Network (OMRN) facilitating future
research and workshops in the topic area.378
Meanwhile, even though the precautionary approach remains subject to
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ongoing criticisms379 and controversies,380 there are a number of law and
policy directions that should be considered under the principle of precau-
tion. Precaution should be expressly articulated as a guiding principle in all
federal and provincial legislation directly relating to aquaculture,381 so that
administrators, and perhaps even the courts,382 are responsible for working
out the operational details. Pollution prevention in aquaculture should be
encouraged by requiring plans for waste minimization and fish escape pre-
vention as preconditions for licensing.383 The application of existing provi-
sions in Canadian environmental laws to aquaculture should be further
clarified, for example the deleterious deposit and harmful habitat
alteration/disruption offenses under ss. 35 and 36 of the Fisheries Act.384
Monitoring, surveillance and enforcement should be promoted by requiring
that aquaculture operators periodically report fish food, drug and chemical
use; mandating “precautionary inspections” of licensed facilities to ensure
compliance with regulatory and licensing standards; and requiring the
prompt reporting of disease outbreaks. Specific precautionary standards
should be established, such as requiring that there be no measurable adverse
effects outside aquaculture tenure areas;385 setting strict limits on the densi-
ties of cultured stocks and the distances between aquaculture operations;
restricting the use of fish foods to those that are “environmentally
friendly”;386 limiting the quantity and timing of drug and chemical use;387
prohibiting salmonid grow-sites near migratory routes and rivers that
support wild salmon stocks;388 and requiring the use of closed-containment
fish-rearing technologies.389
Environmental impact assessment
Since environmental assessment of marine aquaculture proposals has been
almost completely exempted from provincial processes and subject merely to
screening-level assessments under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
the primary target for EIA law reform logically should be on strengthening
the screening category of assessment. Environmental assessment at the screen-
ing level has already been the subject of considerable criticisms,390 and some of
the reform coordinates that should be considered include mandating public
participation rather than leaving it to the discretion of responsible federal
authorities, setting clear timelines for public comments; requiring written
governmental responses to public comments; and providing for alternative
dispute resolution options such as mediation, fact-finding and arbitration.
Funding for NGO and community participation in screening-level assess-
ments also should be considered.391 An appeal process to allow “checking” of
screening decisions also needs to be seriously considered to ensure decision-
makers have considered all critical questions, including cumulative effects and
potential impacts on endangered or threatened species.392
Broader strengthening of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
should also be considered. Government decisions should be required to
82 D. L. VanderZwaag, G. Chao and M. Covan
include justification that the various sustainability principles have been fol-
lowed, including pollution prevention, the ecosystem approach, intergenera-
tional equity, social equity, and integration, among others.393 A transition
from a self-assessment approach by federal departments and agencies, at
times facing conflicts of interest, also needs to occur, with an arm’s-length
independent assessment agency being one key option.394 Providing for the
issuance of EIA permits that are enforceable regarding any mitigation and
monitoring conditions would be a further strengthening.395
A further critical area for law reform in Canada is strengthening SEA at
both the federal and provincial levels. Given the fundamental importance of
government policies, programs and plans to achieving sustainable develop-
ment, and the rather poor record of SEA to date,396 it seems critical that all
Canadian jurisdictions legally require SEAs with full public participation
ensured.397 It also seems critical that existing policies and plans be subject to
required periodic review that would also be subject to SEA.398
The Report of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development to the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada in 2004 recommended develop-
ment of class-type screenings for aquaculture under EIA for both shellfish
and finfish operations,399 but such a recommendation raises a key question:
to what extent might class screening of aquaculture proposals promote
administrative efficiency over critical environmental and social assessment?
Public participation
While public participation is important both for the development of regula-
tory standards and for citizen-monitoring of aquaculture sites, the most con-
tentious public participation issues relate to public acceptance of proposed
aquaculture sites and facility operations.400 To strengthen public participa-
tion in siting approval and in setting operational conditions, at least five
main avenues should be pursued. (1) Those members of the public concerned
with use conflicts and environmental issues should be guaranteed an ade-
quate opportunity to comment on leasing/licensing applications. (2)
Regional and local aquaculture review committees should be established
where they do not presently exist to advise on aquaculture siting and man-
agement questions.401 (3) Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures
should be provided, such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Indi-
viduals opposed to aquaculture approvals should have the right to request
submission to ADR.402 (4) The right of appeal should be provided to oppon-
ents of leasing/licensing decisions. (5) Priorities for site access by traditional
marine users, riparian landowners, adjacent communities and others should
be clarified, as part of Canada’s commitment to ensure social equity.403
Full implementation of the other three sustainability principles focused
on in this chapter should also enhance public participation. Integrated
coastal/ocean planning promises to involve communities and members of the
public in long-term visioning of what human uses are appropriate and
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should have priority. The precautionary approach encourages discursive
processes that should engage the public in debates over what are acceptable
societal risks.404 EIA opens up proposed projects to public scrutiny and
should be one of the primary avenues for expressing concerns about potential
environmental and social impacts.405
A key question relating to public participation still remains for most
Canadian jurisdictions. Should specific legislation be developed to address
public participation in a broad way, such as an environmental bill of
rights?406
Conclusion
The principles of integration, precaution, environmental impact assessment
and public participation have emerged from international environmental law
with important implications for law and policy reform in Canadian aquacul-
ture. However, the task of putting these principles into practice is still
largely unfinished. For example, none of the five provinces studied has incor-
porated the precautionary principle into aquaculture legislation. While the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans has pledged allegiance to the precau-
tionary approach in various documents, in relation to aquaculture DFO has
yet to go very far beyond general and aspirational commitments.407
For better or worse, environmental crises may drive Canadian aquaculture
law and practice to further implement the principles of environmental sus-
tainability. One such crisis has emerged in British Columbia, where sea lice
infestations from salmon farms near the Broughton archipelago have
allegedly caused the reduction of wild pink salmon spawners. This crisis has
focused public attention and debate on at least two of the principles high-
lighted in this chapter: precaution and integration. For instance, the Pacific
Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (PFRCC), responsible for providing
management advice for protecting wild fish stocks, called for application of
the precautionary approach408 and recommended a number of precautionary
options including imposition of fallowing periods for some farms and devel-
opment of a sea lice control plan.409 In light of emerging environmental and
socio-economic issues, PFRCC has suggested the need for relying on integ-
rated planning.410
Moving from the general principles of sustainable development to better
governance practices will likely be a long and rocky voyage. Swirling cur-
rents must be faced: First Nation claims to offshore title and rights; industry
desires for secure access and regulatory efficiency; non-governmental organi-
zations and public environmental concerns; coastal community calls for pri-
ority in licensing decisions and for empowerment through integrated coastal
planning; bureaucratic calls for scientific rationality;411 and globalization and
foreign investment forces. Canada has just left port in the voyage towards
sustainable aquaculture.412
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4 Property rights in Canadian
aquaculture
A principled approach
Phillip M. Saunders and Richard Finn
Introduction
The 1995 Federal Aquaculture Development Strategy summarized some of the
difficulties facing aquaculture development in a federal state such as Canada,
where the jurisdictional entitlements relevant to this “new” (or at least
newly significant) industry are by no means clear:
Aquaculture is a formidable policy challenge. As a new industry, it
straddles the line between fishing and farming, cuts across significant
regional differences and is placed in a context involving the participa-
tion of municipal, provincial/territorial and federal governments.1
Added to the welter of relevant jurisdictions and departmental mandates is
the complexity introduced by the application of common law principles to
the definition of property rights in aquaculture operations. The fundamental
problem is simply stated: aquaculture as a business depends on some level of
tenure over defined aquatic spaces, but the common law evolved in such a
way that it was not fully suited to the effective allocation of property rights
in these spaces, or for these uses.2 In Wildsmith’s definitive review of the
state of aquaculture law in Canada in 1982, he presented the following
assessment of the state of the law with respect to the property rights under-
lying aquaculture operations:
The single most important legal issue confronting an aquaculturist con-
cerns the nature and extent of his property rights. Every industry (I can
think of no legal exceptions) is premised upon property rights which are
on the whole clear and well-defined. Financing is dependent upon the
security of these rights. Aquaculture is unique in that it depends almost
exclusively on property rights, both real and personal, which are either
structured against the aquaculturist or are equivocal as to his position.
Only where he maintains his stock in artificial structures located on or
in his lands do his rights seem clear.3
Wildsmith went on to note that this was “a matter crying out for legislative
intervention,” and recommended the introduction of legislation that would
include provision for aquaculture leases dealing with both the seabed and
the water column.4 This is precisely what has occurred in the years since
1982. The majority of provinces (and all coastal provinces) have aquaculture
legislation, and in those most actively engaged in aquaculture, there is pro-
vision for some form of lease or analogous entitlement to aquaculture areas,
in addition to licensing requirements.5 The introduction of these arrange-
ments has not, however, answered all of the questions surrounding the
nature of property rights involved in aquaculture in Canada. A 2001 review
of legislative and regulatory issues conducted by the federal Office of the
Commissioner for Aquaculture Development (OCAD) identified a number
of outstanding issues relating to the scope, duration and enforceability of
property entitlements in aquaculture sites and products, and recommended
that improvements be implemented:
Uncertainty . . . exists regarding public rights of access to waters near
aquaculture sites [and] prevention of interference with aquacultural
activities by other users of aquatic resources. . . . It usually takes several
years for aquaculture operations to generate a return on the initial invest-
ment. To become established, the businesses require leases that last for a
period that is relevant to the commercial activity being carried out and
rational, transparent regulatory regimes. Yet, it is unclear what rights and
obligations aquaculturists have under the existing legislative and regulatory
regime, and how these rights and obligations are upheld and enforced.6
What is notable about this assessment is the lack of precision as to the exact
nature of the problem. Where and how do the property rights available
under the existing lease schemes fail to meet the needs of the industry?
What tenure arrangements would satisfy the requirements of the industry,
and will this vary with different types of aquaculture operations? Industry
representatives have noted problems with duration and security of tenure
under existing lease arrangements, but again with little indication of exactly
what would be sufficient.7
These concerns can all be addressed in the context of modifications to the
dominant approach to aquaculture tenure for marine areas in Canada
(described in the following sections), which rests on continued Crown
ownership of submerged lands, and government issuance of leases or similar
instruments granting rights to identified areas. Such measures would seem
to respond, at least in part, to the main property-related requirements for
successful aquaculture:
The single most significant question one must ask about any legal
framework affecting marine aquaculture is: how secure is the interest
that the sea farmer receives from the government? For the interest to
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function as a property interest it should have some or all of the follow-
ing attributes: transferability, duration and renewability, and revocabil-
ity only for failure to perform specified conditions.8
There have also, however, been calls in recent years for the development
of full private property entitlements for aquaculture, with rights equivalent
to terrestrial freehold property, through the “alienation of the Crown’s
rights to the foreshore, the water column, and the seabed analogous to the
way in which land has been alienated for agriculture.”9 These arguments rest
in part on the comparison to agriculture, but also on an ideological convic-
tion that continued government involvement, even to the extent of ultimate
control over the issuance of leasehold rights, is bound to be dysfunctional:
[F]ish farming should be governed by a system of property rights analo-
gous to that which has been so successful in North American agricul-
ture. Like agriculture, aquaculture is culture, and should not be governed
by rules suited to the hunter/gatherer nature of the wild fishery. Above
all, however, property rights would provide the legal framework within
which the economic enterprise of aquaculture could achieve efficiency –
that is, the greatest output for society at the least cost. In the absence of
a strongly entrenched, well-defined, rationally constructed set of indi-
vidual property rights in aquaculture, the assertions of special interests
can be given political force through misinformed public opinion or fail-
ures in government. The structure of the industry itself then becomes
inefficient, inequitable, and dysfunctional in every respect.10
There are a number of difficulties with this argument, including the simple
fact that the present arrangements for aquaculture in Canada are based on
the assignment of property rights, in the form of leases or similar instru-
ments, and not on the common property or open access11 approaches associ-
ated with capture fisheries. At a more fundamental level, however, it must
be remembered that one is not starting with a blank slate: it is inevitable
that aquaculture will often be conducted in an environment shared by a
number of other users.12
These issues tend to be addressed by way of the regulatory system, which
should protect against damage to other resources and uses, and by the devel-
opment of transparent siting and lease approval processes that allow for
other interests to be taken into account.13 At a more fundamental level,
however, it must be remembered that in addition to the existence of other
users, there is a complex structure of legal entitlements, protecting some
(but not all) of their interests, which has existed for hundreds of years. The
displacement of these other interests, whether in full (through privatization)
or at least to a greater degree than at present (through enhancement of exist-
ing lease rights), raises questions of equity and access that cannot simply be
ignored.14
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The debate over property rights for aquaculture, therefore, cannot be
limited to an examination of the functional requirements of aquaculture
alone, and whether they are met by the present system. It must also incorpo-
rate some understanding of the place, and the legal entitlements, of other
interests in the affected marine spaces, and whether the further erosion of
those entitlements is both necessary and feasible. Furthermore, as will be
seen later in the chapter, the management of marine and other aquatic
spaces in Canada engages constitutional doctrines that may affect the valid-
ity of current federal–provincial arrangements. These issues are addressed in
this chapter through consideration of the following legal elements which
combine to create the current structure of marine aquaculture property
rights in Canada, and which must be taken into account in any proposals to
further alter that structure:
• common law rights relevant to the creation of private property interests
in marine and other aquatic areas;
• statutory schemes that have modified the common law position, primar-
ily through the introduction of leasehold arrangements; and
• constitutional doctrines that set limits on the effectiveness of provincial
statutory schemes in establishing private rights to marine areas.
The examination of these issues is followed first by a consideration of their
impact on current lease arrangements, and by a final section that offers a
number of conclusions and recommendations with respect to the policy
implications arising from the legal analysis.
Common law property rights and aquaculture operations
Any consideration of the current state of property rights over aquaculture
sites15 in all provinces except Québec16 must begin with a review of the
status of the relevant areas of water and submerged lands at common law.17
The current statutory framework, which will be dealt with in the “Statutory
responses” section (p. 122) was designed in reaction to the pre-existing situ-
ation at common law, and can only be fully understood by reference back to
the regime it sought to replace or modify. This examination may conve-
niently be divided into two parts: non-tidal and tidal waters. For the pur-
poses of this section, the constitutional issues related to the respective
federal and provincial powers to grant property interests, or to regulate the
exercise of those interests, are put aside, and will be addressed in the “Con-
stitutional issues” section (p. 129).
Non-tidal waters
The legal status of lakes and non-tidal rivers in English common law was
relatively straightforward: the ownership rights of riparian landowners were
118 Phillip M. Saunders and Richard Finn
presumed to extend to the midpoint of the watercourse (ad medium filum
aquae),18 and this ownership of the solum, or soil, extended above and below
the bed of the stream or lake in the same way as property rights on land.19
The ownership rights did not extend to the water itself, or to fish (until cap-
tured), but ownership of the soil did bring with it as an “incident of owner-
ship,” an exclusive right of fishery.20 This right to the fishery could,
however, be alienated from the ownership of the soil, whether as part of the
original grant or by subsequent conveyance.21
In English law, it was clear that there was no public right of navigation
in non-tidal, as opposed to tidal, waters. In Canada, however, non-tidal
waters that were actually navigable came to be treated differently in most
provinces (with the Atlantic region as a possible exception),22 in part because
of a recognition of the different physical circumstances in North America,
but also because of the assignment of the power over navigation and ship-
ping to the federal government, and the need for one consistent regime.23
Public rights of navigation in these waters are recognized, and are “domin-
ant” even over validly granted property rights, unless modified or eliminated
by legislative action:
Nothing short of legislation can take away the public right of naviga-
tion. The Crown in right of the Dominion or of a province cannot
abolish the right in the absence of an authorizing statute. Accordingly, a
Crown grant of land does not and cannot give a right to interfere with
navigation.24
In addition to upholding the public right of navigation, courts have also
found that the ad medium filum aquae presumption did not apply in non-
tidal, navigable waters (again with the possible exception of the Atlantic
region). Thus, riparian owners on these water bodies were not presumed to
own to the midpoint, and any such submerged lands that were not explicitly
included in a grant of land were presumed to be vested in the Crown.25
There have also been some suggestions that in these waters, where the rule
of prima facie Crown ownership was the same as in tidal waters, a “public
right” of fishing might also exist, similar to that in tidal waters.26 It seems
clear, however, that the term “public right” is used in this context to mean a
mere common right of fishing which exists subject to extinguishment, con-
veyance or modification by the Crown. In this, it must be distinguished
from the public right of fishing in tidal waters, which, as will be discussed
in the following section, exists as a “protected” Magna Carta right that
cannot be granted or extinguished by the Crown alone.27
Tidal waters
The basic framework of common law rights to the seabed of the foreshore
and coastal waters dates back to the restraint imposed upon the Crown’s
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exercise of prerogative powers in Magna Carta of 1215.28 Proprietary rights
in the foreshore, and later the seabed of the territorial sea, were normally
vested in the Crown, but were subject to the dominant public rights of
fishing and navigation. Furthermore, the Crown could make private grants
of rights over these submerged areas, but “any private grantees must take
title subject to this overriding public right.”29 This position was clearly
stated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the BC Fisheries
Reference:
Since the decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v. O’Dea, 10
H.L.C. 493, it has been unquestioned law that since Magna Charta no
new exclusive fishery could be created by Royal grant in tidal waters,
and that no public right of fishing in such waters, then existing, can be
taken away without competent legislation.30
The major exceptions to the dominance of the public rights are contained
within the statement of the law set out above. First, if a grant or prescriptive
right of fishery existed pre-Magna Carta, it could be maintained against any
public right to fish. Second, and more relevant to the Canadian situation,
the public rights of navigation and fishing could be modified or extin-
guished by an explicit act of the legislature, but not by the Crown. This
framework of rights was adopted in Canada in both pre- and post-
Confederation cases. In Meisner v. Fanning in 1842, the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia considered a claim to an exclusive fishery in Deep Cove, arising
under a Crown grant. Hill J was prepared to assume for the purposes of
argument that a grant to the seabed in the cove could be made by the
Crown, but denied the possibility of a grant to the waters31 and affirmed the
general proposition respecting the limitation on the Crown’s powers.32 This
view was confirmed in Donnelly v. Vroom et al. in 1907, in which the defen-
dants owned the foreshore as part of a Crown grant of title to their farm.
Their counterclaim against the plaintiffs for the digging and removal of
clams from the foreshore was denied, on the basis that the ownership of the
land did not remove the public right to fish by digging the clams, notwith-
standing the defendants’ own activities in this regard.33 Further, in Belyea v.
City of St. John in 1920, a private lease of the foreshore for purposes of a fish
curing operation was used as the basis for a claim to an exclusive fishery. In
finding against the lessee, the New Brunswick Supreme Court (Appeal Divi-
sion) held as follows:
The settled law of the realm appears to be that . . . [w]ithin the territor-
ial waters, subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, the public, being
subjects of the realm, are entitled to fish, except where the Crown, 
or some subject of the Crown has gained a propriety exclusive of the
public right, or Parliament has restricted the common law rights of the
public.34
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In sum, then, the common law established the following four essential ele-
ments which defined the legal status of tidal waters: (1) title was vested in
the Crown, which could grant that title (in whole or in part) to others; (2)
the Crown rights, and thus the rights of any grantee taking from the Crown,
were subject to the public rights of navigation and fishing; (3) new grants of
exclusive fisheries required action by the legislature; and (4) the legislature
also retained the power to regulate, even to the point of extinguishment, the
rights of the public in common law.
The implications of this general structure for the creation of property
rights in aquaculture operations are significant, though perhaps not entirely
clear in all respects. The basic propositions can be simply stated:
• First, it seems clear that anyone attempting to exert proprietary control
over submerged lands in the tidal areas would be a trespasser, against
either the Crown or any grantee under the Crown’s title, unless they
could show their own grant, or that they fell within the exceptions
noted above.
• Second, it would be possible, given the validity of Crown grants in the
foreshore and other areas, for an aquaculturist to obtain “the right to
occupy these subaquatic lands and the water column by grant, lease, or
license from the Crown, or from a successor in title to the Crown.”35
• Third, despite the validity of such Crown grants, no occupier of these
lands, including the Crown and its grantees, could in the course of their
use and occupation restrict or impede the public rights of fishing and
navigation, and to do so would constitute an enjoinable public nuisance.
• Fourth, the interference with the public rights could nonetheless be
authorized, but only under the authority of an explicit legislative enact-
ment.
If it is assumed, then, that an aquaculture operation requires protection from
interference by others who might otherwise exercise their rights of fishing
and navigation, then legislation would be required, either to make the grant
or lease explicitly effective in that respect, or to otherwise restrict the public
rights in the area by separate regulatory action. It should be remembered,
however, that the grant or lease could be effective against other uses, not
encompassed within the public rights of fishing and navigation. The extent
of public rights was limited to the specific categories, as noted by Parker J
in Lord Fitzhardinge v. Purcell, a case in which the court declined to extend
similar protection to a claimed right of fowling:
[T]he public have no rights in the sea itself except rights of fishing and
navigation and rights ancillary thereto . . . This beneficial ownership of
the Crown, or the Crown’s grantee, can only . . . be considered to be
limited by well known and clearly defined rights on the part of the
public.36
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While protection against duck hunters may not be of great significance, the
principle can be applied to other uses as well.37 If this reasoning were
applied, for example, to the actions of someone fishing inside an enclosed
aquaculture pen for species that were the product of that operation, it could
readily be argued that this was not an exercise of the public right of fishing,
in that it was simply the taking of private property.38
Summary
In sum, the common law allowed for Crown grants of private rights in sub-
merged lands in tidal waters. Such grants could conceivably include rights
to aquaculture sites, given that this is an activity distinct from fishing, and
thus would not constitute a private grant of a fishery (which is beyond the
scope of the Crown’s powers). However, any such Crown grant was subject to
the dominant public rights of fishing and navigation, so that private rights
obtained from the Crown would be ineffective to prevent the continued
exercise of those rights. Only grants made under the authority of explicit
legislative provisions could supersede these public rights. Given that aquacul-
ture sites would generally require this protection, it is assumed that legis-
lative schemes are necessary to provide a sufficiently secure form of tenure.
The common law, then, resulted in a requirement for legislative action to
create effective grants of property rights in marine areas for purposes of aqua-
culture. The general structure and operation of the legislative lease arrange-
ments that have actually been developed in Canada will be considered in the
next section.
Statutory responses
As we have noted, most provinces have legislated to provide for leasehold or
similar rights over aquaculture sites, typically in addition to a separate
license or permit issued for the conduct of aquaculture operations. This
section provides a summary of the main elements of provisions respecting
the legislative grants of property rights in five provinces with significant
interests in marine aquaculture: Newfoundland and Labrador; Prince
Edward Island; Nova Scotia; New Brunswick; and British Columbia. Proce-
dures for the review and processing of applications for tenure, and the
involvement of the federal government, will be dealt with separately at the
end of the section.
Provincial approaches
Newfoundland and Labrador
The Newfoundland and Labrador Aquaculture Act39 makes no provision for
the assignment of leasehold or other property interests in aquaculture sites
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on Crown lands. However, by s. 4(7)(a), no proponent shall be granted an
aquaculture license unless “the proposed licensee owns, leases or otherwise
has a right to occupy the parcel of land comprising the site.” Therefore,
unless the proponent has a private interest in the land at the time of applica-
tion, they must apply for a grant or lease of Crown land under the provisions
of the province’s Lands Act40 when applying for an aquaculture license. A
number of provisions in the Lands Act have a bearing on the grant of land
interests for the purpose of aquaculture.
In s. 2(f), “land” is defined as including “land covered by water, both tidal
and non-tidal, and the water column superjacent to it,” which makes it clear
that the entitlements under a lease can encompass both submerged lands
and the water. The interests that can be obtained over these areas are of three
types: lease,41 grant42 or a license to occupy.43 Given the wording of s. 4(7)(a)
of the Aquaculture Act (quoted above), it would appear that a prospective
licensee could satisfy the requirements by obtaining any of the three forms
of entitlement. However, the policy publicized by the provincial govern-
ment specifies that an applicant for an aquaculture license must have applied
for a Crown lease.44
The Lands Act does not specify the nature of the tenure available under a
lease with respect to such issues as exclusivity, transferability, divisibility,
cancellation and term, although the minister is given wide discretion under
s. 3 to specify any terms and conditions that may be required. However,
with respect to some of these issues, other provisions and policies should be
noted:
• The government has announced a policy of granting aquaculture leases
for a period of 50 years.45
• Section 3(2) of the Aquaculture Regulations46 states that aquaculture
licenses are not transferable, which would render the value of a lease
moot, given the lack of a valid license.
• Powers for the minister to suspend or cancel aquaculture licenses for
failure to comply with terms and conditions are provided in the Aqua-
culture Act.47
• Special provision is made in the Lands Act for the 15-metre strips of
land adjoining lakes, ponds or the seashore. By s. 7(1), in the absence of
an express provision, no lease or grant of Crown lands adjoining the
water bodies includes this area. Furthermore, any such grant must be
made with the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, and
only for specified purposes, which include aquaculture operations (see
s. 7(2)(b)).
In sum, Newfoundland and Labrador relies on the aquaculture licensing pro-
visions for much of the specifics respecting terms and conditions of opera-
tions, and the review process for approval.48 The leasing arrangements are
made under a “generic” lands act, without any aquaculture regulations, and
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as such do not incorporate detailed aquaculture-specific conditions, such as
are found in the legislation of other provinces (although these can be
inserted in leases, on the decision of the minister).
Nova Scotia
In Nova Scotia, the Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act (FCRA) authorizes the
responsible minister to issue aquaculture licenses and leases, both of which
will be required for aquaculture operations on Crown land.49 The Act pro-
vides for the general content of a lease, as well as terms and conditions to
which such leases are subject, including, inter alia, the following:
• By s. 52(1), a lease “shall” be “granted for a specific geographic area,”
“shall” specify the plants and animals to be cultured, and “shall” contain
as attachments those permits and approvals that are required (both
federal and provincial).
• Leases are for a term of ten years, renewable for five-year terms “at the
Minister’s option.” No provision is made with respect to transferability
(s. 52(2)(a)).
• Lessees must submit annual reports to the minister on the lessee’s use or
the productivity of the leased area (s. s. 52(2)(d)).
• With respect to termination, “the lease may be terminated by the
Minister at any time if the lessee breaches any of the terms or conditions
of the lease” (s. 52(2)(g)). In addition, leases may be amended upon
request of the lessee, with approval of the minister (s. 59(1)).
Exclusivity of access is dealt with in s. 52(3), which provides that, other
than where there are restrictions in the lease or legislation, “the holder of an
aquaculture lease has, for aquacultural purposes, the exclusive right to use
the leased sub-aquatic lands and water column.”50 A similar provision in s.
44(3) states that the grant of a license “carries with it the exclusive right to
possession of the water column and sub-aquatic land described in the
licence.”51
New Brunswick
New Brunswick has also adopted a system that provides for both licenses
and leases (for Crown lands), issued under the authority of the Aquaculture
Act.52 Under s. 4, no person is to carry on aquaculture without a license,
licenses being issued under three categories: commercial aquaculture; private
aquaculture; and institutional aquaculture.53 By s. 14(1), the registrar, who
is responsible for issuance of licenses and leases,
shall not issue, renew or amend an aquaculture licence in relation to an
aquaculture site on other than designated aquaculture land unless the
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applicant is the owner or lessee of the aquaculture site and has a right to
occupy the site.
“Designated aquaculture lands” are dealt with in the legislation as follows:
• Section 2 of the Aquaculture Act defines the term as meaning “land under
the administration and control of the Minister that has been designated
by the Minister under section 24 as aquaculture land.”
• Section 24(1) simply gives the minister the power to designate lands
under his administration and control as “designated aquaculture lands.”
• Section 25(1) provides that “the Minister may, in accordance with the
regulations, lease designated aquaculture land for the purposes of aqua-
culture.”
In sum, the minister may only lease “designated aquaculture lands,” but it is
not entirely clear what the significance of that term is, other than that the
minister has chosen to so designate particular areas. By s. 25(2), the minister
has a general power to make an aquaculture lease subject to “such terms,
covenants and conditions as the Minister considers appropriate.” In addition
to this broad discretion, the Act and regulations specify a number of terms
and conditions, including the following:
• Leases are for a term not exceeding 20 years (Act, s. 25(3)(a)).
• Leases may be assigned or transferred, with the consent of the Minister
(Act, s. 25(3)(b)).54
• The lease “conveys the right to the exclusive use of the land covered by
the lease” (Act, s. 25(5)), and “land” is defined in s. 2 to include the
water column.55
• The minister may cancel a lease for a number of reasons, including
failure to abide by any lease or license terms (Act, s. 27(1)).
• Application forms and content are specified (regs., s. 24(3)), and shall
include a site development plan.
• Anyone seeking an aquaculture lease must also submit a license applica-
tion (regs., s. 24(1)).
• Decisions of the registrar respecting leases and licenses may be appealed
to the minister, and a process is set out in the regulations (regs., ss. 32,
33).
In addition to leases, the New Brunswick legislation also provides for a
second category of entitlement: the Aquaculture Occupation Permit (AOP).
The AOP allows the holder to “occupy and use” designated aquaculture
lands, for a period of up to three years, and is not assignable or transferable.56
It is clear that the AOP is intended to create a lower level of property
entitlement than the lease, if only because of the shorter term and lack of
transferability.57
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British Columbia
In British Columbia, as in Newfoundland and Labrador, the licensing and
leasing authorities derive from different statutes, and different forms of
tenure are available, as in New Brunswick. The Fisheries Act58 requires that
any person carrying on aquaculture in the province have a permit. For the
necessary land tenures, applicants deal with the Integrated Land Manage-
ment (ILMB) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, which processes
applications for leases and other entitlements under the Land Act.59 Three
forms of tenure are available to aquaculturists under the Act:60
• Investigative permit. A permit for a term of up to two years, without
exclusive access, “to conduct appraisals, inspections, analyses, invento-
ries, surveys or other investigations of the land or of its natural
resources.”61 According to the applicable policy, these are not usually
used for aquaculture sites.62
• License of Occupation. The License of Occupation63 is the most common
form of tenure granted to aquaculturists operating on Crown land. This
license does not convey an interest that can be registered or mortgaged,
and allows restriction of public access only to the extent necessary to
protect the licensee’s use.64 Initial five-year licenses can be followed by
the most common form of aquaculture tenure in the province, a twenty-
year license of occupation.65
• Lease. Leases are authorized under s. 38 of the Land Act, and offer a
higher degree of tenure, including exclusive use, a thirty-year term and
the right to make modifications and improvements.66 Leases are con-
sidered the exception for aquaculture operations, and are not typically
issued for this purpose.67
The primary form of tenure used for aquaculture in British Columbia, the
License of Occupation, does not appear to offer the same degree of security of
tenure as is available under the legislative schemes in place in the provinces
considered above, with respect to both exclusivity and registration of
the interest. It is, however, considered to be an assignable interest, with
permission.68
Prince Edward Island
Prince Edward Island (PEI) is the only province in which the federal
government, through the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ (DFO’s)
Prince Edward Island Aquaculture Division, administers the licensing and
leasing of aquaculture operations.69 There is little information contained
in the enabling legislation regarding the procedure to be followed in
the issuance of an aquaculture lease, or the nature of the property right
obtained by the proponent, but the details of the leasing scheme are found
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in the Prince Edward Island Aquaculture Leasing Policy of the PEI Aquaculture
Division.70
Under the policy, leases are issued for terms up to twenty-five years, with
options to renew. Within the overall term of the lease, the policy distin-
guishes between a “developmental phase” and a “commercial phase.” In the
former phase, the lessee “will assess the biological and environmental aspects
for a proposed site prior to entering full scale commercial operations.”71
Once the site is fully developed, and obligations under the lease are satisfied,
the lease is in the commercial phase, during which the operation is to be
periodically assessed to ensure compliance with lease conditions. In addition
to the classification of phases, leases are defined with respect to the following
types of operation: a “bottom culture lease” covering use of the seabed to
cultivate designated mollusk species; and a “water column lease,” which is
actually a bottom culture lease with a special permission to use the superja-
cent water column.72
Apart from duration, other terms and conditions of these leases are set out
in the federal provincial memorandum of understanding (MOU),73 and
expanded upon in the Aquaculture Leasing Policy. These include, inter alia,
the following:
• Leases are transferable and assignable (including to lending institu-
tions), and may be sublet, but the permission of the Division is required
for such transactions.74
• Lessees acquire the exclusive rights to species produced within their
sites, but with respect to the issue of exclusivity of access, the policy
refers to the “use of the sea-bed and water column,”75 which could indi-
cate a limited approach to exclusion of other uses, as in the British
Columbia License of Occupation. However, the MOU states that the
coordinating committee established by the agreement can determine
conditions, which could include complete exclusivity.76
The Prince Edward Island policy also includes an aquaculture zoning
system, which divides the province into areas approved or not approved for
consideration for bottom or water culture leases. The zoning exercise that
resulted in the current structure considered potential conflicts with other
uses, as well as the needs of the industry.77
Summary
The provincial schemes that have been outlined here all offer some level of
property rights in aquaculture sites. They do, however, vary significantly on
such key issues as duration, assignability, and exclusivity of access under the
property rights obtained. In some cases, notably those of Prince Edward
Island and British Columbia, there appears to be more recognition of the
possibility of “layering” rights depending on the type of access and use
Property rights in Canadian aquaculture 127
required by a particular operation, so that full exclusivity may not be neces-
sary in all cases.
Review processes and federal involvement
Some of the provincial schemes provide for varying degrees of review
and consultation on licensing and leasing decisions. These provisions are
not the primary focus of this chapter, which is concerned with the actual
proprietary entitlements that result, but it is useful to note some of the pro-
visions currently in place, and to consider the extent of federal agency
involvement.
In Nova Scotia, the Aquaculture Act provides for a review process, in
general terms, which applies to decisions respecting both leases and
licenses.78 The province has established ten Regional Aquaculture Develop-
ment Advisory Committees (RADACs), as provided for in s. 47(b), and is
committed to using these bodies as an integral part of the approval process,
including site approval.79 Recommendations of the RADAC are forwarded
to the minister for consideration.
In New Brunswick, the Aquaculture Act and regulations make some provi-
sion for public review and consultation,80 including a specific requirement in
s. 37(2) that the minister “shall establish advisory committees to advise the
Minister in relation to health standards for aquacultural produce and in rela-
tion to site selection criteria for designated aquaculture land.” More import-
ant than the legislative provisions, however, are the policy guidelines that
have been developed to deal with the application process in general, which
include aspects of relevance to site selection review and lease arrangements.
In particular, the Bay of Fundy Marine Aquaculture Site Allocation Policy
sets up a system of zoning built around Aquaculture Bay Management Areas
(ABMAs).81 Aquaculturists operating in a given ABMA will collaborate
with the government and local management bodies to produce Bay Manage-
ment Agreements (BMAs), which will define operating standards and prac-
tices to be followed in that particular ABMA, including allocation and
review processes.82
In British Columbia, the aquaculture land use policy incorporates two
review processes for applications for tenures. First, the referral process,
which feeds into decision-making, provides a means for consultation
with interested departments and others.83 Second, for more complex
proposals, the Project Review Team (PRT) process is utilized. This intera-
gency group includes relevant federal agencies, and has a more proactive role
to seek out information, consult more generally and make recommen-
dations.84
A common element in the provincial processes, even where it is not
formalized, is the involvement of federal agencies that are required to
give approvals of their own for the aquaculture activity, under their own
regulatory mandates.85 The role of these agencies, however, is largely con-
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fined to the regulation of aquaculture, and does not address the grant of pro-
prietary rights, except indirectly, in that refusal of a permit may prevent the
grant of a lease or other entitlement. Otherwise, it is the provinces (with the
exception of PEI) that have taken the lead on the proprietary aspects of
aquaculture management, consistent with the MOUs86 signed by seven
provinces and territories (including those considered above) and the federal
government.87 The assumption underlying this approach to the grant of
statutory grants of leasehold and other entitlements for aquaculture sites is
that the provinces are constitutionally competent to enact legislation that
provides for the desired degree of certainty and security of tenure over all
potential sites. As will be seen in the following section, this is by no means
clear.
Constitutional Issues
The analysis in the previous section demonstrated that, at least to the extent
that aquaculture operations require authorization to interfere with public
rights of fishing and navigation, or protection from the exercise of those
rights, legislative intervention is required to secure the required level of
property rights,88 and those provinces most involved in aquaculture have
indeed opted for statutory leasehold arrangements or similar mechanisms.
The next obvious question, therefore, is which level of government, federal
or provincial, has the constitutional power under the Constitution Act,
1987,89 to make such legislation, and in what circumstances. More particu-
larly, given the approach taken in the majority of coastal provinces, do those
provinces have the constitutional authority to legislate for aquaculture prop-
erty rights in the manner that they have legislated?
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the heads of federal juris-
diction over regulatory issues that necessarily impinge on the exercise of
provincially granted proprietary rights in aquaculture operations, or to
review the provincial regulation of non-proprietary aspects of aquaculture.90
The concentration here is on the proprietary aspect of aquaculture opera-
tions, rather than on the regulatory control that is exerted over it by both
federal and provincial governments, and it is assumed throughout that both
levels of government have valid jurisdictional interests in other aspects of
the regulation of aquaculture.91 In considering the various relevant heads of
jurisdiction as they may affect the subject of this study – the control over
proprietary aspects of the industry – a number stand out as potentially rele-
vant. At the provincial level, the following legislative powers, all falling
under s. 92, confer extensive control over matters related to property rights
on the provinces:
92 (5) The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to
the Province . . . [in that submerged areas of Crown land may be
conveyed for aquaculture]
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(8) Municipal Institutions in the Province . . . [possibly relevant for
municipal zoning and development control under statute]
(10) Local Works and Undertakings . . .
(13) Property and Civil Rights in the Province . . .
(16) Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in
the Province.92
Of this list, it is “property and civil rights” that has emerged in the case law
as the most important to the definition of provincial powers over property
rights in submerged areas, both tidal and non-tidal.93 At the federal level,
the direct authorization of power over property rights per se in s. 91 is more
limited, but, as we shall see, non-proprietary powers such as navigation and
fisheries have been interpreted as significant limitations on the exercise of
proprietary rights:
91 (1A) The Public Debt and Property . . .
(10) Navigation and Shipping . . .
(12) Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries . . .
(24) Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.94
It is implicit in the discussion above that jurisdiction over property rights
and jurisdiction to legislate respecting an activity are separate concepts, and
indeed this distinction is central to understanding the current structure of
federal and provincial interests in property rights over aquaculture. Accord-
ingly, before we turn to the question of jurisdiction over property rights as
such, it is necessary to consider the significance of this distinction in Cana-
dian constitutional law.
Legislative jurisdiction and proprietary rights
Origin and nature of the distinction
As is indicated above, a fundamental distinction has been drawn in Canadian
constitutional law between legislative jurisdiction and proprietary rights.
That is, the fact that one level of government has been given legislative
jurisdiction over a matter does not imply that it has acquired proprietary
rights over the subject of that legislative control. Equally, the existence of
proprietary rights in the provincial government does not mean that the
assigned legislative powers of the federal level are eliminated.95
In the early post-Confederation case of The Queen v. Robertson,96 the
Supreme Court of Canada considered the relationship between the provincial
power over property and civil rights in the province, and the legislative
jurisdiction of the federal government over sea coast and inland fisheries.
The case involved an attempt by the federal Minister of Marine and Fisheries
to issue an exclusive lease of a fishery in the South West Miramichi River in
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New Brunswick (an area of non-navigable waters). The lease was successfully
contested by the prior holders of a private right in the area in question, and
the grantee of the lease sought compensation from the Crown for the loss of
the rights and other expenses. Ritchie CJ set out a number of fundamental
propositions in his judgment, the first of which concerned the relationship
between federal and provincial powers in general:
[A]s there are many matters involving property and civil rights
expressly reserved to the Dominion Parliament, the power of the local
legislatures must, to a certain extent, be subject to the general and
special powers of the Dominion Parliament. But while the legislative
rights of the local legislature are in this sense subordinate to the rights
of the Dominion Parliament, I think that such latter rights must be
exercised so far as may be consistently with the rights of the local legis-
latures, and therefore the Dominion Parliament would have only the
right to interfere with property and civil rights in so far as such interfer-
ence may be necessary for the purpose of legislating generally and effec-
tually in relation to matters confided to the Parliament of Canada.97
Proceeding from this proposition, which allowed for the coexistence of the
two heads of jurisdiction to the extent possible, Ritchie turned to consider
the nature of the rights in issue in the case. He noted that there was a public
right to float logs on the river, and “a right of passage by canoes &c,” but
found that such a right was “not in the slightest degree inconsistent with an
exclusive right of fishing, or with the rights of the owners of property oppos-
ite their respective lands.”98 In sum, he confirmed that in rivers beyond the
ebb and flow of the tide, the right to fish was not a public right, but a private
right connected to ownership of the soil.99 Building on this common law
distinction, Ritchie went on to note the existence in pre-Confederation New
Brunswick of private rights of the type in question, and of regulatory legis-
lation dealing with fisheries,100 and found that, while the previous regulatory
jurisdiction had been ousted by s. 91(12) of the British North America Act
(BNA Act), no such conclusion could be drawn with respect to the control
over aspects of the fishery dealing with property and civil rights.101
The same position was adopted by the Supreme Court in the 1896 Provin-
cial Fisheries Reference. The judgment of Strong CJ confirmed the decision in
Robertson as it applied to provincial powers over proprietary rights in non-
navigable waters,102 and extended that finding to navigable lakes and rivers
within provincial boundaries,103 including tidal waters.104 In 1898, the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council, in the Ontario Fisheries Reference, fol-
lowed the same approach and acknowledged the same distinction as did the
previous cases.105
The significance of these decisions for the structure of common law rights
has been touched on earlier, and their impact on the grant of property rights
under legislation will be dealt with later, but for the purposes of this section
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it is clear that Robertson, Provincial Fisheries and Ontario Fisheries all proceeded
from the same starting point: that proprietary and regulatory aspects of fish-
eries could be separated, with federal and provincial levels both having valid
constitutional interests under the different spheres.
Implications of the federal regulatory power
The first and most obvious implication for the legal status of aquaculture
operations is that, within the boundaries of the provinces, the assignment of
proprietary interests will fall within the provincial jurisdiction over property
and civil rights (see below). The second point arising from these and other
cases is that, despite the provincial jurisdiction over proprietary issues, the
federal regulatory power over fisheries could be used to restrict, potentially
to a very great extent, the exercise of any property rights held or assigned by
the province.106 It might be argued that cases such as Ontario Fisheries dealt
with fairly direct conflicts between the federal fisheries power and provincial
jurisdiction over property and civil rights, and that they may be less applica-
ble to aquaculture, which is on its face a very different activity from the
traditional fishery encompassed by s. 92(12) of the Constitution Act. These
decisions did not, however, limit their effect to provincial measures that
were purely fisheries related, but clearly extended to any instances where the
valid exercise of the federal power necessarily impinged upon the provincial
proprietary interest. In sum, then, a provincial proprietary grant would be
effective, up to the point that it collided with the valid exercise of a federal
regulatory power.
It is assumed, for the purposes of this chapter, that any private exercise of
property rights granted under provincial legislation is subject to extensive
federal regulation.107 Given that general context, the next section considers
how the provincial power over the proprietary aspect of aquaculture has been
structured and limited, apart from the general federal regulatory involve-
ment. In addition, the significance of federal jurisdiction over proprietary
aspects of aquaculture in non-provincial waters is examined.
Jurisdiction to legislate property rights
Delineation of constitutional jurisdiction over property rights in aquaculture
sites requires consideration of three separate legal regimes, defined with ref-
erence to the following categories of waters: non-tidal waters in a province;
tidal waters within a province; and waters outside any province. This divi-
sion is necessary in part because of the common law principles related to
public rights of fishing and navigation, as discussed earlier, and in part
because of the structure of territorial jurisdiction under the constitution.
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Non-tidal waters in a province
The early cases of Robertson, Provincial Fisheries and Ontario Fisheries, referred
to earlier, confirmed that provinces generally have jurisdiction over propri-
etary rights in non-tidal areas within the province. As the Supreme Court
found in Provincial Fisheries, all waters (tidal and non-tidal) within the
provinces at the time of Confederation were vested in the Crown in right of
the provinces, except to the extent that they were subject to other existing
grants or specific exceptions within the constitution itself.108
There are at least three central points that emerge from this general
proposition, and from the other cases discussed above, respecting the provin-
cial entitlements. First, areas that were “ungranted” (and not within some
category of federal lands) would be held by the Crown in right of the
province. Second, where there were pre-existing private rights over the sub-
merged areas in question, whether by operation of riparian entitlements or
by explicit Crown grant, those rights survived as private entitlements.
Third, and critically important for the development of aquaculture rights,
the Crown in right of the province could, by virtue of its power over prop-
erty and civil rights, make new grants over these areas, whether by lease or
by other form of grant. Similarly, the Crown could modify or remove rights
gained under existing grants. There are, however, a number of exceptions
and limitations to these powers that must be considered.
Perhaps the most significant restriction on the provincial power concerns
lands within the provinces that fell under federal jurisdiction by virtue of
the Constitution Act itself. To begin, the general power under s. 91(1A) to
legislate in respect of public property has been interpreted quite broadly,
and represents a significant potential source of federal power over proprietary
aspects of aquaculture within the provinces.109
This position was clearly stated in the BC Fisheries case, in which the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found, inter alia, that certain lands
of the “Railway Belt” (including river waters) had been conveyed from the
Province to the Dominion, as part of the agreement for the building of the
Canadian Pacific Railway.110 For the non-tidal waters of the Fraser River and
other bodies of water within the Provinces, the conveyance of the property
right meant that the federal government stood in the position that would
otherwise have been occupied by the Province, insofar as the control over
proprietary rights such as fisheries was concerned.111
Further issues arise in dealing with non-tidal waters that are actually navi-
gable. As was noted earlier, in at least some, if not all, provinces, the public
right of navigation has been extended to non-tidal navigable waters (unlike
the approach taken in England). It has also been suggested, as noted above,
that there may be a “public right” of fishing in such waters. As was argued
above, however, the reference to a “public right” of fishing was not a “pro-
tected” Magna Carta right as found in tidal waters, but merely a common
right to fish that could be modified or extinguished by a grant of private
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right by the Crown, with or without legislation. The impact of such a
“right” is simply to shift ownership rights from the riparian to the provin-
cial Crown, not to the federal Crown, and the provincial Crown can freely
grant both the lands and any fishing rights, unimpeded by Magna Carta
rights.
With respect to navigation rights, the position is different. Unlike
fishing, which may involve both proprietary elements and use rights, the
interest in navigation is of the nature of a right of passage or an easement,
maintainable even against the owner of the bed.112 The resulting irrelevance
of the proprietary aspect removes the claim to jurisdiction that supports
provincial involvement in the property aspects of fisheries, and the position
of navigation rights in non-tidal waters is thus analogous to the status of
both navigation and fisheries in tidal waters: a “dominant” right that cannot
be interfered with by Crown grant, but only by legislative intervention.
Once it is accepted that legislative action is required, it seems clear, as
stated by La Forest, that such legislation must be federal, given the power
over navigation and shipping.113
In sum, any provincial grants in areas of navigable waters would certainly
be subject to the federal regulatory power over navigation and shipping,
though not to the extent of a federal interest in the proprietary aspect of the
submerged lands, which remains provincial. This coexistence of interests
means that any private actor wishing to develop a work or undertaking that
interferes with navigation in non-tidal waters would require a grant of prop-
erty rights from the provincial government, and a statutory authorization for
the interference with navigation from the federal government.114 Indeed,
this was the basic scheme of rights and requirements identified as early as
the Provincial Fisheries case, in which it was made clear that a grantee under
the province could build a structure in navigable waters, operating under
their property rights granted by the provincial Crown, but such activities
would of course be subject to federal statutory authorization.115
Tidal waters in a province
The status of tidal waters within the boundaries of a province is similar to
that of other provincial waters insofar as the granting of property rights is
concerned: the river or seabed in these areas may be privately owned, but in
the absence of other owners (including the federal Crown), title is in the
provincial Crown, and issues relating to property and civil rights are within
the jurisdiction of the provincial government.116 The general position, which
is to treat tidal waters on the same footing as non-tidal waters for purposes
of determining proprietary interests, was stated in Provincial Fisheries,117 in
which it was held that ungranted submerged lands in “all lakes, rivers,
public harbours and other waters within the territorial limits” of the
provinces were vested in the provincial Crowns.118 Ritchie CJC went on to
make it absolutely clear that “other waters” included tidal waters.119
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Apart from the impact of aboriginal and treaty rights,120 the most
significant limitation on property rights within these waters arises from
the existence of the public rights of navigation and fishing and the subor-
dination of any private property interest to the dominant public rights,
save for cases in which the legislature has acted either to make the private
grant, or to limit the exercise of the public right. From the constitutional
perspective, the jurisdiction to grant property rights remains in the
province, but the critical question is which legislature has the jurisdiction
to authorize any resulting interference with the identified public rights.
For navigation, the answer for tidal waters is the same as for non-tidal nav-
igable waters: only the federal Parliament has the power to remove or
limit these rights. In the case of public fishing rights, one might expect a
different answer, given that the grant of rights in the fishery has a propri-
etary aspect that does not apply to navigation, and that that proprietary
element must be provincial. That is, it could be argued that it is within
the competence of the provincial legislatures to modify or eliminate a
public right of fishing within their territory, subject of course to regula-
tion of the fishery by the federal government.121 This approach was,
however, rejected by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the
BC Fisheries case in 1913, which found that the control of public fishing in
tidal waters, including grants of new exclusive rights in fisheries, was ultra
vires the provincial legislature.122 In light of the centrality of these waters
to aquaculture operations, and the significance of the proprietary issues to
the relevant lease schemes, it is important to consider the rationale for this
decision in some detail.
Viscount Haldane proceeded from the fundamental proposition that the
right of fishing in tidal waters was distinguished from that in non-tidal
waters by the fact that it was not a matter of property at all, in that the right
of fishing in these waters was a public right and was not an incident of
ownership of the land.123 Thus, the Privy Council’s previous decision in
Ontario Fisheries, which recognized the provincial jurisdiction over propri-
etary aspects of fishery rights, was distinguished as irrelevant, and a different
analysis put forth for tidal waters:
The decision . . . does not, in their Lordships’ opinion, affect the
decision in the present case. Neither in 1867, nor at the date when
British Columbia became a member of the Federation, was fishing in
tidal waters a matter of property. It was open equally to all the public,
and, therefore, when, by sec. 91, sea coast and inland fisheries were
placed under the exclusive legislative authority of the Dominion Parlia-
ment, there was in the case of fishing in tidal waters nothing left in the
domain of the provincial legislature. The right being a public one, all
that could be done was to regulate its exercise, and the exclusive power
of regulation was placed in the Dominion Parliament.124
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This reasoning was extended to cover any and all interference by the provin-
cial legislature, whether by regulatory action or by the grant of exclusive
rights to individuals:
Interference with it [the right], whether in the form of direct regula-
tion, or by the grant of exclusive or partially exclusive rights to indi-
viduals or classes of individuals, cannot be within the power of the
province, which is excluded from general legislation with respect to sea
coast and inland fisheries.125
While the prohibition from direct regulation of fisheries is clear enough,
there are a number of queries that might be raised about the logic of the rea-
soning related to the grant of exclusive rights. First, while fishing in tidal
waters may indeed have been something generally open to the public, it was,
even under the Magna Carta restriction, possible to create a private or
exclusive right of fishery by explicit act of the legislature. If that power to
affect property rights (i.e. to create them) rested in the provincial legis-
latures at Confederation, why would it not have survived, as did the same
power in non-tidal waters (despite the presence of the federal regulatory
power in those waters as well)? Second, and related to this point, the
decision seems to assume that only if the right of fishing is seen as a matter
of “property” could it come within the jurisdiction of the provincial legis-
lature. However, if the public right of fishing itself was considered to be a
matter of “civil rights” within the province, would it not have come within
the scope of “property and civil rights”? Haldane, however, advanced an
additional justification for full federal control, based on the fact that non-
residents of the province may have access to the right of fishing:
The right to fish is . . . a public right of the same character as that
enjoyed by the public on the open seas. A right of this kind is not an
incident of property, and is not confined to the subjects of the Crown
who are under the jurisdiction of the province.126
One might have thought that the exercise of the right in the territory of a
province would have placed these subjects “under the jurisdiction” of that
province, at least for these purposes. Elsewhere in the decision, however, the
same point was made in slightly different words: “It was most natural that
this should be done [i.e. assigning full jurisdiction to the federal level],
seeing that these rights are the rights of the public in general and in no way
special to the inhabitants of the province.”127 This argument is also less than
convincing: it is not clear why the pre-Confederation jurisdiction of the
provincial legislature to grant exclusive fisheries would not have extended,
within the territory of the Province, to individuals from outside who have
come into the province. Similarly, no clear argument is presented as to why
this territorial jurisdiction could not have been continued.
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Whatever qualms one may have about the quality of the reasoning in this
case and the subsequent Québec Fisheries case, which took the same approach,
the argument is now moot. It is, however, important to understand the
limits of these decisions insofar as they affect the ability of the provinces to
make private grants in tidal areas within their boundaries. There is nothing
in either decision to suggest that provinces cannot make grants of private
rights in these areas, so long as they avoid the two intrusions on federal
jurisdiction identified in both cases: an actual grant of an exclusive fishery;
or any other grant that has the effect of interfering with the public right of
fishing or the regulation of that right.
Thus, in BC Fisheries Haldane noted in obiter that the situation would be
quite different for provincial grants of “fishing” rights based on “kiddles,
weirs or other engines fixed to the soil” that would “involve a use of the
solum which, according to English law, cannot be vested in the public, but
must belong either to the Crown or some private owner.”128 In Québec Fish-
eries, this issue arose again, and Haldane confirmed the ability of the
province to make such a grant, even for an activity so closely tied to fishing,
so long as it was not strictly within the definition of the true public right of
fishing. In such cases, however, the limits related to provincial interference
with the public right of fishing still obtained:
In so far as the soil is vested in the Crown in right of the Province, the
Government of the Province has the exclusive power to grant the right
to fix engines to the solum, so far as such engines and the affixing of
them do not interfere with the right of the public to fish, or prevent the
regulation of the right of fishing by private persons without the aid of
such engines.129
At the same time, of course, the federal Parliament was still restricted from
granting proprietary rights, and from exercising its regulatory power “to
deprive the Crown in right of the Province or private persons of proprietary
rights where they possess them.”130 The result, as was frankly acknowledged
in these two decisions, was to create a bifurcated power where there had
been a unity, so that, as in non-tidal waters, most grants of private rights
would require action by both levels of government to be effective.131
Waters outside any province
The fundamental basis of provincial jurisdiction under the Constitution is
territorial in nature, and the enumerated powers, including property and
civil rights, are explicitly limited in effect to the territory of the several
provinces.132 Thus, as Wildsmith concluded in 1982, in marine areas of
federal jurisdiction outside the provinces, the legal status is clear: “The
conduct of aquaculture in those areas is clearly a matter for federal control in
its entirety.”133 This applies equally to regulatory and proprietary aspects of
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aquaculture and is subject, of course, to the limitations relating to public
rights of fishing and navigation, and aboriginal and treaty rights. The
impact of this legal status on the validity of current approaches to leasing
arrangements will be dealt with later, but it is useful here to consider the
preliminary question of where the boundaries between federal and provincial
waters can be found.
The territorial extent of a province includes all of those areas that it
brought into Confederation; that is, the extent of the former colony defines
the geographical scope of the province.134 With respect to marine areas,
including submerged lands, the general position in British law at the time
of Confederation was that the realm, and thus any colony, ended at the low-
water mark, in the absence of a legislative enactment to the contrary, and
subject to certain exceptions.135 The exceptions included “waters inter fauces
terrae (i.e. “within the jaws of the land”), which the common law considered
to be . . . within the realm of England.”136 These waters would include bays and
estuaries, and possibly straits, but the term is by no means precise and is
subject to examination on a case-by-case basis. In sum, coastal waters and sub-
merged lands subject to potential claims by a province could be brought within
the province either as part of the general exception, depending on the criteria
applied, or by identification of a positive act of the legislature under British
rule, as the question was put by the majority in the Georgia Strait Reference:
In order to succeed . . . British Columbia must demonstrate that prior to
Confederation either the lands and waters in question were “within the
realm” as that term is used in R. v. Keyn or else that by some overt act
Britain incorporated them into the territory of the Colony of British
Columbia.137
In that case, British Columbia was able to identify an “overt act,” but the
central point arising from this and the other cases138 is that the status of a
particular area of water and submerged lands will be dependent on an analy-
sis of its geographical configuration and legal history, all aimed at determin-
ing whether it was part of the previous colonial territory prior to
Confederation. The result is that the determination of the precise status of
many areas of coastal waters is ill defined, and could require close examina-
tion and possible litigation to determine,139 in the absence of some more
general settlement of the issues with the provinces.140
Other limitations on legislative jurisdiction over property rights
Before we turn to the application of the common law and constitutional
principles to existing lease arrangements, it is necessary to briefly note two
other general limitations on the jurisdiction of the provincial and federal
governments to make grants of property rights in non-tidal and marine
areas: aboriginal and treaty rights, and international law.
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First, aboriginal and treaty rights, given their constitutional status,141 can
limit or exclude the exercise of federal and provincial legislative powers over
fisheries and other relevant natural resources, and it is the exercise of those
powers (or of the Crown prerogative) that enables the governments to create
new property rights in aquaculture operations. Thus, the presence of aborig-
inal entitlements, whether through treaties or through aboriginal rights,
must stand as a limitation on the ability of federal or provincial govern-
ments to issue leasehold rights in any affected areas, if only by virtue of a
duty to consult in advance.142 This complex area of law, which is still evolv-
ing, is the subject of Chapter 8 of this volume, and thus will not be
addressed here.
Canada is also subject to various obligations at international law which
may be of relevance to aquaculture sites located outside internal waters,
whether in the territorial sea or in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
should operations eventually be sited further offshore.143 Relevant obliga-
tions could include the requirement to respect rights of innocent passage in
the territorial sea, and the broader navigational rights of other states in the
EEZ.144 In addition, there are more vaguely stated obligations with respect
to preservation and protection of the marine environment that may come
into play, particularly in the EEZ.145 For the purposes of this chapter,
however, the primary relevance of these obligations is the additional support
they give to the assertion of federal jurisdiction, certainly in marine waters,
and to a lesser degree in non-tidal waters, to the extent that they engage
Canada’s international obligations.146
Impact on aquaculture lease arrangements
Summary of jurisdictional structure
Allowing for the areas of doubt that have been addressed in the preceding
sections, it is possible to summarize federal and provincial powers to create
property entitlements over aquaculture sites, and to identify the main
potential problem areas that arise when those powers are compared to the
leasing and other arrangements discussed in the subsection “Tidal waters”
(p. 134). The examination to this point suggests the following general juris-
dictional structure with respect to the issuance of property rights in aqua-
culture sites in Canada.
Non-tidal waters in a province
• The provinces have the power under common law to grant property
entitlements over the beds of non-tidal waters within their territory
(including the zone above the beds). Such grants could be made by the
Crown with or without legislation, although removal of pre-existing
rights (including riparian rights) may require legislation.
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• Any such grants would be subject to the government’s constitutional
obligations with respect to aboriginal and treaty rights.
• The exercise of property rights is subject to federal regulatory jurisdic-
tion, particularly over fisheries and navigable waters.
• Any interference with navigation rights can only be justified by legis-
lative authority, and that authority must be federal.
Tidal waters in a province
• A provincial Crown, with or without legislation, may make grants of
property rights over the bed of tidal waters that fall within the province.
• Such grants are, as with non-tidal waters, subject to aboriginal entitle-
ments and the paramount federal regulatory power over matters within
federal jurisdiction.
• Any grant that interferes with the public rights of fishing or navigation
must be authorized by legislation, and that legislation must be federal.
Waters Outside Any Province
• The federal Crown may make grants of property entitlements to the bed
of waters outside the provinces, and such grants could be made with or
without legislative authority.
• However, where such grants interfere with the exercise of the public
rights of fishing and navigation, the federal Crown cannot act in its pre-
rogative, but must be acting pursuant to legislative authority.
• The federal ability to make such grants is also subject to any aboriginal
entitlements, and to the international law obligations to which Canada
is subject.
Application to the present leasing system
When the general propositions set out above are considered in the light of
the existing statutory approach to aquaculture leases in the provinces
considered earlier (with the exception of Prince Edward Island), a number 
of potential problem areas of varying degrees of significance become
apparent.147
Waters within provinces
The first general area concerns the extent to which the grant of leases or
other tenures inside the provinces may interfere with matters within federal
jurisdiction. For sites within provincial, non-tidal waters, this issue appears
to have been adequately addressed by the requirements for compliance with
federal regulations, including the referral of sites for federal review and the
necessity of acquiring relevant federal permits.148 That is, consistent with
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the various cases that have addressed the issue, the current scheme allows the
(provincial) proprietary interest to coexist with the additional (federal) regu-
latory power, particularly with respect to fisheries and navigation.
Tidal waters and the problem of public rights
In tidal waters within the provinces, however, the situation is more
complex. The provincial ability to control proprietary interests remains
unquestioned, and the federal regulatory powers are fully acknowledged, as
reflected in the requirements for permits under the Navigable Waters Protec-
tion Act (NWPA)149 and the Fisheries Act.150 Nonetheless, the existence of the
public right of fishing in the tidal areas fundamentally changes the legal
situation in a manner that is not fully addressed in the current law. Respect
for the public rights of fishing and navigation requires something more than
mere provincial avoidance of conflict or incompatibility with federal regula-
tory powers; to the extent that a provincial grant in tidal waters interferes
with either of the public rights, it requires positive authorization under a
legislative enactment, and that enactment must be federal. That is, the
rights involved reside with the public, and raise questions beyond disputes
over constitutional authority.
For navigation, the power under s. 5 of the NWPA is explicit in granting
the federal government authority to permit interference with rights of navi-
gation, and so long as permits under this section are issued where relevant,
there seems no question that any authorized works will be legally justified
with respect to interferences with navigation.151 For fisheries, however, the
issue is more complicated. As a starting point, it seems clear that if a grantee
holds no federal authorization, under either a lease or another form of permit
(as with the NWPA for navigation), then any resultant interference with the
public right of fishing is simply a public nuisance, for which an action could
be brought by members of the public.152 The question, then, is whether or
not the current system provides for adequate federal authorization to prevent
the activity being considered an enjoinable nuisance.153 The primary federal
aquaculture approval of relevance to fisheries is a permit under s. 35 of the
federal Fisheries Act, dealing with the alteration of fish habitat:
35. (1) No person shall carry on any work or undertaking that results
in the harmful alteration, disruption or destruction of fish
habitat.
(2) No person contravenes subsection (1) by causing the alteration,
disruption or destruction of fish habitat by any means or under
any conditions authorized by the Minister or under regulations
made by the Governor in Council under this Act.154
This section does not seem to constitute an authorization for interference
with the public right of fishing in any but the most indirect way, but is
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rather directed to the regulatory aspect of the federal government’s control
over fisheries in general, through protection of fish habitat. By contrast, the
entire purpose of s. 5 of the NWPA is to permit works that would otherwise
constitute an interference with navigation.
The federal aquaculture policy does require consideration of “utilization
by other groups,” including the traditional fishery and aboriginal fisheries,
during the review process for aquaculture siting,155 but it seems clear that a
policy requirement cannot substitute for an explicit legislative authorization
for an abrogation of the public right of fishing. In any event, the federal
position is equivocal on whether or not its approval is even mandated:
As a result of the existing regulatory regime, in most provinces, the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has legal authority by virtue of the
Fisheries Act, for fisheries management reasons, to be consulted on and to
provide recommendations regarding the issuance or expansion of leases
issued by Provinces. These recommendations and/or advice will be taken
into account by the provincial leasing authority. Considering the
wording in the relevant regulations, DFO’s approval of the provincial
lease, based on fisheries management considerations, in most
cases, is not required.156
This assessment may be correct from the perspective of DFO’s regulatory
mandate, but it raises problems for the proprietary aspect of the leasing
schemes. It would appear that for many leases in provincial tidal waters, pre-
sumably including some that interfere with public rights of fishing, the
federal government acknowledges no regulatory requirement to authorize the
private interference with the public right, despite the fact that it may be
consulted and regulate “for fisheries management reasons.” However, the
exclusivity provisions of some provincial lease schemes, which are supported
by the MOUs referred to earlier, are intended to provide for an exclusion of
the public right of fishing. The federal input to this legislative grant of pro-
prietary rights (leaving aside regulatory involvement) consists of some par-
ticipation in the siting approval process157 and possible, but not mandatory,
permit issuance. The difficulty with this approach, again from the narrow
perspective of the property rights involved, is that it seems to rely on a dele-
gation of federal powers that may be constitutionally invalid.
The delegation “solution”
It has long been accepted in Canada that one level of government can dele-
gate administrative powers to another, and this is frequently done by way of
government-to-government MOUs, or similar documents. While such
agreements have been found to be valid, it is clear that delegation of legis-
lative powers is not permitted, in that the parties would otherwise essentially
be amending the constitutional distribution of legislative powers by way of
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a non-constitutional agreement.158 Thus, any such delegation from the
federal level should be based on a clear legislative enactment, the adminis-
tration of which is then delegated to the provincial authority. In cases where
management of freshwater (and some coastal) fisheries has been delegated to
provinces, the legislative provisions are still federal.159
While there may be some scope for allowing discretion or latitude in the
hands of the provincial authority to which the power is delegated,160 there
must still be a legislative basis for the delegation. With respect to interfer-
ence with the public right of fishing, it seems clear that any authorization of
such interference must have an explicit legislative origin, and cannot be a
purely administrative matter within some larger scheme. This would be true
of the delegation of leasing authority from the federal level to the provinces
(for extra-provincial waters), and similarly to any delegation of leasing
authority to the federal government in provincial waters (as in the case of
Prince Edward Island). The courts’ treatment of Magna Carta rights in tidal
waters, which prohibits the Crown from acting without legislative author-
ity, would make any other characterization impossible.
If the federal Parliament had enacted a lease scheme, the administration
of which was then delegated to the provinces via MOUs, that would clearly
be an acceptable structure.161 The question here is whether there is anything
in the Fisheries Act, the most directly relevant federal legislation, that could
be seen as accomplishing this same purpose. There are at least four sections
that might be relevant.
• Section 7 of the Fisheries Act provides for the issuance of “licenses and
leases for fisheries and fishing,” wherever no exclusive right of fishing
exists. This section, however, restricts the purposes of such leases and
licenses to “fisheries and fishing,” which does not encompass aquacul-
ture,162 and s. 3(1) specifically excludes any grant of exclusive fisheries
“in property belonging to a province.”
• Section 57 provides that the minister “may authorize any river or other
water to be set apart for the natural or artificial propagation of fish.” It is
unclear whether this is meant to be restricted to sanctuary and hatchery
operations; that is, for the “propagation” of fish in the natural environ-
ment. In any event, it does not appear to have been used for the purpose
of permitting aquaculture, and is not explicit with respect to the impact
on public rights.
• Section 58 authorizes the minister to issue leases and licenses to “plant”
or “form” oyster beds, and provides that “the holder of any such license
or lease has the exclusive right to the oysters produced or found on the
beds within the limits of the licence or lease.” The reference to exclusiv-
ity, however, is only to the use of the oysters, and the tenure granted
under the lease or license might be limited to the stated purpose of
oyster culture, which need not exclude public fishing.
• Section 59(1) does provide for the delegation of leasing powers to
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provinces,163 but only for the culture of oysters, and only for waters
within the province in question. As with s. 58, the rights accorded do
not explicitly remove the public right of fishing in the lease area (except
to the extent of according exclusive rights over all oysters, cultured or
not). Similarly, the rights do not appear to extend to exclusive use of the
site.
None of these provisions provides for the extent of exclusive use and occupa-
tion set out in some provincial schemes, nor for the range of operations that
must be accommodated, and they are thus unlikely to be effective as a legis-
lative delegation allowing for the resultant intrusion on the public right of
fishing. In any event, the legislative authority for the existing MOUs, which
purport to carry out the delegation of powers to the provinces, is not based
on these provisions. The most recent MOU between Nova Scotia and the
federal government is made (by Canada) on the authority of an Order in
Council164 under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act, which allows the
minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, “to enter into agree-
ments with the government of any province or any agency thereof respecting
the carrying out of programs for which the Minister is responsible.”165 It
does not seem likely that the “carrying out of programs” would be a suffi-
ciently explicit legislative authority for removal of the public rights in ques-
tion.166
The situation in Prince Edward Island is, of course, quite different. Here
the question is not the extent of provincial authority, but simply whether
the federal government has sufficient legislative authority to act so as to
restrict or exclude the public right of fishing. As was noted earlier, in
“Statutory Responses,” the 1928 and 1987 MOUs purport to authorize the
federal government to issue leases within the province, but an intergovern-
mental agreement cannot be legislative authority for anything, let alone
removal of the public right of fishing. The federal legislative basis for
issuing leases is clear for oysters under s. 58 of the Fisheries Act (see earlier),
but what of other forms of aquaculture? It may be argued, as already noted,
that the power under s. 57 is sufficient, but this is by no means clear.
General regulation under the Fisheries Act
If it is accepted that the provincial leases and other tenures may be ineffec-
tive in ensuring exclusivity as against anyone exercising a public right of
fishing, an alternative solution is to rely upon the federal power over fish-
eries, and the licensing provisions of the Fisheries Act, to impose the neces-
sary removal of public rights in provincially leased aquaculture areas,
whether by specific regulation or by inclusion of license terms. Two issues
arise: could the federal government validly legislate to provide the necessary
protection to the leasehold areas; and second, does the Fisheries Act currently
provide for the removal of public rights on this basis?
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On the first question, the answer would seem to be that the requisite
authority does exist. In the early cases, as noted earlier, it was established
that the scope of federal legislation could be extremely broad insofar as it
affected provincial jurisdiction,167 even though it was, in tidal waters in the
provinces, always limited to the regulation of the public, and not the propri-
etary rights.168 The general approach that was applied up to the 1970s and
1980s was focused on a concept of “protection and preservation” as the basis
of management, which could be taken as narrowing the federal power as
applied within the provinces.169 As Meany points out, however, this test
arose primarily in the context of potential conflicts with provincial powers,
and has been found to be less useful where the issue is the breadth of the
federal power in the absence of such conflict. Thus, the courts have found
that the federal power over fisheries can extend to the establishment of “close
times for catching fish not only for the purpose of conservation, but also for
socioeconomic purposes, such as allocation.”170 In a similar vein, sector man-
agement rules restricting the operations of vessel types to certain areas were
found to be valid, even though they were “directed at the socioeconomic
conditions of fishermen.”171 In sum, the federal power, where it does not run
up against valid provincial jurisdiction, must be seen as quite extensive.172 If
this reasoning is applied to the situation of aquaculture in tidal waters
within the province, the first and most obvious point is that the regulation
of the public right of fishing has been found to be entirely within the juris-
diction of the federal government, as has already been discussed. This
removes the only constitutional impediment, and leaves it to the Dominion
Parliament to regulate the matter as it sees fit.
The second question, whether the Fisheries Act currently provides for the
desired removal of the public right, is more problematic. There is no ques-
tion that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has a very high degree of dis-
cretion in the issuance or refusal of fishing licenses, and is statutorily
authorized to impose a wide range of conditions by regulation, which could
almost certainly extend to prohibitions on fishing within specified areas or
types of areas (such as leased aquaculture sites). The minister’s discretion
may be nearly absolute, but some limited challenges may be possible.
In Alford v. Canada, Brenner J of the British Columbia Supreme Court
considered a challenge by commercial fishers to the federal issuance of com-
munal aboriginal fishing licenses, based, inter alia, on a claim that the
licenses constituted a grant of exclusive fishery without parliamentary
authorization, in that neither the Constitution nor statute had given the
minister this power.173 At the heart of this argument was the contention
that the public right to fish had been regulated, but never extinguished, by
federal legislation (the Fisheries Act):
The plaintiffs say that the public right to fish has not been extinguished
in Canada, it has only been regulated, just as the aboriginal right to fish
was found to be merely regulated and not extinguished in R. v.
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Sparrow. . . . The plaintiffs contend that the Minister, by granting an
exclusive right to the fishery to aboriginal fishers, has violated the
public right to fish and that, assuming the latter is a common law and
not a constitutional right, so “privatizing” the public fishery would take
nothing less than a statute specifically doing so. In particular, regulation
and exercise of ministerial discretion are not enough.174
The defendant Attorney General applied to have the action dismissed as dis-
closing no cause of action, but the court accepted the existence of a public
right to fish which “cannot be interfered with except by statute,”175 and
further found that it was “not plain and obvious that the public right to fish
had been extinguished by competent federal legislation.”176 The low stan-
dard of proof required of the plaintiff on an application for dismissal obvi-
ously limits the usefulness of this decision, but the basic approach of
requiring some proof of extinguishment of the right in question may be of
assistance, particularly when the nature of the current problem is considered.
In Alford, the plaintiffs were in the position of having to challenge the valid-
ity of a minister’s positive grant or licenses to others, a difficult task given
the breadth of discretion afforded the minister under the Fisheries Act. If,
however, we assume that a challenge to a private aquaculture site arises from
a claim by a fisher or fishers against the leaseholder, the following line of
argument could be put forward:
• Any private interference with the public rights of fishing or navigation
in tidal waters, even by a grantee from the Crown, is an actionable
public nuisance unless it can be shown that it was explicitly authorized
by legislation.177
• The provincial lease cannot serve as the requisite authorization, as it is
merely a provincial grant of proprietary rights, and action by the
Dominion Parliament is required.
• It is for the grantee to show that the interference with the public right
was justified by an explicit legislative authorization.178
As was argued earlier, the authorization for interference with navigation can
be satisfied by the permit under the NWPA, but it is not immediately clear
where the grantee could turn to show a federal legislative authorization for
exclusive use and occupation that extended to a bar on public fishing rights.
That is, the leaseholder needs to be able to show their own positive autho-
rization, not merely a permit restriction separately imposed on the plaintiff
(although this may be relevant in a procedural sense – see later in the
chapter). Section 23 of the Fisheries Act does prohibit the taking of any fish
“within any fishery described in any lease or licence.”179 This might be
argued to be a restriction on the public right of fishing in any leases, federal
or provincial, but there are two problems with this approach. First, the
section refers to taking fish “within any fishery” contained in such leases,
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which would seem to eliminate aquaculture sites as such.180 Second, in the
statutory context it would be difficult to make the case that “leases” did not
refer to leases issued pursuant to s. 7 of the Act (discussed earlier).181
In sum, while the law is by no means clear at this point, it is entirely con-
ceivable that a private action in public nuisance could be brought against a
leaseholder of an aquaculture site in provincial tidal waters where an inter-
ference with the right of fishing could be shown, on the grounds that no
valid federal legislative authorization supports that interference. The pro-
cedural difficulties that might arise from this action are dealt with below.
Waters outside the provinces
As was shown earlier, outside provincial waters federal authority over both
the regulatory and the proprietary aspects of aquaculture is unquestioned.
This does not, however, entirely dispose of the matter. There remains the
possibility, perhaps unlikely, that a challenge analogous to that in Alford
could be brought against the minister, claiming that the Fisheries Act does
not provide the necessary explicit statutory authorization for removal or
modification of the public right of fishing. Alternatively, as was earlier sug-
gested with respect to tidal waters, a claim in public nuisance might be
brought directly against the leaseholder, putting the proof of legislative
authorization on them.
These possibilities may lie in the future, but at present the greater diffi-
culty arises from the imprecision attached to the notion of provincial tidal
waters, as discussed, for while the legal status of the extra-provincial waters
is clear, their location is not. The various provincial legislative instruments
that authorize aquaculture leases do not purport to extend their effect to
areas outside the various provinces, and indeed if they did so they would be
ultra vires the provinces in any event. There has been no delegation of
responsibility from the federal level, for the MOUs only refer to authority
over leasing and other activities within the provinces.182 At time of writing,
the only apparent method for application of provincial aquaculture laws
outside provincial waters is by delegation as specified in s. 9(1) of the Oceans
Act, which has not been utilized for this purpose:
9. (1) Subject to this section and to any other Act of Parliament, the
laws of a province apply in any area of the sea
(a) that forms part of the internal waters of Canada or the
territorial sea of Canada;
(b) that is not within any province; and
(c) that is prescribed by the regulations.183
. . .
(3) For the purposes of this section, the laws of a province shall be
applied as if the area of the sea in which those laws apply
under this section were within the territory of that province.
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The problem of territoriality was briefly addressed in the Legislative and Reg-
ulatory Review conducted by OCAD, in which it was noted that the
provinces “administer the leasing process for all ‘near-shore’ activities
(except in PEI),”184 a somewhat restrained characterization of a process in
which most coastal provinces both legislate and administer the schemes. Given
the acceptance of two distinct geographic areas of responsibility, the Review
noted the following problem in a footnote:
Near-shore is an indefinite term. The federal and provincial govern-
ments do not agree on the jurisdictional authority, that is, where
provincial authority ends and federal authority starts, with respect to
the seabed beyond the tidal mark.185
The implications of these statements are clear. First, given that most of
the leases in areas of potential doubt are being issued under provincial legis-
lation, it is highly likely that the provinces are issuing leases in areas that
are not within provincial jurisdiction. Second, any such leases that are found
to be outside provincial waters on the particular facts of a case must be of no
force and effect. One response to the apparent untenability of this situation
is to rely on the continued cooperation of the two levels of government,
neither of which has an interest in pressing the matter. However, this
ignores the fact that an action could, as already noted, be brought by private
individuals alleging interference with the public right to fish, and the ques-
tion of location would obviously be relevant to whether any authorization
(let alone a provincial one) could be raised as a defense.
Consequences and implications
If stability and certainty of tenure is one of the primary objectives of legis-
lative schemes assigning property rights in aquaculture operations, this
examination of constitutional issues suggests that the current approach may
present a number of difficulties, which can be summarized as follow.
First, for tidal waters inside a province, the provincial power to grant
property rights, including leases, over submerged lands does not extend to
authorization of any resulting interference with the public right to fish. It is
possible that the federal legislative power to restrict fishing for a wide
variety of reasons may be sufficient to effectively remove that right for leased
aquaculture sites. However, it is also conceivable that in a private action
against a leaseholder, the lease itself could be found to be invalid, as an
interference with a public right of fishing unsupported by any explicit legis-
lative provision. That is, regardless of the validity of the federal restrictions
on the exercise of fishing rights, the grant of the leasehold rights must be
legally sound in its own right.
Second, for any waters that are not within the boundaries of a province,
the leasehold arrangements as currently structured are ineffective to provide
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the desired property entitlements. Provincial legislation cannot have
extraterritorial effect in this case, and the limited opportunities for assertion
of provincial laws outside the province (as set out in the Oceans Act) have not
been applied. Accordingly, under current provincial legislation the grant of
leasehold rights in any area of marine waters that is outside a province
would be invalid, in that such a grant would be ultra vires the province. Fur-
thermore, the invalidity of the lease would mean that the leaseholder would
have no clear defense against a private claim for interference with the public
right of fishing.
The first of these difficulties, dealing with tidal waters in the province,
may be more theoretical than practical. The private action in public nui-
sance can be problematic from a procedural standpoint, in that the plaintiffs
must show “special damage” above and beyond that suffered by the public at
large, in order to maintain the action without the consent of the Attorney-
General. While the law is by no means settled, this has been interpreted in
the fisheries context to mean that commercial fishers had no special interest,
in that they were asserting infringement of the same general right as other
members of the public.186 In any event, the ability of the federal government
to regulate fishing in a broad fashion may be seen as effectively removing the
truly public nature of the right in such cases. The territorial issue is,
however, more problematic. Given that the actual extent of provincial and
federal waters is unclear, a site-by-site resolution could be required in order
to determine whether a valid provincial lease was even possible. Further-
more, it seems clear that at least some aquaculture leasehold areas will be in
federal waters, and for those sites there is little doubt that the leases under
which they operate could be successfully challenged, leaving a situation in
which some operators would have valid leases and others would not, depend-
ing on a finding with respect to the status of particular waters. The legal
regime should be able to provide for both certainty and general application
to all locations and operators, and, given the problems set out here, it may
fail on both counts.
Conclusions: the way forward
The analysis in the preceding sections leads to a number of conclusions and
recommendations as to how the development of property rights for aquacul-
ture might be pursued in the future. These fall into two general categories:
jurisdictional gaps and the need for federal legislation; and the value of a
principled approach to any potential expansion of property rights beyond
their current status.
Jurisdictional gaps and the need for federal legislation
While the focus of many observers is on improving the scope and intensity
of property rights available to aquaculturists, the review conducted in this
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chapter suggests that the more immediate problem is ensuring the legal
validity and effectiveness of those rights that already exist. The potential
jurisdictional gaps and other problems with the assignment of property
rights in aquaculture, as set out in the preceding sections, point to the
necessity for federal aquaculture legislation, for a number of reasons. First,
the present reliance on provincial legislative schemes leaves leasehold
arrangements subject to a degree of insecurity and vulnerability to legal
challenge. Within provincial boundaries, leases in tidal waters could be
subject to private claims for interference with the public right of fishing, in
the absence of federal legislation explicitly authorizing such interference. As
was noted earlier, it is by no means certain that such claims would succeed,
but in waters beyond provincial boundaries the situation is clearer, and more
difficult.
The provincial acts under which most of the current leases are issued do
not purport to extend, nor could they validly extend, to marine areas outside
the boundaries of the provinces. This would not present an insuperable
problem were it not for the fact that the definition of federal and provincial
marine areas, while well set out in some areas, is less than clear in many
others. If the validity of a lease is to depend upon whether the waters in
question are ultimately defined as federal or provincial, the following choices
emerge. A province could decide to issue leases only in areas definitively
settled as falling within provincial boundaries, and leave out of considera-
tion any waters whose status is in doubt, letting the federal government act
in those areas if it wished. It could also, as seems to be the current unstated
practice, simply issue the leases in all requested areas, in the hope that they
are not challenged. Neither option is particularly sound: one leads to the
elimination of potentially valuable sites, while the other exposes the lease-
holders to the risk of losing their investment as a result of the ultra vires
character of their provincial lease.
It might be argued that this problem could be addressed by federal aqua-
culture legislation dealing only with federal waters. That is, provinces would
continue to legislate for leases within their boundaries, and a federal leasehold
system would be in place in adjacent waters beyond the provincial boundaries.
This is a less than optimal solution, however, in that it would lead to a patch-
work approach to the granting of rights in the same region, and would still
not address the problem of identifying all sites as either federal or provincial
waters. Nor is the enactment of a federal scheme that would apply to all
marine waters a viable approach. While it may provide the prospect of unifor-
mity, the federal government does not have jurisdiction to make grants of
private property rights in provincial marine areas (even though it can control
the public right of fishing in those waters). As was noted earlier, action by both
levels of government is needed to make such grants effective.
There are, however, legislative options that could satisfy the requirements
of uniform (and constitutional) application to all waters and operators
within a region, while at the same time respecting the provincial jurisdic-
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tion and recognizing that the provinces have in fact been the lead players in
the promotion and management of aquaculture. First, the federal govern-
ment could act under the Oceans Act, ss. 9 and 26, to provide for the applica-
tion of provincial laws in marine areas outside the provinces. Regulations
would be required for the areas adjacent to each province, and would in
essence designate the relevant provincial aquaculture and leasing schemes as
applicable to those waters. This would have the advantage of ensuring a
uniform system across a geographical area, with no uncertainties as to
whether waters were federal or provincial.187 There are, however, potential
disadvantages to this approach. As discussed earlier, it could be subject to
challenge as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to the
provinces. Alternatively, it might be argued that a regulatory power to
allow for the application of provincial laws is not a sufficiently explicit legis-
lative limitation on the public right to fish, opening up the potential for
private challenges, as discussed earlier.
There are also broader policy reasons to reject this option. This chapter
has not been concerned with the regulation of aquaculture (see Chapter 3),
but rather with the assignment of property rights. Given that the propri-
etary aspect also depends on legislation, however, there would seem to be
benefits in integrating the regulatory requirements in one coherent scheme
with the critical property elements. This can best be accomplished by the
development of a federal aquaculture act, a step suggested by Wildsmith in
1985.188 In the draft federal Act which he proposed at that time, the focus
was on the regulatory aspects, but he included the following proposed provi-
sion for empowering the federal government to issue leases:
The Governor-in-Council may make regulations . . .
(g) respecting the terms of occupation, including leases, of marine or
tidal areas outside the boundary of any province for the conduct of
aquaculture, including exclusive rights of the occupier, lease fees,
and performance standards.189
This draft section highlights one of the limitations of federal legislation,
with nothing more; for purposes of the proprietary grants (as opposed to
regulation) it can only apply outside the provinces, leaving in place the
problems of uncertainty (as to the status of waters) and lack of uniformity
within the same region. Nonetheless, federal legislation could, at a
minimum, put in place a general authorization for the grant of leasehold
entitlements that interfere with the public right of fishing, in all marine
waters. Within provincial boundaries, this could be implemented by the
simple grant of a federal permit to leaseholders, in the same way that a
permit under the NWPA deals with the question of interference with navi-
gation issue in provincial waters. That is, the federal legislation would not
be effecting the grant, but rather would be authorizing the interference with
the public right of fishing, consequent on the provincial grant.
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For federal waters, the legislation could provide for the issuance of leases
but delegate the operation of the scheme to the provinces. In order to main-
tain the diversity of provincial approaches, and to ensure regional unifor-
mity, it could be desirable to establish regulations for each province,
adopting by reference the provincial lease arrangements in place within that
province. The administration of the leases, which would be consistent with
those applicable in adjacent provincial waters, could be delegated to the
province. This approach would go one step beyond that suggested under the
Oceans Act, in that the relevant provincial provisions would actually be incor-
porated into federal regulations by reference, making it clear that only the
administration of the scheme (in federal waters) was being delegated to the
provinces.
Potential modification of property rights
The arguments presented in this chapter suggest that there may be more
pressing issues related to property entitlements in aquaculture than
the immediate expansion of those interests: there is sufficient reason to
believe that the current system of entitlements is founded on doubtful
ground with respect to both constitutional jurisdiction and common
law doctrines. Nonetheless, there is a legitimate debate as to whether the
existing forms of property entitlements for aquaculture operations are ade-
quate to the functional requirements of the industry, in particular because of
the divergence in current provincial approaches. The general examination in
the section “Statutory responses” (p. 122) illustrates that, while the
provinces have all moved to grant some degree of property entitlement in
aquaculture sites, these arrangements vary with respect to some of the key
descriptors of a property entitlement, noted in the introduction to this
chapter: exclusivity, duration, transferability and assignability, and enforce-
ability.190 Complete uniformity in the provincial approaches to property
rights (and even regulation) is not necessary, but a higher level of consis-
tency across jurisdictions might avoid the imposition of comparative
disadvantages on aquaculture operators, or alternatively on other resource
users, in some provinces.
It must be remembered, however, that this debate cannot be limited to
the functional requirements of the aquaculture industry, as was noted at the
outset of this chapter. The existence of other users, with long-standing and
potentially enforceable rights of their own over the areas in question, means
that the debate should be focused on the appropriate balance to be sought
between the private and public rights, and simple recourse to full privatiza-
tion is unlikely to achieve this outcome. While the introduction of more
extensive private rights need not lead inevitably to privatization of the
resource base, it is important to remember that non-aquaculture users of
these areas are likely to view moves in this direction as a threat to their legal
rights, and to continued equitable access to important resources.191 The solu-
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tion will lie in part in ensuring that open, transparent and negotiated
processes are used where public rights are, inevitably, reduced or compro-
mised by the introduction of new private rights.192
Even before we consider the issues of equity and process, however, there is
a need to develop the independent case for enhancement of private property
interests in a common resource; in the absence of a demonstrated need to
increase the private role, the existing interests of other users would prevail
by default. The term “property” in this context denotes a highly variable
mix of the characteristics listed above, especially exclusivity, assignability
and duration. General assertions that more property rights are needed will
not be sufficient; it will be necessary to break down the functional require-
ments of different types of aquaculture operations with reference to the mul-
tiple characteristics of “property” rights. This has not, to date, been a feature
of the public debate, but a systematic application of such functional criteria,
based on the actual needs of the industry, will at least provide a principled
basis for consideration of the industry’s needs, and a starting point for the
comparison of those requirements with the interests of the wider community
of resource users.
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Coastal Waters,” (1999) 4 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 1 at 2–3, 6–10.
13 The challenge is described by Reiser, supra note 8 at 213, as follows:
It is crucial, therefore, that the government’s process for issuing the lease or
license itself protects the sea farmer from conflicts with other marine uses.
The statute authorizing the conveyance of a lease of public waters or sub-
merged lands for aquaculture should identify other public and private uses
of the marine environment that are potentially affected by aquaculture
activities. It should then provide a fair but efficient process for information
to be brought forward about those uses in the area proposed for use as a sea
farm, allowing the leasing agency to make a balanced and informed decision
in which other users believe they have been fairly considered.
See also the discussion at Commons Report 2003, supra note 7 at 28–31.
14 See the examination of social impacts and equity of access in the introduction
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of commercial aquaculture in the Bay of Fundy, in J. Marshall, “Landlords,
Leaseholders and Sweat Equity: Changing Property Regimes in Aquaculture,”
(2001) 25 Marine Policy 335. See also J. Phyne, “Capitalist Aquaculture and
the Quest for Marine Tenure in Scotland and Ireland,” (1997) 52 Studies in
Political Economy 73.
15 Prior to the development of the provincial legislative regimes, there was ambi-
guity respecting the property rights of aquaculturists in the plants and animals
contained within their facilities. This issue has been addressed in most
provinces by statutory provisions similar in effect to that found in s. 60 of the
Nova Scotia Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act, S.N.S. 1996, as amended, and
will not be addressed further in this chapter:
60. All aquatic plants and animals of the species specified in an aquaculture
license or aquaculture lease in or on the licensed or leased area, except
free-swimming or drifting flora or fauna not enclosed by a net, pen,
cage or enclosure, are the exclusive property of the holder of the license
or lease.
16 Although the situation under civil law is not addressed in this chapter, the
current position in Québec, with respect to the issuance of leases and the
rights of aquaculturists is similar to that which has developed in the common
law provinces: see Commons Report 2003, supra note 7, dissenting report of
the Bloc Québécois at 88.
17 It is assumed that aquaculture operations conducted on land, in tanks or
similar facilities, will be subject to the normal regime for property in the juris-
diction, and raise no special issues of relevance to this study. Such operations
would, of course, still require an aquaculture license under provincial legisla-
tion (see later in this section).
18 See, for example, the judgment of Ritchie CJC in The Queen v. Robertson (1882)
6 S.C.R. 52 at 117. This presumption could, however, be rebutted, as was held
in Wishart v. Wyllie, 1 Macq. H.L. Cas. 389, in a passage cited with approval
by Ritchie ibid.:
It may be rebutted, but, generally speaking, an imaginary line running
through the middle of the stream is the boundary; just as if a road separates
two properties, the ownership of the road belongs half-way to one and half-
way to the other. It may be rebutted by circumstances, but if not rebutted,
that is the legal presumption.
See also R. v. Lewis [1996] 1 S.C.R. 921 at para. 56.
19 See the discussion at G. V. La Forest and Associates, Water Law in Canada: The
Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 234. As La Forest
notes (at 200–201), the ownership rights of the riparian landowner are distinct
from their “riparian rights” (including rights of access, drainage and accretion,
and some rights relating to flow, quality and use). The most important dis-
tinction is that the riparian owner “has certain rights respecting the water
therein whether or not he owns the bed” (citation omitted).
20 M. Walters, “Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta and Exclusive Rights to Fisheries
in the Waters of Upper Canada,” (1998) 23 Queen’s Law Journal 301 at 313.
21 The Queen v. Robertson, supra note 18 at 133, per Strong J. See also R. v. Nikal
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at para. 1053.
22 Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992] 1
S.C.R. 3 at para. 76.
23 La Forest, supra note 19 at 179.
24 Ibid. at 190.
25 R. v. Nikal, supra note 21 at paras. 67–72.
Property rights in Canadian aquaculture 155
26 See the discussion in Walters, supra note 20 at 325–326, where this view is
advanced.
27 This is precisely the distinction noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Provincial Fisheries case (Re Provincial Fisheries (1895) 26 S.C.R. 444 at 527):
That the Crown in right of the provinces could grant either the beds of such
non-tidal navigable waters or an exclusive right of fishing is, I think, clear.
Before Magna Charta the Crown could grant to a private individual the soil
in tidal waters with the fishery as an incident to it, or the exclusive right of
fishing as distinct from the soil. Then, as the restraint imposed by Magna
Charta does not apply to any but tidal waters, there is no reason why the
prerogative of the Crown to make such grants in the class of waters now
under consideration, large navigable lakes and non-tidal navigable rivers,
should not be exercised now as freely as it could have been with reference to
tidal waters before Magna Charta.
28 See the description of the pre-Magna Carta position in Coulson and Forbes,
Water Law (1902), as cited in Donnelly v. Vroom et al., (1842) 3 N.S.R. 97
(N.S.S.C.) at 589. For a longer discussion of the issues addressed in this
section, see P. Saunders, “Marine Property Rights and the Development of
Jurisdictional Regimes: Private Rights, Communal Tenure and State Control,”
in D. Vickers, ed., Marine Resources and Human Societies in the North Atlantic (St.
John’s: Memorial University, 1997).
29 C. D. Hunt, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Canada,” in J. Swaigen, ed.,
Environmental Rights in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 153.
30 A. G. British Columbia v. A. G. Canada (1913) 15 D.L.R. 308 (P.C.) at 317,
per Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor [Re. B C Fisheries].
31 (1842) 2 N.S.R. 97 (N.S.S.C.) at 99: “There is no pretence for saying the
crown could make any such grant. It might as well grant the air around the
cove. These waters, fluctuating and in a constant state of change, are not the
subject-matter of a grant.”
32 Ibid. at 99–100:
[T]he crown could not grant a general fishery – a grant to support that must
be as old as the reign of Henry II, and therefore beyond the time of legal
memory, for, by Magna Charta, and the second and third charters of Henry
III, the king is expressly precluded from making fresh grants.
33 (1907) 40 N.S.R. 585 (N.S.S.C.) at 588:
It appears . . . that when the defendants dug clams on the flats they did so
merely in exercise of a right which belonged to them in common with all
other members of the public . . . the question of ownership of the soil, as
well as possession thereof, and user, with, or without, leave, seems to me to
be immaterial. This right could also be maintained against the Crown,
where it stood as owner.
34 (1920) 51 D.L.R. 495 (N.B.S.C. – A.D.) at 497 (emphasis added). The case
was somewhat complicated by the fact that the lessor city acquired its title by
virtue of its charter, confirmed by an act of the provincial legislature, and had
the power to regulate and control fisheries in the area in question. In this
sense, both aspects of the legislative power were engaged: the power to make
an explicit grant of an exclusive fishery (which was not done on the facts); and
the power to regulate and control the public right to fish (as exercised by the
city under statute). Ibid. at 497, 500–502.
35 Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 106.
36 [1908] 2 Ch. 139 at 165–166. It should be noted that the position in the
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United States evolved quite differently. There the doctrine of the public trust
imposed limits on the alienability of submerged lands to protect dominant
public interests, and a critical distinction from the British position was that
the list of public trust interests was capable of expansion. See the discussion at
Hunt, supra note 29, passim.
37 See, for example, Foster v. Warblington Urban Council [1906] 1 K.B. 648 (C.A.).
The plaintiff’s actions in placing clams on a section of foreshore belonging to
another, but over which the plaintiff had prescriptive rights, was seen by Stir-
ling LJ as “totally different from anything that he could have done simply as a
member of the public exercising the right of fishing” (at 671). See the discus-
sion of this case at Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 106, 108–109. The view
expressed in Foster was endorsed at the trial level in Donnelly v. Vroom, which
referred to the oysters in Foster as the “plaintiff’s property,” in contrast to the
clams in Donnelly, supra note 28 at 592.
38 This assumes that the “captured” property inside could be designated as
private property. This argument would be separate and distinct from any
claim that the pen might be an impediment to fishing for wild species within
the parameters of the public right.
39 R.S.N.L. 1990, c. A-13, as amended [Aquaculture Act].
40 S.N.L. 1991, c. 36. According to the policy of the Department of Fisheries and
Aquaculture, the Crown lands lease application should be presented with the
application for an aquaculture license.
41 Ibid. at s. 3: “The minister may issue a lease to a person of an area of Crown land
for the period and upon those terms and conditions and subject to the payment of
those rents, royalties or other charges that the minister may set out in the lease.”
42 Ibid. at s. 4(1) (less than 20 hectares) and 4(2) (greater than 20 hectares).
43 Ibid. at s. 6(1): “The minister may issue a licence for occupancy of an area of
Crown land subject to those terms and conditions and subject to the payment of
those fees, rentals and other charges that the minister may set out in the licence.”
44 See the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador website, http://www.
fishaq.gov.nl.ca/aqua/licencing.stm#Application (accessed 8 August 2005).
45 See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador website, http://www.env.gov.
nl.ca/env/lands/cla/aquaculture_leases-licences.html (accessed 8 August 2005).
46 Aquaculture Regulations under the Aquaculture Act, 1996 (O.C. 96-939).
47 Aquaculture Act, supra note 39 at s. 6(6)–(8).
48 This even extends to the protection of private property rights in the product of
operations found in sites, which is found in s. 5 of the Aquaculture Act.
49 Supra note 15, s. 44(2). On other lands, by s. 44(1), a license is still required.
Under s. 44(3), the grant of a license (without a lease) “carries with it the
exclusive right to possession of the water column and sub-aquatic land
described in the licence.” The purpose of this section would seem to be to
ensure that the exclusive possession granted by the lease on Crown lands is still
available to an operator on private submerged lands, where the title would not
otherwise extend to the water column.
50 The restriction to “aquacultural purposes” could raise some difficulties of inter-
pretation. Does it mean that others may be excluded only to the extent necessary
to conduct aquaculture, or is it more broadly intended to allow for true exclusiv-
ity, so long as the purpose of exercising the exclusion is to conduct aquaculture?
51 The purpose of this section would seem to be to ensure that exclusive possession
of the water column and submerged lands granted by the lease on Crown lands
is still available to an operator on private lands, where the title would not
otherwise extend to the water column, and where exclusion from the submerged
areas might also be in doubt. It is unclear why the exclusivity provision for
licenses does not have the same restriction to “aquacultural purposes” as is found
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in the lease provision, supra. In fact, it is not clear why a separate provision was
required for the lease at all, as any aquaculture operator would require a license,
and would therefore obtain the desired exclusivity in any event.
52 S.N.B. 1988, c. A-13, as amended [Aquaculture Act].
53 There is no similar requirement for a lease, but given that anyone carrying out
such activities on Crown lands would be a trespasser, the practical effect is the
same.
54 Further specification of requirements for transfer and subletting of leases are set
out for the Bay of Fundy area in the Bay of Fundy Marine Aquaculture Site Alloca-
tion Policy (Government of New Brunswick, 2000) [Bay of Fundy Policy] at 6–7.
55 Aquaculture Act, supra note 52: by s. 25(6) the exclusive right does not include
mineral rights, and by s. 25(7), the lease may make provision for access by
adjacent landowners.
56 Ibid. s. 26(1), (3).
57 According to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture
(DAFA), AOPs are usually issued “prior to the issuance of a lease,” as a tempo-
rary measure. See DAFA Licensing Policy. Online. Available http://www.
gnb.ca/0177/01770002-e.asp (accessed 8 August 2005).
58 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 149, s. 13.
59 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 245 [Land Act]. The responsibility for processing tenure
applications formerly rested with a Crown Corporation, Land and Water
British Columbia, Inc. (LWBC), but in 2005 this role was transferred to the
ILMB. See the description of the ILMB mandate at http://ilmbwww.gov.
bc.ca/ilmb/index.html. As of time of writing, the various policy documents
were, however, maintained on the LWBC website at http://lwbc.bc.ca/.
60 Other forms are available in the act, but those available to aquaculturists are
limited in a policy document issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands:
Crown Land Use Operational Policy: Aquaculture (Government of British
Columbia: 2005) at 5–6. Online. Available http://www.lwbc.bc.ca/011wbc/
policies/policy/land/aquaculture.pdf.
61 Land Act, supra note 59, s. 14(1)
62 Crown Land Use Operational Policy: Aquaculture, supra note 60 at 5.
63 Land Act, supra note 59, s. 39.
64 Crown Land Use Operational Policy: Aquaculture, supra note 60 at 5. See also the
following clause from a 1988 License of Occupation (on file with author),
which is consistent with the policy:
(9.05) This license shall not entitle the Licensee to exclusive possession of
the Land and the Owner [the Crown] may grant licenses to others to
use the land for any purpose other than permitted herein, so long as
the grant does not materially affect the exercise of the Licensee’s
rights hereunder. The question of whether a grant materially affects
the exercise of the Licensee’s rights hereunder shall be determined by
the Owner at his sole discretion.
65 Crown Land Use Operational Policy: Aquaculture, ibid. at 5: “The standard form
of Crown land tenure for a shellfish or finfish aquaculture operation is a 20-year
licence of occupation.”
66 Ibid. at 6. The Land Act, supra note 59, s. 38, contains only the essentials: “The
minister may issue a licence to occupy and use Crown land, called a ‘licence of
occupation’, subject to the terms and reservations the minister considers advis-
able.”
67 Crown Land Use Operational Policy: Aquaculture, ibid. at 6: “Crown land leases
are not typically used for aquaculture tenure and where they are, it is more
common for shellfish operations than finfish farms.”
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68 Ibid. at 20–22. Both leases and Licenses of Occupation can be assigned or “sub-
tenured,” which refers to a grant of an interest in the land by the primary
tenant to another party, without a full transfer of the right.
69 The origins of this situation date back to a 1928 agreement between the
federal and provincial governments in which it was “agreed that the federal
government would be responsible for the control, administration, development
and improvement of the oyster or mollusk industry, as well as for conducting
surveys and issuing leases.” The Prince Edward Island Report: Report of the Stand-
ing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans No. 8 (December 1998). This agreement
was subsequently confirmed and updated in the 1987 Agreement for Commercial
Aquaculture Development between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Prince Edward Island [1987 PEI MOU] at s. 5.1 A, for mollusks, and salmonids
and other finfish were added to the agreement by s. 5.1 C: “Canada shall
licence and issue leases for salmonids and other fin fish covered under this
Agreement and its Amendments.”
70 Aquaculture Leasing Policy Prince Edward Island (Ottawa: DFO, 2005 ed.) [PEI
Policy 2005]. The leasing policy (at 6) states that leases are issued under “the
authority” of the 1928 MOU, but, as noted ibid., the authority for species
other than mollusks comes with the 1987 agreement. The policy also notes (at
6) that for “more detail on the rights and obligations of a leaseholder, one can
reference the Fisheries Act and Regulations, the Management of Contaminated
Fisheries Regulations (MFCR) and the 1928 Agreement.” No precise reference
is included. For the purposes of this section, the validity of leases issued under
the policy is assumed, and the implications of the vague legislative basis will
be dealt with in “Constitutional issues” (p. 129).
71 Ibid. at 7. Under the previous policy, in effect until 2005, these operational
phases were dealt with under two distinct leases, the developmental lease
(which offered a range of durations, but typically were for three to five years),
and the long-term lease (for up to twenty years). See Aquaculture Leasing Policy
Prince Edward Island (Ottawa: DFO, 2000–2001 ed.) at 5–6.
72 PEI Policy 2005, supra note 70. Licenses are available for the collection of seed,
but are not considered to be leases.
73 1987 PEI MOU, supra note 69 at s. 5.1 B and D.
74 PEI Policy 2005, supra note 70 at 25–26.
75 Ibid. at 6.
76 1987 PEI MOU, supra note 69 at s. 5.1 B. The focus is stability and security of
tenure:
In recognition of the need to convey property rights and stability to licensing,
both Canada and the Province agree that appropriate tenure should be granted
subject to conditions to be determined by the Coordinating Committee.
77 PEI Policy 2005, supra note 70 at 9–11.
78 The main features of the process are as follow:
1 Prior to making a decision on an application, the minister shall consult
with a number of specified departments and agencies (s. 47(a)) and “may
refer the application to a private sector, regional aquaculture develop-
ment advisory committee for comment and recommendation” (s. 47(b) –
emphasis added)
2 After the completion of the required consultation, the minister may:
issue the license or lease, as submitted or with conditions; reject the
application; or refer the application to a public hearing (s. 48). If a
hearing is conducted, the matter then reverts to the minister for decision
(s. 50).
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See the description of the current policy on licensing and leasing of the
Government of Nova Scotia. Online. Available http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsaf/
aquaculture/radac/index.shtml (accessed 8 August 2005).
79 Ibid. Recommendations of the RADAC are forwarded to the minister for
consideration. Where an RADAC is not in place in a region, the intent is to
use the public hearing process as a means of obtaining community input on
the decisions.
80 The general duty to consult, found in s. 35(1), is vague and discretionary: “The
Minister shall undertake such public consultation in relation to aquaculture as
the Minister considers appropriate or as is required by or in accordance with
the regulations.”
81 Bay of Fundy Policy, supra note 54 at 4–5.
82 The potential impact of the ABMA scheme is significant. The policy states
that the ABMAs will take the form of written contractual agreements, and
that they will address such issues as technical aspects of management and day-
to-day operations: ibid. at 5.
83 Land Use Policy: Aquaculture, supra note 60 at 13:
Referrals are a formal mechanism to solicit written comments on an applica-
tion from recognized agencies and groups. Referrals are initiated as per leg-
islated responsibilities and formal agreements developed with other
provincial and federal government agencies. Referrals may also be used to
address the interests of local governments and First Nations.
84 Ibid. at 14–15.
85 These responsibilities, which are dealt within the next section, “Constitutional
issues,” and in Chapter 3 by VanderZwaag, Chao and Covan in this volume, may
include the following: approval of alteration or disruption of fish habitat; approval
for deposits of substances deleterious to fish or fish habitat; environmental assess-
ment requirements; and authorization of obstructions to navigation.
86 See Memorandum of Understanding on Aquaculture Development,
Canada–Nova Scotia (2002) [Canada–NS MOU 2002]; Canada–New
Brunswick Memorandum of Understanding on Aquaculture Development
(1989) [Canada–NB MOU 1989]; Canada/Newfoundland Memorandum of
Understanding on Aquaculture Development (1988) [Canada–NL MOU
1988]; and Canada–British Columbia Memorandum of Understanding on
Aquaculture Development (1988) [Canada–BC MOU 1988]. The Prince
Edward Island MOU is addressed supra, note 69. See also the discussion of the
MOUs and their role in delegation of regulatory responsibilities at D. Van-
derZwaag, G. Chao and M. Covan, “Canadian Aquaculture and the Principles
of Sustainable Development: Gauging the Law and Policy Tides and Charting
a Course – Part II,” (2002–2003) 28 Queen’s Law Journal 529 at 532–536.
87 Senate Report 2001, supra note 7 at 28:
The approval process for site leases is governed by Memoranda of Under-
standing (MoUs) between the federal and provincial governments. The
Memoranda . . . were intended to establish a “one-stop shop” approach for
lease applicants. . . . Except in the case of Prince Edward Island, the
provinces were said to be the lead agency, and each has developed its own
policies and site-specific approval process.
88 Even in areas where legislation is not required, as, for example, where the
provincial Crown has full authority to make the necessary grants and there is
no actual conflict with fishing or navigation rights, a clearly defined regime is
desirable for the purpose of providing certainty and transparency to the
process.
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89 Constitution Act, 1987 (UK), 30 of 31 Vict., C.3, reprinted in R.S.C., 1985,
App. II, No. 5.
90 See Chapter 3 by VanderZwaag, Chao and Covan in this volume on the scope
of provincial and federal regulatory control; and for a full discussion of the
current application of regulatory controls under provincial jurisdiction, see
VanderZwaag et al., supra note 86. For a review of the extent of federal powers
to regulate non-proprietary aspects of aquaculture, see B. Wildsmith, Federal
Aquaculture Regulation, Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatic
Sciences No. 1252 (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1984), and
in particular 3–9, 27–52. With respect to provincial regulatory powers and
their interaction with federal powers, see Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 34–37,
53–57. See also A. Scott, “Regulation and the Location of Jurisdictional
Powers: The Fishery,” (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 720, for an analysis,
in the context of fisheries, of the “optimal” assignment of federal and provin-
cial jurisdiction over a common property resource.
91 In 1982, Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 71–81, set out an extensive list of federal
powers under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, including fisheries, public property,
navigation and shipping, taxation, and criminal law. See also OCAD Legis-
lative Review, supra note 6 at 15–17. The provincial powers under s. 92 derive
primarily from jurisdiction over property and civil rights.
92 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 89 at s. 92.
93 For a discussion of the impact of provincial powers in the practical regulation
of aquaculture within the provinces, see Senate Report 2001, supra note 7 at
11:
The scope of permissible provincial regulation includes the following: the
management and use of Crown land; the licensing of aquaculture opera-
tions; the setting of standards for the business of aquaculture and those who
conduct it; local marketing and consumer protection; waste management;
and labour relations and employment standards . . . at the local level,
regional districts and municipalities administer zoning bylaws.
94 Ibid. at s. 91. It should also be noted that the “public property” of the federal
Crown extends to all areas outside of any province, meaning that in significant
marine areas the federal government has complete proprietary jurisdiction.
95 In this approach, the constitutional jurisprudence mirrors the separation of
these two aspects of entitlements to marine space in common law, as described
earlier, and it is perhaps not surprising that a number of the cases that have
helped to establish the general position have arisen in the context of fisheries.
96 Supra note 18.
97 Ibid. at 111. This approach was affirmed in Venning v. Steadman (1884) 9
S.C.R. 206 at 214–215, per Strong J. The structure of the analysis in this
section has drawn on the more extensive review of the early cases found in
Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 37–53. It should be noted that in an earlier case,
Robertson v. Steadman (1876) S.C.R. 621 at 633–634, the Supreme Court did
uphold a federal grant of a “lease” of a fishery in non-tidal waters in New
Brunswick. However, that decision was dealing with a grant that did not
profess “to give . . . an exclusive right of fishery,” and the Court found it
unnecessary to determine the nature and extent of the property rights arising
under the lease as between the plaintiff and defendants, noting that it might
be the case that “the only liability incurred by a person for fishing without
permission, within the bounds of the lease, would be a prosecution for a
penalty . . . [under the Act].” As such, it seems to stand as an affirmation of the
federal legislative power to regulate fisheries, despite some language in the
case that might be taken to refer to the grant of proprietary rights.
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98 Robertson, supra. note 97 at 115.
99 Ibid.:
There is no connection whatever between a right of passage and a right of
fishing. A right of passage is an easement, that is to say, a privilege without
profit, as in the common highway. A right to catch fish is a profit à prendre,
subject no doubt to the free use of the river as a highway and to the private
rights of others.
100 Ibid. at 119–120.
101 Ibid.:
I cannot discover the slightest trace of an intention on the part of the Impe-
rial Parliament to convey to the Dominion Government any property in the
beds and streams or in the fisheries incident to the ownership thereof,
whether belonging at the date of the confederation either to the provinces or
individuals, or to confer on the Dominion Parliament the right to appropri-
ate or dispose of them.
102 Provincial Fisheries, supra note 27 at 519.
103 Ibid. at 521–522. The impact of this case on the common law with respect to
leasehold grants was considered earlier.
104 Ibid. at 514–515.
105 Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorneys-General for Ontario, Quebec and Nova
Scotia [Ontario Fisheries Reference] [1898] A.C. 700 at 712, per Lord Her-
schell:
Their Lordships are of the opinion that the 91st section of the British North
America Act did not convey to the Dominion of Canada any proprietary
rights in relation to fisheries. Their Lordships have already noted the dis-
tinction which must be borne in mind between rights of property and legis-
lative jurisdiction. . . . Whatever proprietary rights in relation to fisheries
were previously vested in private individuals or in the provinces respectively
remained untouched by that enactment.
106 The nature of this interaction, and the outer limits of the federal power, were
set out by Lord Herschell in the Ontario Fisheries Reference, ibid. at 712–713:
At the same time, it must be remembered that the power to legislate in
relation to fisheries does necessarily to a certain extent enable the Legislature
so empowered to affect proprietary rights. . . . The suggestion that the
power might be abused so as to amount to a practical confiscation of prop-
erty does not warrant the imposition by the Courts of any limit upon the
absolute nature of the power of legislation conferred. . . . If, however, the
Legislature purports to confer upon others proprietary rights where it pos-
sesses none itself, that in their Lordships’ opinion is not an exercise of the
legislative jurisdiction conferred by s. 91.
107 See OCAD Legislative Review, supra note 6 at 15–17.
108 Provincial Fisheries, supra note 27 at 514–515:
At the time of confederation the beds of all lakes, rivers, public harbours
and other waters within the territorial limits of the several provinces which
had not been granted by the Crown were vested in the Crown as represent-
ing the provinces respectively. . . . The ungranted beds of all streams and
waters were therefore lands belonging to the several provinces in which the
same were situated . . . subject only to the exception respecting existing
trusts and interests mentioned in that section, and excepting the beds of
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public harbours, which by operation of section 108, were vested in the
Dominion.
109 La Forest, supra note 19 at 8 (citation omitted):
Section 91(1A), which gives the Dominion exclusive legislative power over
its public property, is a most important source of federal power in relation
to the development of water resources. In the first place, the Dominion may
do whatever it wishes with its property, and accordingly where it owns land
it may . . . make any legislation concerning the property even if such legisla-
tion would ordinarily fall within the provincial ambit. So long as it retains
title, the Dominion may lease the land and control its development.
110 Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada (BC Fish-
eries) (1913) 15 D.L.R. 308 at 311. These measures were incorporated in the
Orders-in-Council effecting the union.
111 Ibid. at 314–315:
[Fishing rights] are, in their Lordships’ opinion, the same as in the ordinary
case of ownership of a lake or river bed. The general principle is, that fish-
eries are in their nature mere profits of the soil over which the water flows,
and that the title to a fishery arises from the right to the solum.
For a discussion of the range of lands that might be defined as federal, whether
as harbors, reserve lands or otherwise, see Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 73–74;
La Forest, supra note 19 at 18–27.
112 See, for example, Robertson, supra note 18 at 115.
113 La Forest, supra note 19 at 190: “The only legislature competent to authorize
interferences with navigation is the federal Parliament” (citations omitted).
This point is of general application, with no distinction as between tidal and
non-tidal navigable waters in Canada (again, with possible exceptions noted in
some cases). La Forest does go on to note that there is also an exception for
provincial statutes passed prior to Confederation and never repealed by either
the federal or provincial legislatures.
114 Ibid. at 190 (citations omitted):
Thus federal statutory permission to build a dam in navigable water is
necessary, but such permission cannot interfere with the rights to the bed,
which will usually be in the province or a private owner. Conversely, while a
province may incorporate log boom companies, such companies are not
thereby authorized to unreasonably interfere with the rights of others to
navigate a river.
115 Provincial Fisheries, supra note 27 at 516:
[I]n the case of a provincial grant such as the question supposes the grantee
would have a right to build upon the land so granted, subject only to his
compliance with the requirements of the statute [a federal act respecting
works in navigable waters] . . . and to his obtaining an order in council
authorizing the same, and provided the work did not interfere with the nav-
igation of the lake or river.
116 This is, of course, subject to the important exception, as noted earlier, where
the federal Crown holds proprietary rights.
117 Supra, text quoted in note 108.
118 Provincial Fisheries, supra note 27 at 514 (emphasis added).
119 Ibid. This was confirmed in BC Fisheries, supra note 30 at 318.
120 These issues are addressed in Chapter 9 by Murphy, Devlin and Lorincz and
will not be dealt with in detail here. It should be noted, however, that with
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respect to the public right of fishing, it may be limited but not extinguished by
the existence of aboriginal rights: R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 67:
As a common law, not constitutional, right, the right of public access to the
fishery must clearly be second in priority to aboriginal rights; however, the
recognition of aboriginal rights should not be interpreted as extinguishing
the right of public access to the fishery.
121 If this line were followed, the position would be the similar to that for non-
tidal waters within the province, with the exception that any new grant of a
fishery or other restriction on public fishing rights would require action by the
provincial legislature, and not by the provincial Crown alone.
122 BC Fisheries, supra note 30 at 320, per Viscount Haldane LC. The decision in
this case was endorsed and confirmed by the Judicial Committee in the Québec
Fisheries case in 1920: Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Quebec
[Re Québec Fisheries] (1920) 56 D.L.R. 358 at 370–371.
123 In BC Fisheries, supra note 30 at 320, in a passage dealing with “the right of
fishing in arms of the sea and the estuaries of rivers,” the Lord Chancellor held
the following: “The right to fish is . . . a public right of the same character as
that enjoyed by the public on the open seas. A right of this kind is not an inci-
dent of property.” Further (at 317), in a discussion directed to Dominion
ownership of the soil in the “railway belt,” but which nonetheless states the
underlying position, we have the following description:
In the non-tidal waters they belong to the proprietor of the soil. . . . In the
tidal waters, whether on the foreshore or in the creeks, estuaries, and tidal
rivers, the public have the right to fish, and by reason of the provisions of
Magna Charta no restriction can be put upon that right of the public by an
exercise of the prerogative in the form of a grant.
124 Ibid. at 317–318.
125 Ibid. at 320.
126 BC Fisheries, supra note 30 at 320.
127 Ibid. at 318.
128 Ibid. at 317.
129 Québec Fisheries, supra note 122 at 370.
130 Ibid. at 370–371.
131 Ibid. Haldane, in considering a pre-Confederation statute that covered both the
“disposal of property and the exercise of the power of regulation,” noted that
neither government could now act alone: “The former of these functions has
now fallen to the Province, but the latter to the Dominion; and accordingly
the power which existed under s. 3 of the Act no longer exists in its entirety.”
132 The preamble to s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 89, begins with
the following words: “In each Province, the Legislature may exclusively make
Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subject [as enumer-
ated in s. 92].” This point is further emphasized in both s. 92(13) and 92(16):
13. Property and civil rights in the Province . . .
16. Generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province.
For a full review of the development of the territorial limitation on provincial
jurisdiction in the case law, see E. Edinger, “Territorial Limitations on Provin-
cial Powers,” (1982) 14 Ottawa Law Review 57.
133 Wildsmith, supra note 3 at 75.
134 See, for example, Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia [BC
Offshore Minerals] [1967] S.C.R 792.
135 The position adopted in BC Offshore Minerals and the subsequent case, Reference
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Re Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas [1984] 1 S.C.R. 388 [Georgia
Strait Reference], was based on the finding in the British case of R. v. Keyn
(1876) 2 Ex. D. 63, where the majority “held that unless specifically extended
by Parliament, the realm of England ended at the low-water mark” (Georgia
Strait Reference at 400).
136 Georgia Strait Reference, supra note 135 at 397.
137 Ibid. at 400.
138 In the provincial reference to the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland, which
preceded the Hibernia Reference at the Supreme Court, the Court found that the
then 3-nautical mile territorial sea was a part of Newfoundland at Confedera-
tion, and thus that area remained part of the province: Re: Mineral and Other
Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf off Newfoundland (1983) 145 D.L.R.
(3d) 9 (Nfld. C.A.). The territorial sea was not addressed in the Supreme Court
reference, presumably leaving this ruling in place, but in a subsequent case the
Court of Appeal reversed itself on this point, finding that the Supreme Court
in the Hibernia Reference had effectively assumed that the province ended at the
low-water mark (although this was not in issue in the Hibernia Reference): ACE-
Atlantic Container Express Inc. v. The Queen (1992) 92 D.L.R. (4th) 581 at 601.
139 See, for example, the situation in New Brunswick in the Bay of Fundy: In R. v.
Burt (1932) 5 M.P.R. 112 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.), a location more than a mile
offshore was found to be in the province: see the discussion of this case, and
others (including Conception Bay in Newfoundland) in BC Offshore Minerals,
supra note 134 at 809.
140 The Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, does not settle the matter, but rather leaves it
for case-by-case determination. Section 7 provides that both the 12-nautical
mile territorial sea and internal waters “form part of Canada,” but says nothing
about their status as federal or provincial waters. Section 8(1) provides for the
vesting in the federal Crown of title to the seabed and the subsoil of the terri-
torial sea and internal waters, but only for areas outside of any province (and
without prejudice to previously held rights and interests). In sum, then, the
Oceans Act simply relies, as it must, on the general position in constitutional
law, and the status of particular coastal areas remains subject to the case-by-
case determination described earlier.
141 Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c.11.
142 See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511,
in which the Supreme Court confirmed a duty of prior consultation where a
government decision might adversely affect potential aboriginal claims.
143 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982 (entered into
force 16 November 1994). Online. Available http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/index.htm (accessed 8 August 2005) [LOS 1982]. Canada ratified
this convention in November 2003. In the EEZ which extends from the outer
limit of the 12-nautical mile territorial sea to a maximum of 200 nautical
miles seaward from the coastal baselines, Canada’s jurisdiction is limited
mainly to “sovereign rights” over economic uses of the area, including its
natural resources: see LOS 1982, Part V, Articles 55, 56. While this would
certainly give jurisdiction to control and regulate aquaculture, the rights are
limited as to the extent of permissible interference with foreign shipping,
pipelines and submarine cables, all elements which would need to be taken
into account in siting decisions.
144 See, for example, LOS 1982, ibid. Article 58(1):
In the exclusive economic zone, all States . . . enjoy . . . the freedoms . . . of
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and
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pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of
this Convention.
145 Ibid. Articles 192, 194.
146 See, for example, R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, in which
the existence of international implications, and treaty obligations, respecting
marine pollution influenced a finding for federal jurisdiction over the dumping
of waste in marine areas within the province of British Columbia.
147 It is assumed throughout that provision for aboriginal and treaty rights must be
made to ensure that grants of rights do not infringe upon those constitutional
rights. As was noted earlier, this is the subject of Chapter 9 by Murphy, Devlin
and Lorincz in this volume, and for the purposes of this section it will be assumed
that the necessary consultations are conducted and accommodations are made.
148 For a review of the processes by which the federal and provincial processes are
integrated and coordinated, see the discussion of the Atlantic provinces in
VanderZwaag et al., supra note 86 at 532–562. See also Commons Report
2003, supra note 7 at 19–120 for a summary of federal agency involvement in
the process; Senate Report 2001, supra note 7 at 28–30, on concerns related to
the complexity and delays resulting from the roles of multiple agencies,
particularly in site selection and approval.
149 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22.
150 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. Apart from any required regulatory approvals, DFO
asserts the more general position that its mandate would enable it to object to
creation or expansion of lease areas, assuming a fisheries management concern
was engaged, while acknowledging that the regulations may not all be in place
to permit direct action, see DFO, Interim Guide to Fisheries Resource Use Consider-
ations in the Evaluation of Aquaculture Site Applications. Online. Available
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/aquaculture/fisheries_resource_use/pg001_e.htm 
(accessed 8 August 2005), section 3.
151 Supra note 149 at s. 5, which provides, inter alia:
5. (1) No work shall be built or placed in, on, over, under, through or
across any navigable water unless the work and the site and plans
thereof have been approved by the Minister, on such terms and con-
ditions as the Minister deems fit, prior to commencement of con-
struction.
DFO has also prepared interim guidelines on some of the requirements related
to these approvals: DFO, Interim Guide to Application and Site Marking Require-
ments for Aquaculture Projects in Canada Under the Navigable Waters Protection Act
(Ottawa: DFO, 2002).
152 This action is subject to particular restrictions, which will be discussed later.
153 It is assumed for the purposes of this discussion that the grant of an aquacul-
ture lease or other tenure does not violate the prohibition on Crown grants of a
“fishery,” as that term is applied to the public right of fishing. As was noted
earlier, both the BC Fisheries case, supra note 30, and the Québec Fisheries Case,
supra note 122, distinguished even fishing operations based on “fixed engines”
such as weirs from the exercise of the public right of fishing. This reasoning
would apply a fortiori to aquaculture facilities. Any potential problem, then,
will lie in the second element, which is the non-interference with public right.
In the words of the Belyea case, supra note 34 at 498, the federal government
could be seen as having “restricted the common law rights of the public”
without the authorization of Parliament.
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154 Supra note 150 at s. 35. Approvals may also be required under s. 36, which
deals with deposits of substances deleterious to fish or fish habitat. On the
necessity for approval under s. 35 and s. 36, see OCAD Legislative Review,
supra note 6 at 16. As is noted in the OCAD review, the application of ss. 35
and 5 of the NWPA can also engage the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
S.C. 1992, c. 37. For a detailed description of departmental expectations for
the application of s. 35 in one type of operation, see DFO, Interim Guide to the
Application of Section 35 of the Fisheries Act to Marine Salmonid Cage Aquaculture
(Ottawa: DFO, 2002).
155 OCAD Legislative Review, supra note 6 at 16. See also Interim Guide to Fisheries
Resource Use Considerations, supra note 150 at 7–8 and Appendix A, for guidance
on groups to be consulted and information to be sought in federal reviews
from a fisheries management perspective.
156 Interim Guide to Fisheries Resource Use Considerations, ibid. at 5 (emphasis in ori-
ginal). An exception is noted for Newfoundland salmon operations, and of
course in PEI the federal government has a direct role in leasing.
157 This is also clearly the view of both the Senate and House of Commons com-
mittee reviews as to how the current system is intended to operate: Senate
Report 2001, supra note 7 at 32–33; Commons Report 2003, supra note 7 at
28.
158 See the statement of the doctrine at A.G. Nova Scotia v. A.G. Canada [1951]
S.C.R. 3. Any delegation of administrative powers must also be considered as
revocable, for otherwise a current government could bind future Parliaments,
in violation of the principle of parliamentary supremacy: Reference Re Canada
Assistance Plan (British Columbia) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 548, per Sopinka J.
159 On the use of this approach in fisheries management, see Wildsmith (1984),
supra note 90 at 5: “The practice invariably followed where control of aspects
of the fishery are turned over to the province is to designate provincial officials,
usually Ministers of provincial governments, to administer province-specific
regulations, which are still federally enacted.”
160 See, for example, Peralta et al. v. The Queen In Right of Ontario (1985) 49 O.R.
(2d) 705 (C.A.), affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peralta v. Ontario
[1988] 2 S.C.R 1045. In this case, the delegation of fisheries licensing powers,
pursuant to regulations, was found to be valid despite the fact that the provin-
cial authorities set quotas for individual species, which were not specifically
provided for in the federal regulations. In essence, the setting of individual
quotas was seen as consistent with powers provided for in the regulations.
161 See “Conclusions” (p. 149) for suggestions as to how this might be accom-
plished under federal legislation.
162 Wildsmith (1984), supra note 90 at 14, noted that in the Act at that time,
some fisheries regulations contained aquaculture licensing provisions, meaning
that aquaculture was being construed as part of the fishery for regulatory pur-
poses. He did not, however, take this to mean that this section authorized
aquaculture leases. On the current definitions in s. 2 of the Fisheries Act for
“fishing” (“fishing for, catching or attempting to catch fish”) and “fishery”
(which refers to methods of catching fish and the localities where they are
used), it seems unlikely that this section could be considered applicable to
aquaculture.
163 Section 59(1) sets up the power to delegate a power held by the federal govern-
ment as well, under s. 58. Section 58(2) excludes any additional intrusion on
federal use of the lands if they are located in a public harbor.
164 O.I.C. P.C. 2002–1082, 18 June 2002.
165 Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act R.S.C 1985, c. F-15, s. 5. See also the
Order in Council authorizing the updated MOU with Nova Scotia: Authority to
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Enter into a Memorandum of Understanding on Aquaculture Development with the
Province of Nova Scotia That Will Allow the Parties to Continue Their Collaboration
in the Development of Commercial Aquaculture, Order In Council P.C. 2002-1086,
18 June 2002.
166 Neither the Newfoundland and Labrador nor the BC agreements specify a statu-
tory basis, so they might be presumed to fall under the same general authority.
167 See, for example, Provincial Fisheries, supra note 27; and Québec Fisheries, supra
note 122.
168 See, for example, the discussion in J. Meaney, “Federal Fisheries Law and
Policy: Controls on the Harvesting Sector,” in VanderZwaag, supra note 5,
27–48 at 29; considering the impact of the BC Fisheries case, supra note 30: “It
can be seen that the scope of the federal power to legislate with respect to
marine fisheries is not absolute, but limited to the regulation of the public
right to fish.”
169 See the following discussion of this issue at Meaney, ibid. at 29–30 (citations
omitted), referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Interprovincial Co-opera-
tives Ltd. v. R. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477 at 495:
The traditional scope was thought to relate to the protection and preserva-
tion of fisheries as a public resource – that federal fisheries laws are only
valid if they relate to biological conservation. . . . This view continued to be
applied by the Supreme Court in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In Interprovincial
Co-operatives Ltd. v. R., Chief Justice Laskin noted that the federal power in
relation to fisheries “is concerned with the protection and preservation of
fisheries as a public resource, concerned to monitor or regulate undue or
injurious exploitation.”
170 Meaney, supra note 168 at 31.
171 Ibid. at 31–32.
172 Ibid. at 32. The breadth of the minister’s discretion under s. 7 was confirmed
in Comeau’s Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) [1997] 1
S.C.R. 12 at para. 37, which emphasized the broad discretion available to the
minister in virtually all aspects of licensing, assuming minimal requirements
for natural justice were met:
This interpretation of the breadth of the Minister’s discretion is consonant
with the overall policy of the Fisheries Act. Canada’s fisheries are a “common
property resource,” belonging to all the people of Canada. Under the Fish-
eries Act, it is the Minister’s duty to manage, conserve and develop the
fishery on behalf of Canadians in the public interest (s. 43). Licensing is a
tool in the arsenal of powers available to the Minister under the Fisheries Act
to manage fisheries.
173 [1997] 31 B.C.L.R. (3d) 228 at para. 18:
[T]he plaintiffs say that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, as a minister
of the Crown, has violated the public right to fish by granting an exclusive
fishery to aboriginal fishers without parliamentary authorization. They
contend that neither s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867, nor any provi-
sions of the Fisheries Act have taken away the public right to fish or given to
the Minister the authority to take it away. 
The plaintiffs had also claimed that the public right of fishing was a constitu-
tional right, but the Court found at para. 19 that this position had already
been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gladstone, supra note
120, and that it was purely a common law right at stake.
168 Phillip M. Saunders and Richard Finn
174 Alford, supra note 173 at para. 20
175 Ibid. at para. 17.
176 Ibid. at para. 21. The decision on the motion was appealed, and was affirmed
by the BC Court of Appeal: Alford v. Canada (Attorney General) [1998] B.C.J.
No. 2965 (B.C. C.A. 11 December 1998).
177 See Esson v. Wood (1884) 9 S.C.R. 239, which involved interference with navi-
gation through construction of a wharf on privately owned submerged lands in
Halifax harbor. In that case, the plaintiff was the landowner who had created
the obstruction, claiming for trespass against a defendant who had destroyed
it. The obstruction was referred to as a public nuisance, and although the
defendant might have sought an order for removal, their self-help was justified
as abatement of the nuisance (at 243–244, per Strong J), defeating the claim
for trespass.
178 In Esson, ibid., it was clear from the decisions of Ritchie CJ and Strong J at
242 and 243 that it was for the landowner to show any justification for the
prima facie infringement, and that the justification must involve legislative
authority.
179 Section 23 provides as follows:
23. No one shall fish for, take, catch or kill fish in any water, along any
beach or within any fishery described in any lease or license, or place,
use, draw or set therein any fishing gear or apparatus, except by permis-
sion of the occupant under the lease or license for the time being, or
shall disturb or injure any such fishery.
180 This is consistent with the approach taken in the regulations, which distin-
guish between aquaculture and fishing. See, for example, s. 3(1)(d)(i) of the
Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations, SOR 93-55, P.C.1993-188, 4 February
1993, which provides that the regulations do not generally apply to “cultured
or cultivated fish” found in or taken from aquaculture sites leased or licensed
by the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick governments. This provision does not
purport to restrict the public right of fishing, but would permit such fish to be
taken by an owner without need for a fishing permit.
181 As was noted earlier, oysters are a special case. Section 59 of the Fisheries Act
empowers the federal government to authorize provincial governments to
grant leases for oyster production within the provinces, and provides that any
grantees have the exclusive rights (subject to the fishery regulations) to the
oysters “produced or found within the limits” of the lease areas. It is not
entirely clear whether it extends to an authorization for any interference with
the public right of fishing, save that it would prevent any other fisher from
accessing oysters “found” within the lease area.
182 See, for example, the Canada–NS MOU 2002, s. 2.1: “This MOU applies only
to aquaculture activities carried out or operated in Nova Scotia.” See also
Canada-BC MOU 1988, which, in its preamble, refers to “development of the
aquaculture industry in British Columbia.” This MOU does not deal in detail
with leases, but does confirm the continuing effect of provincially issued
tenures, defined as falling within the province: “ ‘Provincial Tenure’ means the
right to occupy Provincial Crown lands.”
183 The regulations, by s. 26(1)(b) of the Oceans Act, must be made on the advice of
the Minister of Justice.
184 OCAD Legislative Review, supra note 6 at 15.
185 Ibid.
186 In Hickey v. Electric Reduction Co. (1970) 21 D.L.R. (3d) 368 (Nfld. S.C.), the
Newfoundland Supreme Court held that losses to commercial fishers from a
fishery closure caused by pollution were not “special” or distinct from the
Property rights in Canadian aquaculture 169
damage suffered by the public at large from damage to a public right of
fishing. However, in the later case of Gagnier v. Canadian Forest Products
Limited (1990) 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 218 (B.C.S.C.), which also resulted from a
pollution incident leading to a fishery closure, the court found, inter alia, that
private claims under public nuisance need only show a “significant difference
in degree of damage” (at 230).
187 Other federal regulatory provisions under the Fisheries Act and the NWPA
would still apply, in that s. 9(5) of the Oceans Act provides that the application
of s. 9 shall not be interpreted as “limiting the application of any federal laws.”
188 B. Wildsmith, Toward an Appropriate Federal Aquaculture Role and Legislative
Base, Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences No. 1419
(Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1985) at 30–31.
189 Ibid. at 27–28.
190 With respect to enforceability against others (apart from the Crown), the situ-
ation is not as clear, in that enforceability against private users in common law
would depend to some extent on the nature of the property right asserted, and
the extent to which any outside party actually interfered with that particular
right. Furthermore, the essential problem with the continued existence of
public rights, as discussed earlier, is one that relates to enforceability, and the
current situation in that regard is untested.
191 See, for example, the description of these fears in a study (Marshall, supra note
14 at 350) of the impact of commercial aquaculture on a community in the
Bay of Fundy (citation omitted):
Increasing privatization of the marine commons is fundamentally a disen-
franchisement of all traditional fishers, effectively precluding sustainable
livelihoods within the wild fishery. The loss of local control threatens to
transform the communities into “competitive, atomized, and dependent”
entities.
192 See ibid. passim on the difficulty of ensuring the introduction of truly negoti-
ated rights in situations of pressure to develop new industries. Advocates of
full privatization, on the other hand, would tend to reject the inherently polit-
ical dynamic involved in transferring rights in this manner, and prefer market-
based approaches such as auctions or other forms of sale: see, for example,
Neill, supra note 10 at 12–16.
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5 Conflict prevention and
management
Designing effective dispute resolution




Social conflict arising from socio-economic system change is neither a new
phenomenon nor peculiar to the emergence of fish farming or aquaculture.
The term is used in this chapter to refer loosely to activities associated with
the growing and harvesting of marine organisms as a coastally based com-
mercial food production industry.1 Social conflict is to be expected and is, in
fact, a very normal human response to the introduction of a new situation
and any associated loss or perceived loss of the status quo. As noted in con-
nection with the experience of organizational and individual change,2 even
when a change in situation has been sought as an improvement and is per-
ceived as desirable, inevitably there will be a period of transition, unease and
even resistance to the change – often to the point of what may, from some
perspectives, be regarded as irrationality or shortsightedness. Where there is
uncertainty about the nature or import of the change, a poor change man-
agement process, disagreement as to whether the change is an improvement,
or where the change involves differing values, then the problem is exacer-
bated and can lead to various expressions of conflict, including violence, liti-
gation (“court battles”) and other forms of political pressure.
Aquaculture is generally understood as the fastest-growing food produc-
tion industry in the world.3 According to the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) report The State of World Fisheries and Aqua-
culture 2002, “[A]quaculture is growing more rapidly than all other animal
food producing sectors,” with more than half of this production being of
finfish and with a continued expansion in the already wide range of aquatic
species being farmed.4 Similarly, a report by the IMO/FAO/UNESCO-
IOC/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint Group of Experts on the Scient-
ific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP) points out that
“[a]quaculture has great potential for the production of food [and provision
of food security], alleviation of poverty and generation of wealth for people
living in coastal areas, many of whom are among the poorest in the world.”5
Despite this growth and the apparent and uncontroverted benefits, particularly
when combined with the significant decrease in, and in some case even dis-
appearance, of the traditional “wild stock” fishery, conflict relating to the
development and growth of aquaculture has increased in countries such as
Canada commensurate with the expansion of the industry.
In Canada, conflict or “opposition,”6 especially with respect to access to
high-quality aquaculture sites for new enterprises, is now regarded as “a
major impediment to the growth”7 of this sector on both the eastern and the
western coasts.8 In 2000, the Canadian Commissioner for Aquaculture
argued for, inter alia, proactive planning of aquaculture siting, including:
• integrated coastal management (aquaculture zoning);
• conflict resolution mechanism; and
• DFO (federal) guidelines and operational policies for decision-making
regarding allocation of aquatic space for aquaculture purposes.9
Concern about the impact of conflict on the development of aquaculture
as a source of future global food security is also articulated in the GESAMP
report, which is predicated on adoption of an integrated planning approach
to supporting the development of sustainable aquaculture. It points out that
[i]f an integrated planning initiative leads to litigation, it has clearly
failed, since one of the objectives of more integrated planning is to
resolve or pre-empt resource use conflict. Indeed, it is arguable that the
whole process of more integrated planning is a form of mediation
between the various coastal resource users and government sectoral
interests.10
At the same time, conflict relating to aquaculture, while having some
unique features, must be understood as being embedded within the broader
socio-economic and demographic context of coastal/ocean settlement and
urbanization. The problem of conflict arising from increased demand for use
of coastal resources is of sufficient import that it resulted in discussion at the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED). This was followed with action by the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1996 when it
created the platform for Environment and Development in Coastal Regions
and in Small Islands (CSI) to focus on the development of “an intersectoral,
interdisciplinary and integrated approach to the prevention and resolution of
conflicts over resources and values in coastal regions and small islands.”11
As noted by presenters at a UNESCO-CSI conference in 2001,
Competition for limited resources and space makes coastal regions flash-
points for conflict. This means that much is at stake for the great major-
ity of the world’s countries, 80% of which are coastal, located either
adjacent to an ocean or a sea.12
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Dealing with conflicts has been called the greatest challenge facing
integrated coastal management because of the multiuse setting of
coastal systems and because most of these systems are a mosaic of
“rights” (property rights, fishing rights, use rights) and usually involve
common property resources as well.13
It is notable that similar points were made in the early 1990s, prior to the
concepts articulated at UNCED, specifically in relation to aquaculture
development in Canada. Coffen and Smillie argue in Canadian Ocean Law
and Policy that there were problems for development of this industry in
Canada because of:
• vested interests and competition for coastal space;
• privatization of a common “public” resource (erosion of the “public
trust” doctrine); and
• human opposition to change.14
At that time, the authors proposed a combination of comprehensive zoning
or planning and the use of a variety of consensual dispute resolution
processes as a means of addressing conflicts. More than a decade later, it is
striking that the problems remain much the same, and the regulatory
system design and response, although improved in some respects, still pre-
sents difficulties. This is the case despite the clear national policy and the
allocation of significant budgetary and human resources to foster the devel-
opment of the aquaculture industry in Canada.15
Why is this so? Is the problem of conflict endemic to the situation and
therefore an inescapable part of change – something to be borne stoically
and with confidence that the economic forces at play will ultimately prevail?
How or why is it that in countries such as Norway, where the social, eco-
nomic and ecological situation and concerns are similar to those of Canada,
aquaculture – particularly salmon farming, one of the more environmentally
controversial forms of aquaculture – has been able to thrive, with Norway
now a world leader in farmed salmon production? As noted in 2001 by the
Norwegian Fish Farmers’ Association, “In the course of only 30 years Nor-
wegian aquaculture had developed from a side-line into an industry that has
turned us into the world’s largest exporter of salmon and trout.”16
This chapter, based on research carried out within the framework of the
Law and Policy Project under the auspices of AquaNet,17 examines the
problem of aquaculture siting conflicts in Canada with a view to proposing a
regulatory system approach that may reduce the level or nature of conflicts
relating to site access. Specifically, it considers the utility and role of oft-rec-
ommended procedures18 such as negotiation, conciliation, mediation and
arbitration, generally falling within the term “ADR” (alternative dispute
resolution) or, more correctly, “DR” (dispute resolution)19 for addressing
these conflicts. In order to illuminate the problem and explore alternative
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approaches, this study specifically considers the Norwegian experience with
siting conflicts and any legislative solutions for conflict management proce-
dures that have been adopted in the course of the industrial development of
aquaculture. For a variety of reasons, Norway has not focused on developing
procedures for resolving disputes about individual development applica-
tions. Rather, it has adopted an entirely different approach, largely based on
the use of coastal zone (including sea-use) planning as a mechanism for con-
flict prevention and management. In principle, the effect of this approach,
from a conflict resolution or management perspective, is to shift the site of
conflict upstream, or earlier in the process. It attempts to resolve concerns as
a more holistic spatial management exercise before individual development
or spatial use applications are involved. This study explores the implications
of the Norwegian experience and any regulatory options it may suggest for
the Canadian situation.
Using ideas derived from negotiation and conflict management theo-
rists,20 this chapter concludes by suggesting that the concept of aquaculture
conflict, and siting conflicts in particular, needs to be disaggregated and a
conscious conflict management strategy developed to identify and address
differing kinds of conflicts that arise, taking into account factors such as the
actors in the conflict, the underlying interests, the temporal placement of
the conflicts, and so on. It is suggested that the more traditional DR tech-
niques, such as mediation or arbitration, are of limited utility to siting con-
flicts, although integrated management (IM), if understood as a form of
macro or system-level mediation, is an exception. Drawing on the example
of Norway, the study proposes that aquaculture siting conflicts must be
dealt with holistically and must take into account the predictably increasing
use of near coastal waters and the seabed for a range of activities – often reg-
ulated by differing sectoral agencies and involving transnational actors. A
sea-use/zoning approach, perhaps incorporating the planning methodology
advocated by communicative planning theorists,21 is proposed as a regula-
tory system approach that is the most likely to ensure prevention or reduc-
tion of conflict and sustainable development of coastal, including marine,
resources and space. It is further proposed that, despite the legal and juris-
dictional challenges posed under the Canadian Constitution, which are
detailed elsewhere in this book, sea-use planning should as far as possible be
carried out at a municipal or the local level of governance, with accountabil-
ity to provincial and/or national level authorities to provide assurance that
broader environmental, health security, trade obligations and social concerns
are addressed.
Before moving to the next section of the study, it is important to
comment briefly on the relationship between the investigation discussed in
this chapter and that carried out by other researchers engaged in the
AquaNet Law and Policy Project. An investigation into conflict and conflict
management is akin to pulling the thread that unravels an entire cloth.
Potentially all issues are raised, including interagency, governmental and
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jurisdictional conflicts, competing property and other rights, participatory
processes, integrated management processes, and so on. These and other
topics are dealt with in other chapters in this book. The intention in the
study presented in this chapter was, through a mix of discussion with other
researchers, literature review, anecdotal/media commentary and reflection, to
identify some of the systemic elements that seem to feature in siting con-
flicts and to consider what may be a viable approach to alleviating this
problem in Canada.
The background research reflected in the discussion in this chapter
involved case studies and data drawn from Atlantic Canadian and British
Columbian experiences. However, the investigation is focused on identifying
commonalities as opposed to elaborating the development of a single con-
flict. Certainly the regulatory climate and systems differ between provinces
in Canada, a factor that may itself have an impact on the nature and reasons
for conflicts. Similarly, the Norwegian discussion is drawn primarily from
the case studies carried out by Norwegian researchers based in one area
(Bergen22 and environs) of Norway,23 and from discussion with personnel
and researchers in that area. The study can therefore only be taken as a sam-
pling of the Norwegian experience. This specificity of experience and the
need to design and implement regulatory systems that achieve goals and
meet specific standards but also accommodate local needs and factors is, in
fact, the essence of modern integrated management.
With respect to this point, it is also important to understand that the
geographic and demographic characteristics of a location are a key factor in
siting conflicts. Where coastal land and aquatic resources are in abundance
and are not under pressure, the likelihood of conflict is, of course, signific-
antly reduced. However, given the need for access to rapid and inexpensive
transport of harvested fish farm products for global markets, it is predictable
that desirable or “prime” locations will involve both ecological and eco-
nomic/transport considerations, and will likely conflict with other users. As
noted in a report of Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries,
Aquaculture in Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific Regions:24
When selecting a site for aquaculture, many factors are taken into
account, such as water depth, current flow, salinity, temperature, wind
and waves, oxygen content, pollution, ice conditions, proximity of other
resource users and tourist sites, patterns of marine traffic and proximity
to suppliers and services (e.g., wharves, roads, air transportation, and
communications). Thus the industry is generally constrained by the
availability of suitable grow-out sites. Although Canada has 244,000
kilometres of coastline on the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, the
environment, in particular, is an important limiting factor.25
The next section of this study outlines on a “snapshot” basis the
experience in Norway specifically in terms of siting decisions and any
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regulatory mechanisms that either assist to resolve or may instead serve to
exacerbate or create conflicts. The third section of the study presented in this
chapter discusses the implications of the Norwegian experience and any
lesson or options it might suggest as an approach to better address the
problem of siting conflicts in Canada.
Aquaculture and siting conflicts in Norway
This section of the study provides an overview of some of the issues that
have arisen in relation to siting and the development of aquaculture in
Norway. As noted earlier, it is not intended to present a comprehensive
examination of the industry or regulatory regime, but rather is intended to
focus on the elements relating to conflict prevention and resolution.
Aquaculture has been carried out in Norway for just over thirty years and
has rapidly achieved prominence as a significant contributor to the Norwe-
gian economy.26 Although there is an increasing interest in shellfish aqua-
culture and the culture of other finfish species,27 the main exports are
Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout. In 2000, Norway was the world’s largest
producer of Atlantic salmon, which it exports mainly to the European
Union.28 It is useful to note that Norway, like Canada, has an extensive
coastline,29 an increasingly declining wild fish fishery, a well-developed off-
shore oil industry and related shipping industry activities (boat-building,
etc.). In some areas, particularly in the south, there is increasing use of the
coastal areas and coastal waters for recreational homes, boating and conserva-
tion. As Bennett notes, “[t]hroughout this century [the twentieth], the
number of uses of marine resources has proliferated and environmental
impacts have become heavier.”30 However, as he also points out,31 coastal
planning concerns are not uniform and differ between regions, a fact that is
important in the Canadian context as well. For example, in the south and
east of Norway, the pressures relate more to development of the coastal land
and nearshore areas, while in the west and north, with less densely populated
coastal areas, the concerns relate more to regulation of sea areas and manage-
ment of marine resources.
An important geophysical feature of Norway, aside from the famous
fjords or inlets, is the small islands or skerries that fringe much of its coast-
line. The Norwegian baseline, which marks the seaward limit of Norway’s
internal waters and land areas and the point from which the territorial sea32
is measured, runs along the outermost of the skerries. This is an important
factor in Norway’s approach to coastal and sea area regulation,33 and one that
distinguishes it from Canada’s. This means that much of the near coastal
water that would be used for aquaculture is not in the territorial sea but in
internal water – marine spatial areas governed by domestic law. Although
Norway has various levels of government and authorities, unlike Canada it
has a unitary system of government with one (national) government that has
ultimate legislative authority and responsibility. The NORCOAST study
176 Moira L. McConnell
explains34 the relationship between the various governmental actors as
follows:
Central government is responsible for the formulation of national policy
objectives for all sectors. The government system in Norway is charac-
terized by a division of tasks and responsibilities with a hierarchy of
local and county institutions based on local elections on one hand, a
hierarchy of decentralised state agencies on the other. Communes [the
“lowest” or most local institution] are not subordinate to the county
councils, it is more a division of responsibilities and tasks.35
Aquaculture in Norway is governed by several different pieces of national
legislation administered by different ministries. The first legislation for fish
farming, adopted in 1973, was a temporary Act on fish farming, with a
permanent law first being enacted in 1981.36 The current legal framework37
comprises38 the following primary legislation and related regulations:
• Aquaculture Act (Ministry of Fisheries);
• Act No. 54, 1997, Act Relating to Measures to Counteract Diseases in Fish
and Other Aquatic Animals (the Fish Diseases Act) (Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Department of Veterinary Services);
• Act No. 77 of 1985, Planning and Building Act, as amended (Ministry of
the Environment);39
• Pollution Control Act (Ministry of the Environment);
• Act Concerning Quality Control of Fish and Fish Products (Ministry of Fish-
eries);40
• Working Environment Act (Labour Inspection Authority)
• Harbors and Coastal Waters Act;41
• Animal Protection Act;42
• Animal Feed Inspection Act.43
In addition to the foregoing, an important regulatory tool in Norway is
found in the application of the outcome of the National Evaluation of the
Suitability of the Norwegian Coast and River System for Aquaculture
(known as LENKA). LENKA was an interdepartmental project initiated in
the mid-1980s (ending in 1990) by the Department of the Environment,
largely to respond to the administrative demands posed by the boom in fish
farming, particularly in the coastal areas. Bennett describes LENKA as
follows:
Its general aims were to ensure “continued positive development and
growth of the fish-farming industry without causing huge conflicts with
other users and conservation interests” and “contribute to communal
and county planning in the coastal and river systems and decision-
making concerning the location of aquaculture.” . . . In the sea LENKA
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was designed to measure suitability for the farming of salmon and
rainbow trout in open cages.44
LENKA sought to identify areas that were biologically and environmentally
suitable for aquaculture and to estimate capacity, which, as Rogers notes,
was then estimated at 700,000 tonnes, a figure which using today’s techno-
logy would be even greater.45
However, as Bennett points out, although LENKA generated a huge
amount of potentially useful data, it was viewed with skepticism because of
its,
huge cost, top-down organization and weak methodology . . . [and its
failure to take] account of actual water quality and circulation, and was
said frequently to lead to the “wrong” classification of areas that were
known to be suited for fish farming. . . . [However, irrespective of the
failures of LENKA] . . . it did generate discussion and awareness of
issues and methods in coastal zone planning, highlighting the need for
other methods of determining recipient capacity and locating fish
farming.46
Although the Aquaculture Act, which sets up a system of licensing for
aquaculture, can be seen as the primary regulatory instrument for aquacul-
ture development, from the perspective of aquaculture siting and conflict
management the Planning and Building Act of 1985, under the Ministry of
the Environment, is the key legal instrument affecting this issue and has
greatly influenced the approach that has been adopted in Norway. Of course,
the operation of this Act also interacts with other regulatory instruments
dealing with factors noted earlier, affecting siting. For example, legislation
aimed at preventing the spread of fish diseases by regulating distances
between farms, stock density and interaction between species can have a
significant impact on the location of a farm.47
The Planning and Building Act requires that communes (municipalities)
develop “commune plans” for spatial use. These plans, developed at the local
level, are subject to review and approval of the national-level ministries
affected by them, with final agreement under the Ministry of Environment.
As noted in the NORCOAST study of Hordaland,
The Ministry of Environment is the main planning authority at national
level. Through policy guidelines and by monitoring at county and
commune level, the Ministry is responsible for planning within a
national policy framework. . . . The responsibility for spatial planning
lies basically with the political branch of government, whereas state
administration is responsible for implementing the central government
policy within the specific sectors and for monitoring local government
performance in relation to national directives and norms. However, the
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expectations of cooperation and interaction between state administration
and local government institutions at all levels is a key feature of plan-
ning legislation and should be emphasized. . . . Responsibility for plan-
ning in accordance with the Planning and Building Act is therefore
decentralised to the county councils and communes. Plans on local and
regional level due to the Planning and Building Act are to be revised
every four years.48
Originally addressed only to land-use planning, the Act now provides for
national, county and municipal/commune planning of use of marine spaces
under the control of the communes (often including large marine spaces) out
to the national territorial baseline.49 The Planning and Building Act provi-
sions are supplemented by a number of national-level coastal zone planning
guidelines.50 It also contains obligations on the part of the various govern-
ment agencies to cooperate both vertically51 (national–county–municipal)
and horizontally52 (interstate sectoral, intercounty and intermunicipality
planning), and also provides for environmental impact assessments as part of
the development application process for some activities.53
Bennett, explaining the evolution of coastal zone planning in Norway,
points out that although awareness of the need to plan for coastal use had
been building since the 1960s with the rise in recreational homes and other
coastal uses,
[t]he biggest single development precipitating a need for coastal zone
planning in western northern Norway, and to a great extent setting the
agenda and pace, was the rapid expansion of fish farming, particularly
farming of salmon and rainbow trout, which took place from the mid-
1980s onwards.54
The 1999 NORCOAST study comments similarly:
Norway had several reasons for establishing coastal zone planning. An
increasing number of second homes were being built along the coast,
especially in the south. These were often the result of dispensations from
the general directive of no building within a 100-meter belt from the
shoreline and the terms of local structure plans. In addition to this,
comes pollution around many urban areas. Still, it was fish-farming
which led to the first initiatives to plan in sea areas. The fish-farming
business steadily increased in extent from the mid 1980s and needed
larger areas to avoid contamination of infectious fish-diseases. The busi-
ness was also often in conflict with traditional uses of the coastal areas.
This led politicians to understand that something had to be done to
avoid further problems. Questions about ownership rights arose in an
area where everyone earlier had a right to free use, but where fish-farms
now demanded significant areas for their floating constructions. The
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Norwegian solution was to enable the communes and the counties to
plan in sea areas through the Planning and Building Act of 1985. Each
commune is expected to prepare a Commune Plan for the onshore areas.
The planning of marine areas is not mandatory, but communes are
strongly advised to do so.55
Aside from the more obvious economic returns from fish farming, the
early stages of government promotion of fish farming also served a deeper
socio-political purpose in that they countered the trend to urban migration
from the coast. It was “realized early in the 1970s that the industry could be
used to generate jobs and wealth and help to maintain population in the
periphery.”56 This was achieved largely through the licensing system, which
provided a control mechanism with respect both to local ownership and to
farm size. Unfortunately, this approach also led to a proliferation of small-
scale fish farms in inhabited areas without regard to the ecological suitabil-
ity of the site for farming.57 This sudden growth was in a period of infancy
for the industry when technical and scientific knowledge about aquaculture
operations on a commercial scale was only emerging. It resulted in signific-
ant problems with fish disease, pollution and conflicts with other users.
Changes in the licensing regime to allow owners to hold multiple farm
licenses and changes in size restrictions to promote industrialization of
operations have largely removed the demographic, if not the economic
development, component of fish farming. The industrialization of fish
farming to the scale of global marketing necessarily requires proximity to
rapid international transport centers. The growth of the industry and the
operational and food safety demands of the industry led, in the 1980s, to the
understanding that,
decisions on licensing and location should no longer be made on a piece-
meal basis, even though each application was subject to an elaborately
democratic process. Conflict potential with other uses of the coastal zone
made it imperative to solve questions of resource management and
spatial ordering within the framework of communal structure plans for
marine areas.58
Bennett and others have detailed the evolution of marine space planning
in Norway through the 1980s and 1990s, including extensive government-
funded research and reports into planning law, spatial ordering, conflict
analysis and the development of LENKA, as discussed earlier. The main
point of interest for this study is that the primary response to the coastal
zone use conflict and the industrial development of marine space was
through planning and planning law under the Ministry of the Environment,
as opposed to other regulatory mechanisms. It is useful, therefore, to under-
stand how planning was viewed in Norway, and the purpose behind the
planning law. In terms of conflict resolution, the fact that the issue is
180 Moira L. McConnell
already characterized as one of “no planning” or poor planning is itself of
significance. Section 2 of the Planning and Building Act, the purpose clause,
provides that,
[p]lanning pursuant to the Act is intended to ensure the right con-
ditions for coordinating national, county and municipal activity and
provide a basis for decisions concerning use and protection of resources
concerning development.
By means of planning, and through special requirements concerning
the individual planning building project, the Act shall promote a situ-
ation where the use of land and the building thereon will be of greatest
possible benefit to the individual and the community.
When carrying out the planning pursuant to this Act special
emphasis shall be placed on securing children a good environment in
which to grow up.
The philosophy behind the Norwegian approach to planning has been
described as a combination of “project planning” with elements of “strategic
planning.”59 The difference between the two is important in that planning
can have various meanings in a regulatory system. For example, as pointed
out by Bennett,60 a development plan can be a control mechanism – a blue-
print, if you will – that is to be implemented, with success measured in
terms of adherence to and implementation of the blueprint. A project plan-
ning approach might arise in the context of the particular problem that has
to be dealt with and the focus is on ensuring that there is an accurate diag-
nosis of the problem and appropriate implementation. A development plan
can also be intended as a “strategic planning” activity in that it is intended
to function as a “store of policy principles intended to guide but not control
decisions,”61 in which case the focus is more on inclusiveness in policy
formulation, communication and flexibility with implementation and policy
development ongoing processes. Finally, development planning can also be a
“system of conflict mediation,”62 with the planning process itself allowing
for a working out of the conflict through an articulation of interests, views,
values and concerns, and then the negotiation of solutions in the plan to
meet varying interests.
Bennett, a long-time commentator and observer of Norwegian coastal
planning, suggests that the Planning and Building Act reflects the view that
“development is a normative social process rather than a rational techno-
cratic exercise.”63 The emphasis on cooperation and dialogue, with vertical
and horizontal integration among institutional actors, has already been
referred to. At the same time, once the plans are adopted, they are legally
binding, a situation that to some degree counters the flexibility of strategic
planning. Despite the four-year review, once interests are recognized in a
plan, then they are vested; that is, successor plans must work with the 
status quo.
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From a slightly different perspective and analysis, the NORCOAST study
describes the Planning and Building Act (PBA) as embodying,
democratic ideals of openness and public participation, requiring com-
munes to inform and consult all who have an interest in the plan at an
early stage of the planning process. The PBA thus builds on concepts of
social learning and participatory planning. . . . One practical instrumen-
tal objective of this planning act, was to render public planning more
effective by making it more legitimate. The prescription was to root
planning in local communities, by implanting it in the sphere of local
political discourse and social interaction. Decision making on spatial
matters was to be brought into a structured institutionalised framework
within which county and state authorities also exercised considerable
influence. . . . [In addition] Regional government bodies [regional offices
of national ministries e.g. Fisheries] also have responsibility for plan-
ning and management of their own sector interests through legal acts as
law of nature conservation, law of aquaculture, law of salt water fisheries
etc. Integration of these interests is taken care of through the PBA. . . .
Planning under the Act is intended to form a basis for subsequent
decisions concerning the use and conservation of resources and building
development.
Despite this ethos of cooperation and communication, coastal zone plan-
ning, particularly in relation to aquaculture and marine space planning, has
been a “battlefield”64 and a site of power struggles, largely between the sec-
toral agencies. Until the advent of sea-use planning under the PBA, the
Ministry of Fisheries was for the most part the primary sectoral agency
responsible for marine space and activity regulation. It still retains that
responsibility and jurisdiction through sectoral control over the activities of
fishing and aquaculture.
However, the Ministry of the Environment is in charge of spatial plan-
ning. Bennett provides a detailed account of some of the early commune and
regional planning exercises, which were supported by the Norwegian
government, in part as a means of developing a methodology and identify-
ing issues arising in connection with sea-use planning. In many cases,
studies indicate that although the communes were able to develop plans,
problems were encountered in getting approval of the plan from the various
state authorities that were required to agree, all of which had been involved
in the planning exercise: that is, Fisheries and/or Environment. In addition,
the Ministry of the Environment itself came out with a national parks
coastal conservation plan that impacted on commune planning and appar-
ently constituted a “surprise” to the Ministry of Fisheries and the affected
commune. This coastal conservation plan directly affected areas where Fish-
eries had managed the biological resources. Thus, a battle erupted between
the agencies, which was then fought out over the planning exercise.65
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Further issues arose and continue to arise in connection with interpreta-
tion of the PBA. One view holds that communes are obliged to consult with
the state agencies, but ultimately the communes determine the extent to
which they plan the sea areas. In principle, a commune could exclude aqua-
culture. However, the Fisheries authority contested this interpretation,
arguing, inter alia, that national policy favored maximum flexibility for fish
farming and that the Aquaculture Act allows Fisheries to reserve areas for fish
farming. Ministry of Fisheries authorities, therefore, have the view that the
communes should plan only in areas where there is conflict, otherwise areas
should remain unplanned and be available for aquaculture (assuming ecolo-
gical suitability). In addition, Fisheries authorities hold the view that aqua-
culture is an industry that changes rapidly and moves locations: the
communal planning structure lacked sufficient flexibility as a planning
approach. Bennett, examining the (continuing) history of this struggle,
posits several ideas as to why so much trouble was encountered despite
enthusiasm on the part of communes for planning.66 For example, from a
planning theory point of view, he points to what is sometimes seen as a
weakness of territorial planning compared with sectoral management.
Furthermore, the shift to planning directly affected the historically
powerful position of the Ministry of Fisheries. Although the intent of plan-
ning was to develop an inventory to help in siting of fish farms, in fact plan-
ning became regarded as a mechanism for production and control and
therefore resulted in what we may call “turf wars” between sectoral agencies
for control over coastal space. Bennett observes that:
The struggle over management of the coastal zone is at least partly
attributable to the lack of a tradition of cooperation between sector
authorities. Until the mid 1980s the fishery authorities had a virtually
unchallenged monopoly of the management of marine resources and of
ideological production in the field. Up to about 1990 the approach to
management of aquaculture can be characterised as typical piecemeal
engineering based on the rational appraisal of a limited number of vari-
ables with little concern for externalities. With little or no experience of
the procedures or complexities of public planning, the fishery authori-
ties were not well prepared for the introduction of coastal zone planning
by the Planning and Building Act of 1985. This was a challenge to their
accepted view of the world and their role in it. . . . Established in 1971,
the Ministry of the Environment was originally conceived as a ministry
over ministries in charge of the environment, resources and spatial plan-
ning: but it is common knowledge that it has never been accepted as
such by other ministries, which regarded it as just another sector
department.67
A related problem arose from the lack of clarity in the legislation and, in
particular, the relationship between sectoral legislation and the PBA. In
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addition, the PBA does not require sea-use plans or aquaculture planning,
but where they are developed, the Act provides for planning for “areas for
traffic, fishing, aquaculture, nature and recreation, either separate or
together” (s. 20.4). It remains unclear and debated as to whether this allows
for supplementary rules to be developed within these areas. Some new areas
of aquaculture conflict that were observed as emerging in relation to this
issue are, for example, whether a commune plan can designate a particular
kind of aquaculture. Conflicts also arise between forms of aquaculture as
they compete for space for either salmon or other finfish or shellfish. This has
provoked some frustration in communes which have found that they cannot
fully control or plan for resources or space – for example, to avoid fish dis-
eases – under the PBA because it is an issue regulated by the veterinary
authorities and not the Act.
Other areas of conflict that have been noted are the following:
Planning in the sea represents something quite different from planning
on the shore. Planning on the shore and offshore are supposed to be
integrated and seen in connection with each other. It is meaningless not
to see them closely tied to each other. This is also in most cases what is
attempted, but it has often been hard to do. . . . The sea represents a 3-d
medium which contains a surface the volume between and the bottom.
This makes it difficult to translate the planning principles from two-
dimensional physical planning onshore. . . . More and better knowledge
about the coastal zone and its related problems is relevant to good plan-
ning solutions, since decisions made on insufficient knowledge destroy
the legitimacy of plans and confidence in planners. To register data and
problems in cooperation with other agencies could ease this problem. To
build up a GIS-database for the coastal zone would probably also con-
tribute a lot to problem solving.68
Although there are formal administrative appeal processes provided for in
the Act, and in fact there are some letter-writing campaigns and complaints
filed with respect to individual development applications,69 it appears that
the level of litigation and resort to courts seen in Canada is not common in
Norway.70
Another factor that may have affected the acceptability of aquaculture,
despite the above-noted coastal zoning “battles” and its ability to develop as
an industry, is simply that of timing and history. Aquaculture developed to
a commercial/industrial scale in Norway through the late 1970s and early
1980s. Although there were environmental concerns during this period (the
United Nations Environment Programme was created in the mid-1970s),
the level of information and immediacy and breadth of communication
through media and the Internet simply did not exist. Nor were the plethora
of national and international environmental non-governmental organizations
(ENGOs) that now impact significantly on public awareness and the level of
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concern in existence. However, as was pointed out in the NORCOAST
study, increasingly conflicts are now experienced between the more urban-
ized desire for recreational space and the more traditional interests that favor
farming and are dependent on fish farming.71
To some extent, at least in connection with salmon farming, this tension
is said to be easing because salmon cages are being moved further offshore
and therefore out of onshore sight lines. This also means that the harvesting,
and indeed much of the access, to the farmed stock is occurring by water.
This is seen as helping to address the aesthetic concerns posed by farms,
although the movement of fish cages further out to sea is also potentially
posing greater problems for navigation. There is also a foreseeable impact on
shipping and tanker routes to service the oil industry, particularly as
information and concern about the impact of invasive species (e.g. red tide)
and diseases introduced through discharges of ships’ ballast water increase.
The movement of farms further offshore, when combined with increasing
corporatization and non-resident ownership of the farms, is also seen as
leading to new tensions as local residents experience the costs, ecological and
otherwise, of the industry but are not necessarily experiencing the benefits in
terms of revenue through taxation or employment in the community.
As was noted earlier, another emerging tension or conflict relates to pos-
sible competition between forms of farming/species for fish farming space.
Other agency-related tensions also exist in addition to those between sec-
toral agencies, some of which are now actively being addressed through a
coordinated or “team” approach to working with communes on planning
exercises. One such tension is experienced within the Ministry of Fisheries,
where traditional fishing “wild stock” interests, spatial claims and fish
health concerns may appear to conflict with the other activities of the
department related to the promotion and development of aquaculture.
The foregoing story has briefly outlined some of the issues and solutions
that have arisen in the development of aquaculture – and, in particular,
salmon farming – in Norway. The regulatory response to problems of con-
flict in the siting of farms has been dominated by the adoption of a planning
approach to marine spatial management. Sea-/land-use planning was the
central response to dealing with conflicting uses and interests and the need
to provide an adequate number of ecologically appropriate and healthy sites
for fish farming. As is often the case with integrated coastal management,
the introduction of a new actor or spatial claim on the coastline, in this case
the development of aquaculture in Norway, is a catalyst for the broader
process of coastal/marine zone planning. The emphasis on local planning and
involvement is also a notable part of the overall planning exercise, which
appears, at least initially, to support the development of the industry.
Finally, although problems with diseases did generate immense dif-
ficulties and some reconsideration of the industry, the fact that aquaculture
developed largely from within communities and on a commercial scale about
thirty years ago, prior to the current heightened level of environmental
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awareness, access to information and activism, cannot be ignored. Informa-
tion about environmental concerns and fish disease, and the level of general
access to information and stories of conflicts now available on a global basis,
are clearly factors relating to greater community mobilization and possibly
greater conflict than would have existed in Norway, or anywhere, thirty
years ago. It is evident that conflicts still exist in Norway with respect to
some siting decisions, but the industry is now well established as an active
participant and contributor to the coastal community. The problems and
conflicts that are now emerging appear to be what might be called “second-
generation” problems relating to globalization, such as transnational owner-
ship, intra-industry conflict, and competition for space and markets, as well
as the greater social awareness of the need for environmental and biosafety
protection.
Implications and options for Canadian siting conflicts
A number of salient points emerge from the story72 of Norwegian aquacul-
ture development and siting concerns outlined in the foregoing section.
First, the conflicts relating to aquaculture siting appear to change over time
and the development of the industry. Thus, there are what can be called
“first-generation conflicts”; that is, where aquaculture is a newcomer or
entrant new user of coastal and marine space. Where space is relatively
abundant or there is no perceived competition, then initial development can
be fairly easy,73 particularly if local residents carry out the activity. This was
largely the case in the very early stages of aquaculture development in
Norway. However, this situation is clearly unlikely for contemporary fish
farming activities that are intended to operate on a commercial scale with a
global market: they will need to occupy premium marine space that is also
sought for recreational use, shipping or other activities.
A “second generation” of emerging siting-related conflicts was also noted
in Norway. These relate to a number of issues, including competition
between differing forms of aquaculture for prime aquaculture areas; concerns
about non-resident ownership and benefits, with costs being borne locally;
and ecological concerns about the impact of farmed fish on biodiversity and
on the ecological balance in an area. The Norwegian response to the first-
generation conflicts, many of which were ultimately triggered by the need
for larger and better-situated spaces to avoid fish disease, was to invest in a
strategy of promoting and developing marine spatial planning to resolve
immediate conflicts and operational concerns relating to existing sites and to
identify ecologically and operationally appropriate sites for industrial devel-
opment of aquaculture. At present, the same strategy remains as the main
tool to deal with the more complex second-generation conflicts.74
Although, as was indicated earlier, there were and are, in fact, jurisdic-
tional conflicts between sectoral regulators in Norway, it was relatively
simple as a legislative exercise to add sea-use planning to land-use planning
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activities, because the marine space involved is, for the most part, internal
waters (although the Planning Act can apply in the economic zone). Finally,
although perhaps not perceived to be so, it is clear that despite some tend-
ency to regard fish farming as in opposition to some “environmental con-
cerns” (biodiversity) but complementary to other such concerns (how to feed
the world without destroying all the wild fish stocks to meet market needs),
there is a clear common ground. In order to operate high-production, “high-
quality fish” farms (irrespective of the form of farming, i.e. shellfish or
finfish), a clean and healthy marine ecological system is required. Water that
is contaminated by chemicals, other substances, disease, or invasive or
harmful organisms is not viable for the production of farmed species.
Equally, fish farms must be operated in an environmentally friendly manner
to have long-term productivity or they must be prepared to move as sites
get fouled. This mix of concerns, largely caused by the spread of fish diseases
among farmed species and the need to move farms for the sake of having a
clean or healthy location, was an important trigger, in combination with
coastal use competition, in generating a more holistic planning response
from the Norwegian government.
Does the Norwegian experience have any relevance to the Canadian situ-
ation? Does Canada also have to go through the same “teething” process of
fish disease, siting problems, and so on as its industry develops? Are there
some lessons to be learned from the foregoing “story”? A brief review of
recent conflicts relating to siting of aquaculture farms in Canada75 suggests
that the answer is both yes and no.
Certainly it can be observed that conflict and managing conflict is a pre-
occupation in Canada and is perceived as a major problem by many on both
the east and the west coasts, to the extent that it has even generated Senate
inquiries into the matter.76
As suggested earlier, a very important factor to consider relative to the
Norwegian situation is that Canada is seeking to promote aquaculture at a
much later period in history.77 There is a markedly different global social
political climate, where interest groups and the media of communication are
vastly different and highly influential. In addition, the level of sophistication
required for commercial operations, particularly in connection with finfish
farming, as well as the competitive and integrated global marketing
involved, means that large-scale industrial developments, probably involv-
ing transnational and, at a minimum, non-resident ownership to some
degree, will be the norm.78
Another central factor in the Canadian context is that (unlike in the
1970s and 1980s, when, although the wild fishery was the subject of
increasing concern, there had not been the wide-scale experience and con-
flicts relating to the “death” of a fishery) now there is ongoing, even violent,
conflict and resistance to government regulation and restrictions on the wild
fishery on both coasts. While aquaculture is not necessarily a direct replace-
ment for, or equivalent industry to, the traditional “wild” fishery, obviously
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in some communities it may have been seen by some as an alternative indus-
try to provide employment for displaced fishers.79 However, the lifestyles,
skills and cultures differ: for various reasons, fishers often resist location of
aquaculture sites in coastal communities. Shellfish farming is seen as a nui-
sance or as providing problems for nets and access to fishing areas or posing
a danger to navigation. Salmon farming is more a matter of concern for its
possible impact on wild fish stocks and the introduction of fish disease to the
wild stocks.80
A further confounding factor is the prevailing climate of distrust of gov-
ernmental regulation of fisheries and any science associated with the regula-
tion of fisheries, in particular regulation involving the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans.81 In many cases, on both the east and the west coasts it
is evident that there is an ongoing refusal to accept that the wild stock
fishery is no longer viable and may not ever recover. The issues differ on the
two coasts in terms of causal factors, but the refusal to accept change is a
common thread. Efforts to introduce a new actor into communities that do
not accept that the traditional fishery is no longer possible are, understand-
ably, viewed with suspicion and resisted.
The following comments from a residents’ committee in Nova Scotia in
February 2003 reflect concerns and a general suspicion of the industry and
any perceived benefits, including government-related information as to the
economic benefit of the industry:
The “benefits,” often quoted by open-cage finfish aquaculture interest
groups, cite job creation and economic contribution. In reality most of
these jobs are part-time and the loss of traditional jobs, due to probable harm to
the natural fishery are not taken into account.
Aquaculture operations receive subsidies, soft loans, grants and com-
pensation from government and a false picture is created of the eco-
nomic viability of aquaculture operation. . . . In reality, jobs are not
provided, and needed revenue is not provided to the government82 [emphasis in
original].
These are factors that render the climate and context for conflict preven-
tion and management with respect to the siting of aquaculture, and indeed
the introduction of any new coastal use in Canada, complex, to say the least.
A further complication is the fact that legislative and regulatory authority
combine a vertical and horizontal mix of federal and provincial jurisdictions
– that is, some standards are national and some are provincial – and, in each
case, multiple agencies are implicated at both levels, none of which are
necessarily in hierarchical relationship to each other.83 The fact that control
over the near offshore has been and remains a somewhat fraught question in
federal–provincial relations in Canada adds to the problem. These constitu-
tional and jurisdictional questions, as well as the emerging issues such as the
nature and extent of First Nations peoples’ constitutional authority in
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decision-making over spatial use and natural resources, the impact of inter-
national trade obligations and the effect of the 1992 Rio Declaration prin-
ciples84 such as precaution, public participation and subsidiarity, are
considered in greater depth in other investigations in the AquaNet Law and
Policy Project that are presented in this book.
Finally, it appears that most siting “conflicts” – that is, ones that reach a
stage of expression in the courts or media – involve citizens or citizen groups
against the government and are usually in the form of a citizen challenge to
a ministerial decision to grant a permit or a license to a farm.85 Thus,
although they may appear to be citizen versus citizen conflicts, in fact the
form of the complaint or dispute is generally citizen disagreement with a
process or a decision of the government. In addition, in some cases the issue,
although appearing as a siting problem, is often, in fact, operational in that
the industry is already in the location but problems are being encountered
with other actors located nearby.86
In many cases, the concern is that government did not employ an appro-
priate process or fully take into account relevant concerns, including accur-
ate scientific data, when making the decision to allow the site. This leads to
ongoing operational conflicts for existing sites and creates a barrier to devel-
opment of new sites. For example, in some cases community groups may
have the view that they were given insufficient notice to respond to public
hearing notices, even where there have been regional or advisory community
processes provided.87 Community concerns often arise from conflicting data
or lack of information, especially with respect to scientific data about the
ecological suitability of an area or the environmental impact of the farming,
particularly finfish cage farming. For example, the study of conflicts in New-
foundland noted that:
[a] striking feature among all interest groups was the lack of awareness
of the positive impact aquaculture has had on the community. Though
aware of some employment generated by the farms, people doubted the
actual magnitude of this benefit as well as the overall profitability of
aquaculture. Also misconceptions abound regarding the negative
impacts of aquaculture. Though not a source of conflict, this lack of
knowledge certainly makes conflicts more bitter and debilitating for the
aquaculturists.88 . . . Some local residents attribute any negative environ-
mental change to fish farming operations. Often residents don’t always
realize that growers need to maintain clean water to produce healthy fish.89
The result is that when conflicts become manifest or erupt, they tend to do
so in the context of an individual siting decision or application, often after
extended negotiations or investment has occurred on the part of the appli-
cant to evaluate and prepare a proposal that may be acceptable to the various
government departments involving approvals in Canada (even with the
“one-stop shopping” approach).90
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Various forms of public participation approaches or transparency-based
siting and licensing criteria to avoid conflict and bring “stakeholders” into
the process have been tried or proposed to prevent or reduce conflict. For
example, in Nova Scotia local Regional Aquaculture Development Advisory
Committees (RADACs)91 can be set up to help with the public consultation
process. However, the creation of these has itself become a source of conflict
where the government has chosen not to create them or where the RADAC
is viewed as “stacked.”92 These do have not appear to have solved the
problem of citizen complaints, many of which have ended up in court.
The British Columbia government, through Land and Water British
Columbia Inc., a Crown corporation dealing with land-use programs,
including agricultural and aquaculture (now Integrated Land Management
Bureau), has also developed very detailed aquaculture tenure policies and
procedures as part of the government’s support for aquaculture development
involving Crown land. This policy, effective since the autumn of 2002,93
articulates strategic principles underlying the government’s approach to
aquaculture development decisions. The policy is based on the British
Columbia government’s acknowledgement of aquaculture as a legitimate
user of coastal resources and its support for sustainable development of aqua-
culture that is conducted in an “environmentally, socially and economically
suitable manner.” It also expresses the government’s commitment to reduce
red tape and the regulatory burden, expedite decisions, increase access to
Crown land to protect and create jobs, protect both private property and
resource tenure rights, eliminate government subsidies to business and elim-
inate delays to Crown land applications. In 2002, the aquaculture policy was
said to have been built on ten strategic principles (summarized):
1 certainty (timely and clear resource decisions with a predictable regula-
tory framework);
2 competitiveness (removing barriers to investment and promote open
trade);
3 efficiency (maximizing net benefits arising from the allocation, develop-
ment and use of natural resources);
4 shared responsibility (encouraging cooperation among departments,
First Nations, industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.
in developing and implementing resource management);
5 innovations (encouraging innovative technologies, skills, etc. to ensure
sustainability of natural resources);
6 integration (ensuring that resource decisions integrate economic,
environmental and social considerations);
7 accountability (performance-based standards, compliance, reporting,
auditing and enforcement mechanisms);
8 continual improvement;
9 transparency (open, understandable decision-making processes, includ-
ing consulting with key interests prior to making a decision); and
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10 science-based decision-making (justifiable decisions informed by
science-based information and risk assessment).94
However, laudable though these principles are, they do not appear to have
resolved the conflicts in British Columbia, at least with respect to salmon
aquaculture. Although it is outside the scope of this chapter, one can par-
tially attribute the problem to another kind of conflict or perceived conflict:
government regulatory agencies appear to find themselves in what can be
seen as a conflict of interest or, at the very least, tasked with meeting man-
dates that may appear to be in conflict. Although the mantra of “sustainable
development” or environmentally sustainable operations is oft invoked as
the point of reconciliation or mediating paradigm to achieve myriad, some-
times conflicting, agendas, increasing public skepticism about the term
renders it meaningless in this function.95
In sum, both the timing of the Canadian desire to promote aquaculture
industry and with the general nature of industrial activity in the twenty-first
century suggests that the Norwegian experience in responding to and managing
siting conflicts, while of interest, is not applicable or especially relevant to
Canada and that we are perhaps doomed to battle it out until the passage of time
itself changes views and attitudes. And to some extent this is correct. The best
regulatory system and conflict dispute resolution system possible will not reverse
or alter some of the factors referred to above. Regaining public confidence in reg-
ulatory activity in Canada, particularly in this and other sectors such as health,
will not be easy or rapid. It is, then, perhaps less than helpful that regulatory
leaders and officials, such as the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development
located within a department responsible for overall regulation of fisheries and
ocean activities in Canada, are on record with views such as the following:
c) Allocation of Aquatic Space
There is considerable competition for the use of public waters among
various groups, including recreational boaters, fishers, aquaculturists,
shippers, offshore oil and gas developers, etc. Integrated coastal zone man-
agement is one means whereby long-term, balanced decisions could be made on the
use of coastal and open sea areas, including use for aquaculture and enhancement
purposes. The time frame for implementation of an effective mechanism for integ-
rated coastal zone management, however, is lengthy. To meet the current needs of
the aquaculture sector, the Commissioner does not consider it acceptable to wait
for the implementation of a system of coastal zone management. He also consid-
ers that the lack of guidelines to assist operational staff with resource
allocation decisions is delaying the decision-making process and con-
straining growth in the sector.96 [emphasis added]
To be fair, however, this comment is part of a broader position urging the
development of other mechanisms to address a wide range of conflicts,
including regulatory complexity and uncertainty.
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The lack of definition of aquaculture in Canadian law and the lack of any
guidance as to the application of the precautionary principle and risk assess-
ment to expedite decision-making are factors that can lead to conflicts that
affect the development of the industry. Nonetheless, there is a clear message
from some of the highest levels of government: where a process such as
integrated management takes “too long,” at least in terms of a government
agenda to expedite the development of the aquaculture industry, then the
processes will be ignored in favor of the government and industrial develop-
ment agenda. This is the message despite the fact that integrated manage-
ment is officially promoted as a means of preventing poor decision-making
that can negatively affect aquaculture operations and the environment in the
long term. Given this stance, citizen suspicion of hearings and processes
designed to be “independent” is not surprising. The receiving climate, while
welcoming and simplified (no red tape) from a government perspective, is
not welcoming from the community perspective, and applicants and govern-
ment will face citizen resort to courts, media and consumer boycott tactics,
all of which counteracts government efforts to expedite the development of
sites. The siting application and the applicant become the catalyst and cru-
cible in which these broader tensions are fought out.
These are largely political issues that underlie any proposal to develop
conflict management and prevention approaches to siting applications in
Canada. Can they be resolved by resort to ADR or DR approaches such as
arbitration, mediation, negotiation or conciliation? These four ADR proce-
dures are listed as examples of dispute resolution procedures in the Fisheries
and Coastal Resources Act of Nova Scotia and are generally endorsed
elsewhere.97 These processes, which are often understood as referring to a
spectrum of procedures ranging from consensual (negotiation) to coercive
(litigation/legislation), can be useful as tools to help resolve some types of
conflict. For example, operational disputes or beach access or nuisance com-
plaints appear particularly well suited for supported negotiation, concilia-
tion, mediation (third party to assist with process but usually not the
decision) or even arbitration (third party chosen by parties to make a
decision or finding) processes involving citizen-to-citizen matters. However,
as suggested earlier, it is questionable whether they are useful to siting con-
flicts where the complaint is largely with respect to government process and,
often, ministerial decisions. Are governments genuinely willing to enter
into processes such as mediation to reach consensual decisions that may in
fact alter the outcome and require that they relinquish some degree of
decision-making authority? Can a minister actually do this and still be
within her or his jurisdiction if charged with responsibility for making a
decision? Will a government accept negotiated outcomes on siting, or non-
siting as the case may be, of aquaculture in any one case? It is not at all clear
that this is likely or even desirable.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the idea of developing DR and con-
flict management prevention approaches should be abandoned. To the con-
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trary, they are, if anything, clearly essential in the Canadian context. The
argument in this chapter is that the notion of dispute resolution and the
nature of siting conflicts must be disaggregated and a much broader view of
the procedures and processes be taken. There are many different kinds of
siting and other conflicts warranting different strategic responses.
It is in this context that although in some respects the Norwegian story is
not easily applicable to Canada’s situation, except perhaps warning about
the danger of ad hoc decision-making, there are some features in the Norwe-
gian response and approach that are instructive and are applicable or should
be tried in Canada.
The first and most essential lesson – and it may simply be a post hoc reifi-
cation of the events – is that it appears that the Norwegian government
specifically recognized marine spatial conflict as problem in and of itself.
Resources were devoted to exploring the problem, and a specific strategic
approach was adopted to preventing and managing these conflicts, which
were obviously going to increase with the development of the industry and
its increasing need for marine space allocation. Similarly, what is needed in
Canada is a consciously focused strategy for addressing conflicts relating to
use of marine space, including aquaculture development. Of course, this can
and should be part of a broader integrated management process in which
aquaculture is the catalyzing issue or trigger event around which the process
is centered. In addition, a more strategic approach can be adopted for spe-
cific siting issues or conflicts. There are numerous models and tools that can
be adopted.
One useful approach to dealing with the kinds of issues and actors
involved in siting conflicts is sometimes known as the “wheel of conflict,” a
diagnostic and strategic tool propounded by Christopher Moore in the late
1980s for working with group conflicts.98 This approach focuses on a careful
evaluation of the nature of the conflict and key elements in it, which are
then tied to a range of strategic interventions to address the particular
problem or problems. It posits that sources of conflict can be understood as
falling into one or more of the following categories: data conflicts, interest
conflicts, structural conflicts, value conflicts and relationship conflicts.
Very often a group conflict may exhibit more than one feature. Each of
these categories itself has various causes. For example, a data conflict can be
caused by lack of information, misinformation, and differing views on what
is relevant, by differing interpretations of data or by differing assessment
procedures. The point of interest is that each of these elements or categories
or sources of conflicts may need to be, and can be usefully, addressed by
some specific interventions aimed at their resolution. Data conflicts, depend-
ing on the source of the conflict, can perhaps be resolved by interventions
such as agreeing on what data are important, agreeing on a process to collect
data, developing common criteria to assess data, or the use of third-party
experts to gain an outside opinion or break deadlocks. Such an approach
requires that time and expertise be devoted to considering the nature of
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conflicts as they develop and to strategically resolving them. Positive resolu-
tions will in turn generate a “counter-history” to poor conflict-processing
histories and can be a basis for developing greater trust among actors. This
kind of approach can be adopted within a more long-term overall marine
and coastal integrated management approach.
A second lesson, and one that may appear more difficult in the Canadian
context, is adopting a prevention-based comprehensive planning approach.
It is suggested that planning, particularly planning that involves commun-
ity interaction and dialogue (communicative planning), can be understood as
a conflict resolution/prevention mechanism. For example, use of joint map-
making and other tools can help to facilitate communication among actors
and to identify areas of disagreement and areas of mutual concern. Sea-use
planning, especially if done at the municipal or local level, may seem more
difficult to achieve in the Canadian constitutional system, especially given
the geographic layout of the Canadian coastline. Nonetheless, the Norwe-
gian experience demonstrates quite clearly that piecemeal ad hoc siting is
likely to result in reduced efficiency of operation and fish disease problems.
Perhaps one of the most useful aspects, from an industrial development
perspective, of the Norwegian approach is that making some initial
zoning/use decisions about marine space allocation pushes major community
conflicts “upstream” in the process. Major issues and concerns are brought to
the surface and resolved before any individual development or licensing appli-
cation is involved. In principle, this can allow for more objective assessment
of elements of the ecological and other utility of the space without the
tension of a community concerned that it is facing a “done deal” and that
the consultation is simply pro forma. This approach can also better ensure a
higher level of predictability for an applicant and, in turn, generate a better
“climate” for sectoral development. As in the case of land-use planning,
where zones are designated for certain kinds of buildings and activities,
there may still be hearings and assessments and, in some cases, concerns or
conflicts relating to any individual applicant, depending on its nature and
the unavoidable NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) factor. Nonetheless, the
underlying decision as to the nature of the use has been made beforehand,
and the issues then may simply be more related to specific placement within
a zone or specific features of the operation. The Norwegian emphasis on local
planning is also important in that, as noted, the second generation of con-
cerns about transnational ownership, locally experienced consequences and
cost are themes in contemporary conflicts in Canada and are emerging as
concerns in Norway.
There has been some experience in Canada with zoning. For example, on
Prince Edward Island (PEI) an aquaculture zoning system was developed in
the 1980s that essentially classified the waters of PEI in terms of their
acceptability or appropriateness for aquaculture. In so doing, it took account
of other uses in the area at the time.99 The main difficulties that appear to
have emerged with this system are that uses and concerns have changed over
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time, but the 1980s zoning policy is not easily altered. The zoning system
did not formally provide for further public participation in siting decisions
unless required under the federal environmental impact assessment process.
In fact, most decisions are made at an administrative level by a leasing man-
agement board. However, unless zoning of marine space is comprehensive
and not focused on a single industry, it does not really achieve the goals of
marine spatial planning in resolving conflicting or competing uses. Given
the rapidity of coastal use change as well as the need in some cases to move
sites from time to time, it is also important that plans be reviewed fairly
regularly.
The 1997 study of possible conflict resolution strategies for Newfound-
land notes that:
The application of land use planning methodologies and techniques to
the Province’s coastal resources would be of considerable benefit in
avoiding, resolving or mitigating conflict situations in the provinces
and the aquaculture industry. . . . In the case of aquaculture, there is a
desire to have a land (water) planning process that will allow designa-
tion for exclusive integrated aquaculture development. Such a process
would be designed to recognize the value of aquaculture to regional and
community development and protect that value from activities that
would be detrimental to development of the industry (e.g., waste dis-
posal).100
However, the same study also observes:
Fishers are generally opposed to establishing land (water) use designa-
tions. However, they have cooperated with such efforts to date by pro-
viding information regarding their traditional fishing areas. They see
merits for its use as a tool to keep aquaculture away from traditional
fishing areas but are not in favor of using it to divide a resource between
two (or more) users.101
Similarly, in Nova Scotia there has been some site identification and
mapping;102 however, it has not incorporated sea-use planning or ocean
zoning processes as such. There is, nonetheless, increasing interest in ocean
zoning issues in Nova Scotia, with workshops relating to zoning for ballast
water discharge to avoid introducing invasive or harmful species into sensi-
tive areas (for example, red tide into shellfish aquaculture farm sites) and an
ocean zoning workshop held in 2004, organized in part by an NGO, the
Ecology Action Centre.103 The fact that Nova Scotia is the site of several
marine uses, including a marine protected area, a strong interest in encour-
aging offshore oil and gas development, a commercial port and major coastal
tourism, points to the need to develop a planned and strategic response if
aquaculture is to develop further in this province.
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Conclusion
Although not strictly speaking a siting conflict as such, the story of Norway
is similar to that of Canada in terms of the impact that inter- and intra-
agency jurisdictional conflicts can have on siting and industrial develop-
ment. The development of memoranda of understanding and general
adoption of a “one-stop shopping” approach (as much as possible) to regula-
tory approvals means that federal–provincial and interdepartmental juris-
dictional conflicts, while not resolved totally, have to some degree been
worked out.
However, we can expect differing kinds of interagency conflicts to surface
relating to control over marine space and the coastline, and at times conflict-
ing mandates. For example, the development of marine protected areas, her-
itage areas, oil and gas development, the increasing interest in use of marine
space for wind farms, communication channels and pipelines, as well as
more traditional uses such as shipping, recreation and traditional fisheries,
all have the potential for generating conflicts unless a strategic approach is
adopted. Again, it is suggested that a strategic sea-use planning approach
combined with a well-developed conflict prevention and management strat-
egy could be useful in preventing or managing such conflicts. The exercise
of developing plans for all potential users and, with it, processes for resolv-
ing conflicts among potential licensees of marine space and coastal users,
through municipal authorities – often representing particular socio-
economic and ecological systems – could ultimately result in a climate
which recognizes that conflicts will occur, but has developed a means of
resolving disputes as they arise with strategic and flexible planning process.
This process cannot, of course, occur in isolation from the development of
other aspects of siting – namely, issues of fish health or disease control, ecolog-
ically appropriate siting, data collection, and protection of fish safety to ensure
that biodiversity and ecological systems are protected. In addition, a licensing
system/space allocation system should be developed with a view to addressing
concerns about the need to ensure that local benefits are explicitly provided for
in order to offset any short- and long-term costs that are incurred for lost
access to public resources, including the aesthetic impacts of aquaculture.
All of these activities will require a legal framework that articulates and
supports this approach rather than exacerbating conflicts. To the fullest
extent possible, a federal aquaculture law and policy should focus on devel-
opment of these approaches in a facilitative role, perhaps much as the role
envisaged for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans under the Oceans Act of
Canada for integrated management, to date a role perhaps less than fully uti-
lized. Certainly flexibility and responsiveness to local concerns and differ-
ences in values and kinds of conflicts on each of Canada’s coasts should be a
key theme at a federal level.104 A provincial-level effort should be made to
develop conflict management strategies and to develop greater human capac-
ity and awareness of approaches to analysis and intervention in sources of
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conflict, in order to de-escalate conflicts and to also plan for likely conflicts
in a strategic manner.
Conflicts will occur even with a well-planned approach. Indeed, conflict is
a normal and even healthy process in a society where interests and values are
diverse and changing rapidly. To fail to acknowledge this process does,
however, risk the very experience that is increasingly present in discussions
about marine space activities conflict leading to violence and court battles.
At all levels of governance, it is quite clear that these tensions and concerns
will only increase as pressures on the coastline and the environment increase.
Although time is perhaps of the essence for some in achieving a prominent
role for Canada in the world aquaculture market, the folk wisdom about
“haste making waste” also comes to mind. It suggests that time and
resources devoted to preventing or resolving conflicts would be well spent
and might provide a more solid foundation for the establishment and long-
term growth of the industry.
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ability as important features of the aquaculture industry: see, for example,
“Norwegian Fisheries Policy – with Main Focus on the Promotion of Sustain-
ability,” Lecture by the Minister at the University of Washington, Seattle, 20
October 2004. Online. Available http://odin.dep.no/fkd/engelsk/
p100001957/047041-090002/dok-bu.html. In his lecture, the Minister noted
that trade in seafood is Norway’s second largest export industry after oil and
gas. Of that trade, 40 percent by value (US$1.4 billion), or 577,000 tons of
2.7 million tons by weight, is derived from the high-value farmed salmon and
trout.
17 AquaNet is an initiative of the federal government under its Networks of
Centres of Excellence program. It is aimed at encouraging collaboration
between university researchers, industry and government in the development
and advancement of aquaculture in Canada.
18 See, for example, Fisheries and Coastal Resource Act, S.N.S 1996, c. 25, s. 9;
GESAMP, supra note 5 at 68, which also includes litigation.
19 The term “ADR” has been criticized as implying that litigation is the norm,
while all other methods for settling disputes are “alternative” to the norm. DR
tends to be used to imply a panoply of methods, including litigation, all of
which are potentially useful, depending on the features of the problem.
20 In particular, the wheel of conflict developed by Christopher W. Moore, The
Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1989), is a useful tool for designing systems to prevent or respond to
conflict.
21 Communicative or collaborative planning has been seen as a mid-ground
between a “top-down” social-engineering rationalist approach to planning and
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social mobilization/activism that is sometimes viewed as difficult for govern-
ment to implement or adopt. The term “governance” as opposed to “govern-
ment” serves to capture the idea that the activity of collective decision-making
is a partnership including all actors in a system. There are many different
authors, studies and theoretical perspectives, ranging from the most abstract to
the more applied, regarding the utility of communicative planning techniques
in increasingly pluralistic societies. See, for example, J. Habermas, The Theory
of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist
Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987); P. Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping
Places in Fragmented Societies (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); R. G. Bennett,
“Coastal Planning on the Atlantic Fringe, North Norway: The Power Game,”
(2000) 43 Ocean and Coastal Management 879; J. Amdam, “Governance and
Communicative Planning in Practice in a Welfare State: Experience from
County Level in Norway,” (2002) Paper presented to Association of European
Schools of Planning Congress, Volos, Greece; T. Sager, Communicative Planning
Theory (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1994). A useful description and discussion of
the relationship between communicative planning and greater use of GIS
and expert information is found in B. Goldstein, “How Communicative
Planning Can Help Counties to Reduce the Impact of Land Use Change
on Biodiversity, while Other Planning Frameworks Fall Short: A Conceptual
Blueprint for the California Biodiversity Project” (1996). Online. Available
http://gis.esri.com/library/userconf/proc96/TO50/PAP036/P36.HTM (accessed
14 March 2004).
22 Hordaland, the county in which Bergen is located, is “the leading county in
fish farming. . . . In 1996, 150 fish farms in Hordaland produced 68793 tons of
the total Norwegian export. 93% of the production is exported.” NORCOAST –
Review of National and Regional Planning Processes and Instruments in the North Sea
Region – Full Study, Phase I Report, Hordaland Fylkeskommune, Norway (County of
North Jutland, Denmark: NORCOAST Project, 1999) at 11.
23 I am particularly indebted to Professor Roger G. Bennett, Department of Geo-
graphy, University of Bergen, first for providing me with his very interesting
scholarly articles and case studies on coastal planning in Norway (which led
me to Bergen), and second for his generous collegiality in hosting my visit to
the Environmental Law Center, University of Bergen, and organizing and
accompanying me to several key interviews with relevant personnel in the
County of Hordaland. I am also grateful to the kind assistance and information
provided by Ernst Nordtveit, Dean of Law, University of Bergen.
24 Interim Report, June 2001. Online. Available http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/
parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fish-e/rep-e/repintjun01-e.htm. Although the
Report is still at this location on web search engines as of March 2004, it is
not possible to access it directly using this URL. It is also not easily accessible
through the Senate website. The best link to the report is through the Aquatic
Network website. Online. Available http://www.aquanet.com/Resources/
aqua/aq_aqua5.htm (accessed 14 March 2004).
25 Ibid. at 8.
26 An estimate of value added in 2001 is 16.200 million Norwegian kroner. See
also supra note 16, where the Minister of Fisheries estimated the value of aqua-
culture in 2004 as US$1.4 billion.
27 Cod, char, halibut and other species.
28 In its 2002 report, the FAO noted that Norway has now identified Asia as the
future growth market and that international trade in farmed salmon has
moved from “virtually zero to about 1 million tones (2001) in less than two
decades.” Atlantic salmon accounts for about 88 percent of this trade, with
Norway being the main exporter. FAO, 2002, supra note 4 at 36.
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29 R. G. Bennett, “Norwegian Coastal Zone Planning,” (1996) 50 Norsk
Geografisk Tidsskrift 201, notes that it has over 55,000 kilometres of coastline
(including islands) and a relatively small population. However, he continues,
“[s]ettlement is largely concentrated in the coastal zone and many activities are
localized and intensive.”
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. at 202.
32 In January 2003, the Norwegian government issued a White Paper proposing
extension of its territorial sea from 4 to 12 nautical miles (nm), largely to
respond to marine pollution concerns and the need to be able to regulate a
greater area of near coastal activities. See Press Release 9/03, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2003. Online. Available http://www.odin.dep.
no/ud/engelsk/aktuelt/pressem/032081-070019/index-dok000-b-n-a.html
(accessed 17 March 2004). The Act relating to Norway’s Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone, extending the nautical sea limit to 12 nm, was adopted on 27
June 2003 and entered into force on 1 January 2004. See Press Release 212/03,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 December 2003. Online. Available
http://www.odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/aktuelt/pressem/ 032001-070316/index-
dok000-b-n-a.html (accessed 17 March 2004).
33 Bennett, supra note 29 at 201.
34 In order to better reflect and perhaps even shed further light on the situation
in Norway, as much as possible, Norwegian-authored descriptions of the Nor-
wegian “system” and relationship between agencies and the processes have
been used, rather than author observations or a review of legislation. This is a
critically important aspect of comparative research in that, although a review
of legislation or an outsider description of situation has some utility, it can and
often does fail to capture the subtle differences, or what we might call a sense
of “how things really work”; that is, the view from inside. The relevance of the
perception of how things work resides in the fact that responses to problems
reflect the comprehension of the problem by those experiencing it and how
they frame the issues. This seemingly obvious point is more difficult in prac-
tice and is central to ideas about effective negotiation, conflict resolution and
prevention.
35 NORCOAST, supra note 22 at 5.
36 Bennett, supra note 29 at 203.
37 References taken from interviews, Bennett, ibid., copies of legislation provided
during a meeting with the Fiskerdirektoratet in Bergen, and from Rogers
Consulting, A Review of Legal and Policy Frameworks Used to Regulate and Legis-
late Aquaculture in Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, United States, pre-
pared for the Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development,
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, June 2000 at 53–58.
38 This list is derived from the 2001 Report, supra note 16 at 7. The name of the
legislation varies when translated: for example, the Act of 14 June 1985 No.
68 relating to Aquaculture (Aquaculture Act) (Online. Available
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19850614-068-eng.doc (accessed 17
March 2004)) is also referred to in some reports as Act No. 68 of 14 June 1985
Relating to the Breeding of Fish, Shellfish, etc. (see Rogers Consulting, supra
note 37), or the Act of Fish Farming (see notes for presentation of Dr. Bjarne
Aalvik, May 2000, provided to the author by the Ministry of Fisheries,
Bergen, August 2002). Some but not all Norwegian legislation has been trans-
lated into English. See the University of Oslo, Faculty of Law Library website
listing translated legislation. Online. Available http://www.ub.
uio.no/ujur/ulov/ (accessed 17 March 2004). As noted by the Minister of Fish-
eries and Coastal Affairs, supra note 16, the Aquaculture Act is undergoing revi-
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sion to “make it a modern tool for administering the industry.” The revised
Act is scheduled to come into force in 2006. It will be administered within a
more integrated system, to be established in 2005, which will better incorpo-
rate environmental concerns and improved technical standards. A new regula-
tion is also under development to address sea ranching for lobster, shellfish and
other species, which will broaden the sector. It should be noted that the role of
government in developing the regulations remains, as noted by the Minister,
one of “wealth creation” and facilitation rather than of being a “restraint” on
the industry.
39 Interestingly, a handout (hand-dated May 2000) comprising speaking notes
provided to the author by the Ministry of Fisheries allocates responsibility for
this Act to the Ministry of Local Government and Labour.
40 Rogers Consulting, supra note 37, or, as it is also known, the Act Relating to the
Regulation of Exports of Fish and Fish Products (1990).
41 This is listed in the report, supra note 16. In the “Presentation Notes” referred
to above in note 39, it is listed as Ports and Harbours under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Fisheries; however, it is not listed in the legal database and
does not appear to have been translated.
42 Listed in the Report, supra note 16, but not elsewhere and does not appear to
be available in translation.
43 Listed in the Report, supra note 16, but not elsewhere and does not appear to
be available in translation.
44 Bennett, supra note 29 at 204–205.
45 Rogers Consulting, supra note 37 at 54.
46 Bennett, supra note 29 at 205. Bennett also provides a useful summary of
LENKA’s methodology (and problems associated with it) for assessing capacity
as a basis for developing regulatory responses. Problems noted included the
overly large zones for capacity assessment, which did not correspond to the
local governance/planning units and did not, therefore, prove to be much help
for local planning and management decisions.
47 For example, Chapter 3 of the Fish Diseases Act, No. 54 of 1997, which applies
seaward up to and including Norway’s economic zone, provides that
7. No one may establish, expand or move aquaculture establishments
without the approval of the Ministry [of Agriculture]. [in translation]
48 NORCOAST, supra note 22 at 5.
49 Section 1 of the Act (as amended to 1990 in translation – which is the most
recent English translation). Interestingly, it provides that the King may fix the
limit of application of the Act to beyond the baseline in “certain sea areas” (s.
1). Bennett, drawing on case studies, particularly those involving the develop-
ment of fish farming, has traced the evolution of coastal zone planning in
Norway in several articles. Specifically, he examines the impact of different
planning processes used by communes and considers the relationship between
institutional actors and the varying degrees of public participation in coastal
zone use planning under the Planning and Building Act. See Bennett, supra note
29; Bennett, supra note 21; R. G. Bennett, “Challenges in Norwegian Coastal
Zone Planning,” (1996) 39 GeoJournal 153.
50 For example, Note T-1078 National Political Guidelines for Protected Water-
courses; Note T-9/1985 About Coastal Zone Planning; Note T-4/1996 About
Laws and Guidelines for Planning and Resource Use in the Coastal Zone, supra
note 22 at 4.
51 For example, sections 9.3, 9.4, 10.2, 12.3 and 29.
52 For example, sections 19.2 and 20.3.
53 Section 33.3ff.
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54 Bennett, supra note 29 at 202–203.
55 NORCOAST, supra note 22 at 3. For example, at the time of the author’s
research in Bergen, it was believed that the government was about to enter a
new round of licensing for salmon farms (highly lucrative and not easily avail-
able) and would perhaps give preference to communes where a sea-use plan
was in place. Although, in principle, no building is allowed within a 100-
meter belt of the shore (s. 17.2 of the Planning and Building Act) except for
some specified exceptions, local authorities have some authority to allow “dis-
pensations” from this national planning rule. Informal comments indicate that
this is a source of tension in that local populations had differing views regard-
ing what areas needed protection. In fact, one project (Hordaland) was under
way to experiment with allowing local authorities/population to draw their
boundaries. The thought was that in many places the local population might
well draw a line that more closely accorded with local understanding of the
geography and ecology of areas and places that needed more or less protection
than that afforded by a rigid application of the 100-meter rule (a rule that
seemed perhaps more often honored in the breach).
56 Bennett, supra note 29 at 203.
57 In fact, it is understood by the author that under traditional Norwegian law,
people resident on the coast – usually fishers or farmers – had a property right
over the marine area adjacent to the property out to the depth at which a horse
could stand at low tide (horse’s height). In effect, fish farming evolved in many
communities in the fjords and along the coast as “out the back door” for many
who were also fishers and engaged in this as a supplemental activity: it was not
necessarily an incursion into a “public space” per se or an activity that might
compete with the traditional fishery.
58 Bennett, supra note 29 at 204.
59 NORCOAST, supra note 22 at 5.
60 “Challenges in Norwegian Coastal Zone Planning,” supra note 49 at 154,
drawing on the work of Healey, supra note 21.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Bennett, supra note 29 at 206.
64 Bennett, supra note 21.
65 This particular pattern of coastal conflict, and indeed competition for regula-
tion of the coast and marine space, is increasing and will become more
common with the proliferation of marine protected areas (MPAs), which also
seek to regulate activities within marine ecosystems “zones.” See, for example,
the 2002 dispute, described as a dispute “between two state government
departments,” over the siting of a finfish farm in Sceale Bay, on the west coast
of South Australia, in an area that had been proposed for a protected marine
park that is also a breeding site for Australian sea lions. Concern was expressed
that “PIRSA [Primary Industries South Australia] Aquaculture appears to be
an active advocate for the proposal [finfish farm], rather than assessing the pro-
posal independently.” See Friends of Sceale Bay media release, “Major Conflict
Looms over Proposed West Coast Fish Farm Development” 12 October 2002,
GROWfish News ref: 455/02. Online. Available http://www.growfish.com.au.
66 Bennett, supra note 21 at 895ff.
67 Ibid. at 896–897. He notes also the contest regarding a “monopoly of know-
ledge” and the refusal of the Fisheries Department to agree for some time that
escaped salmon were contributing to the parasite problem, despite the views of
the Department of the Environment on the problem at 899.
68 NORCOAST, supra note 22 at 21–23.
69 This appeared to be perceived largely as a NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”)
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problem rather than general opposition to aquaculture, and appeared to relate
to recreational and aesthetic concerns. The fact that many areas are already
zoned for aquaculture use means that decisions on individual applications
relate more to reviewing the ecological/food security suitability of a specific
operation and siting within a zone. Although things may be changing, it
appears that Norway also has fairly restrictive rules regarding non-resident
ownership of countryside property and second homes. Informal comments sug-
gested that those who were not full-time residents in an area were perhaps seen
as having less of a “stake” or legitimacy in voicing concerns about local land-
use decisions, particularly those relating to economic development decisions.
70 It was suggested in discussion that Norwegians are perhaps more accepting of
the idea of a social contract and the accommodation of broader social interests,
less litigious and more accepting of regulatory authority. It was noted, for
example, in asking about recourse to mediation or DR in other areas of law
such as divorce, custody, etc., that whereas the practice is well developed in
Canada, it appeared that the norm is for the couple to settle matters and come
to an arrangement between themselves, with the agreement then registered
with the court: people are expected to be able to sort out these social matters
themselves.
71 NORCOAST, supra note 22 at 11.
72 The word “story” is used to acknowledge the fact that this account of the evo-
lution of aquaculture in Norway is told from a coastal conflict, planning and
regulatory development perspective. The secondary materials, case studies and
discussions used are derived from sources with a “stake” in that view: planners,
geographers, legal academics and regulators. Other stories or explanations can
also be advanced, each presenting equally plausible descriptions for a series of
events. For example, this history of developments can also be understood in
terms of the development of the science and practice of aquaculture, or perhaps
also in terms of industrialization of farming and food production to keep up
with population growth and international marketing. Other chapters in this
book reveal other versions of the Canadian “story.”
73 Informal observation on the part of a regulatory official to the effect that there
has not been a major problem of conflict in the community, largely because
there is “a lot of coast in Newfoundland,” with major problems mainly relat-
ing to a lack of clarity regarding the jurisdiction between regulatory agencies.
It is, however, notable that a study was carried out in Newfoundland regard-
ing ways to prevent or manage conflict and opposition to aquaculture; see
Sharing Coastal Resources, supra note 6 at 19, which noted:
Newfoundland and Labrador, in many ways, is at the cutting edge of the
aquaculture industry . . . however, in some regions, the incidence of conflict
has significantly delayed aquaculture development.
74 For example, there has been some discussion about whether the commune can
designate for specific forms of aquaculture when designating aquaculture
zones. Ecological issues can also be worked out as part of the planning process.
Questions of residency and benefits are more likely to be worked out through
the licensing system process.
75 As noted earlier, the interest in this study is to identify common themes and
issues rather than to trace the course of a particular conflict. In addition, the
specifics of a conflict necessarily vary from location to location, a fact that
underlies an integrated management approach. In Atlantic Canada, various
reports on conflicts, including the discussion in the Senate study, supra note
24; J. A. Percy, “Farming Fundy’s Fishes: Aquaculture in the Bay of Fundy”
(Autumn 1996) 7 Fundy Issues. Online. Available http://www.bofep.org/
Conflict prevention and management 203
aquacult.htm (accessed 18 March 2004) (an overview of conflicts in the Bay of
Fundy area, primarily New Brunswick, where aquaculture has developed quite
rapidly), as well as data relating to recent Nova Scotia siting conflicts
(1999–2002: Northwest Cove, St. Margaret’s Bay, and St Ann’s Bay, Victoria
County, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia), were considered. The situation in British
Columbia more recently relates to the decision to lift the seven-year morato-
rium on salmon farming and to concerns about intertidal shellfish farming
activity on some of the Gulf islands.
76 See Senate report, supra note 24; Newfoundland report, supra note 6.
77 Aquaculture began in Canada at about the same time as in Norway. However,
the major government support and development of the industry on a large
scale appears to have occurred later.
78 For example, as noted by the Georgia Strait Alliance, “Wrong Direction on
Fish Farms,” (November 2002) 8(6) Strait Talk at 14, reporting on the lawsuit
filed by a First Nations people against the BC government for its failure to
consult before issuing two fish farm licenses thought to affect First Nations’
interests:
As for the “jobs” claim, it is worth noting that world wide fish farms have
expanded and that the number of people they employ has decreased. There
is no reason to think it will be different in BC, especially since the same
foreign-owned multinationals control the industry here (only one of the big
“five” companies operating in BC is even Canadian).
79 For example, see comments describing federal and provincial agencies’ views in
Percy, supra note 75.
80 The complaints voiced in February 2003 by the Stop (application) 1169 Horse
Island Fish Farm, Residents’ Committee from Northwest Cove, Southwest
Cove and Tilley Cove, Nova Scotia, areas where there remains a strong lobster
fishery as well as mackerel and tuna industry, are typical of concerns expressed
regarding siting in traditional fishing communities:
Conclusion
Inshore open-cage fin fish farms are not compatible with traditional fishing
communities. The present system of aquaculture can do serious harm to
established fisheries and the existing economy of the area.
Featuring largely in the concerns are: the impact of escaped farm fish on
wild fish stocks; the spread of sea lice; and possible water quality deteriora-
tion from fecal matter.
81 See, for example, R. Barron, “Fish Farm Campaign Kicks Off,” 29 October
2002, Nanaimo Daily News A1, on the public education campaign about the
environmental and potential health risks associated with farmed salmon,
mounted on the west coast by the Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform
(CAAR) and the quoted views of media spokespersons that: “the government
and industry have not been forthright in providing the necessary information
to allow the consumer to make an informed decision about farmed salmon.”
82 Stop application, supra note 80 at 2.
83 Aspects of the structural problem of multiple decision-makers, each with mul-
tiple objectives, provide ample fodder for conflict resolution game theory and
systems modeling approaches to conflict resolution. See, for example, “Salmon
Aquaculture Conflict in British Columbia” and other case studies. Online.
Available http://www.eng.uwaterloo.ca/~lhamouda/interest.htm (accessed 18
March 2004), developed by various faculty members working with systems
theory and systems design engineering methodologies at the University of
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Waterloo, and “the graph model of conflict resolution,” co-author Hipel, supra
note 9. Online. Available http://www.systems.uwaterloo.ca/Faculty/Hipel/
conflict_resolution.htm (accessed 18 March 2004).
84 The Declaration, issued with a global systems management document, Agenda
21, was produced by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development. For the text of both, see online. Available
http://www.unep.org (accessed 18 March 2004).
85 For example, the 2003 complaint referred to in note 80 is with respect to a
license that had been granted. In the context, there is, of course, even more
concern in British Columbia about the idea that some areas of surface water
would be brought into an agricultural reserve by amending “the Right to
Farm Act” (the Farm Practices Protection Act) to include aquaculture farms. Such
an amendment would, to some degree, insulate aquaculture, along with other
agricultural operations, from nuisance by-laws and other regulations that may
affect operations. See Georgia Strait Alliance, supra note 78 at 14.
86 See, for example, the Newfoundland study, supra note 6, which details con-
cerns about moorings for mussel farms being unmarked or otherwise creating
problems. Of course, apprehension about the possibility of these impediments
to the operation can lead to siting concerns at the outset. However, for pur-
poses of this study they are distinguished. One cannot, however, ignore the
fact that operational conflicts, although usually manifesting themselves as
involving different parties than siting conflicts (i.e. citizen-to-citizen), in turn
fuel resistance to the development of new sites, as they can provide evidence of
predictable “problems” that will occur if a site is allowed. Thus, the collective
experience is shaped by the earlier history of poor processes and decisions or
difficult experiences. This historical element or “legacy,” as it is sometimes
called in negotiation and conflict resolution theory, is a factor that must be
explicitly considered in developing a strategic approach to conflict prevention.
87 The Nova Scotia case of the St. Ann’s Bay siting conflict is a good example of
such concerns.
88 Newfoundland study, supra note 6 at 10.
89 Ibid. at 12.
90 For fuller discussion of the various departments involved and their roles, see
Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development (OCAD), Legislative
and Regulatory Review of Aquaculture in Canada, DFO/6144 (Ottawa: Fisheries
and Oceans Canada, March 2001) at 15ff.
91 Regional Aquaculture Development Advisory Committees (RADACs) can be
created to review an aquaculture application. In principle, RADACs are used
to “facilitate economic development while simultaneously providing informa-
tion to the local residents and determining the level of public support.”
Online. Available http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsaf/aquaculture/radac/ (accessed 18
March 2004). The committee is usually made up of local fishers, aquacultural-
ists, recreational boaters, waterfront landowners, business operators and local
politicians. On occasion, provincial bureaucrats will also be appointed to the
committee. The committee provides recommendations to the minister on
whether to accept or reject the proposal for aquaculture activity. However,
these recommendations do not fetter the minister’s discretion in making a final
decision. The various provincial agencies that the provincial government must
consult with are contained in s. 47 of the Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act,
SNS 1996, c. 25 as amended.
Before making a decision with respect to the application, the Minister
a) shall consult with
(i) the Department of Agriculture and Marketing, the Department of
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the Environment, the Department of Housing and Municipal Affairs
and the Department of Natural Resources, and
(ii) any boards, agencies and commissions as may be prescribed; and
b) may refer the application to a private sector, regional aquaculture devel-
opment advisory committee for comment and recommendation.
92 This was controversial in the case of the St. Ann’s application. No RADAC
was formed, although comments in the media suggest it should have been.
However, the industry has been less enthusiastic and the government less
inclined to create them, as there is concern that the RADACs are being
stacked with opponents of aquaculture that are not interested in developing
workable solutions.
93 LWBC file 12075-00, Volume 3, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.0400. This policy has
been updated and revised in 2004 and 2005. Online. Avaliable http://lwbc.
bc.ca/0llwbc/policies/policy/land/aquaculture.pdf.
94 Ibid. at 2–3.
95 This is rather unfortunate, since in principle many of the ideas behind sustainable
development – that is, how to have economic development without destroying
the environment – are useful. The problem lies less in the inherent fallacy of the
notion that in the failure actually to implement any of the associated concepts
such as the precautionary principle. In many cases, from a public perspective there
has been a lot of “process” and discussion but decisions and impacts remain
largely the same as they would have been without the concept of sustainable
development. Ultimately, knowledge of the “product” affects the degree to which
participants engage wholeheartedly in processes, hence the resort to the familiar
measures of litigation and media and political battles.
96 OCAD, supra note 90 at 25.
97 SNS 1996, c. 25, s. 9. Similar procedures are listed in the GESAMP report,
supra note 5 at 68.
98 Graph entitled “Sources of conflict in groups and types of interventions,” in
Moore, supra note 20 at 27.
99 Information drawn from the PEI “Aquaculture Leasing Policy 2000–2001.”
Aquaculture is regulated somewhat differently in PEI than in other provinces,
in that PEI signed a memorandum of understanding with the federal govern-
ment in which the federal government has responsibility for aquaculture
leasing, much of which relates to shellfish farming.
100 Newfoundland Report, supra note 6 at 13.
101 Ibid. at 6.
102 See the “Aquaculture Site Finder” developed by the Aquaculture Division of
the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Nova Scotia Geomatics
Centre of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations. Online. Available
http://gov.ns.ca/GeoNova/home/applications.asp (accessed 5 October 2005).
103 See, for example, the policy backgrounder N. Hynes and J. Graham, Coastal
Zone Planning in Nova Scotia, prepared for the RCIP Rural Policy Forum,
17–19 February 2005 (Halifax: AHPRC, Coastal Communities Network and
Dalhousie University, 2005). Online. Available http://www.ecologyaction.ca/
coastal_issues/coastal_issues.shtm (accessed 5 October 2005).
104 It is acknowledged that this study has not at all addressed the fact that Canada
is tri-coastal and also an island country, with all the differences and concerns
the extremes between each raises.
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Much of the burgeoning literature on aquaculture law and policy focuses on
industry development, property rights, regulatory standards and environ-
mental impact, but the relationship of mariculture to maritime law remains
largely unaddressed. The layperson may not easily see the relevance of this
body of law for mariculture activities. In reality, there are actual and poten-
tial connections between the two that can result in far-reaching legal and
fiscal consequences.
Also known by the older term “admiralty law,” maritime law governs
shipping and navigation. In ancient times, this law emerged to support
commercial marine transportation and maritime trade, but it eventually
evolved to address all types, aspects and impacts of navigation at sea and
inland waterways, including obstacles to navigation. Whether a vessel is a
container ship, fishing vessel, drillship or recreational vessel, while at anchor
or navigating (using own propulsion or in tow), there are commercial, safety
and environmental aspects governed by maritime law. Obstacles in naviga-
ble waterways are a maritime law matter. If harm is caused to persons or
property, off or on board a ship, as a result of faulty navigation, or if a ship
causes environmental or resource loss, maritime law governs the claims that
may be advanced and the liability and compensation that will apply. Ocean
uses such as fishing, recreational boating, whale watching, laying of subma-
rine pipelines and cables, and offshore oil and gas activities may not be ship-
ping qua marine transportation, but still trigger the application of Canadian
maritime law because very often there is a navigation element involved.
Similarly, the reason why mariculturalists should take an interest in mar-
itime law is not that this body of law governs farming; unlike aquaculture,
fisheries and environmental law, maritime law does not regulate the farming
activity proper. Rather, maritime law is relevant where there is navigation
or an impact on safe navigation, with reference both to the location of a farm
and to support activities. Although this may appear as fairly confined rele-
vance, in Canadian maritime law “shipping and navigation” matters may
engage a broad range of activities and issues beyond what the layperson
would normally associate with this area of law. Characterization of a marine
activity as a “maritime matter” may invoke uniquely admiralty institutions,
such as limitation of liability for maritime claims.
Initially occurring in sheltered inshore coastal areas, mariculture has
gradually expanded to include offshore areas. Offshore cage culture has been
found to have minimal environmental impact, is less likely to find objection
by coastal communities, has access to cleaner and better marine areas, and
can be located in areas where there is less likelihood of conflicts with other
uses. Huge cages engineered with space-era materials are now constructed
and may be located on the surface or submerged at various depths. Also,
disused offshore oil and gas installations may be converted for use as plat-
forms for offshore farms.1 The technology used includes offshore installa-
tions, supply ships or boats, a diversity of cages and, occasionally,
superstructures to provide workspace (including living space) for workers
and anchoring systems, and floating automated feeders. Not all coastal and
offshore mariculture activities fall within the ambit of maritime law, hence
the need to explore the relationship between the two to determine which
activities and under what conditions they do constitute maritime law
matters. The question ultimately relates to where the line is to be drawn to
determine the applicable body of law.
This chapter addresses this largely unexplored relationship by looking at
some of the most important maritime institutions. It commences with a dis-
cussion of Canadian maritime law, the jurisdiction it generates and the cri-
teria to apply when considering whether mariculture activities are maritime
matters. Its main discussion focuses on the actual and potential relevance of
several maritime law institutions. The consequences of applying maritime
law to mariculture activities are also discussed. It is submitted that federal
and provincial regime-building in support of mariculture should factor in
maritime law applications and consequences.
Preliminary maritime considerations
Maritime law as a body of federal law
As the law governing navigation and shipping in Canada, maritime law is a
federal constitutional responsibility.2 Section 2(b) of the Federal Court Act
defines Canadian maritime law as
the law that was administered by the Exchequer Court of Canada on its
Admiralty side by virtue of the Admiralty Act, chapter A-1 of the
Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, or any other statute, or that would
have been so administered if that Court had, on its Admiralty side,
unlimited jurisdiction in relation to maritime and admiralty matters, as
that law has been altered by this or any other Act of the Parliament of
Canada.3
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This complex provision puts a historical dimension on the content of Cana-
dian maritime law. It refers to English maritime law as it was received in
Canada and administered by the Exchequer Court, and further developed by
Parliament and Canadian courts. The origins of this law are civilian, but
over time it received significant inputs from the common law and inter-
national maritime law. Thus, the modern sources of Canadian maritime law
are: (1) federal statutes (e.g. the Federal Court Act, the Admiralty Act 1891,4
the Admiralty Act 19345 and any other maritime law statute enacted by the
Parliament of Canada, such as the Canada Shipping Act,6 the Canada Shipping
Act 20017 and the Marine Liability Act;8 (2) case law, including the jurispru-
dence of English courts until 1934 and the jurisprudence of Canadian courts
before 1934 and decisions since then (federal and provincial); (3) principles
of civil law and the common law applied by the Federal Court; and (4) mar-
itime law conventions to which Canada is a party (or which Canada has
implemented without becoming a party), and presumably also international
maritime customary law.
The exact limits of Canadian maritime law are uncertain, in that com-
mercial, technological and environmental factors continue to influence the
development of this law to encompass new issues. As the Supreme Court of
Canada has had opportunity to note, Canadian maritime law is not static or
frozen in time, but rather continues to evolve in the modern context of navi-
gation and shipping.9 Maritime law is not part of the provincial law, but
rather is subject to the power of Parliament to repeal, abolish and alter. It is
uniform throughout Canada irrespective of origins or location of cause of
action. There is overlap between maritime law and provincial law, and dif-
ferent outcomes are possible depending on which body of law is applied.10
Federal law is not “foreign law” to the provinces, but rather is an integral
part of the law of each province.11 This body of law relates to both domestic
and international activities; there is thus a policy imperative in support of
uniformity, both nationally and internationally.12
Admiralty jurisdiction
Subject matter of jurisdiction
Admiralty jurisdiction – that is, the jurisdiction of a court to administer mar-
itime law – may not be exercised by any court, but only by the Federal Court,
provincial superior courts and such other courts that are specifically so
empowered.13 The Federal Court was established for better administration of
the laws of Canada, and as the successor to the Exchequer Court and earlier
Vice-Admiralty Courts, it is the Admiralty Court of Canada.14 For historical
and statutory reasons, its admiralty jurisdiction is original and concurrent
with that of provincial courts. Whereas the provincial superior courts possess
inherent jurisdiction over maritime matters, the Federal Court does not.15 Its
jurisdiction is statutory and limited only by what may reasonably be
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interpreted as being maritime, thus pertaining to navigation and shipping,
and within its statutory limits. The Federal Court’s admiralty jurisdiction is
set out in the Federal Court Act and several other maritime law statutes nour-
ishing that statutory grant.
Historically, the jurisdiction of admiralty courts in common law systems
was based on a combination of maritime subject matter and location of cause
outside the jurisdiction of common law courts. Today in Canada, the geo-
graphical dimension is a factor, but not a necessary requirement to ground
admiralty jurisdiction.16 The Admiralty Court’s jurisdiction and the admin-
istration of maritime law by any other court of competent jurisdiction is
grounded ratione materiae, that is, by reason of subject matter. Hence, charac-
terization of a cause of action as “maritime” will ground this jurisdiction and
invoke Canadian maritime law.
In general, admiralty jurisdiction is engaged whenever a claim is
advanced under or by virtue of “Canadian maritime law or any other law of
Canada relating to any matter coming within the class of subject of naviga-
tion and shipping, except to the extent that jurisdiction has been otherwise
specially assigned.”17 The presumption is that all navigation and shipping
matters fall within the Federal Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, unless juris-
diction, over specific matters is assigned to other bodies instead.18 Without
limiting the general grant of jurisdiction, the Federal Court Act provides a
comprehensive inventory of subject matter giving rise to maritime actions,
much of which is directly or potentially relevant for mariculture activities:
• title to and possession of a ship or share;
• disputes between co-owners concerning possession and use of ship;
• mortgages, hypothecs and other securities;
• damage, loss of life and personal injury caused by ship in collision or
otherwise;
• damage to or loss of ship, cargo, equipment and any property during
loading or unloading;
• damage to goods during carriage by ship and transit;
• loss of life or personal injury during the operation of a ship;
• damage to cargo and passengers’ luggage;





• construction, repair and equipping of ship;




• port, canal, dock and related charges.19
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The discussion so far has assumed a scenario where there is no issue on the
characterization of causes of action. A cause that falls within any aspect of
the subject matter mentioned above or that arises by virtue of any other
maritime law statute raises no issue. Thus, because ships are a maritime law
matter, the utilization of supply vessels for mariculture is subject to several
maritime causes of action, inter alia disputes concerning supply ship owner-
ship, wages due to those who sail the ship and claims for damage done by
the ship in a collision. However, where the vessel used is not immediately
characterized as a ship, the application of maritime law may not be obvious
and determination of admiralty jurisdiction will depend on one of two
factors, namely the extent to which technology used in mariculture ought to
be considered a vessel or ship, and the nature and degree of connection
between the mariculture activity in question to navigation and shipping.
The latter will concern not only the technology involved, but also the nature
of the claim advanced when it touches upon other maritime aspects – for
example, relating to the personnel involved. Canadian courts have developed
analytical approaches attempting to establish when the threshold is crossed.
When a vessel, installation or structure is considered a ship
In addition to the utilization of vessels, potentially a wide variety of structures
are employed in mariculture, including floating platforms, converted offshore
installations, floating and submerged cages, and floating and automated struc-
tures, among others, and the technology can be expected to develop new struc-
tures. As seen earlier, if a structure employed for mariculture is characterized
as a ship, it is clear that any claim in connection with it is within the ambit of
maritime law. In Canadian maritime law, there is no one definition of ship for
all purposes. The Federal Court Act defines “ship” as follows:
“[s]hip” means any vessel or craft designed, used or capable of being
used solely or partly for navigation, without regard to method or lack of
propulsion, and includes
(a) a ship in the process of construction from the time that it is capable
of floating, and
(b) a ship that has been stranded, wrecked or sunk and any part of a ship
that has broken up.20
The legal definition of ship has a broader scope than everyday usage of the
term. Thus, an unpropelled craft (an undefined generic term) that is capable
of being used in part for navigation is caught by this definition. The key
element is a navigation capability of sorts. Other statutes, such as the
Canada Shipping Act, similarly emphasize navigation capability.21 The
Canada Shipping Act 2001, which is not yet in force, does not define “ship”
and instead uses a generic definition of vessel.22 However, even this defini-
tion emphasizes navigation capability.
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Canadian courts have considered a wide range of vessels and craft to
determine what ought to qualify as ship. The leading case defining “ship,”
in a non-exhaustive manner, is Canada v. Saint John Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., wherein the criteria that were applied to determine whether a crane
barge was a ship were the following:
• construction for use on water;
• capability of being moved from place to place, even if only occasionally
(e.g. with towage assistance);
• cargo-carrying capability, even if only occasionally;
• people-carrying capability.23
Assessed collectively, the criteria indicated that the vessel, although not
having its own means of propulsion, was “built to do something on water,
requiring movement from place to place.”24 The crane barge was able to
perform a number of maritime functions and was consequently considered a
ship.25 Generally, the courts have considered barges, including dumb barges
(i.e. having no propulsion), to be ships.26 Further, for the purposes of the
Collision Regulations, “barge” is defined to mean “ a non-self-propelled barge,
scow, dredge, pile-driver, hopper, pontoon or houseboat,” clearly further
widening the range of vessels to which these regulations, which are designed
for navigation safety, would apply.27
A different conclusion was reached in relation to a floating dry dock, which
was considered in R. v. Star Luzon (The) with reference to its characteristics
and function.28 The vessel resembled a rectangular barge with high sidewalls
and open ends. It was built in Japan and was towed to North Vancouver,
where it was moored in a manner that allowed it to be raised and lowered
while remaining centered. It had navigation lights when it was towed from
Japan, but these were removed once it was moored. Its function was to raise
ships for repair. It could be moved, but only after extensive work to remove it
from its moorage. It could not be used for navigation, and when moved was
akin to cargo (possibly as machinery) at best. Even so, the owners had it regis-
tered as a ship under the Canada Shipping Act. However, the court found that
the floating dry dock was not used for navigation, despite its towage from
Japan. It was probably a vessel (at least during towage), but not a ship for the
purposes of the Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations.
There are vessels that are incapable of navigation on their own, but which
are not necessarily disqualified from consideration as ships. It is important
that such vessels must have been designed to be able to undertake some
form of movement, even without their own means of propulsion. In Falcon-
bridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd., a contract of carriage was per-
formed in part by barges used to lighter cargo from ship to shore. The
lighters were considered ships.29
Especially useful by way of analogy are a wide diversity of vessels, includ-
ing what might be more appropriately termed installations and structures,
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used for offshore oil and gas drilling and production. These may not specifi-
cally be designated as ships.30 Although not necessarily included in formal
definitions of “ship,” a “drilling unit” means “drillship, submersible, semi-
submersible, barge, jack-up or other vessel that is used in a drilling program
and is fitted with a drilling rig, and includes other facilities related to
drilling and marine activities that are installed on a vessel or platform.”31
The inference is that they are vessels and have some navigational capability.
Some installations (e.g. jack-up rigs, semi-submersibles and tension leg plat-
forms) are towed in and out of a location, and their main function is per-
formed in a stationary capacity. Some may be anchored, whereas others may
have some propulsion and dynamic positioning (e.g. semi-submersibles).
The principal purpose of these installations is clearly drilling and produc-
tion, not navigation, but they all need to move from one place to another,
and are designed to do so. Offshore installations are required to be classed,
have to comply with international standards and are registered like ships.
They can be mortgaged and require marine insurance.32 The courts have
considered them ships.33 The Court of Appeal of Newfoundland in Bow
Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. considered Bow
Drill III a drilling platform and a navigable vessel. The vessel was “capable
of self-propulsion; even when drilling, is vulnerable to the perils of the sea;
is not attached permanently to the ocean floor and, can travel world wide to
drill for oil.”34 Significantly for mariculture, the Supreme Court of Canada in
the same case held that “even if the rig is not a navigable vessel, the tort
claim arising from the fire would still be a maritime matter since the main
purpose of the Bow Drill III was activity in navigable waters.”35 The infer-
ence to be drawn here is that tort claims in a marine context, even if not
directly navigation related, but occurring in navigable waters, may still
come within the ambit of Canadian maritime law.36
A final consideration here is what is included in the ship. The term
“vessel” includes the appurtenances, tackle, apparel, furniture, engines, and
boilers,37 as well as the wreck thereof.38 The notion of appurtenances is an
inclusive concept and continues to evolve to include other items and situ-
ations,39 but does not include bunkers.40 As we shall see, the range of equip-
ment considered to be part of the ship has far-reaching significance.
In conclusion, it is likely that the broad definitions of ship and vessel for
maritime law purposes will encompass vessels used for mariculture purposes.
Insofar as characterization of a mariculture vessel or structure as “ship” is
concerned, although function may be considered, it is not necessarily deter-
minative. What is determinative is whether the structure concerned has a
connection to navigation and/or navigable waters.
Integral connection to maritime matters
When an activity is not immediately apparent as maritime, what are the cri-
teria applicable to determine whether it falls within the class of subject
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“navigation and shipping”? The question as to when a particular activity in
the marine environment constitutes a maritime matter has been considered
by the Supreme Court of Canada in a variety of situations, but not in a mari-
culture setting as at the time of writing. Accordingly, in order to seek guid-
ance on the question as to when and under what conditions a mariculture
activity or issue would be subject to maritime law, pertinent Supreme Court
case law needs to be assessed with a view to drawing appropriate analogies.
In Buenos Aires Maru, which concerned theft from a warehouse, the
Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the subject matter of the case
at bar was sufficiently “integrally connected to maritime matters as to be
legitimate Canadian maritime law within federal legislative competence”41
and thus avoid what might be in pith and substance a provincial matter.
“Integral connection” was identified on the basis of three facts relating to the
incidental storage of the goods as part of the contract of carriage:
• proximity of the warehouse terminal operation to the sea in the port of
Montreal;
• the connection between the terminal operator’s activities in the port
area and the contract of carriage for the stolen goods; and
• the temporary nature of the storage pending final delivery to the con-
signee in accordance with the carriage contract.
The maritime connection consisted of a spatial relationship between the
warehousing and the maritime carriage, the function of the warehousing in
the maritime contract, and the temporary nature of the warehousing to
enable completion of a maritime undertaking.
A similar type of analysis was undertaken by the same court in Monk
Corp. v. Island Fertilizers Ltd. concerning a claim for various expenditures and
whether the contract in question was simply a sale of goods governed by
provincial law or a carriage by sea contract. The court was divided on the
characterization of the contract. The purchase of marine insurance, the char-
tering of a self-geared vessel and discharge (including demurrage and dis-
patch provisions) suggested a contract of maritime carriage. The claim
before the court concerned the obligation to discharge and not the sale of
goods proper. Again significantly for mariculture, Iacobucci J held that liti-
gants
can assume maritime obligations governed by maritime law even
though they may not formally be parties to a charter-party or even a
contract of carriage by sea. What is important for purposes of maritime
law jurisdiction is that their claim be integrally connected with mar-
itime matters.42
In Shibamoto & Co. v. Western Fish Producers, a case where the use of a fish
processing ship, financing and fish processing at sea were concerned, the
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basic issue underpinning the maritime matter was the provision of funds for
the acquisition of a ship and processing of salmon and salmon roe at sea. A
key question was whether the supply of monies on board the ship consti-
tuted necessaries; that is, “any claim in respect of goods, materials or services
wherever supplied to a ship for the operation or maintenance of the ship,
including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, claims in
respect of stevedoring and lighterage” (emphasis added).43 Rouleau J held:
It might well be that the word “operation” in that paragraph does not
refer only to the actual navigation of a ship over the water but to its
operation generally where it has another function such as receiving
delivery of fish on the high seas and processing same, even though the
actual processing might well be the same as the operation carried on by
a fish processing factory situated ashore.
. . .
The contract between the parties was for the “Nicole N” to proceed
on the high seas to acquire fish in a specified fishing area and receive,
process and deliver same. If one looks at the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the I.T.O. case [Buenos Aires Maru] . . . I think the
analysis referred to at page 657 wherein the Court considered the prox-
imity of a terminal to the operations at sea sufficient to bring it within
Maritime law, I am satisfied that I am by no means exceeding the
bounds of jurisdiction conferred on this Court and the issues are inte-
grally connected to Maritime law.44
The connection between a cause of action arising from a mariculture
setting and maritime matters could be similarly analyzed. If the cause of
action relates to an activity or event that happens in navigable waters, the
spatial dimension is satisfied. If the cause relates to an activity or event hap-
pening on land, but in support of mariculture, this per se does not render the
cause not maritime. It would be necessary to examine the function. The
functional criterion is met where the cause of action relates to what is essen-
tially the performance of a function of a ship or provision of a maritime
service, such as towage or carriage (including temporary storage on land). If
the cause of action does not clearly relate to a maritime function, then a
more probing analysis of the circumstances of the claim would be necessary.
A court would need to consider whether marginal cases are more appropri-
ately provincial “private and local” or “property and civil rights,” or possibly
whether the federal context of navigation and shipping has evolved further
to encompass new subject matter.
Relationship between federal maritime law and provincial law
Where a mariculture issue is characterized as a maritime matter, it is federal
maritime and not provincial law that will be applied to dispose of the
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matter. As we have seen earlier, the reason is that Canadian maritime law is
a body of federal law uniform throughout the country, and consequently
does not comprehend provincial statutory law.
Before Ordon Estate v. Grail, it was possible to consider the application of
provincial law in a variety of maritime settings, such as marine insurance,
death and personal injury at sea, and occupiers’ liability.45 However, in
Ordon the Supreme Court of Canada developed a test to determine when a
provincial statute may be applied in a maritime context. Since maritime law
is by definition federal law that is uniform across the country, maritime law
cannot include provincial law, because provincial law is not uniform. Thus, a
court will first need to characterize the issue before it as navigation or ship-
ping, or, more appropriately (in this case), property and civil rights.46 On
the facts, the court must be able to discern an integral connection to mar-
itime matters in order to determine the application of maritime law, and if
this is the case, it then moves to the second step of applying maritime law.47
Where the issue is characterized as maritime and yet there is insufficient
maritime law to apply, the courts are encouraged to develop non-statutory
maritime law as an exercise in judicial reform.48 This is significant because
the absence of substantive maritime law does not leave a vacuum to be filled
by provincial law. Finally, and assuming that the first three steps do not find
applicable federal law, it is only at this stage that a constitutional analysis
may be needed. Such an analysis may result in the reading down of a provin-
cial statute where it trenches upon a core federal power.49 Commenting on
Beetz J’s effort at distinguishing between the pith and substance and inter-
jurisdictional immunity doctrines in Bell Canada v. Quebec, Professor Hogg
comments as follows:
According to this [i.e. Beetz J’s] formulation, provincial laws may
validly extend to federal subjects unless the laws “bear upon those sub-
jects in what makes them specifically of federal jurisdiction.” This
formulation seems to involve a judicial judgment as to the severity of
the impact of a provincial law on the federal subject to which the law
ostensibly extends. If the provincial law would affect the “basic,
minimum and unassailable” core of the federal subject, then the inter-
jurisdictional immunity doctrine stipulates that the law must be
restricted in its application (read down) to exclude the federal subject.
If, on the other hand, the provincial law does not intrude heavily on the
federal subject, then the pith and substance doctrine stipulates that the
provincial law may validly apply to the federal subject.50
In earlier dicta, the Supreme Court considered the possibility that in
some cases provincial law may be applied. In Buenos Aires Maru, it was stated
that “where a case is ‘in pith and substance’ within the court’s statutory
jurisdiction, the Federal Court may apply provincial law incidentally neces-
sary to resolve the issues presented by the parties.”51 This may be useful to
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consider where the provinces have aquaculture legislation and have extended
the application of other provincial law (e.g. workers’ compensation and
occupiers’ liability statutes) to this industry. The Ordon analysis does not
eliminate the application of provincial law where a case involves a mixture of
issues clearly invoking parallel federal and provincial laws. Where one body
of law ceases to apply and the second begins to apply will depend on the cir-
cumstances of the case.
Planning and financing considerations
Registration and licensing
The provincial licensing of a fish farm does not automatically mean that
vessels used in association with the farm are thereby registered or licensed.
Under the Canada Shipping Act, ships over fifteen gross tons require registra-
tion.52 In order to qualify for Canadian registration, there must be Canadian
ownership of the ship or shares, and registration in Canada is prima facie
evidence of ownership.53 Ships with a smaller tonnage may still be registered
at the owner’s option.54 The registration process involves various steps,
including the classification of the ship. Ship classification is conducted by
surveyors employed by classification societies in order to ascertain that the
ship conforms to international standards for safety. Mariculture vessels of
less than fifteen gross tons and equipped with a motor of 7.5 kilowatts of
power or more, and not registered as ships, are covered by the licensing
regime for small commercial vessels administered by the Department of
Transport.55
Insofar as mariculture structures other than ships are concerned, there is
at this time no requirement for registration or licensing in Canada. This is
similarly the case with many other jurisdictions. The practice in relation to
offshore oil and gas installations is clearer in this respect, where registration
is required, and classification societies have a well-established practice of cer-
tifying a wide variety of structures and equipment for marine safety pur-
poses. Mariculture, like offshore wind farming, is a relative newcomer to
maritime regulation; however, at least one major ship classification society
has now commenced certification of wind farms.56
The lack of registration requirement does not mean that marine safety
standards are not applied; indeed, conditions may be imposed in the license.
For example, aquaculture regulations in Norway address safety issues.57
Interestingly, the major Norwegian classification society, Det Norske
Veritas (DNV), has discontinued the certification of standards for fish farm
equipment.58 Standards seem to be addressed by the Ministry of Fisheries. In
Canada, the provincial licensing process includes input from the Coast
Guard, an organization responsible for maritime safety and administering
much of the Canada Shipping Act and Navigable Waters Protection Act
(NWPA).59 Particularly relevant for mariculture is the NWPA review
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process. The Coast Guard’s prior approval is needed for any work built or
emplaced in, on, over, under, through or across navigable waters that inter-
feres, or may interfere, with navigation.60 The Coast Guard may require 
the provision and maintenance of lights and markers for navigation safety
purposes.
Whereas shipowners are subject to a duty of seaworthiness in relation to
the vessels they put to sea, it is not clear that there is a similar duty for mar-
iculturists, other than for mariculture vessels. Other than statutory duties, it
remains to be seen what the standard of care might be for mariculturists that
emplace structures in navigable waters.61
Mortgages
Depending on whether the mariculture vessel under construction or in use is
characterized as a “ship,” mariculture operators may be able to benefit from
maritime mortgage financing. In addition to the regular mortgage available
for ships in operation, the Canada Shipping Act also provides the builder’s
mortgage, which is available for a ship to be or under construction. Both
mortgages require registration and will in fact appear on the Register of
Ships entry. In addition to these mortgages, mariculturalists may also
benefit from mortgages of vessels under the Bank Act.62 However, it appears
that aquaculture mortgages may be at a disadvantage if, although registered
under the Bank Act, they are not similarly registered in the Register of
Ships. The disadvantage will arise in a competition for a limited fund, where
the registered mortgages will be discharged before unregistered mortgages.63
The ship is a valuable asset and may be used to generate financing to
support operations. For mortgaging purposes, it is important to consider
what components of a ship would be considered as forming part of the vessel
to determine the full value of the security. There may be an issue for mari-
culture equipment suppliers and the security they might hold for payment.
As seen earlier, the ship includes not only the hull, but also equipment
installed into it. Once installed, such equipment is considered part of the
ship. Maritime law may operate to the exclusion of provincial conditional
sales legislation with the consequence that title over the equipment passes
with the title in the ship.64
Operational considerations
Safety of navigation and safety of life at sea
There are three major maritime law safety of navigation concerns for mari-
culture. The first concerns the emplacement of mariculture installations and
structures that may become obstacles to navigation. The second is collision
avoidance regulations. The third is safety of human life at sea.
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Safety of navigable waters
Coastal and offshore mariculture farms come in various sizes. At their
largest, they can occupy significant tracts of ocean space, but large size can
be a problem for navigation safety. The controversial 1988 American Nor-
wegian Fish Farm proposal for an offshore aquaculture license twenty-seven
miles from Cape Ann, Massachusetts, failed in part for reasons of size and
impact on navigation. The proponents planned a forty-seven-square mile
facility with ninety floating salmon pens (ninety feet in diameter and ninety
feet deep) attached to nine moored barges. In addition to objections from
the fishing industry and environmentalists, there were navigational con-
cerns, including concerns regarding the passage of submarines in the area. A
major issue was whether it was in the public interest to allocate for exclusive
use large areas of public waters and thereby exclude mariners.65 The sub-
sequent and more successful SeaStead pilot project twelve miles off Martha’s
Vineyard occupied nine square miles, but had to be moved by five miles to
avoid overlap with an active trawl fishing ground.66
The Navigable Waters Protection Act addresses the problem of potential
obstacles to navigation. As noted earlier, the Act prohibits the building or
emplacement of any work “in, on, over, under or across any navigable water”
without prior ministerial (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) permission.67
“Work” includes a variety of infrastructural works, but especially relevant
for mariculture is “any structure, device or thing, whether similar in charac-
ter to anything referred to in this definition or not, that may interfere with
navigation.”68 The minister has discretionary power to approve the work and
site, and impose construction and maintenance conditions.69 Alterations
must not interfere with navigation and also require permission.70 The minis-
ter may order a mariculturist to refrain from proceeding with the work
where, in the minister’s opinion, the work interferes or would interfere with
navigation. Where the work is emplaced without permission or ministerial
conditions are not abided by, the minister may direct the alteration or
removal of the work, and may even remove and destroy the work at the
expense of the owner.71
Norwegian regulatory safety requirements for mariculture installations
are more specific than those in Canada. Mariculture floating installations
must not be anchored in such a way as to pose danger to ordinary traffic.
They must be equipped with lights, and such as not to have a blinding
effect on ordinary traffic. The extreme ends of the installation must carry
flashing yellow lights at night, and colored buoys or poles (yellow or orange)
in daytime. License numbers must be visibly displayed.72 Although not spe-
cific to mariculture, the Navigable Waters Works Regulations have generic
requirements that may be applied to mariculture. Any work in navigable
waters will require the installation and maintenance of lights, buoys and
other marks to the satisfaction of the minister.73
Where a mariculture vessel, or for that matter any structure, sinks in
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navigable waters and causes an obstruction or impediment to navigation, the
owner has a duty to notify the minister and remove it.74 Until removal, there
is a continuing duty on the owner to maintain warning signals and lights.
Failure to remove the wreck may result in its removal by public authorities
at the expense of the owner.75
Collision avoidance
Mariculture vessels must be navigated with good seamanship and are subject
to the Collision Regulations, just as is any other ship.76 A vessel towing a
structure such as a cage could be considered a vessel restricted in its ability
to maneuver and will therefore enjoy the status of stand-on vessel in relation
to most other vessels.77 It has to carry prescribed signs and lights.78
It is less clear to what extent, if at all, the regulations apply to maricul-
ture installations and structures, other than ships, when on site. The rules
are potentially important not only for the mariculture operation, but also for
all other navigation in its vicinity. Where the legislator intended that the
regulations apply to exploration and exploitation vessels (i.e. in relation to
non-living resources of the seabed), the regulations clearly state so. Thus, the
Additional Canadian Provisions in the Collision Regulations provide require-
ments for signs, lights and sound systems to enable communication with
surrounding traffic.79 They are also required to maintain safety zones of 500
meters in all directions and fifty meters beyond the boundaries of the anchor
pattern, and in some cases may have smaller or larger safety zones.80 No
traffic extraneous to the exploration and exploitation activity is allowed
within the safety zones. In the realm of marine scientific research, the regu-
lations also apply to ocean data acquisition systems (ODAS), consisting of
“any object on or in the water that is designed to collect, store or transmit
samples or data relating to the marine environment or the atmosphere or to
the uses thereof.”81 Where special vessels or vessels undertaking particular
operations or that are in a certain condition are concerned, the regulations
likewise take into consideration their requirements for safe navigation.82
Despite the obvious safety importance, there appear to be no similar spe-
cific requirements for mariculture installations and structures in the Collision
Regulations. For the purposes of these regulations, one would need to rely on
the definition of “vessel” in the Rules, which includes “every description of
water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable
of being used as a means of transportation on water.”83 However, this poses a
problem for floating and submerged cages, which cannot be interpreted as
craft and which potentially are threatened by surface navigation in their
vicinity, while at the same time posing a hazard to navigation.
Instead, various other regulations provide an incomplete patchwork of
safety measures. For instance, as seen earlier, the Navigable Waters Works Reg-
ulations require the demonstration of lights, buoys and other marks over
works in navigable waters. Under the Boating Restriction Regulations, an aqua-
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culturist may be authorized “to place a sign in an area for the purpose of
indicating that a restriction on the operation of vessels established by these
Regulations exists in respect of that area.”84 However, these regulations are
restricted to boating and designated waters only, which tend to be mostly
inland waters and bays.
Should mariculture in Canada move from coastal to offshore waters, the
existing collision avoidance regime ought to be reconsidered. In addition to
the requirements in the NWPA, it would be advisable to consider regulatory
intervention to enhance safety around mariculture operations. One possibility
is new regulations under the Additional Canadian Provisions in the Collision
Regulations. Provision in the Collision Regulations is important because mariners
are expected to be fully familiar with those rules. A second, and possibly
complementary, option is for dedicated regulation similar to offshore installa-
tions and structures engaged in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore.85
Safety of life at sea
For shipping generally, safety of life at sea is regulated under international
standards established under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended.86 The standards concern various aspects of
the equipping and operation of ships, such as construction, life-saving appli-
ances and arrangements, and safety of navigation. SOLAS requirements do
not apply to all types of ships (e.g. construction requirements for small
recreational vessels not used for trading), but at the same time there are
particular requirements for specific ships (e.g. fishing vessels and passenger
ships). SOLAS safety standards have been applied to the offshore oil and gas
industry. In addition, safety of life at sea in this industry is regulated
further. For instance, the Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Installations Regula-
tions require that offshore installations be constructed with reference to a
quality assurance protocol and be classified by a designated international
classification society.87 Human safety is paramount, and therefore there are
requirements for navigation equipment, communication systems, emergency
evacuation procedures and life-saving equipment, among others.
It is not clear what the full safety of life at sea regulatory requirements
applicable to mariculture are in situations other than when a ship is utilized.
It is not even fully apparent whether the federal Marine Occupational Safety
and Health Regulations apply to mariculture, although they are applicable to
Canadian ships.88 The regulations apply to persons working on board ships
registered in Canada, persons employed in the loading and unloading of
ships, and employees on government non-military ships.89 Again, unless
mariculture structures are characterized as ships, these important work
safety standards at sea are probably inapplicable. In contrast, the legislator
saw fit to regulate safety and health matters in the oil and gas industry
through dedicated regulations.90 This leads to a potential problem in situ-
ations of death and personal injury at sea in the mariculture industry.
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Death and personal injury at sea
The problem
In R. v. Jail Island Aquaculture Ltd., a judicial review case, the issue arose as
to whether New Brunswick’s Occupational Health and Safety Act was applica-
ble to an accident occurring at sea during an aquaculture operation.91 The
application for review was from a provincial court oral decision ruling that
New Brunswick had jurisdiction to try Jail Island on charges under the
provincial statute. A worker died as a result of an accident on an aquaculture
harvest barge during the unloading of smolt at a salmon cage site at sea. The
oral decision found that aquaculture was of a local and private nature under
s. 92 of the Constitution Act 1867.92 Counsel for Jail Island argued that the
death occurred on a ship registered under the Canada Shipping Act, and
accordingly death at sea is a federal navigation and shipping matter as per s.
91 of the Constitution Act 1867.93 Moreover, maritime law is a body of federal
law, and therefore if the accident in question was a maritime matter, provin-
cial law could not be applied.
The logic of this argument is that the Province of New Brunswick did
not have constitutional authority to lay the charges under the Act in ques-
tion, but would have had to lay charges under federal maritime or other law.
In this case, although not considered, it is likely that the Marine Occupational
Safety and Health Regulations would have been held applicable, as the death
occurred on a ship.94 The reviewing court did not characterize the applica-
tion as one going to jurisdiction, but rather on error of law, so that a poten-
tial jurisdictional conundrum was not addressed. The court decided that the
lower court had the right to be wrong until a final determination of the case,
at which point there could be an appeal, but until that point it permitted
continuation of the case. As a result, the extent to which federal law applies
in a mariculture setting to the exclusion of provincial occupational health
and safety law has not been tested post-Ordon, but can reasonably be
expected to arise again.
There are a number of issues that arise. First, in the absence of statutory
provision, what is the legal status of mariculture workers? Second, depend-
ing on their legal status, what law applies to work safety matters (federal or
provincial, or federal and provincial)? Third, what law governs claims from
death and personal injury at the workplace, provincial workers’ compensa-
tion or federal maritime law?
Legal status of mariculture workers
Mariculture workers are not one homogeneous group of workers with a well-
defined legal status. Subject to an exception in relation to those working on
ships, they are neither seamen nor fishermen, and most of the marine safety
requirements are for those two categories of marine workers and offshore
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industry workers. And yet mariculture employs a variety of professionals and
laborers whose status merits classification. Inclusion within a particular class
of marine occupation is important for various reasons, including certification
of competence, occupational health and safety, workers’ compensation, and
remedies available for unpaid wages. There is first the aquaculturist, who
may be the entrepreneur and license-holder (i.e. management). A second cat-
egory of persons is researchers and technicians. A third category is skilled
and unskilled laborers, and may include mariners.
There is no one definition of “aquaculturist” in use for all regulatory pur-
poses. There are two federal statutes with such a definition, and the proposed
definitions are inconsistent. The Bank Act defines this person as “tenant of an
aquaculture operation,”95 whereas the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act’s definition
more generously “includes the owner, occupier, landlord and tenant of an
aquaculture operation.”96 Both definitions have limited application to the
entrepreneur, owner or manager. Neither definition is helpful for determining
rights and responsibilities beyond fiscal issues. The Nova Scotia Fisheries and
Coastal Resources Act defines “aquaculturist” simply as a person who practices
aquaculture.97 In contrast, in shipping, the shipowner is a well-understood
concept and, as a consequence, designation as an “owner” carries a complex set
of rights and responsibilities in the ownership and operation of ships.
As for technicians and laborers, there is no standard term or definition for
“aquaculture workers,” although provincial occupational health legislation
may include employees in the aquaculture industry as an eligible occupation.
But even when this is the case, it needs to be considered to what extent, if at
all, such workers are also subject to maritime law and in particular to labor
law, standards of safety and responsibility. It must be borne in mind that the
working conditions of seamen are federally regulated.98
Where aquaculture workers are part of the crew of a ship, maritime law is
likely to consider those persons “seamen” with consequent rights and
responsibilities for the worker and shipowner alike. Seamen are:
(a) every person, except masters, pilots and apprentices duly indentured
and registered, employed or engaged in any capacity on board any ship, and
(b) for the purposes of the Seamen’s Repatriation Convention, every
person employed or engaged in any capacity on board any vessel and
entered on the ship’s articles,
but [do] not include pilots, cadets and pupils on training ships and
naval ratings, or other persons in the permanent service of a government
except when used in Part IV where [the definition] includes an appren-
tice to the sea service.99 [emphasis added]
Similarly, the Crewing Regulations include as seafarer a person who “is
employed or is to be employed in any capacity on a ship.”100 The crew are
not necessarily exclusively those persons that actually sail the ship, but may
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also include other employees performing functions on board and for which
the ship was intended.101 Thus, Canadian courts have recognized fisherper-
sons,102 musicians103 and seamen acting as watchmen as crew members.104
Similarly, workers on mariculture vessels may be considered members of the
crew if their responsibilities on board the vessel are an integral part of the
functions of the ship concerned.
Seamen operate in a dangerous environment and may be the subject of
abuse by those who employ them. Over time, there have emerged inter-
national and national maritime safety and labor standards for seamen and
employers alike. The implications for those working on board mariculture
vessels can be far-reaching. Persons who work on board a ship are deemed to
be members of the crew and are subject to the Canada Shipping Act and regu-
lations. There are international training and certification standards that
apply to the master, officers and crew.105 Although the contract of crew
employment may be governed by the Canada Labour Code, this fact per se
does not supersede the application of the Canada Shipping Act.106 Thus, the
shipowner or master is always bound by the Canada Shipping Act. Moreover,
the master and crew enjoy special prioritized privileges for unpaid wages,
most especially through a maritime lien on the ship.107 A maritime lien
travels with the ship irrespective of a change of ownership, and lasts until
discharge by payment or judicial sale. A seaman’s wages may be garnished
in limited situations.108 There are also maritime limitation periods applica-
ble and restrictions on which courts can hear suits for seaman’s wages.109
If workers are only temporarily on board the vessel (e.g. for maintenance
purposes) or are simply using the ship as a platform for the performance of a
function not connected to the ship, they do not form part of the crew com-
plement. However, although persons on board a ship may not be part of the
crew complement and therefore not subject to the training and certification
standards for seamen, they are still subjects of maritime law, whether as pas-
sengers or visitors, if they suffer death or injury on board the ship. Thus,
persons injured while on board an inflatable dinghy for whale watching pur-
poses have been covered by maritime law.110 Not all cases of death and
injury where a ship is present necessarily engage maritime law. In Dreifelds
v. Burton, a chartered vessel carried scuba divers to a dive site. A diver had a
gas embolism and died, but the vessel was not involved in the accident.
Both trial and appeal courts held that Canadian maritime law was not
engaged, and provincial tort law applied instead.111
Workers’ or seamen’s compensation?
A question arises as to whether mariculture workers are entitled to workers’
compensation. Workers’ compensation is a provincial field of legislation, but
seamen’s compensation is an area occupied by federal legislation, notably the
Merchant Seamen Compensation Act.112 In general, under the federal Act a
seaman is entitled to claim compensation from the employer as a result of
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injury suffered by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment.113 The significance of the issue is not whether “mariculture
seamen” are entitled to compensation, but rather whether that compensation
ought to be provincial workers’ or federal seamen’s compensation.
Because of the relative novelty of this industry, provincial legislation has
not always moved fast enough to address the entitlements of mariculture
employers and workers to the benefits normally applicable in such legislation.
For instance, whereas New Brunswick’s Workers Compensation Act is drafted in a
general manner such as to apply to any industry in the province,114 the coun-
terpart statute in Nova Scotia extends workers’ compensation only to desig-
nated occupations, and aquaculture is not specifically so designated. It is
possible that this might give rise to uncertainty in that province.115
In a post-Ordon scenario, a question may be raised as to the extent to
which provincial workers’ compensation would still apply to mariculture
workers who may come within the ambit of Canadian maritime law.
Workers’ compensation is in pith and substance a provincial matter, and
consequently such provincial legislation may apply to federal undertak-
ings.116 At the same time, seamen are a central maritime law matter and
consequently fall within Parliament’s prerogative over navigation and ship-
ping.117 The Merchant Seamen Compensation Act has a provision that might
serve to avoid the need to apply the Ordon test insofar as the application of
provincial law to the compensation of seamen is concerned. The federal Act
provides that where a seaman is entitled to compensation under a provincial
workers’ compensation statute, that seaman is not entitled to compensation
under the federal Act.118 This provision lends support to the view that
provincial workers’ compensation may also apply to federal undertakings.119
Towage
The emplacement of mariculture structures at sea may involve on-site con-
struction and/or towage to the emplacement area. An interesting hypotheti-
cal question is whether the contract governing the towage of a cage is a
contract of towage proper or a contract of affreightment. The significance is
for liability and insurance purposes. In Burrard Towing Co. v. Reed Stenhouse,
Southin JA stated that a “contract to move goods from one place to another
by means of a tug and barge, both supplied by the tugowner, is a contract
. . . for the carriage of goods.” She added that “the fact that a vessel called a
tug has a tow does not mean that the undertaking upon which the tug is
engaged is a contract of towage.”120 She then raised a question as to whether
a contract to tow a log boom constitutes towage rather than carriage of
goods.121 Case law has held that a log boom is not a ship and could thus be
argued to be cargo.122 By analogy, if a cage is a good to be towage-delivered
by the supplier to a particular site indicated by the mariculturist, there
might be an argument for carriage of goods law to apply. Naturally, the
intention of the parties to the contract will be key.
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Salvage
Salvage is an ancient maritime institution concerning the saving of life and
property at sea by volunteers or persons contracted for this purpose. The key
issue to address in determining the relevance of salvage for mariculture is
the extent to which mariculture property qualifies as a subject of salvage. It
is conceivable that, owing to weather conditions or other misfortune,
workers and mariculture property may need to be rescued. For instance, a
two-person team who lived on a former oil industry platform in the Gulf of
Mexico which was converted temporarily for the cultivation of red drum in
cages had to be evacuated by oil personnel for their safety, and cages with
fish were lost or damaged.123 Where salvage applies to mariculture activities,
the salvor is entitled to a reward for his or her efforts, but only where there
is success (i.e. property has been saved, on the basis of which the reward will
be determined). The basic principle is “no cure, no pay.”
Historically, in English and Canadian maritime law the subject of salvage
was maritime property, and this was generally understood as centering on
the saving of the ship and associated property interests, which could be
equipment, stores, fuel, cargo on board and the freight to be earned by the
ship on completion of the voyage. If the ship suffered calamity, the wreck,
flotsam and derelict were also property subject to salvage.124 There had to be
a ship and/or property associated with a ship.125 In the United Kingdom,
there were exceptions to this conception of eligible property, and, most
interestingly, royal fish (fish and marine animals deemed to belong to the
Crown, such as whales and sturgeon) were subject to salvage.126 Thus, a
beached whale could be salved and returned to the Crown.127
US maritime law seems to include a wider scope of salvage subject
matter. In addition to vessels and their cargo, the term “maritime property”
includes all kinds of objects, such as money on a floating corpse and floating
logs.128 The property may be located onshore or at sea, but does not need to
be maritime in nature.129 According to Schoenbaum,
[T]he limit as to property that can properly give rise to a salvage award
should be properly understood as jurisdictional in nature: whatever of
value found in or upon navigable waters that is properly within admi-
ralty jurisdiction is subject to the law of salvage.130
The International Salvage Convention, 1989, to which Canada is a party and
which is implemented through the Canada Shipping Act,131 broadened the
subject of salvage by adopting a wider definition of vessel to include “any
ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation,”132 and including also
“any other property in danger in navigable waters or in any other waters
whatsoever.”133 Property is defined as “any property not permanently and
intentionally attached to the shoreline and includes freight at risk.”134 It
seems that although, on the one hand, “any other property in danger” com-
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prehends any other property other than the traditional subjects of salvage,
on the other hand, the convention underscores navigation (i.e. movement)
capability at the time the salvage service is rendered. Consistently, the con-
vention further provides that it does not apply to platforms and drilling rigs
when these are on location engaged in exploration, exploitation and produc-
tion of seabed resources.135
Canadian courts have not considered the extent to which mariculture
equipment is a legitimate subject of salvage. Consideration of this depends
in part on the actual property that may be the subject of salvage. Clearly,
ships and the equipment on board are subjects of salvage. The reference to
“craft” in the convention potentially refers to a broad range of structures,
but there must be a navigational capability, which at a minimum is the pos-
sibility of being towed. It is conceivable that the aquatic product may be
considered cargo for salvage purposes when salvage is rendered to a maricul-
ture vessel in distress. However, the saving of fish in a floating cage would
be more difficult to encompass as a subject of salvage, unless the cage can
somehow be characterized as a craft, or possibly as a platform.136 Given that,
as indicated earlier, one potential use of an offshore installation decommis-
sioned from oil and gas activity is mariculture, it is conceivable that salvage
services to it might be eligible subject matter.
Vessel-source pollution
Maritime law has a well-developed regime for compensation of oil spill
victims, in both Canadian maritime law and international law. Unlike in
most of the other areas discussed so far, there is no argument that maricul-
turists benefit from this regime. Although the Canadian mariculture indus-
try has been spared loss from oil spill damage, the mariculture industry in
many other countries has not, and perhaps it is only a matter of time before
a similar loss may be experienced in Canada. There have been numerous
incidents of losses resulting in claims in Denmark,137 France,138 Greece,139
Japan,140 South Korea,141 Singapore,142 Spain,143 the United Kingdom144 and
the United States,145 among others. In the case of the Braer casualty in Scot-
land, 84,700 tonnes of crude and 1,600 tonnes of bulk fuel oil were spilled
and a 400-square mile area was closed to fishing and aquaculture. As many
as eighteen farms in the exclusion zone and the salmon intakes at each farm
had to be disposed of. Salmon farmers outside the exclusion zone also suf-
fered loss of income as a result of reduced prices for Shetland salmon.146 Even
worse, in the aftermath of the Erika casualty, French mariculture and oyster
farmers submitted 989 claims for compensation.147
The closest that Canada has been to a similar threat to mariculture was in
2000, when the Keta V, a Canadian-registered tug, grounded and eventually
sank in Liverpool Harbour, Nova Scotia, with approximately 27,000 liters of
diesel fuel on board. The wreck was located only a half-mile from a large
salmon farm, which had to be boomed. After several attempts, all vessel
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parts that may have been contaminated with oil were removed in January
2001. Fortunately, the only costs that arose were those incurred by the
Canadian Coast Guard, whose claim was settled by the Ship-Source Oil Pol-
lution Fund (SSOPF) in November 2001.148
Where oil spills have caused harm, such harm has produced various
losses, including mortality of fish and other organisms (e.g. contact toxicity),
tainting of flesh, public health risks, loss of access to mariculture sites,
fouling of cages and other equipment, loss of market share, impossibility of
fulfillment of contracts, and pure economic loss for those farms not suffering
physical loss, but suffering economic loss as a result of public association of
their product with the incident.149 For instance, after oil was detected in the
oyster beds in the case of the New Carissa, the Oregon Department of Agri-
culture closed the Coos Bay commercial oyster farms. Four of the farms con-
cerned had US$10 million worth of young oysters seeded in the bay, and
soon enough 3.5 million oysters died. The tissues of every single oyster
sampled tested positive for oil from the New Carissa.150
The compensation scheme is a multi-tiered system operating under the
Marine Liability Act, the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC)151 and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (IOPCF), to which Canada is a
party.152 The two conventions have been implemented through the Marine
Liability Act, and the applicable Fund in Canada is IOPCF 92. The Act and
conventions establish three closely related funds that cover mariculture
losses. These are explained briefly and are followed by an assessment of the
criteria that mariculturalists have to meet in order to be compensated for oil
spill-related loss. Insofar as the threat posed by bunkers from other ships is
concerned, there is a new convention establishing a compensatory regime
similar to the CLC, but this instrument is not discussed, as it has not yet
entered into force.153 A similarly modeled compensation regime for pollu-
tion from hazardous and noxious substances is established in another inter-
national convention that is also not in force.154
CLC and IOPCF
The CLC provides a regime of strict liability for the shipowner. Unlike other
forms of strict liability for public welfare offenses, strict liability in the case
of vessel-source oil spill pollution does not allow a due diligence defense,
and consequently the grounds for avoidance of liability are fewer.155 At the
same time, the right to damages is supplanted by the statutory compensa-
tion process. The rationale is that, irrespective of fault, the shipowner is the
first line of defense and has to compensate victims of pollution damage
subject to limitation of liability based on a tonnage formula. In Canada, the
owner must establish a fund in the Federal Court to which claims will
attach.156 Not all shipowners can benefit from limitation: the ships must be
registered in CLC states parties, the ship concerned must be a tanker (i.e. a
228 Aldo Chircop
ship designed to carry oil in bulk) and the cargo carried must be persistent
oil.157 Prior to 1992, only laden ships were covered, but since then ships on
ballast voyages are also covered as long as they carry residues of an oil cargo.
This is important because a ship carries several thousand tons of fuel oil
(bunkers).
In those instances where the claims against the shipowner exceed the
limit of liability or where the shipowner is incapable of meeting the claims,
there is the possibility of supplementary compensation from the IOPCF
92.158 Unlike the IOPCF, the Fund represents the cargo-owner’s share and in
fact consists of contributions made by large importers in Fund member
states. The CLC rules on the nature of compensable damage apply to and are
administered by the IOPCF. It is essential that the oil be from a ship.
The IOPCF was established to provide an administrative process to
handle claims, in lieu of judicial recourse, and thus enable an expedited
process of compensation. In many instances, the Fund has not been able to
provide full compensation to claimants, and from time to time the Fund
Council has set levels of compensation depending on the number of
claimants and the extent of their claims.159 For the most part, mariculture
claimants have generally opted to accept compensation from the IOPCF.
Occasionally, mariculture-related claimants have had recourse to the
courts, either because they saw the possibility of more compensation
through litigation or because their claims were not considered admissible by
the IOPCF. Central issues have tended to be causation and the extent to
which pure economic loss may include relational or secondary economic loss,
and the extent, if at all, to which the common law rules on causation and
loss are to be read into strict liability provisions in the maritime law statute
implementing the IOPCF convention.
In order for mariculturalists to be eligible for CLC and IOPCF compensa-
tion, they have to provide evidence of pollution damage. “Pollution damage”
is defined as
[l]oss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever
such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive
measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.160
Thus, eligible losses are property damage, economic loss, cleanup, preven-
tive measures, and reinstatement of the environment where feasible. The
most common mariculture claims are those concerning damage to property
(cleaning costs and equipment replacement) and business interruption (e.g.
additional management and feed costs). Occasionally, where product has to
be destroyed and thus there is lost production, management and feed
become saved costs and are calculated to determine profit loss. As indicated
earlier, the IOPCF has considered many mariculture damage and loss claims,
but in general it has not considered these claims differently from other
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claims, such as those in the fishing and tourism industries.161 Guidelines for
compensation have been developed, and the criteria include the following:
• Any expense/loss must actually have been incurred.
• Any expense must relate to measures that are deemed reasonable and
justifiable.
• A claimant’s expense/loss or damage is admissible only if, and to the
extent that, it can be considered as caused by contamination.
• There must be a link of causation between the expense/loss or damage
covered by the claim and the contamination caused by the spill.
• A claimant is entitled to compensation only if he or she has suffered a
quantifiable economic loss.
• A claimant has to prove the amount of his or her loss or damage by pro-
ducing appropriate documents or other evidence.162
The compensation provided may also include pure economic loss. The central
elements to be satisfied are: (1) causation and proximity; (2) quantification; and
(3) documentation. An Inter-Sessional Working Group of the IOPCF meeting
in 1994 developed four criteria to determine reasonable proximity:
• close geographical proximity between the claimant’s affected activity
and the contamination;
• economic dependence of the claimant on the affected resource;
• the claimant’s access to alternative supplies; and
• the extent to which the claimant’s activity is integrally connected with
the area affected by the spill.163
Measures incurred to prevent pure economic loss are also eligible, but again
the cost of proposed measures must be reasonable, proportionate (to the loss
they seek to mitigate), appropriate (promising a measure of success) and
related to actual target markets (e.g. where a marketing campaign is
launched to mitigate losses).164
In the United Kingdom, the issue of proximity was addressed in Land-
catch Ltd. v. International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, which concerned a
supplier of smolt to the Shetland salmon industry that lost its market as a
result of the Braer casualty in 1993.165 Landcatch ran its business not in the
Shetlands, where the spill occurred, but on the Scottish west coast. The
rearing process took some two years, and therefore Landcatch’s business was
heavily dependent on advance planning and commitments to purchase its
product. More than half of its business was with Shetland farmers when the
spill occurred. However, because of the government exclusion zone around
the Shetland spill area, farmers could not buy the usual smolt for their fish
farms. In the past, Landcatch had always been able to rely on its Shetland
buyers. Landcatch therefore proceeded against the Fund for compensation,
and, having failed to obtain compensation, sought relief in a Scottish court,
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arguing that its business was integrally connected with the Shetland
economy, which had suffered loss. Landcatch was not successful. The Outer
House and Inner House (Second Division) of the Scotland Court of Session
saw its claim as one of relational economic loss. Landcatch did not claim
under the common law, although if it had done, it would in any case not
have been successful. It had advanced its claim under the UK statute imple-
menting the CLC and IOPCF conventions, which provided for strict and
limited liability of the shipowner if pollution damage could be proven. It
was not in the position of a person who had an existing contract disrupted,
and it was not bound with the Shetland fish farming industry. The court
applied general principles of causation to determine whether the claim
advanced was a result of oil pollution damage, did not find a reasonable
degree of proximity and instead found the connection between supplying
smolt and the activities affected by the exclusion zone remote. Thus, a claim
advanced on the basis that the loss would not have occurred “but for” the
casualty is insufficient without the establishment of a persuasive consequen-
tial link and evidence to that effect.166
In assessing claims, the IOPCF is normally assisted by the International
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), an industry organization pos-
sessing extensive expertise in oil spill response and damage assessment.167
ITOPF seeks to provide objective advice to the IOPCF on the claims before
it. On the basis of IOPCF guidelines, ITOPF undertakes a detailed analysis
and assessment of the technical merits of claims for compensation, reason-
able claims for response and cleanup costs, and claims for damage to eco-
nomic resources. ITOPF is normally present on-site shortly after a spill has
occurred. This is important because what ITOPF considers “reasonable”
measures in the circumstances may mean what is “compensable” by the
IOPCF.168 That measures may be ordered or taken by a government agency
per se does not make those measures reasonable. Measures taken in order to
be seen to be responding are not necessarily compensable. Because water
quality is critical to avoid tainting, mariculturists face further difficulties
when attempting to relocate cages with product to other areas. The towage
(if at all possible) can cause damage to the product by way of abrasions, and
forecasting of spill directions may not be accurate, so that the spill may still
reach the relocated farm.169 In any case, there must be likelihood that the
measures will be reasonably successful in minimizing environmental harm
and damage to economic resources.170
The actual claims must satisfy a number of requirements. It has often
happened that in the aftermath of a spill, not all claims are legitimate.171
Accordingly, the compensation regime that has evolved requires trans-
parency and accountability on the part of claimants, and claimants must
fulfill key requirements:
• adhere to published international guidelines on the admissibility of
various classes of claims;
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• keep good records, and follow international advice on claims presenta-
tion and the provision of supporting evidence;
• do not submit claims that are speculative in nature or are inflated
beyond their true value; and
• cooperate and share information with those who will pay the compensa-
tion (i.e. the shipowner’s third-party liability (P&I) insurers and, if rele-
vant, the 1992 Fund), as well as with those who are working on their
behalf, especially during the actual spill.172
Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund (SSOPF)
Formerly operating under the Canada Shipping Act, the SSOPF now func-
tions within the framework of the Marine Liability Act. It was established in
1973 as the Marine Pollution Claims Fund on the basis of a levy imposed at
the time on every barrel of imported oil. In 1989, the SSOPF became the
successor fund and is today responsible for compensating claims for oil pol-
lution damage or anticipated damage in Canada, Canadian waters and the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).173 It also operates on the principle of strict
liability, when the polluter is known.
Unlike the IOPCF, the SSOPF is a fund of last and first resort. It serves as
a third tier of compensation after the shipowner, its insurer and IOPCF, and
is, in fact, joined as defendant with the others.174 Importantly, and unlike
the IOPCF, the SSOPF provides compensation for damage from mystery
spills.175 The compensation may include costs incurred for preventive meas-
ures in respect of actual or anticipated pollution.176 The SSOPF enables
claimants to proceed against it first, subject to a right of subrogation on
compensation of claims. Subrogation entitles the SSOPF to eventually
proceed against the shipowner and IOPCF, if necessary. Like the IOPCF,
SSOPF operates on an administrative basis, and the administrator is empow-
ered to consider, investigate and assess claims, and make offers of compensa-
tion to claimants.177 Claimants may choose to accept the offer or appeal it to
the Federal Court.178
Claims from mariculturists for loss of income are compensable claims
when those claims are not recoverable otherwise under the Marine Liability
Act.179 Mariculture claimants are persons who derive income from “the pro-
duction, breeding, holding or rearing of fish, or from the culture or harvest-
ing of marine plants.”180 It is not necessary that the loss has actually been
suffered, so long as the claimant believes that he or she will suffer loss.
However, the claimant must be a national or permanent resident, or be
incorporated federally or provincially, and have been carrying out a lawful
activity (e.g. licensed).181 The SSOPF administrator considers the claim and
may settle it with the claimant. If the claim is not settled, the administrator
communicates the claim to the Minister of Transport, who in turn will
appoint an assessor for the claim.
The assessor, who has powers of a commissioner, may receive evidence
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given by the SSOPF administrator or the claimant, and determine whether
it would be admissible before a court. The assessor has to determine whether
the following requirements are met:
• The loss alleged by the claimant has been established.
• The loss resulted from the discharge of oil from a ship.
• The loss is not recoverable otherwise under this part.182
The assessor then sets the amount of the loss, and the SSOPF administrator
is directed by the minister to pay the loss. In essence, the claimant has to
meet an evidentiary requirement. However, if the loss resulted from a
mystery spill, the claim is still eligible. If a mariculture claimant opts to
proceed against the shipowner or insurer directly, he or she is still required
to join the SSOPF administrator in the suit.183
Procedural matters
Like all other ships, mariculture ships possess a special legal status as mar-
itime property, entailing far-reaching procedural consequences for maricul-
turists and creditors alike. The ship can be mortgaged and earn liabilities
secured by maritime and other liens. A ship at fault in a collision automati-
cally earns a maritime lien on the date of the event, and, unless discharged,
this lien travels with the ship irrespective of a change in ownership.184 Sim-
ilarly, the salvor’s claims for assistance to the ship185 and the unpaid wages of
the master and crew generate maritime liens.186 In addition to maritime
liens, the ship can also earn other liabilities secured by statutory rights in
rem, some of which also survive a transfer of ownership.187 Other than dis-
charge of these liabilities by the owner, it is only a judicial sale of the ship
that can launder the claims against it, after which the ship may start to earn
new liabilities again.188
Unless otherwise provided by statute, creditors may not be able to
proceed against maritime property in the same way as other property. For
instance, in a situation of parallel proceedings in bankruptcy and an admi-
ralty action over the ship, the admiralty action is not necessarily stayed.189 In
Canada, claims against the ship are pursued by means of an action in rem (the
ship being the res) and, with few exceptions, only where there is also the
shipowner’s liability in personam.190 Hence, the action in rem is then
accompanied by an action in personam.
Also significant is the court within which a claimant institutes proceed-
ings. The Federal Court is normally the court within which the action in rem
is instituted. The action is commenced with the “arrest” of the ship. It is
possible for a claimant to institute an action in rem in those provinces whose
rules of court allow for such a procedure, as in the case of British Colum-
bia.191 The action in personam against the owner can otherwise be instituted
in any court of competent jurisdiction.
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One of the most important consequences of proceeding against a ship is
that its owner, charterer, manager, operator and insurer are entitled to limi-
tation of liability.192 Limitation of liability is based on a tonnage formula
and might well result in a claimant (whether for property damage or death
and personal injury scenario) not being able to recover fully from the
shipowner. In order to benefit from limitation, the shipowner will need to
constitute a limitation fund in the Federal Court up to the amount of the
claims or, if these exceed the limitation amount, up to the limitation the
owner is entitled to.193 All claims will then attach against the ship, and
claimants cannot proceed against any other assets of the shipowner.
Conclusion
It is likely that Canada will need to legislate a national framework to com-
plement provincial aquaculture law in order to ensure that there is a func-
tional and appropriate legal regime for activities in federal waters.
Mariculture poses jurisdictional, regulatory and other legal challenges
similar to those posed by the offshore oil and gas industry. There are lessons
to be learned on how an appropriate regime can be developed to facilitate
orderly development. In the case of offshore hydrocarbons, Parliament legis-
lated dedicated statutes in cooperation with interested provinces, and there
is no reason why this could not serve as a policy precedent for mariculture.
After all, the same arguments of proximity and regional economic develop-
ment are equally valid for mariculture.
In addition, the Oceans Act provides the Governor-in-Council with the
power to extend the application of any federal and provincial law to Canada’s
maritime zones.194 The exercise of this power in relation not only to provin-
cial aquaculture statutes, but also to other pertinent statutes, such as occu-
pational health and safety and workers’ compensation, would go a long way
to address some of the gaps, ambiguities and concerns raised in this chapter.
However, even in a scenario where Canada opts to develop and adopt a
national aquaculture statute as federal law or to extend the application of
provincial legislation to offshore mariculture, maritime law will remain rele-
vant, because this body of law will continue to apply to navigation concerns
in navigable waters. A discussion of maritime law alone shows that there are
legal issues of concern to mariculturists and legislators alike. For example,
the legal status of mariculture installations, applicable safety standards and
legal status of mariculture workers at sea are significant concerns.
Canadian maritime law, perhaps more than the maritime law of any other
Commonwealth jurisdiction, has evolved to respond to a broad range of nav-
igation and shipping concerns. It certainly has not been frozen in time or
remained limited to shipping, and has shown a capacity to respond to the
needs of new ocean uses and technologies as necessary. Thus, Canadian mar-
itime law has responded to the fishing, cruise ship, and oil and gas indus-
tries, as well as a broad range of recreational uses (e.g. boating), so it can be
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expected to address the concerns raised by newer ocean uses in a Canadian
context, such as mariculture and wind farming. What legislative inter-
vention could also do is to better define where one body of law ceases and
another commences to apply.
It is thus important for those in the mariculture industry to consider the
relevance of maritime law and how it might transform their rights and
responsibilities, and its procedural implications. At the same time, and in
the interests of an integrated approach to mariculture regime building,
federal and provincial bodies responsible for the promotion of this industry
need to consider the complex interactions among different ocean uses and
the bodies of law that govern them.
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7 The taxation of aquaculture in
Canada
A comparison with the taxation of
agriculture and its policy implications
Faye Woodman
Introduction
In Canada, at both the federal and the provincial government levels, the tax
rules applicable to agricultural producers under the Income Tax Act1 and
other taxing statutes often apply with relatively few modifications to the
aquaculture sector. The agriculture rules differ in significant aspects from
those applied to other taxpayers. They also tend to be more generous. Thus,
the aquaculture sector operates under regimes of taxation in Canada that
may be characterized as preferential, but may also have been developed with
the needs and circumstances of agriculture, not aquaculture, in mind. This
chapter will examine the rationales underlying the various special rules and
their application to the aquaculture sector. The policy implications of the
agriculture model when it is applied to aquaculture will be addressed.
There are, of course, many different taxes levied on aquaculture producers
– whether incorporated or unincorporated – by the federal and
provincial/municipal levels of Canadian government. The federal govern-
ment is responsible for the imposition of an income and a capital tax on
certain large corporations.2 In addition, it imposes a value added tax, the
goods and services tax (GST).3 The provinces also levy income and capital
taxes on individuals and corporations, although in some provinces the
federal government may collect the tax on their behalf.4 They impose retail
sales taxes,5 except in three Atlantic provinces in which the proceeds of a 15
percent value added tax (harmonized sales tax, HST) are shared between
particular provinces and the federal government.6 Provinces also levy prop-
erty taxes.7 These taxes may be imposed in addition to or in lieu of property
taxes levied by local units of government. Finally, provincial governments
exact license and leasehold fees from the operators of aquaculture concerns.
These license and leasehold fees are not, strictly speaking, taxes. Taxes are
compulsory levies by government that are not, at least directly, for goods or
services. Nonetheless, these levies will be briefly considered in this chapter.8
Their connection with market values is in many instances tenuous, and they
are worth canvassing to derive a more complete picture of the government–
aquaculture sector fiscal relationship.
It is not possible to survey the specific rules governing the taxation of
aquaculture under all these regimes. The following discussion, while consid-
ering the three main categories of taxes – income, property and sales – will
concentrate on income taxation. The income tax system is more complex
than the others, draws more completely on the agricultural model and ulti-
mately seems to yield more insights concerning the particular position of
aquaculture. Nonetheless, the other types of taxes have significant effects on
aquaculture operations, and in unprofitable years may be the only taxes to
which they are subject. So too, the focus will be on the federal/provincial
taxation regimes of British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces. While
aquaculture operations can be found in all the provinces of Canada, in 2001
British Columbia and New Brunswick accounted for over 81 percent of the
gross value of the Canadian sector.9
The emphasis here will be on primary producers in the marine aquacul-
ture sector. The situation of the suppliers, processors and marketers who sur-
round the producers will not be specifically addressed. Like their equivalents
in the agricultural sector, these others do not have an unique taxation
regime devoted to their special circumstances.
Finally, it must be remembered that primary producers in aquaculture,
like primary producers in agriculture, are a diverse lot. They are of different
sizes, they operate differently and they are connected to the market in differ-
ent ways. Most producers, it is true, are incorporated. The corporations
include, however, a range of operations. Many of the shellfish farms on both
coasts are run through small family corporations. In the west, salmon pro-
ducers are generally Canadian subsidiaries of large multinational corpora-
tions. In New Brunswick, there are locally based but substantial
“independent” finfish operations. On both coasts, First Nations may be
involved in aquaculture, and for reasons unrelated to the industry, but due
to historical entitlements, may be exempt from some taxes. In addition,
aquaculturalists may carry on their businesses differently. There are many
instances of vertical integration where one entity controls production from
hatcheries through to and including value added processing. Other produc-
ers may concentrate on fish-raising only but be contractually tied to other
concerns. They may own the fish in the operation but be constrained by
marketing and supply relationships. In some cases, the corporation may
simply offer “management” services of aquaculture sites to some other body.
In considering the various tax regimes, it is important to keep these differ-
ences in mind. Tax rules that lack an appropriate policy rationale when
applied to taxpayers with one type of profile may be quite justified when
imposed on other taxpayers with different characteristics. In this regard, the
distinction between shellfish operators, which tend to be smaller, closely
held corporations, and finfish concerns, which are, in many cases, large
multinationals, is particularly important.
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Income tax
The federal Income Tax Act does not specifically refer to aquaculture. Rather,
the courts have held that a “farmer” includes a fish farmer. Thus, the Tax
Review Board in Les Immeubles Dramis Inc. v. M. N. R.10 held that a trout
farmer was a “farmer” for the purposes of the Act. It said:
The fact that fish are raised in the water rather than on land or in the air
has nothing to do with the point at issue. In my view, there is no real
distinction for income tax purposes between growing, keeping and
catching marine animals – that is, fish-breeding – and performing the
same activities with respect to other animals.11
Interestingly, in that case the Crown, not the taxpayer, argued for the designa-
tion in order to have the “hobby farming” limitation of losses provisions in the
Act apply. It is not clear whether at any time the government, through the
Department of Finance (the department responsible for tax policy), ever
actively considered the position from a public policy perspective.
The provisions relating to the taxation of farmers in the Act, while exten-
sive, do not in themselves constitute an altogether separate system for the
taxation of agriculture.12 The calculation of income for tax purposes is gener-
ally the same as that for other taxpayers. So too, the rate of tax, either
corporate or individual, is the same as for other corporations or individuals.
The main differences are when income is recognized for tax purposes
(timing) and the taxation of capital gains.
These differences, or tax preferences, which are really deviations from the
normative tax system, are difficult to quantify. In the 2002 tax expenditure
budget, it is estimated that the CDN$500,000 capital gains exemption for
all farm property will cost CDN$230,000,000 for the year.13 Many of the
other benefits extended to farmers through the tax system, such as the inter-
generational rollover and cash-basis accounting, are not assigned a value
since data are not available to support a meaningful estimate. Aquaculture,
of course, generates only a fraction of the total Canadian agricultural revenue
and it could be expected to generate only a corresponding fraction of tax
expenditures.
The differences between the taxation of farmers and the taxation of other
taxpayers developed over many years and, some would argue, on an ad hoc
basis with ad hoc rationales. One of the earliest concessions was to amend the
Act to recognize the prevailing practice of permitting farmers to account for
income on a cash, not on an accrual, basis. In its 1966 report, however, the
Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) recommended that
this and other preferences for farmers be abolished. In its words:
In general, we have found that many of the special tax provisions and
practices are no longer appropriate. Because of the changing nature of
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the industry, farmers, or at least those with larger incomes, should now
be able to report income on a basis similar to that followed by other
small businessmen.14
As the Commission reasoned, and its remarks apply, in part, to aquaculture
operations today:
The taxation of farming income must take into consideration the special
characteristics of this natural resource industry, the vagaries of nature
and markets, the prevalence of small individual operators, and the close
relationship of personal and business activities. On the other hand, if
equity is to be achieved, the importance of these special characteristics
must be considered in comparison with those encountered by taxpayers
in other lines of endeavor. In making this comparison it is necessary to
keep in mind the changes which have been taking place in agriculture
and, in particular, the increase in the size of the farm unit, the increased
technical assistance from government authorities, improved marketing
arrangements, and the increased use of scientific knowledge and busi-
ness methods.15
However, despite the Commission’s recommendations, the 1972 reform leg-
islation left many of the preferences intact. Indeed, tax reform, and in
particular the introduction of the taxation of capital gains, which many felt
had a particularly adverse effect on farmers, precipitated a further spate of
special concessions to farmers. So too, the reformed tax system incorporated
a number of income recognition and averaging provisions that were either
specifically orientated to farmers or, in some aspects, modified for farmers.
The policy implications for aquaculture of these provisions can be best
addressed under four rationales for the adoption or continuation of special
concessions to agriculture.
Administrative expediency
One of the most significant differences between the taxation of farmers,
including fish farmers, and other taxpayers is that the former, unlike the
latter, are specifically permitted to use the cash method of accounting in
computing their (farming) incomes.16 The cash method of accounting is a
considerable advantage to a taxpayer. It permits the concern to recognize
income for tax purposes when it is received and to deduct expenses (includ-
ing the cost of inventory) when they are paid. A taxpayer’s inventory is
otherwise not recognized until it is sold. In contrast, the accrual method
recognizes income when it is earned and expenses (generally) when they are
incurred. The difference between the cost of the taxpayer’s opening and
closing inventories reduces the cost of goods sold in any particular taxation
year. Since the cash method permits the calculation of taxable income based
The taxation of aquaculture in Canada 247
on cash flows rather than income earned and because of the treatment of
inventory, it is far more susceptible to manipulation by the taxpayer for the
purpose of deferring the recognition of income and therefore tax.
Until the introduction of a specific provision in the Income Tax Act 1948
there was some uncertainty whether, under the Canadian Act, the accrual
method of accounting was authorized for any taxpayers. The definition of
income in the 1948 Act clarified that the accrual method was permitted
(and, in fact, practically required) in most calculations of business income.
Farmers and fishermen, the latter by administrative fiat, were permitted to
continue using the cash method of accounting. Farmers were allowed to use
the cash basis of accounting because it was thought that some, at least, of
the many farmers (at that time, many more Canadians lived on farms) would
find it too burdensome to deal with the more complicated accounting
required under the accrual method.
The use of the cash method of accounting by farmers was subsequently
reviewed by the Carter Commission, which recommended its abolition in
most circumstances.17 It said:
The failure of the cash basis to reflect accounts receivable and payable
would not materially affect the income of most farms, but its failure to
take inventories into account is serious because of the substantial inven-
tories of livestock or grain which are maintained on many farms. In such
cases, the cash basis permits the cost of building up the inventories to
be deducted immediately, thereby giving the farmer the advantage of a
tax deferment equal to the tax which would have been exigible on an
amount equal to the cost of the inventory. It is true that the advantage
under the present tax system is only a deferment of tax in that the cost
would ultimately be allowed as a deduction; however, the deferment is
equivalent, in relative terms, to an interest-free, unsecured loan, which
could be of material amount, and is not granted to business generally.18
The government failed to adopt the Commission’s recommendation for this
reform, and, indeed, formally extended the provisions to fishermen. Further,
two important adjustments were introduced to address some of the dif-
ficulties inherent in the cash basis system. The provisions adopted sought
both to enhance and to limit the advantage of cash-basis accounting. They
are the optional inventory adjustment19 and the mandatory inventory adjust-
ment.20 The former provision is intended to assist farmers who stand to
“lose” loss years. Under the cash method of accounting, the costs of inven-
tory are recognized when they are paid, but revenue is not recognized until
it is sold. As a result, some farmers might generate a number of loss years
and those loss years, might “expire” before they can be set off against prof-
itable years. The optional inventory adjustment eliminates this problem by
permitting a farmer to elect to recognize all or part of the value of inventory
in a year. In addition, the provision operates to permit the farmer to average
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income. The mandatory inventory adjustment, on the other hand, was intro-
duced to limit the ability of the farmer to generate losses and gain signific-
ant tax deferral and income averaging benefits. It requires a farmer who
incurs a loss in a year to recognize the value of purchased inventory up to the
amount of the loss.
The obvious complexities of the inventory adjustments undermine the
justification of the cash basis method of accounting as a method to assist
unsophisticated taxpayers. The cash method of accounting as modified by
the inventory adjustment rules in the Act requires considerable expertise to
master and to use effectively. But even if we accept that the rules are simpler
than the accrual method of accounting, the profile of aquaculture concerns,
which may be run by younger and more educated individuals or as part of
large multinationals (though admittedly this varies from region to region
and type of operation), does not suggest any compelling justification for this
tax preference. It is a concession that exists because it has always existed.
It is worth noting that fishermen are permitted to use the cash method of
accounting, and always have been, although this was not specifically recog-
nized in the tax Act until 1972. Presumably they also have the requisite lack
of sophistication in accounting knowledge. The inventory adjustment rules
do not apply to them since, presumably, they do not carry significant inven-
tories over time.
Interestingly, the cash method of accounting and the one-year class rules
in New Brunswick have intersected in, perhaps, unexpected ways. The move
to the one-year class system has meant that under the cash basis of account-
ing and with one site, the aquaculturalist will have no income in year 1, and
all the income from that crop will typically arise in year 2.21 This can be
accommodated to a certain extent by the optional inventory adjustment.
Preservation of the “family” farm: intergenerational tax-free
transfers
Under the Canadian Income Tax Act, farmers, including fish farmers, are per-
mitted a more or less tax-free intergenerational transfer of the family farm.22
In tax parlance, this transaction is called a rollover. In order to qualify for
the rollover, the recipient (transferee) of the next generation must be the
child or other lineal descendant of the taxpayer.23 The rollover was initially
available only for property used in unincorporated farms. With some tax
planning, however, the benefits of the rollover could be obtained for shares
of family farm corporations and interests in family farm partnerships.
Further, the obvious unfairness to farmers who choose for good family or
business reasons to carry on business in corporate or partnership form
resulted in the extension of the rollover to property of an individual where
the property is either (1) shares of the capital stock of a family farm corpora-
tion;24 or (2) interests in a family farm partnership.25 The rollovers were
introduced as a result of the changes to the Canadian tax system arising from
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the tax reform in 1972. One of the Carter Commission’s most significant
recommendations was the full taxation of capital gains.26 While the 1969
White Paper on Tax Reform eschewed the Carter approach, encapsulated in
the aphorism (incorrectly attributed to Carter) that “a buck is a buck is a
buck,” it did propose that half, not the full amount, of capital gains be
taxed.27
The reluctance to adopt the Carter position of full taxation reflected a
number of concerns. Because capital gains are normally realized only on gift,
sale or death, there is the problem of income “bunching” in one year, which
in a progressive rate system can push the taxpayer up into a higher tax
bracket. The taxation of capital gains also imposes a hardship on taxpayers
in times of inflation. Tax will be levied on “nominal” rather than the “real”
appreciation in the value of an asset. Finally, the “deemed disposition” and
taxation of capital gains on death is a necessary part of the taxation of capital
gains. Otherwise, accrued but unrealized capital gains that were not taxed
during the taxpayer’s lifetime would escape the tax net altogether. Never-
theless, the fact that all the property of the taxpayer is deemed to be dis-
posed of can contribute to the forced sale of the deceased taxpayer’s estate
assets.
For farmers, even the 50 percent taxation of capital gains eventually
adopted was, they asserted, an unacceptable burden. Farmers were concerned
that the taxation on death of capital gains accrued on farm assets, especially
land, would undermine the institution of the family farm. Instead of the
farm being passed on to children and grandchildren, the farm would have to
be sold to pay the tax. Hence, the intergenerational rollover was introduced.
Of course, this argument applies to a lesser or greater extent to other types
of businesses. And, indeed, a provision was introduced for approximately a
ten-year period ending after 1987 with the enactment of the CDN$500,000
capital gains exemption, to permit a limited rollover of up to
CDN$200,000 of capital gains on shares of “small business corporations”
transferred by a taxpayer to a child.28 Farm businesses, however, may have
faced a heavier tax burden because of the accelerating appreciation in the
value of land during that period. Furthermore, farms, especially family
farms, were an integral part of the rural landscape and rural towns that gov-
ernments, then and now, were ostensibly committed to preserve.
Fish farmers are an integral part of the coastal rural landscape. Whether
they are more like farmers or other rural businesses, which do not enjoy the
rollover, is a more difficult question. It is noteworthy that the intergenera-
tional rollover has not been extended to fishermen. Fishermen can take
advantage of the cash basis of accounting but they cannot pass on their busi-
ness to their children tax free. Of course, fishermen do not own large
amounts of appreciating land, and maybe that was, at first, the justification
for the difference. But fishermen may own substantial depreciable properties
(which might benefit from the rollover), and fishermen and family fishing
businesses are mainsprings of many coastal communities.29
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It is significant that the rollover, which is intended to preserve the family
farm for the next generation, does not require the next generation to con-
tinue farming, nor does it require family farms to be “family-sized.” The
transferors or their children must farm before the rollover, because the
rollover can only be claimed for any amount of farm property that was “used
principally in a farming business in which the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s
spouse or common-law partner or any of the taxpayer’s children was actively
engaged on a regular and continuous basis.”30 The transferees do not have to
be farmers, however, or, if they are, there is no penalty if they discontinue
farming. Therefore, the rollover may, in some circumstances, simply be a
means to facilitate the tax-free intergenerational transfer of family property
that will then be sold off. It may be possible, as well, for the rollover and the
CDN$500,000 capital gains exemption to operate together to multiply pos-
sible tax advantages for a family who wants to extricate themselves from
farming.31
Thus, the intergenerational rollover, as we have seen, is not a particularly
well-targeted provision. It probably extends tax advantages to the undeserv-
ing and possibly withholds them from individuals/businesses who are
important contributors to the rural economy. There are a number of
alternatives, most of which would include a claw-back of benefits if the
operations are sold out of the family. Further, a direct expenditure program
in which specific grants are made, in lieu of a tax preference, would have the
further advantage of transparency and greater accountability.32
Finally, even if the intergenerational rollover is successful in encouraging
the retention of the aquaculture operation in the family, it is arguable that
more attention should be paid to the assertion that this result makes good
social and economic policy. In some cases, it could be suggested, it may lock
in family members whose efforts would be better directed elsewhere. Also,
one effect is probably to make aquaculture sites scarcer and hence more
expensive – at least in some of the more developed regions – so that new
and, generally, young entrepreneurs may be priced out of the market. On
the other hand, in some systems, such as the one in place in southwestern
New Brunswick, the effect of the rollover may be to encourage intrafamily
transfers of smaller concerns, which might preserve some of the few “inde-
pendents” in the region against the continuing pressure for integration with
larger concerns.
Providing funds for retirement
The introduction of the capital gains tax at tax reform galvanized farmers to
press for relief for family farms. But even with the intergenerational rollover
described above, farmers still perceived that they were particularly adversely
affected by the taxation of capital gains. Many farmers, after all, experienced
low lifetime earnings while sitting on highly appreciating or appreciated
assets. Because of their low incomes, they argued, they were not able to save
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for retirement in an ordinary tax-subsidized savings vehicle.33 For many of
these individuals, the expected reward for a lifetime of marginal income was
a retirement secured by the (untaxed) proceeds from the sale of the farm.
Even a half-rate of inclusion of 50 percent of capital gains was not enough
relief. Farmers lobbied for a further, special tax reduction.
Of course, other taxpayer interest groups could and did rail against the
capital gains tax. Being a “new” tax, and a tax that disproportionately
affected upper-income taxpayers,34 it was almost inevitably challenged. In
any case, in 1985 the government of Brian Mulroney introduced a lifetime
exemption from taxation of CDN$500,000 of capital gains for all indi-
viduals.35 The lifetime exemption was ostensibly to encourage risk invest-
ment in Canada.36
As originally formulated, the CDN$500,000 capital gains exemption was
to be phased in over a six-year period except for dispositions of “qualified farm
property.” Taxpayers disposing of qualified farm property were to immediately
enjoy the whole $500,000 exemption.37 Moreover, there was no requirement
that the exemption be limited to proceeds destined for use as farmers’ retire-
ment savings. Qualified farm property was initially defined to be:
• real property used by the individual, his spouse or any of his children,
family farm corporation, or family farm partnership in the course of car-
rying on the business of farming in Canada:
(a) in the year the property was disposed of by the individual, or
(b) in at least five years during which the property was owned by the
individual, his spouse and his children;38
• the share of a capital stock of a family farm corporation39 and
• an interest in a family farm partnership.40
It did not take long for the deficiencies of the new lifetime $500,000
capital gains exemption to be evident. As the provision was originally drafted,
taxpayers could claim the exemption against capital gains accruing on assets
outside Canada, and in respect of “non-risky” assets such as real estate. In any
case, after only three years the 1988 Tax Reform halted the phase-in of the
lifetime exemption at $100,000 and increased the inclusion rate to two-
thirds.41 The $100,000 exemption was subsequently eliminated in 1994.42
Significantly, however, the $500,000 capital gains exemption was preserved
for farmers, although rules were introduced to attempt to limit the exemption
to “real” farmers. In addition, the $500,000 exemption was extended to tax-
payers who held qualified small business corporation shares.43 These corpora-
tions have to qualify as Canadian-controlled private corporations, carry on an
active business and comply with certain other conditions. Farming qualifies as
an active business, so some shares of farming corporations may qualify both as
shares of a family farm corporation and shares of a qualified small business cor-
poration. Any shareholder is, however, limited to one $500,000 exemption.
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The amendments in 1988 referred to above also limited the ability of
farmers to claim the exemption. The amendments represented another
effort, more extensive and complicated than the rollover rules, to target
benefits under the tax system only to “real” farmers. Since there is not the
same element of recreational or “hobby” use in fish farm operations, these
rules are of less concern to aquaculturalists, but they nevertheless must be
addressed if the exemption is claimed.
The rules distinguish between the disposition of farm property other
than the shares of a family farm corporation and shares of a family farm cor-
poration. Where a taxpayer disposes of farm property other than shares of
the family farm corporation, and the property was owned by an eligible
user, either of the two tests described below must be met for the taxpayer
to claim the exemption. The gross revenue test requires that the gross
revenue of the individual or other eligible users (including a spouse or chil-
dren) from the farming business in which the property was principally used
must exceed the income of the eligible user from all other sources for at
least two years. Further, the eligible user must have been actively engaged
on a regular and continuous basis in the farming business in which the
property was principally used. Alternatively, the property must be used by
a family farm corporation or a family farm partnership principally in the
business of farming throughout a period of at least twenty-four months
during which time the individual or other specified persons (including a
spouse or children) was actively engaged on a regular and continuous basis
in the farming business.44
Holders of shares in a family farm corporation are not subjected to a
gross revenue test. Generally, in order for the shares to qualify as property
eligible for the exemption, the following conditions apply:
• The corporation has to be in existence for at least twenty-four months.
• Throughout any twenty-four-month period ending before the disposi-
tion, more than 50 percent of the fair market value of the property
owned by the corporation was used by the taxpayer, spouse, child, or
parent principally in the business of farming.
• At the time of the disposition, all or substantially all of the fair market
value of the property was used principally in the business of farming by
the corporation or the taxpayer, spouse, child or parent.45
As mentioned previously, some shares may be both shares of the capital stock
of a family farm corporation and qualified small business corporation shares.
The policy rationale behind the initial introduction of the lifetime capital
gains exemption is, as has been explained, somewhat suspect. Further, its
continuation solely for farmers and holders of qualified small business corpo-
ration shares has been criticized, most notably in the Report of the Technical
Committee on Business Taxation (the Mintz Committee).46 The report was the
result of the efforts of a technical committee of the Department of Finance
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established in 1996 to review taxes paid by Canadian business. Its objectives
were to suggest ways to:
• improve the tax system to promote job creation and economic growth;
• simplify the tax system to facilitate compliance; and
• enhance fairness in the system.
It recommended
elimination of the enhanced lifetime capital gain exemption for farm
property and qualifying shares of small business corporations, with tran-
sitional relief for all gains accrued to the date of the change (to be
obtained by election similar to that used for the repeal of the general
lifetime capital gain exemption).
It also recommended the exemption be replaced by an enhanced RRSP
[registered retirement savings plan] contribution system that would
allow taxpayers to use taxable capital gains on farm property and quali-
fying small business shares that are earned in a year to increase their
RRSP contribution room for previous years, up to the maximum room
that would be available if they had had sufficient earned income.47
Three reasons were cited for the recommendation.48 First, the committee did
not favor taxing capital gains differently, depending on the nature of the
particular asset. In the committee’s view, the differential taxation of capital
gains is contrary to the principle of neutrality in the business tax system. By
neutrality, the committee meant that “total tax paid on income earned from
different business activities is similar so the decisions of business are largely
unaffected by the tax system.”49 For the committee, the pursuit of the prin-
ciple of neutrality (together with internationally competitive taxes) is essen-
tial if the goals of job creation and economic growth, simplification, and
fairness are to be attained.50
Second, the committee found little evidence that the capital gains exemp-
tion or its more limited version, the capital gains exemption for farmers and
small business, has had any measurable positive impact on encouraging risk-
taking and investment – ostensibly the reason for their introduction.
Finally, although the committee found some evidence to support the
proposition that farmers and lower-income business owners do not benefit
from tax-assisted retirement savings as much as others, it favored adjust-
ments to that system rather than the wholesale exclusion of the capital gains
of some assets from taxation. To quote the committee, “A measure such as
the lifetime capital gains exemption provides too much benefit to some who
do not need it and not enough to those who do.”51
As an alternative to the CDN$500,000 exemption, the committee pro-
posed that the capital gains arising on the disposition of qualifying farm
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property or a qualified small business corporation share be transferable on a
tax-deductible basis to a registered retirement savings plan. The maximum
amount transferable would be the lesser of CDN$375,000 (in 1996, three-
quarters of capital gains were taxable) and the maximum annual registered




For over fifty years, farmers have had the advantage of provisions in the
Income Tax Act intended to ameliorate the adverse effects of fluctuating
incomes under the system of progressive rates. The farm sector, which faces
the vagaries of weather, the vicissitudes of natural storms, droughts, and
disease and insults effected by unreliable markets both at home and abroad,
seemed a particularly appropriate beneficiary. Eugene LaBrie suggested
additional reasons as follows:
Other likely factors are the primary nature of these industries, their
chronically depressed state, their considerable importance both
economically and numerically as voting taxpayers and the laudable
independence and innate conservatism of taxpayers engaged in these
industries–factors that sometimes prompt the statement that these
forms of livelihood are not a source of income but a “way of life.”53
Indeed, tax reform in 1972 and thereafter saw, despite the contrary recom-
mendations of Carter,54 a flurry of provisions enacted to deal with the
“problem” of fluctuating income. These provisions, except for the block
averaging legislation and the optional inventory adjustment, applied not
only for farmers, but for other taxpayers. Since then, however, the trend has
been to phase out most of the income-averaging provisions.55 It should be
mentioned that some of the other provisions referred to above, such as the
farm rollover and the capital gains exemption, assist with the problem of
fluctuating incomes in the special circumstances arising from sale or death.
One of the reasons that the income-averaging provisions have been gradu-
ally eliminated may be that, over time, the federal tax rates for individuals
have tended to “flatten.” Indeed, the 1987 reforms telescoped the ten federal
rate brackets into three at 29 percent, 26 percent and 17 percent.56 Today
there are four federal rate brackets:
• 16 percent up to $31,677;
• 22 percent up to $63,354;
• 26 percent up to $103,000;
• 29 percent over $103,000.
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The provinces generally set their own rates on income steps similar to the
federal ones on a similar tax base. Alberta is an exception: it levies a 10
percent flat tax.57 Québec has its own separate rate and tax base.58 Corporate
tax in Canada is generally a flat-rate tax. Canadian-controlled private corpo-
rations, however, face increased rates on active business income over
CDN$200,000.59
The income-averaging provisions that are in place today – besides the
optional inventory adjustment – include the rule regarding farm losses and
the special regime developed to recognize agricultural income assistance
programs. The farm loss rule permits both individual farmers and farm cor-
porations to carry back business losses three years but forward ten years (an
extra three years more than the seven years generally allowed.)60
The taxation of agricultural stabilization programs and compensation
programs
For political and trade reasons, there is no comprehensive income stabiliza-
tion program for aquaculture. In contrast, the federal government, in con-
junction with the provinces, has provided and continues to provide income
stabilization for primary commodity producers other than aquaculturalists.
In December 2003, the Minister of Agriculture announced61 that the
required two-thirds of provinces representing 50 percent of Canada’s agri-
cultural production had agreed to implement the new Canadian Agricul-
tural Income Stabilization Program (CAIS),62 which will replace the Net
Income Stabilization Account (NISA) program63 and the Canadian Farm
Income Program (CFIP).64 The new program will not incorporate the tax
preference, which is a characteristic of the NISA program. Under that
program, two funds are established for producers. A producer contributes to
fund number one and governments contribute to fund number two. In low-
income years, the producer can withdraw monies from the funds. Amounts
from fund number one are not included in the producer’s income. However,
interest on the funds, and “matching” amounts contributed to fund number
two by governments are included in the producer’s income but – and this is
the tax preference – not until they are withdrawn.65 Under the CAIS
program, the producer is required to provide an amount on deposit. Interest
is included in income when earned. In low-income years, producers can
withdraw non-taxable amounts from their accounts. There are no govern-
ment funds on deposit. Rather, taxable government assistance is paid out
separately and directly to producers on the basis of a pre-established “insur-
ance” formula related to the producer’s amount on deposit.
Despite considerable efforts, the aquaculture industry has not been suc-
cessful in obtaining income support(s) similar to other farmers from either
or both levels of government. Indeed, they have not obtained the more
modest goal of a compensation/income support program to moderate the
impact of diseases in which major costly measures to producers, including
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stock destruction, are necessary to reduce pathogen levels and the risk of
disease spread. At the present time, the industry is frustrated by the failure
of the federal government to implement a tripartite initiative by itself, the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and provincial governments concern-
ing a national fish health program that would include some compensation
arrangements.66
To date, compensation for industry disasters has been provided on an ad
hoc basis. The most significant “bail-out” of the aquaculture industry
occurred from 1996 to 2001 in New Brunswick during the first recorded
outbreak of infectious salmon anemia (ISA) in Canada. The payout was
under the auspices of the provincial Disaster Relief Fund.67 Over CDN$14
million of taxable compensation was paid to fish farmers who had to dispose
of their inventory.
Research and development costs
The income tax system in Canada permits taxpayers who engage in research
and development to claim tax credits.68 Although these are not directly
related to income fluctuations, it can be expected that new enterprises in
beginning low-income years might be likely to incur these types of
expenses. Further, the “new” aquaculture sector characteristically has
embraced innovation and new technology. However, in tandem with other
claimants, fish farmers have found it difficult, if not impossible, to make use
of the credits. The smaller operators, in particular, do not have the expertise,
time or money to document the basis for a claim. This is a familiar com-
plaint that the revenue authorities have attempted to address on numerous
occasions. Nonetheless, difficulties remain, and are exacerbated by the fre-
quent legislative changes in the area.
Property taxes
Property taxes are levied in all the provinces of Canada. Property taxes are
calculated as a percentage of the assessed value of real property, although in
some circumstances tax may also be imposed on business machinery and
equipment. The taxes have a long history and were originally imposed to
support “local” services, especially schools and the responsibilities normally
assumed by municipal governments. In some jurisdictions, such as New
Brunswick69 and Prince Edward Island,70 there is a local tax at a rate set by
the particular municipality, in addition to a provincial tax. In Nova Scotia,71
British Columbia,72 and Newfoundland and Labrador,73 the tax is levied and
the rate designated by each municipality.
In most provinces, a distinction is made between residential and non-resi-
dential land with residential land, generally being taxed at a lower rate.
Thus, in New Brunswick the provincial property tax rate for residential
property is CDN$1.50/$100.00 of assessed value but 1.5 times that amount
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– that is, CDN$2.25/$100.00 – for non-residential uses.74 Distinctions are
also made among other uses of real property, and in British Columbia, for
example, there are nine classes of land with different rates.75 Significantly,
agricultural land is treated separately and preferentially.
The reason for the special position of agriculture under the various prop-
erty tax systems rests on the characterization of property taxes as primarily,
but not exclusively, benefits-based taxes. The argument is that if property
tax rates are set at levels that capture as closely as possible the cost of ser-
vices consumed, then, as between farm and residential property of equal
value, the effective tax rate on the farm property should be lower. The farm
covers (usually) more land, it is true, but it has fewer people and does not
require the same level of services. Other reasons for agricultural preferences
may include the force of past practice and the desire to slow the rate of con-
version of agricultural land to urban uses. Tax concessions may also be
extended to agricultural property as a form of economic assistance.
In the five provinces considered in this chapter, British Columbia explic-
itly provides for the tax treatment for property tax purposes of aquaculture
on a comparable basis with agriculture. In that province, primary agricul-
tural production for the purposes of the Assessment Act includes aquacul-
ture.76 In Nova Scotia, on the other hand, farm property is generally exempt
from taxation under the Assessment Act77 but aquaculture is taxed.78 In New
Brunswick, aquaculture operations do not qualify for tax deferral under the
Farm Land Identification Program administered under the Real Property Tax
Act.79 So too in Newfoundland, the Real Property Tax Exemption Program
for Agricultural Land80 does not apply to aquaculture. Finally, Prince
Edward Island’s legislation makes no reference to aquaculture. “Farm prop-
erty” is defined as cleared arable land.81
It is noteworthy that the types of concessions generally extended to agri-
cultural concerns in rural areas have not been typically extended to other
commercial activities in those areas, though resource-based operations may
enjoy separate tax relief.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are other property taxes that
may affect aquaculture operations. For example, in British Columbia the
province levies a school tax under the School Act82 that is based on the nine
categories of property authorized in the Assessment Act. The School Act
exempts 50 percent of the assessed value of property assessed as farmland.83
The school rate is 0.68 percent (mill rate of 6.8) for farm property,
0.41–0.45 percent for residential property and 0.99 percent for light indus-
try and business in each municipality.84
Value added (GST) and provincial sales taxes
The federal government imposes a 7 percent multi-stage or value added sales
tax (GST) on goods and services consumed in Canada.85 Three provinces –
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland – also piggyback on the
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federal tax so that the 7 percent tax is increased to 15 percent in those juris-
dictions.86 Every seller along the chain of production and distribution of
goods and services must collect the tax, but each taxpayer, except the final
non-commercial consumer, is entitled to claim a credit (input tax credit)
against taxes owing equal to the taxes already paid by them on their particu-
lar inputs.
The production from agriculture and aquaculture is, generally, effect-
ively exempt from GST because basic groceries are zero-rated; that is, the
rate of tax on the sale to the final consumer is zero percent.87 Further, since
GST is exigible only on goods or services consumed in Canada, produce
destined for the export market is not subject to tax. Though produce is
zero-rated, farmers may claim input tax credits for GST paid in carrying on
their operations. They may, however, experience cash flow difficulties
because they do not collect GST on sales to consumers, but are required to
pay GST on their inputs. Many farm inputs are, however, zero-rated, and
farmers may register to recoup, on a monthly basis, an amount equal to
their input tax credits.
The policy rationale for the zero rate of tax on agricultural and aquacul-
ture produce consumed in Canada arises because of consumer, not producer,
concerns, and is based on the politically expedient view that some human
essentials should not be taxed. The reason for the non-taxation of exports is
to encourage them.
British Columbia88 and Prince Edward Island89 impose retail sales tax.
Neither tax is applicable to food for human consumption.
License and leasehold fees
In marked contrast to the private property basis of agricultural operations,
an important aspect of aquaculture operations in the Atlantic provinces and
British Columbia is a direct reliance on the use of public (marine) resources
for private purposes. The rent charged for the use of these public resources is
generated in the form of leasehold fees for leases or occupation licenses of
marine acreage. Leasehold fees and license fees (which are necessary whether
or not there is a marine leasehold) are not, of course, taxes, but will, as
already indicated, be briefly addressed in this chapter.
Each province administers its own system of licenses and leases except
Prince Edward Island, which is administered by the federal government.90
The fees charged in each of British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces
vary but it is fair to say that, overall, the amounts exacted tend to be quite
modest (see Table 7.1). The different regimes are outlined below. British
Columbia has the highest fees. This figure can be put in some perspective by
the observation that an “average” total area of a salmon aquaculture site is
generally about 10 hectares. In contrast to British Columbia and New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland charge
only nominal fees.
The taxation of aquaculture in Canada 259
Table 7.1 Provincial lease and license systems92
British Columbia
License Lease
Finfish Intensive – 7.5% of Zone Value Intensive – 8% of Zone Value 
($500 min.) ($500 min.)
Extensive – 7.5% of half the Zone Extensive – 8% of half the Zone 
Value ($500 min.) Value ($500 min.)
Shellfish New tenues – 4% of $4940/ha New tenues – 5% of $4940/ha 
($600 min.) ($600 min.)
Replacements – 4% of double the Replacements – 5% of double the 
assessed land value on file with assessed land value on file with 





Institutional $20 Marine site, commercial license
Finfish $250/ha
Mollusks $20/ha ($100 min.)
Crustaceans $250/ha
Inland site, Commercial license
$20/ha
Lease fee to holder of private license
$100










License None Lease $10/acre
or
$4.05/ha
Sources: This table was compiled from the following sources:
British Columbia: Land and Water British Columbia Inc., Land Use Programs, Vol. 3:3,
Agricultural and Aquacultural Land Use (2001) at Appendix 1. Online. Available
http://lwbc.bc.ca/applying_for_land/aquaculture/aqua_policy.pdf (accessed 18 August 2003).
In an appendix, the document provided a map displaying the various “fee” zones that fall
within the issuing body’s jurisdiction. The zones are priced as follows:
Zone A Value $7,031/ha
Zone B Value $6,375/ha
Zone C Value $5,156/ha
Zone D Value $4,875/ha
Zone E Value $4,325/ha (Ibid. at Appendix 4).
Additionally, the document defined the following terms:
• “Intensive area” – The area of Crown land used for aquaculture activities and related
improvements directly associated with the production of finfish, shellfish or marine
plants. The intensive area will include net-cages, netting, float camps, net storage, docks
and mort sheds as well as a thirty-meter buffer around these structures. The thirty-meter
buffer is mandatory and is intended to cover the area where anchor lines are likely to pose
a restriction to navigation owing to the scope and angle of lines closest to the structures.
Outside of the thirty-meter buffer, the lines are generally at a suitable depth to allow safe
passage of a boat; however, any anchor lines beyond the thirty-meter buffer that restrict
access or hamper navigation will also be included as part of the intensive area.
• “Extensive area” – The area of Crown land used for anchoring structures outside of
intensive areas that do not impede navigation or access to lands beyond. (Ibid. at 4–5).
New Brunswick: Aquaculture Act, S.N.B. 1988, c. A-9.2; N.B. Reg. 91–158. The Regula-
tion establishes and defines the two categories of aquaculture sites, and the three classes of
licenses as follows:
• “Inland aquaculture site” is a class of aquaculture site that is situated in non-tidal
waters or on land.
• “Marine aquaculture site” is a class of aquaculture site that is situated in tidal waters.
• “Commercial aquaculture license” is a class of aquaculture license that permits a
licensee to conduct aquaculture for commercial gain.
• “Institutional aquaculture license” is a class of aquaculture license that permits a
licensee to conduct aquaculture for the purposes of research outside a laboratory or an
aquarium, or for use in public fishery enhancement activities, and not for the purposes of
commercial gain.
• “Private aquaculture license” is a class of aquaculture license that authorizes a licensee
to carry on aquaculture for private use and not for commercial gain (ibid. s. 2).
Newfoundland: Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. Online. Available
http://www.gov.nl.ca/fishaq/Aqua/Licencing.stm#Cost (accessed 26 March 2004).
Nova Scotia: Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Online. Available
http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsaf/aquaculture/application/aqua_fees.htm (accessed 26 March 2004).
Prince Edward Island: Interview with Dale Smith, Chief, Aquaculture Division, Depart-
ment of Fisheries and Oceans (18 August 2003).
In a review of the lease/license fees extant in New Brunswick prepared for
the Licensing and Inspection Branch of the Department of Fisheries and
Aquaculture in New Brunswick,91 the authors concluded that while the
New Brunswick fees were higher than those of most of the other east coast
provinces, they were lower than those in most of the eastern seaboard states.
It should be mentioned, however, that many provinces and states periodi-
cally review their fee structures.
It is noteworthy that in other resource sectors, Canadian governments
have sometimes insisted on sharing, or indeed appropriating, the Ricardian
rent derived from the use of public resources for private purposes. Thus,
governments earn substantial royalties from the exploitation of minerals and
fossil fuels. On the other hand, they have, for whatever reason, sometimes
elected to forgo any share in this surplus such as in the capture fisheries.
This is a debate that so far has not been much pursued in considering these
license and leasehold fees.
Conclusion
As I have demonstrated, the agriculture model of taxation in Canada has
often been applied to the aquaculture sector. Fish farmers have approved of
this development, not the least reason being that the model provides tax
benefits. Further, the tax treatment of aquaculturalists as farmers supports
other initiatives by the aquaculture industry to have government supports
and incentives similar to those for agriculture extended to aquaculture.
There seems little doubt that most aquaculturalists consider themselves as
farmers, not fishers, and, indeed, different from other small and large rural
businesses.
This chapter has compared the taxation of aquaculture with that of agri-
culture in the three main categories of taxation. It found that under the
income tax system in Canada, fish farmers are generally taxed in the same
way as other farmers. On the other hand, except in British Columbia, aqua-
culture operators are not treated the same as farmers for property tax pur-
poses, although they may enjoy some tax concessions. Finally, the chapter
considered the sales taxes regimes of the federal government and the
provinces. Aquaculturalists are treated similarly to other farmers. It is diffi-
cult to derive any useful policy insights from comparisons in this last
category.
Two questions arise when considering the policy implications of the
application of the agricultural model to aquaculture. The first-order ques-
tion is whether the special rules for agriculture are defensible when applied
to traditional farmers. The second question, assuming the special rules can
be justified, is whether, given the similarities and differences between the
two sectors, the rules should be extended to fish farmers.
While the agricultural model was considered in relation to all the main
categories of taxes, this chapter concentrated on the income tax system(s).
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The income tax system draws more completely on the agricultural model in
the taxation of aquaculture and ultimately seems to yield more insights. The
special rules for agriculture, generally extended to aquaculture, were exam-
ined from four functional perspectives. They were rules designed to:
• enhance administration and compliance;
• assist in intergeneration succession;
• help farmers provide for their retirement; and
• alleviate the burden of fluctuating incomes.
It is fair to say that many of the special rules relating to agriculture were
developed in an economic and social context that no longer exists. Thus,
their continued application to both agriculture and aquaculture is, from a
policy perspective, suspect. For example, the rules relating to the adminis-
tration of the Income Tax Act (cash-basis accounting), which permitted unso-
phisticated and unschooled farmers (among others) to calculate and report
income more easily, have morphed into a labyrinth of complex rules and
elections. Their extension to the aquaculture industry, which has a substan-
tial representation from a younger, better-educated generation (although
this is not true across the board), and where a substantial component of the
industry comprises large corporations, is not convincing.
Other special rules can be criticized, even though one accepts the stated
or implicit policy reasons advanced for their existence. For example, the goal
of the special rules relating to intergenerational succession is to preserve
“local” and “family” farms. The special rules relating to intergeneration suc-
cession may not operate effectively, however. There is no guarantee, even
after the tax-free transfer, that the next generation will stay in the commun-
ity and continue to farm. They may simply take the (unwarranted) tax
advantages and sell off farm and assets. Further, the rollover rules may actu-
ally create additional barriers to new entrants to the aquaculture industry. So
too, the CDN$500,000 capital gains exemption (which also generally
applies to qualified shares of small business corporations that are not farm
corporations) goes far beyond providing tax assistance comparable to that
provided to the general population to save for retirement. It helps farmers
who sell out to retain more of the proceeds, but there are no stipulations
that the amounts must be deposited into a retirement fund. In addition, in
order to limit the provision to “real” hands-on farmers, government efforts
to target its benefits have generated a maze of overly complex rules that may
not fulfill their intended purpose but certainly constitute a trap for the
unwary and unadvised, or both.
Finally, there may be insufficient recognition of the circumstances under
which the aquaculture industry operates. For example, most of the special
rules in the Act that attempt to ameliorate the tax effects of fluctuating
incomes have been eliminated over the past decade or more. Further, fish
farmers generally do not qualify for income support programs extended to
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other farmers, including the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA)
program, which incorporates some tax preferences and the new Canadian
Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program, which generally does not
because of its different structure.
In the property tax area, the agricultural model is sometimes and some-
times not applied to aquaculture, depending on the jurisdiction and particu-
lar tax provision. While a benefits-based justification of property taxes (and
historical precedent) may support reduced rates of tax on agriculture, it is
not so compelling when applied to aquaculture. From a property tax
perspective, aquaculture may more appropriately be compared with other
rural industries, including industries in the resource sector.
Finally, it should be noted that fish farmers in the marine sector generally
pay modest leasehold fees (which are not taxes) for their marine acreage. The
system of leasehold interests is in significant contrast to the full ownership
rights of most farmers. A list of leasehold fees for the five marine provinces
has been included in this chapter.
Notes
1 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended [ITA]. This chapter
purports to reflect the law as of September 2003. Note that, in its 2 May 2006
budget, the Canadian fedeal government proposed extending the intergenera-
tional rollover and the CDA$500,000 capital gains deduction to fishers with
certain kinds of qualified fishing property. Online. Avaliable http://www.fin.gc.
ca/budget06/bp/bpa3ae.htm#fishers.
2 Ibid. The federal government taxes individuals and corporations. For 2003, the
tax on individuals is 16 percent to CDN$31,677, 22 percent to CDN$63,354,
26 percent to CDN$103,000 and 29 percent thereafter. Corporate rates vary
depending on the type of corporation and the type of income. The general
corporate rate is 28 percent, but Canadian-controlled private corporations
(CCPCs) are taxed at about 12 percent on certain amounts and types of income.
Corporate dividends received by individuals are also subject to tax but a divi-
dend tax credit is credited against tax payable to partially or, in the case of
certain income of CCPCs, completely recognize the corporate tax already paid.
Part l.3 of the Act imposes a special tax on corporations on their taxable capital
employed in Canada in excess of their capital deduction for the year. The tax oper-
ates as a minimum tax applicable to larger corporations. The Part l.3 tax is gradu-
ally being phased out and will be fully eliminated in 2008. Until that time, the
capital deduction will be increased from CDN$10 to CDN$50 million for taxa-
tion years ending after 2003 and the rate gradually reduced from 0.225 percent to
0.0625. The tax has been of considerable concern to aquaculture operations.
3 Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, Part IX.
4 Income Tax Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 215; New Brunswick Income Tax Act, S.N.B.
2000, c. N-6.001; R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 217; Income Tax Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. I-
1; Income Tax Act, 2000, S.N. 2000, c. I-1.1. Provincial tax rates vary among
provinces. Both individuals and corporations are taxed. For 2003 in British
Columbia, the tax on individuals is 6.05 percent up to CDN$31,124, 9.15
percent to CDN$62,249, 11.7 percent to CDN$71,470 and 14.7 percent over
CDN$86,785. Corporate rates depend on the type of corporation and the type of
income. The general corporate rate is 13.5 percent but Canadian-controlled
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private corporations are taxed at 4.5 percent on certain amounts and types of
income. Corporate dividends received by individuals are also subject to tax, but
a dividend tax credit is credited against tax payable to partially or, in the case of
certain income of CCPCs, completely recognize the corporate tax already paid.
The tax base for provincial individual and corporate taxes generally approxi-
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This chapter discusses the potential impact of aboriginal property rights on
the development of aquaculture policy by considering whether such rights
could provide a basis for First Nation peoples to participate in aquaculture
or to manage the participation of others in this industry. The purpose of the
chapter is to describe the relevant law as it now stands, to identify issues
that have not yet been decided and to consider how the courts might
approach such issues in the future.
There are two categories of property-based1 claims which First Nation
peoples might consider using in relation to areas in which aquaculture is or
could be carried out: claims based on aboriginal title and claims based on
common law riparian rights. In an aboriginal title claim, a First Nation
would argue that because of its historical use of an aquaculture area, it holds
that area by way of aboriginal title. Given that the doctrine of aboriginal
title has developed in relation to dry land, the first question to be addressed
is whether the courts are likely to apply the doctrine to water areas. The first
part of this chapter outlines the current law on aboriginal title; discusses the
applicability of that law to rivers, lakes and marine coastal areas, reaching
the tentative conclusion that the doctrine of aboriginal title could apply; and
considers how recognition of aboriginal title in such areas might affect aqua-
culture policy. The second part considers whether property-based arguments
might be made based on the common law concept of riparian rights to the
land beneath rivers. At English common law,2 the owner of land bounded by
the non-tidal portion of a river or stream was presumed to own the waterbed
to the center line of the river, while the Crown was presumed to own the
land beneath the tidal portion of rivers. The latter part of this chapter out-
lines the issues that would have to be decided if a First Nation attempted to
use the concept of riparian rights to claim a portion of a riverbed. There are
so many unanswered questions in this area that it is difficult to predict how
courts would respond to such a claim; however, aquaculture policy-makers
should be aware of the issues and watch how the law develops in this area.
Aboriginal title
The doctrine of aboriginal title
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 19823 states, “Existing treaty and abo-
riginal rights are hereby recognized and affirmed.” The source of treaty
rights is self-explanatory: these are rights that have been recognized in a
treaty (whether a historic agreement or a modern land claims agreement)
between the Crown and a particular aboriginal nation or community. Abo-
riginal rights, however, do not have their source in any document or agree-
ment; instead, these rights arise from the occupation of what is now Canada
by aboriginal nations at the time of the British assertion of sovereignty.
“Aboriginal rights” is thus an umbrella term that includes both activity
rights (such as rights to hunt, fish or gather) and aboriginal title to land.4
The most thorough discussion by the Supreme Court of Canada on abo-
riginal title is the 1997 decision of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.5 Com-
bining what is said in Delgamuukw with discussion in several other cases, we
can say that aboriginal title, as currently conceptualized by Canadian courts,
has dual sources: first, historic use and occupation of the land by First
Nations,6 and, second, the relationship between the common law and pre-
existing aboriginal systems of law.7 Aboriginal title is more than simply a
right to carry out certain activities on the land: it is title to the land itself.8
This form of title is sui generis (that is, unique),9 communal and inherent.10
Furthermore, aboriginal title is an exclusive form of title; that is, it carries
with it the right to exclude others from using or occupying the area covered
by aboriginal title.11 Aboriginal title confers the right to use land for a
variety of activities. Thus, a First Nation holding aboriginal title is not
limited to traditional uses of the land. There is, however, one inherent limit:
aboriginal title land cannot be used in ways that are “irreconcilable with the
nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the particular
group’s aboriginal title.”12 Aboriginal title exists in conjunction with under-
lying or radical Crown title13 and can be alienated (transferred) only to the
federal Crown.14 With the protection afforded by s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, existing aboriginal title can now be extinguished only with the consent
of the First Nation involved, by way of a land claims agreement or other
bilateral instrument.15 Prior to 1982, federal jurisdiction over “Indians and
lands reserved for the Indians”16 was seen as permitting the federal govern-
ment to extinguish aboriginal title unilaterally as well, so long as the intent
to do so was “clear and plain.”17 Finally, because aboriginal title represents a
relationship between common law principles and aboriginal systems of law,
it “must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal
perspective.”18
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Application of the doctrine of aboriginal title to water areas
If a First Nation makes a claim of aboriginal title to a terrestrial area, it is
clear that the doctrine is applicable, and the question becomes one of evid-
ence: what evidence is there of historic use of the area and what evidence is
there of extinguishment? At present, however, no Canadian case law directly
addresses the question of whether the doctrine of aboriginal title can be
applied to water areas.19 First Nations have made several aboriginal title
claims to rivers and portions of the sea but the issue has not yet been
decided by Canadian courts. The best-known such claim is probably the one
filed by the Haida Nation in 200220 claiming aboriginal title to land,
internal waters and a portion of the seabed and seas off the coast of British
Columbia. However, the Haida case has not yet come to trial. In other cases
where a decision has been rendered, it has been on other (usually preliminary
or procedural) grounds.21 Thus, the question of whether aboriginal title can
exist in water areas has still not been resolved.
Courts in both Australia and New Zealand have heard aboriginal title
claims to the seabed. In 2002, the High Court of New Zealand heard an
appeal from a 1997 decision of the Maori Land Court, which recognized the
possibility that the foreshore and seabed of the Marlborough Sounds could
be held by way of customary Maori title.22 The High Court reversed this
finding.23 With respect to the seabed,24 the Court focused on the wording of
s. 7 of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act (now the Territorial Sea and
Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1977), which states:
Subject to the grant of any estate or interest therein (whether by or pur-
suant to the provisions of any enactment or otherwise, and whether
made before or after the commencement of this Act), the seabed and
subsoil of submarine areas bounded on the landward side by the low-
water mark along the coast of New Zealand (including the coast of all
islands) and on the seaward side by the outer limits of the territorial sea
of New Zealand shall be deemed to be and always to have been vested in
the Crown.25
According to the High Court of New Zealand, this title was vested in the
Crown for the benefit of all subjects and could not be granted to anyone,
including Maori, in fee simple, as that fee simple would conflict with the
public right of navigation.26
In 2003, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand reversed the High Court,27
and found that the Maori Land Court did have jurisdiction to determine
whether portions of the foreshore or seabed were held by Maori customary
title. The Court of Appeal cautioned that the outcome was not a finding of
customary title,28 only a finding that “the Maori Land Court can enter into
the substantive inquiry.”29 The Court of Appeal rejected the idea that prop-
erty law principles applicable to terrestrial land were inapplicable to the
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foreshore and seabed,30 and the argument that legislation such as the Territo-
rial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act precluded a claim of customary title.31
In a 2001 decision, the High Court of Australia considered a native title
claim to “the seas in the Croker Island region of the Northern Territory.”32
The case was heard in the first instance by Olney J of the Federal Court, who
held that native title extended only to the low-water mark, although he
recognized the claimants as having a right to fish, hunt and gather in the
claimed area, to travel through it, and to “visit and protect places within the
claimed area which are of cultural or spiritual importance [and] to safeguard
the cultural and spiritual knowledge of the common law holders.”33 On
appeal to the full court of the Federal Court, a majority of the court upheld
Olney J’s decision. Both the claimants and the defendants appealed to the
High Court.
The High Court of Australia held that the idea of title – even radical title
in the Crown – was not an appropriate concept for the seabed. The Court
considered the wording of the Sea and Submerged Lands Act, 1973, s. 11 of
which states:
The sovereign rights of Australia as a coastal state in respect of the
continental shelf of Australia, for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources, are vested in and exercisable by the
Crown in right of the Commonwealth.34
The court concluded that this “did not amount to an assertion of ownership
of or radical title in respect of the seabed or superadjacent sea in that area,
whether as a matter of international law or municipal law.”35 The court then
held that “[a]s a matter of international law, the right of innocent passage is
inconsistent with any international recognition of a right of ownership by
the coastal state of territorial waters.”36 Further, the existence of title in the
seabed was negated by “the recognition of public rights of navigation and
fishing.”37 Thus, exclusive native title in the seabed could not be recognized
because it would be inconsistent with the right of innocent passage and the
rights of public navigation and fishing.38 Olney J’s order recognizing non-
exclusive native interests was upheld.
Leaving aside issues of evidence, how is a Canadian court likely to
respond to aboriginal title claims to water areas? Given that Canadian
jurisprudence characterizes aboriginal title as a “burden” on the underlying
radical title of the Crown, the first step in considering whether aboriginal
title could exist in water areas is to ask whether the Crown holds title to
those areas. The second step is to ask whether there are aspects of the doc-
trine of aboriginal title (particularly the concept of exclusivity) that would
be more problematic in the context of water areas than on dry land. Before
we address these issues, however, a word about terminology: should aborigi-
nal title claims in aquatic areas be described as claims to the subaquatic
land, or to the water and waterbed as a whole?
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The common law position in Britain and Canada is that running or per-
colating water cannot be owned, although the land beneath it can.39 Thus, at
common law, the concept of proprietary rights is applied to the underlying
land, rather than the water itself. On the other hand, it is certainly possible
that some First Nations may conceive of a river or marine area as a unified
resource. Since aboriginal title has been described by the Supreme Court of
Canada as based in both aboriginal legal systems and the common law,40
aboriginal perspectives on use of and control over water areas would have to
be taken into account and should be reflected in the development of the law
of aboriginal title in aquatic areas.
In this chapter, however, I focus on title to the waterbed, for three
reasons. First, it cannot be assumed that all First Nations would view water
resources in exactly the same way, and therefore, in the context of a claim,
the perspective of the particular First Nation making the claim would have
to be explored, rather than trying to factor in some sort of generic “aborigi-
nal perspective.” Second, Lamer CJC’s wording makes it clear that the
common law will still have to be considered, although not privileged, so it
is necessary to consider how an aboriginal title claim to submerged land
would fit with Canadian law generally. Third, it may be that the distinction
between title to the waterbed alone versus title to the bed and the water
together would not actually have much impact on the consequences of a suc-
cessful claim. If it were established that a First Nation held unextinguished
aboriginal title to a riverbed or a portion of the seabed, use of that sub-
merged land would seem inevitably to carry with it use of the water flowing
over it – in other words, use of the water resource as a whole.
Crown title to submerged land
As has been noted already, aboriginal title – at least as currently conceptual-
ized by Canadian courts – coexists with underlying fee simple in the Crown.
Therefore, to consider whether aboriginal title might be found to exist in
submerged lands, one must first inquire as to the existence of Crown title in
those areas.
The English common law distinguished among land beneath non-tidal
waters, land beneath tidal waters to the low-water mark, and land below the
low-water mark. Land beneath non-tidal waters was presumed to lie with
the owners of the adjacent river or stream bank, while land beneath the tidal
portions of rivers lay, prima facie, with the Crown. According to the
common law, the territory of the realm extended only to the low-water
mark, so no one owned the seabed. The common law position was adopted,
with some variations, in Canada, but, more to the point here, has been
largely overridden by legislation. Most jurisdictions in Canada have passed
legislation vesting the ownership of waterbeds within the province in the
provincial Crown. In the case of the territories, title now lies with the
federal Crown. Arguably, Canada also holds title to the land beneath
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Canada’s 12-mile territorial seas, by virtue of ss. 7 and 8 of the Oceans Act,
which state:
7. For greater certainty, the internal waters of Canada and the territo-
rial sea of Canada form part of Canada.
8(1) For greater certainty, in any area of the sea not within a province,
the seabed and subsoil below the internal waters of Canada and the
territorial sea of Canada are vested in Her Majesty in right of
Canada.41
Where the fee simple to subaquatic land in Canada lies with the Crown,42
whether federal or provincial,43 it seems possible that, as with dry land, this
title could be subject to aboriginal title. In fact, one of the sui generis aspects
of aboriginal title is that it exists as a burden or limitation on the under-
lying Crown title. Certainly, existence of Crown title is likely to be seen by
courts as a precondition for any consideration of aboriginal title in sub-
merged land. If, as has been suggested here, the Crown holds title to most
waterbeds within Canada, as well as the bed of Canada’s territorial seas, this
precondition has been met. The next question to consider, then, is whether
the various aspects of aboriginal title, as described by the courts, raise any
greater or different conceptual problems in relation to submerged lands, as
compared to terrestrial areas.
The nature of aboriginal title
Aboriginal title has been described as flowing from historic use and occupa-
tion and from the relationship between aboriginal systems of law and the
common law. Nothing about this aspect of the doctrine seems inherently
inconsistent with a First Nation being able to claim aboriginal title in a
riverbed or a portion of the seabed.44 Nor would Lamer CJC’s comments in
Delgamuukw concerning the purposes for which aboriginal title land can be
used seem to cause any greater interpretational difficulties for subaquatic
lands than for terrestrial lands.
It seems likely that the Supreme Court of Canada’s characterization of
aboriginal title as exclusive might well be the most problematic issue, at
least with regard to those portions of rivers that are at common law subject
to public rights of fishing and navigation, and those portions of the seabed,
that are subject to the international right of innocent passage. As noted
above, the High Court of Australia held in the Croker Island case that the
recognition of any title – even Crown title – in the seabed is irreconcilable
with the right of innocent passage, and that aboriginal title could not
coexist with common law rights of public fishing and navigation. It is this
author’s position however, that these conclusions should not be seen as per-
suasive by Canadian courts, partly because of differences in the legal frame-
work, but also because of flaws in the court’s reasoning.
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INNOCENT PASSAGE
Thinking first about the right at international law for ships of one nation to
make innocent passage through the territorial waters of other nations, it is
unclear why this would negate the possibility of title in the seabed. Certainly,
the language of ss. 7 and 8 of the Oceans Act, cited on p. 276, would seem to
indicate that Canada intended to acquire property rights over the bed of its
territorial sea. The fact that international law places some limits on a title-
holder’s power to exclude others (in this case, ships of other nations) is not
irreconcilable with the existence of title. As to the impact of the right of
innocent passage on the possible existence of aboriginal title, the short answer
would seem to be that if Crown title can coexist with such a right, so could
aboriginal title, and it, like Crown title, would be subject to the international
right. Where the exclusivity of the underlying Crown title is curtailed by
international law, it seems logical that any aboriginal title which exists as a
burden on that title would be similarly curtailed. While the right of innocent
passage would limit the rights otherwise associated with aboriginal title, it
should not, however, be seen as preventing courts from recognizing aborigi-
nal title in the bed beneath Canada’s territorial seas.
PUBLIC RIGHTS
Public rights of fishing and navigation in the tidal portions of rivers have
been entrenched in English common law since the Magna Carta. This is
based on an interpretation of s. 47 of Magna Carta, the modern translation
of which states: “All forests that have been created in our reign shall at once
be deforested. River-banks that have been enclosed in our reign shall be
treated similarly.”45 In Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that
rivers “so far as the ebb and flow of the tide” are
open to public use and enjoyment freely by the whole community, not
only for the purposes of passage, but also for fishing, the Crown being
restrained by Magna Charta from the exercise of the prerogative of
granting a several fishery in that part of any river.46
This does not mean that public rights of fishing and navigation are sacro-
sanct; only that if the Crown wishes to curtail such rights, it must do so
through legislation rather than through an exercise of the royal prerogative.
Nor has the common law viewed the existence of such rights as irreconcil-
able with the concept of title. As noted earlier, the prima facie assumption is
that the title to land beneath the tidal portions of rivers lies with the Crown.
Thus, at common law, title exists to the riverbed but the otherwise exclusive
character of that title is subject to Magna Carta rights. Where there is a con-
flict between the rights associated with title, and the public rights of fishing
and navigation, the latter prevail.47
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Extrapolating from this, it seems logical that aboriginal title could
coexist with the common law public rights of navigation and fishing. In
fact, there is even a possible argument that if a court recognized aboriginal
title with relation to the bed of the tidal portion of a river, this would oust
any rights based on Magna Carta.48 The argument here would be that Magna
Carta is irrelevant when the title being claimed arises not from a Crown
grant but from use and occupation of the land before British sovereignty.
Based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach in R. v. Gladstone49 to rec-
onciling aboriginal fishing rights with Magna Carta rights, it seems doubt-
ful, however, whether courts would currently be willing to accept such an
argument. In Gladstone, Lamer CJC stated:
[T]he aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) exist within
a legal context in which, since the time of the Magna Carta, there has
been a common law right to fish in tidal waters that can only be abro-
gated by the competent legislation. . . . While the elevation of common
law rights to constitutional status obviously has an impact on the public
common law rights to fish in tidal waters, it was surely not intended
that, by the enactment of s. 35(1), those common law rights would be
extinguished in cases where an aboriginal right to harvest fish commer-
cially existed. . . . [I]t was not contemplated by Sparrow that the recogni-
tion and affirmation of aboriginal rights should result in the common
law right of public access in the fishery ceasing to exist with respect to
all those fisheries in respect of which exist an aboriginal right to sell fish
commercially. As a common law, not constitutional, right, the right of
public access to the fishery must clearly be second in priority to aborigi-
nal rights; however, the recognition of aboriginal rights should not be
interpreted as extinguishing the right of public access to the fishery.50
On the other hand, while courts may be unwilling to see aboriginal rights
as extinguishing the common law rights of navigation and fishing, clearly
these common law rights should not be seen as negating the possibility of
aboriginal title. It is noteworthy that in the Marlborough Sounds case, the
New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the notion that “public interests” in
navigation would “make private property interests somehow unthinkable.”51
Even if a court felt compelled to construct the rights associated with aborig-
inal title in such a way that the common law public rights were not com-
pletely ousted, Gladstone makes it clear that constitutionally protected rights
would have some degree of priority over those grounded only in the
common law – which is very different than saying that aboriginal title
cannot exist in areas subject to public rights.52
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Implications for aquaculture policy
A 1982 publication, Aquaculture: The Legal Framework, noted the relevance
of aboriginal title to aquaculture in Nova Scotia:
Aboriginal land claims are of particular interest to the aquaculturist as
they claim a usufructory interest, i.e. a right to use the land and
resources as they had historically. These uses and the area where they are
carried on are pertinent to aquaculture, as they include taking shellfish
and marine plants along the marine foreshore and salmon along the
rivers of the province.53
Thus far, the potential significance of aboriginal title for aquaculture
policy does not appear to have been explored in the academic literature.
However, the potential interplay between aboriginal title and aquaculture
has become even more significant than would have been the case in 1982. As
noted above, in Delgamuukw the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that
aboriginal title is more than simply a right to use the land in traditional
ways; it is title to the land itself and carries with it a right to use the land
for a broad range of activities and the right to exclude others. Furthermore,
there are now constitutional restraints on the government’s ability to
infringe aboriginal title, either directly through its own actions or by per-
mitting others to engage in activities that would interfere with a First
Nation’s title to land.
If aboriginal title were recognized in a riverbed or a portion of the seabed,
could the First Nation holding aboriginal title decide to use the area for
aquaculture? If so, would the First Nation be required to obtain a license
under, or otherwise adhere to, the aquaculture legislation in that jurisdic-
tion? Could a First Nation prohibit others from carrying on aquaculture in
the aboriginal title area, or decide to permit but regulate such activities?
These questions raise two issues: first, absent any government regulation,
what rights would flow from the recognition of aboriginal title? And second,
to what extent could government restrict those rights?
Rights associated with aboriginal title
Would aboriginal title give a First Nation the right to engage in aquacul-
ture or to control whether or how others could engage in aquaculture? As
noted, the only limit that the Supreme Court of Canada has put on the use
of aboriginal title land is that the uses must not be irreconcilable with the
community’s attachment with the land. There is already disagreement in the
academic literature as to exactly how this limitation should be interpreted,
but it seems unlikely that this would preclude all First Nations from using
aboriginal title land for aquaculture. If such activity were challenged, a
court would have to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the particular
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form of aquaculture being practiced was irreconcilable with the attachment
of the particular First Nation to its land.
Assuming that aquaculture could take place on aboriginal title land,
could the First Nation regulate how its own community members practiced
aquaculture, prohibit outsiders from coming into the area for aquaculture
purposes, or decide to allow outside involvement, but regulate it? Subject to
what is said below regarding justified infringements of aboriginal rights,
authority to do each of these things would seem to flow from the fact of
holding title. With regard to regulating its own aquaculture activities,
where land is held by a community (as is the case for aboriginal title land),
presumably the government structure of that community has the authority
to regulate members’ use of the land.54 With regard to outsiders engaging in
aquaculture, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that aboriginal
title, like other title to land, includes a right to exclude others, so (again
subject to what is said below) presumably it would be up to the First Nation
to decide whether an individual or corporation outside the community
should be allowed to engage in aquaculture in the aboriginal title area. The
corollary of the power to exclude is the power to invite others in, and to reg-
ulate the conduct of those so invited. Therefore, absent valid legislation lim-
iting the rights flowing from aboriginal title, it seems that First Nations
holding land by way of aboriginal title might well, depending on the nature
of their historic connection to the land, have the right to engage in aquacul-
ture. They would also have the authority to prohibit or permit such activ-
ities by those outside the community and to regulate any aquaculture that
was permitted.
Justified infringement of aboriginal rights
It is possible, however, that governments might be able to restrict the rights
referred to above, whether by prohibiting the First Nation from carrying on
aquaculture, by allowing it to do so but requiring adherence to a federal or
provincial regulatory scheme, or by controlling any aquaculture activities by
those outside the First Nation.
Although aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title, are recognized and
affirmed by the Constitution, courts have held that these rights are not
absolute. They can be infringed by both the federal and provincial govern-
ments,55 provided that the infringement can be justified. The Supreme
Court of Canada has set out a two-part analysis on the issue of justification.56
First, an aboriginal nation wishing to challenge legislation as infringing its
aboriginal rights bears the onus of proving prima facie infringement; not
every application of legislation will be seen as an infringement of aboriginal
rights. To determine whether there is a prima facie infringement, the courts
must consider various factors, including whether the legislation limits the
exercise of the right, whether the limitation is unreasonable, and whether it
imposes undue hardship.
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If the First Nation is able to show infringement using these tests, the
second step of the analysis comes into play. It is up to the Crown to show
that applying the legislation in this context could be justified. The Crown
would have to prove that the legislation in question was “enacted according
to a valid objective,”57 and that the infringement of the aboriginal right can
be justified in terms of the “honour of the Crown.”58 According to the
Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw, this might mean that the govern-
ment would have to show that it accommodated the participation of Aborig-
inal peoples in resource development or that Aboriginal peoples had been
involved in decision-making in respect of their lands.59 Delgamuukw also
stated that there would always be a duty to consult where the government is
seeking to justify the infringement of aboriginal rights; however, the nature
and extent of the consultation required could differ significantly from case to
case.60 The Supreme Court of Canada also held that since aboriginal title
“has an inescapably economic aspect . . . fair compensation would ordinarily
be required when aboriginal title is infringed.”61 Therefore, rights flowing
from aboriginal title could be limited by aquaculture legislation if the
Crown could show that the relevant provisions of the Act met the test for
justification.
Common law riparian rights
Introduction
This section considers whether a First Nation might be able to claim propri-
etary rights in a riverbed by virtue of the fact that it holds aboriginal title to
the adjacent land; that is, whether rights could be claimed through the
application of common law principles regarding riparian rights62 without
the need to prove aboriginal title to the riverbed itself. As was noted in the
previous section, the English common law drew a distinction between tidal
and non-tidal waters in determining the ownership of the waterbed. Owner-
ship to the beds of tidal waters lay prima facie with the Crown, and since the
time of Magna Carta, there has been a public right to fish in such waters,
which could only be restricted by an Act of Parliament. When non-tidal
water runs in a definite stream or channel, there is at common law a pre-
sumption that the owner of land bounded by the river or stream owns the
submerged land to the centre of the riverbed (usque ad medium filum aqua).63
This presumption could be rebutted by a contrary expression in the grant or
conveyance, or by evidence that the grantor of the abutting lands had not
intended to convey the stream bed as well.64
At common law, fishing rights in non-tidal waters, unless at some time
separated and conveyed as a profit a prendre, go with ownership of the
riverbed.65 Thus, there existed in England an exclusive common law right to
fish in non-tidal waters, which right was an incident of ownership of the
submerged land beneath. Finally, at English common law the soil beneath a
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lake or pool as well as the water66 in it belonged to the person whose land
surrounded it.67 Where one’s property abuts rather than surrounds a lake,
the law was for a time less clear,68 but according to Cheshire and Burns it is
likely that the same rules would apply as to non-tidal waters.69
Application in Canada
In Canada, the ad medium filum presumption has been applied more narrowly
in some jurisdictions than was the case in England, and most provinces and
territories have passed legislation placing the ownership of watercourses and
waterbeds in the Crown. While English common law distinguished between
tidal and non-tidal waters, with the ad medium filum presumption applying
to non-tidal waters, in the western provinces courts have drawn the distinc-
tion between navigable and non-navigable waters such that the presumption
applies only to waters that are both non-tidal and non-navigable. Similarly,
in Ontario the Beds of Navigable Waters Act70 ousts the presumption with
regard to navigable waters. In these provinces, then, riparian rights to the
waterbed could at most apply to those parts of rivers or streams that are non-
tidal and too small for navigation.
In Atlantic Canada, however, the English approach has been followed, so
that the key issue is whether water is tidal, not whether it is in fact naviga-
ble.71 The Canadian situation was summarized by the Supreme Court of
Canada in a 1992 decision, Friends of the Oldman River:
Except in the Atlantic provinces, where different considerations may
well apply, in Canada the distinction between tidal and non-tidal waters
was abandoned long ago. Instead the rule is that waters are navigable in
fact whether or not the waters are tidal or non-tidal.72
Even more significant is that fact that most provinces have, by legislation,
appropriated ownership of all river and stream beds to the provincial
Crown.73 Similar legislation has been passed by the federal government in
relation to the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.74 Thus, of
the common law provinces and territories, common law riparian rights
would seem only to exist in Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
and Newfoundland and Labrador, and even in several of these provinces the
common law rights have been significantly limited.75
Potential application of common law riparian rights to
aboriginal title lands
A consideration of whether the common law presumption that the owner of
riparian lands also owns a portion of the riverbed could be applied to ripar-
ian lands held by way of aboriginal title is, at best, highly speculative, given
the lack on jurisprudence on this issue. The Supreme Court of Canada has
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been willing to assume without deciding that the presumption might apply
to reserve lands,76 and a 1985 decision of the British Columbia Supreme
Court, Pasco v. C.N.R.,77 held that that there was “a serious question to be
tried” with regard to an Indian band’s claim of riparian rights attached to a
reserve.78 Given comments by the Supreme Court in both Guerin79 and Del-
gamuuk80 regarding the similarity of the interest held by aboriginal
communities in reserve lands and aboriginal title lands, these cases at least
leave open the possibility of arguing that the presumption is relevant.
However, there is very little else to guide the discussion or to suggest how
courts might respond to the series of questions that would have to answered
if the riparian rights presumption were held to be applicable. All that this
section attempts to do, therefore, is to outline the questions and subques-
tions that would arise, depending on how a court reasoned at each stage of
the inquiry, and to sketch in some of the factors that might be taken into
account.
In considering the question “do common law riparian rights attach to
aboriginal title land?” a key issue may well be whether the application of the
ad medium filum presumption is limited to the interpretation of a grant – in
other words, whether the existence of title created by grant is a necessary
precondition for the application of the presumption. From the perspective of
aboriginal title, it matters greatly whether the rule is seen to mean “if you
are granted or conveyed property fronting on a non-tidal portion of a river,
it is assumed, absent evidence to the contrary, that you were also granted or
conveyed half the riverbed” or whether it means “if you hold title to prop-
erty fronting on a non-tidal portion of a river, it is assumed, absent evidence
to the contrary, that you also hold title to the half the riverbed.” Only the
latter would permit the argument that riparian rights could attach to abo-
riginal title land, given that aboriginal title is founded on historic use,
rather than on a Crown grant. Halsbury’s simply states that “By a presump-
tion of law, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the owner-
ship of a bed of a non-tidal river or stream belongs in equal halves to the
owners of the riparian land.”81 Thus, the focus in Halsbury’s seems to be on
the fact of ownership rather than on the source of that ownership. However,
Anger and Honsberger Law of Real Property refers specifically to a Crown grant:
“[T]he rule respecting non-tidal waters applies only if there is a Crown grant
extending to the centre of the water. If the bed is not included in the grant,
the land extends only to the water’s edge.”82
As was noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada has left for another day
the issue of how or whether the presumption might operate in the context of
reserve lands. In both R. v. Nikal83 and R. v. Lewis,84 it was argued that a
fishing by-law passed by the band applied as far as the midpoint of a river
adjacent to the reserve, by virtue of the ad medium filum presumption. In
Nikal, the court held that the river in question was navigable and therefore
the presumption did not apply. In Lewis, the court decided against the
claimants both because of the navigability of the river and because of
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historical evidence regarding the government’s intention in creating the
particular reserve. However, in Nikal the British Columbia Court of Appeal
saw the absence of a grant or conveyance as fatal to a claim that riparian
rights attached to reserve land:
The creation of the Moricetown reserve did not involve a grant or con-
veyance of title or ownership to the Gitksan Wet’suwet’en people. It
affirmed their right to use and occupation of the land. The English
property rule in question applies to the interpretation of grants and con-
veyances of land. It has no application to circumstances which do not
involve a grant but which recognize or affirm existing rights.85
In Lewis, despite the statement from the Supreme Court of Canada that for
the purposes of the appeal it would assume without deciding that the pre-
sumption could apply to reserve lands, Iaccobucci J, speaking for the court,
raised the question of whether title in reserve land would be seen as owner-
ship for the purposes of the presumption: “At the outset, it should be noted
that since the ad medium filum aquae presumption related to ownership of
land, the question remains as to whether it applies to Indian reserves.”86 If a
court held that riparian rights could attach to aboriginal title land, the court
would then have to consider the nature of the estate acquired by way of the
presumption: would the First Nation hold the riverbed by way of fee simple,
as would be the case in a wholly common law context, or by way of aborigi-
nal title? While it seems logical that the presumption, if applicable, would
replicate the title to which it attached (meaning that the First Nation would
hold the riverbed by way of aboriginal title), there is no case law on this
point.
If riparian rights could attach to aboriginal title land and if the title in
the riverbed so acquired were characterized as aboriginal title, rather than
fee simple, the question then arises as to whether the title to the riverbed
would have the same protection as other aboriginal title. On the one hand, it
might be argued that since title to the riverbed is not based on historic
occupation and use of the riverbed itself,87 it is not deserving of the constitu-
tional protection provided to aboriginal title in other contexts. The oppos-
ing argument would be that s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 simply
refers to aboriginal title and so there is no basis for creating different cat-
egories of aboriginal title, with different levels of protection. Again, there is
no case law to guide this discussion. However, one author has suggested that
“since riparian rights are not Aboriginal rights, they do not need to meet the
requirements of infringement or extinguishment set out in the doctrine of
Aboriginal rights.”88
If this were the case, then aboriginal title in a riverbed acquired by way of
the ad medium filum presumption could be restricted without governments
having to meet the test for justification, and could be unilaterally extin-
guished by the federal government. The argument might be made that such
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a different species of aboriginal title, arising solely from the application of
the common law and therefore having little inherently “aboriginal” about it,
could even be extinguished by provincial governments. If the court adopted
this approach, and if a claim arose in a province or territory where title to
waterbeds is, by legislation, vested in the Crown, then the court would have
to consider whether such legislation should be seen as expressing sufficiently
clear and plain intent to extinguish the aboriginal title.
In some jurisdictions, this question might be answered by the wording of
the legislation itself. If the Act was to the effect that after a certain date any
grant or conveyance of riparian lands could not extend past the high-water
mark, this would not seem to affect any aboriginal title based on the ad
medium filum presumption, since aboriginal title does not depend on any
grant or conveyance for its existence. Where legislation simply states that
the title to the beds of all watercourses lies with the Crown, a court would
have to decide whether this meant that the Crown intended to acquire the
unencumbered fee simple and whether it had made that intention suffi-
ciently plain to extinguish aboriginal title. An alternative argument might
be that since aboriginal title coexists with Crown title, the fact that the
riverbed is held by the Crown would be no impediment to a claim based on
riparian rights.
If a court held both that the riparian presumption could attach to aborig-
inal title lands, creating aboriginal title in the riverbed, and that all aborigi-
nal title, however acquired, has the same constitutional protection, then the
title in the riverbed could only be infringed by legislation meeting the tests
for justification. Furthermore, it could only be extinguished by the federal
Crown, and could not be unilaterally extinguished after 1982. In this sce-
nario, legislation placing the ownership of waterbeds in the provincial
Crown would certainly not extinguish such rights, as provincial govern-
ments cannot extinguish aboriginal title.89 With regard to the impact of
legislation vesting waterbeds in the federal Crown, then the earlier discus-
sion on the wording of such legislation and the possible coexistence of the
Crown title with aboriginal rights would be relevant here as well. Interest-
ingly, in Lewis and Nikal the Supreme Court of Canada rejected claims based
on riparian ownership on the grounds that the river was navigable, and
therefore the ad medium filum presumption would not apply. The court did
not state that all such rights have been ousted in British Columbia by the
Water Act.
Conclusion
The first section of this chapter considered whether the doctrine of aborigi-
nal title, as developed thus far by Canadian courts, could apply to rivers,
lakes and the seabed. While there is no Canadian jurisprudence directly on
point, it is at least arguable that the doctrine of aboriginal title might apply
in these areas. Aboriginal title carries with it the right to use the land for a
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variety of purposes, the right to exclude others and the right to regulate use
of the land. In areas where aboriginal title claims might be made out, careful
thought will therefore have to be given to accommodating aboriginal title
rights within aquaculture policy, and considering the extent to which
attempts to limit such rights would be upheld as justifiable.
The second part of this chapter asked whether the common law ad medium
filum presumption could be used by an aboriginal community holding river-
bank land by way of aboriginal title in order to claim title to the riverbed.
Given the lack of relevant case law and the number of questions that would
have to be worked through by any court tackling this question, it is difficult
to draw even tentative conclusions on this question. However, the possibil-
ity of riparian rights claims cannot be rejected out of hand, and so any devel-
opments in this area of the law should be watched closely by those
responsible for developing and implementing aquaculture policy.
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9 Aquaculture law and policy in
Canada and the duty to consult
with Aboriginal peoples
Ronalda Murphy, Richard Devlin and
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Introduction
In November 2003, a Mi’kmaq elder from the community of Eskasoni
launched a court action seeking to stop seismic testing in the waters off
Cape Breton. He claimed that the government of Nova Scotia had failed to
consult with his First Nation before issuing an approval to allow the testing
by Corridor Resources, as part of its oil and gas exploration program.1 Abo-
riginal communities throughout Canada assert they must be consulted
before governments or corporations make decisions that could impair the
constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples. Invocation of the duty to consult
as an independent source of legal entitlement is increasing. This chapter
explains why these claims are being made and how they may operate in the
specific context of aquaculture. Our objective is to illuminate the historical
and political context of the duty to consult, and to canvass the responses of
courts and governments to date. Unfortunately, the law is at a nascent stage
of development, as the courts are struggling to give substance and structure
to this novel doctrine.2 Nonetheless, it is possible to identify basic themes
and to outline the contours of the duty to consult as it presently is being
defined by courts in response to urgent and complicated litigation.
Our conclusions can be briefly stated. Aboriginal communities may or
may not have a right to develop, or refuse to develop, aquaculture projects.
If they claim such a right, and the government has knowledge, real or con-
structive, of the potential existence of aboriginal right or title and the con-
templated government conduct might adversely affect Aboriginal peoples,
then the duty to consult is triggered. If the duty to consult exists, the con-
sultation process may reveal a further duty to accommodate Aboriginal con-
cerns by making changes to proposed actions. Because these duties exist and
are triggered once a prima facie case has been made out, they afford aborigi-
nal communities and governments the opportunity to draft plans for devel-
opment that are responsive to the needs and concerns of Aboriginal peoples.
Importantly, however, the duty to consult is distinct from the substantive
right that triggers its application. We explain the significance of this dis-
tinction in the discussion of the case law. Our emphasis is on the holdings of
the Supreme Court of Canada, though we make mention of a few significant
decisions from lower courts.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we sketch the overall legal
context for aboriginal rights and the relationship between Aboriginal
peoples and the governments of Canada. Then we explain the role of s. 35 of
the Constitution Act, the provision that guarantees the rights of Aboriginal
peoples, and the legal tests required for establishing a constitutional aborigi-
nal right. With this in place, we introduce the legal regime for the duty to
consult in the context of aquaculture and survey the responses of various
governments to this issue. Finally, we outline the specific contours of the
duty to consult as it has been articulated to date. The law can be quickly
grasped by examining the following four questions: Who has the duty?
What is the nature and intensity of the duty? Where does the duty arise?
When does it get triggered? We conclude by addressing the question of why
the duty exists, and we offer our tentative views regarding its potential
impact on aquaculture development in Canada.
Historical legal context of the duty to consult
An understanding of the duty to consult requires an inquiry into the history
and nature of aboriginal rights. The starting point is the colonization of
what we now call North America and claims to sovereignty over Aboriginal
peoples, in particular Britain’s claim in Canada as explicitly stated in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763.3 In 1867, when four of the colonies agreed to
the terms of the British North America Act 1867 (BNA Act), they divided the
legislative powers between themselves and the newly created federal govern-
ment. The judiciary was, and remains, responsible for ensuring compliance
with the division of powers in the Constitution. The federal government
exercises legislative authority or jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands
reserved for the Indians.”4 The policies and laws applied to “Indians” over
the next hundred-plus years can only be described as vacillating from explic-
itly racist to effectively racist. Aboriginal peoples had very little political
power, and nothing in the rule of law seemed capable of responding to the
unjust treatment they received at the hands of the Canadian state.5
Indeed, with respect to law, under the principles of parliamentary
(federal) or legislative (provincial) supremacy, any aboriginal rights recog-
nized at common law could be abrogated, even extinguished. Validly
enacted federal or provincial law could therefore eradicate any protection the
common law afforded to Aboriginal peoples,6 and, more shockingly, even
extinguish treaty rights.7 While the provincial government cannot legislate
with respect to “Indians and the lands reserved to them,” provincial laws can
apply to Aboriginal peoples in one of two ways. First, the provincial law can
have an incidental effect on Aboriginal peoples provided the law is otherwise
validly enacted – in other words, it is a law that in pith and substance is one
regarding a subject matter assigned to the provinces under s. 92 of the BNA
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Act. Second, a provincial law of general application can apply by virtue of s.
88 of the Indian Act.8
The general principle of parliamentary or legislative supremacy operated
until 1982, when the Canadian Constitution was amended to add the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”). Under the new legal
regime, Canada became a constitutional democracy. Legislative enactments
are now subject to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter, or any
rights established elsewhere under the Constitution Act 1982. The rights and
freedoms protected in the Charter are subject to such reasonable limits as are
prescribed by law and justified in a free and democratic society, which is set
out in s. 1 of the Charter. The constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal
rights is found in s. 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. It is not part of the
Charter, and is not subject to s. 1 of the Charter. Section 35 provides that
“the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” While s. 35 is the “source” of
current litigation and of central significance to Aboriginal peoples, a proper
understanding of the law requires an examination of pre-s. 35 legal develop-
ments.
Recall that “Indians” and lands belonging to them are “assigned” to the
federal level of government. In Canada, courts have identified key differences
between title to aboriginal lands held by Aboriginal people, and other types
of property rights with respect to land.9 Aboriginal title exists in conjunc-
tion with radical or ultimate title flowing to the Crown, and aboriginal title
can be sold only to the Crown. While aboriginal title can be put to a wide
variety of uses, it cannot be put to a use that is inconsistent with the nature
of the title being held by Aboriginal people as a communal interest. This is
because of the origin of the title: it arises as a result of historical use and
occupation of the land by Aboriginal people with a special relationship to
their land. All of this makes the interest unique, or sui generis.
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in the case of Guerin v. The Queen10
that the federal government (in its capacity as the Crown) was required to
deal with aboriginal land only in a manner that was for the benefit of that
community. In reaching this conclusion, the Court interpreted various legis-
lative clauses regarding the creation and sale of reserve lands, and the
common law rules governing aboriginal title. Under those rules, aboriginal
title lands cannot be sold directly to any third parties. They can be sold or
“surrendered” only to the Crown, which in turn generates a “distinctive
fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown to deal with the land for the
benefit of the surrendering Indians.”11 The rationale for this discretionary
power in the Crown, as stated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and con-
firmed in the provisions of the Indian Act, was to “interpose the Crown
between the Indians and the prospective purchasers or lessees of their land,
so as to prevent the Indians from being exploited.” The Court characterized
this as a “historic responsibility” undertaken by the Crown, and a relation-
ship that courts would supervise as a fiduciary obligation, albeit a sui generis
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one based on the “unique character both of the Indians’ interest in land and
of their historical relationship with the Crown.”12
In this particular case, Crown agents negotiated the surrender of reserve
lands so the lands could be leased to a golf club. However, they acted
improperly at law by accepting contractual terms from the golf club that
were worse than those agreed to by the aboriginal community. In engaging
in that course of action, the federal agents were not acting in a manner con-
sistent with the honor of the Crown. This honor is expressed as the Crown
owing Aboriginal peoples a “fiduciary duty,” or an equitable obligation to
deal with the land for the benefit (not the disadvantage) of the aboriginal
community involved. The Court explained that a breach of this duty
occurred when the Crown agents failed to consult with the aboriginal
community about the terms of the lease. It stated, “In obtaining, without
consultation, a much less valuable lease than that promised, the Crown
breached the fiduciary obligation it owed to the Band. It must make good
the loss suffered in consequence.”13
This case affirmed the existence of a fiduciary relationship and underlines
the role that consultation plays within it. At this point, it is critical to note
that the case was not a constitutional case, and there was no legislative
action. Rather, there was a legislative framework in place (the Indian Act)
that circumscribed what the Crown was entitled to do upon surrender of
aboriginal land in light of the historical relationship between the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples. Consultation was characterized as a feature of a court-
imposed fiduciary relationship, and in this case proved to be a major obstacle
to the Crown’s attempts to deal with the land as it pleased. Nonetheless, it
should not be forgotten that the court would not have refused to enforce a
validly enacted law that altered or even eradicated aboriginal rights without
consultation.
One example suffices to make this critical point. A series of numbered
treaties were entered into between the federal government and a wide
variety of aboriginal communities to facilitate settlement of non-Aboriginal
people in the western region of Canada between 1871 and 1923. The
treaties typically protected the right to commercial hunting by Aboriginal
peoples. In the 1930s, however, the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement
(NRTA) was entered into by each of the three western provinces of Alberta,
Saskatchewan and Manitoba and the federal government. In paragraph 12 of
those Agreements, the commercial right to hunt was extinguished and
replaced with a right to hunt for food, on an extended land base. In a non-s.
35 case in 1990, R. v. Horseman, it was argued on behalf of the Aboriginal
litigant that precedent affirming the loss of the treaty right to commercial
hunting should not be followed. The claim was that paragraph 12 of the
NRTA was passed without the consultation, much less the consent, of the
affected communities. Further, counsel asserted that allowing the Crown to
unilaterally change and derogate the treaty rights granted earlier “could only
lead to the dishonor of the Crown.”14 The Supreme Court of Canada effort-
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lessly rejected the argument and, in doing so, revealed the true limits of the
fiduciary duty concept in the context of a legislative enactment:
These contentions cannot be accepted.15 . . . In addition, although it
might be politically and morally unacceptable in today’s climate to take
such a step as that set out in the 1930 Agreement without consultation
and concurrence of the Native peoples affected, nonetheless the power of
the Federal Government to unilaterally make such a modification is
unquestioned and has not been challenged in this case.16
In sum, when it was not inconsistent with government intent as expressed
in law, the Supreme Court of Canada imposed a powerful fiduciary duty on
the Crown to act in the aboriginal community’s best interest and in a
manner that reflected the “honor” of the Crown.17 Nonetheless, absent the
status of constitutional rights, treaties did not serve to insulate Aboriginal
peoples from government laws that unilaterally altered, or even extin-
guished, the rights of Aboriginal peoples even though they were protected
in their treaties with the Crown. Any common law protection for Aboriginal
or non-Aboriginal peoples is always vulnerable to legislative changes. What
remains to be determined is how the recognition of aboriginal rights as
“constitutionally protected” creates new vigor to the duty to consult, and in
what manner. This leads us to s. 35.
Contemporary legal framework for the duty to consult
Canadian courts use a fairly straightforward – though not necessarily wise18
– approach to defining s. 35 rights and the conditions under which they can
be violated. Section 35 has repeatedly been held by the Supreme Court of
Canada to exist for the purpose of recognizing the prior occupation of North
America by Aboriginal peoples, and the reconciliation of prior occupation
by Aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.19
Section 35 protects three classes of rights. First, and in many ways the
strongest, are rights to aboriginal title. As we have noted, the nature of abo-
riginal title is quite unusual. It is a collective concept, attaching to the
community for use of traditional lands.20 Second, there are treaty rights.
Treaties are not exactly like contracts, but they do create binding obliga-
tions and rights. Canadian courts now interpret treaty provisions generously,
and in a manner that recognizes the unequal bargaining relationship that
often characterized the negotiation process prior to treaty formation.21 The
treaties vary; some are compared with peace and friendship, some involved
the “surrender” of land; and they are both quite old and very new.22 Third,
there are ancestral rights (often confusingly called aboriginal rights as
well).23 These protect traditional practices, traditions and customs that were,
prior to contact with Europeans, integral to the distinctive culture of the
specific Aboriginal group. There must also be continuity between those
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historic activities and the particular practice, tradition or custom relied
upon by aboriginal communities today. These activities can be manifested in
contemporary form – bows and arrows are not required to exercise an aborig-
inal right to hunt – and they may or may not exist alongside of an aborigi-
nal title claim.24 Finally, the right claimed must be infringed.25 In
addressing this requirement, the court considers whether the limitation is
unreasonable, whether it imposes undue hardship or whether it denies rights
holders their preferred means of exercising their rights.26
Interestingly, it will not suffice for the state to keep silent with respect to
aboriginal rights holders and wait for claims of infringement to be made. In
R. v. Adams, the court was confronted with a legislative scheme that allowed
for sport and commercial fishing, but had no provisions for aboriginal food
fishing except when a special permit was granted at the discretion of the rel-
evant minister. It had been previously established that regulatory schemes
that allow for ministerial discretion are not per se violative of the Charter;
rather, the court will simply require the discretion to be exercised in a
manner that accommodates the Charter.27 Yet the court refused to follow
earlier precedents and distinguished aboriginal rights as requiring more
than this:
I am of the view that the same approach should not be adopted in iden-
tifying infringements under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In
light of the Crown’s unique fiduciary obligations towards aboriginal
peoples, Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured discretionary
administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a sub-
stantial number of applications in the absence of some explicit guidance.
If a statute confers an administrative discretion which may carry
significant consequences for the exercise of an aboriginal right, the
statute or its delegate regulations must outline specific criteria for 
the granting or refusal of that discretion which seek to accommodate the
existence of aboriginal rights. In the absence of such specific guidance,
the statute will fail to provide representatives of the Crown with suffi-
cient directives to fulfil their fiduciary duties, and the statute will be
found to represent an infringement of aboriginal rights under the
Sparrow test.28
Clearly, then, s. 35 is of great significance. However, it is important to note
that although s. 35 is not subject to s. 1 of the Charter, in its first s. 35
decision, R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada held that no rights are
absolute, and thus it was essential to subject these rights to limits that were
justified.29 Compelling and substantial government interests would be justi-
fiable.30 A valid objective is conservation and safety. This approach protects
laws designed to preserve the existence of a natural resource (such as
wildlife) or ensure safe practices in an activity that might otherwise expose
individuals to danger (i.e. weapons restriction).31
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In some cases, where the right in issue is one to sustenance, the state
must accord that right a priority over other users of the resource who are not
rights holders, such as sport and commercial fishers, subject to the overrid-
ing requirement of conservation of the resources itself.32 When the court
recognizes a “commercial” right to a certain resource, as in R. v. Gladstone, s.
35 does not operate to secure absolute or unlimited priority to the Aborigi-
nal peoples; instead, if there is no internal limit to the right (i.e. limited to
food), then
the doctrine of priority requires that the government demonstrate that,
in allocating the resource, it has taken account of the existence of abo-
riginal rights and allocated the resource in a manner respectful of the
fact that those rights have priority over the exploitation of the fishery by
other users.33
Finally, and most important for our purposes, the court held that the
manner in which governments seek to achieve their “compelling and sub-
stantial” objectives must “uphold the honour of the Crown,” in light of the
Crown’s fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples. In a later case, the court
explained: “The fiduciary duty, where it exists, is called into existence to
facilitate supervision of the high degree of discretionary control gradually
assumed by the Crown over the lives of Aboriginal peoples.”34 Section 35 is
intended in part to limit the degree of that control. In Sparrow, the court
thus expanded the fiduciary duty to extend to s. 35 rights. It stated:
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and
responsibility assumed by the Crown constituted the source of such a
fiduciary obligation. In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor
and Williams, ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is,
the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government
and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary
recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light
of this historic relationship.35
Of critical note, however, is that the duty to consult is not limited to s. 35
rights or to existing reserves, though it must still be tied to specific Indian
interests rather than “a plenary Crown liability covering all aspects of the
Crown–Indian relationship.”36
Delgamuukw, the seminal case explaining the ubiquitous role that consul-
tation plays in the Court’s understanding of the nature of aboriginal/state
relations, is one involving aboriginal title, where the court stated:
There is always a duty of consultation. Whether the aboriginal group
has been consulted is relevant to determining whether the infringement
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of aboriginal title is justified, in the same way that the Crown’s failure
to consult an aboriginal group with respect to the terms by which
reserve land is leased may breach its fiduciary duty at common law:
Guerin. The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with
the circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or
relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important
decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to abo-
riginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the minimum
acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of
the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be
significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even
require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when
provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal
lands.37
It is inconsistent with the honor of the Crown to not consult with Aborigi-
nal peoples when their interests are being affected in a manner that violates
their rights. In the very first case, Sparrow, involving ancestral rights to fish
for food, social and ceremonial purposes, the court explained:
Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be
addressed, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry. These include
the questions of whether there has been as little infringement as possible
in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropria-
tion, fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in
question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being
implemented. The aboriginal peoples, with their history of conserva-
tion-consciousness and interdependence with natural resources, would
surely be expected, at the least, to be informed regarding the determina-
tion of an appropriate scheme for the regulation of the fisheries.38
Similarly, in Gladstone, a case that recognized commercial fishing rights as
a traditional feature of the particular aboriginal community involved, the
court required the state to engage in consultation as a component of the
justification analysis: “questions relevant to the determination of whether
the government has granted priority to aboriginal rights holders are those
enumerated in Sparrow relating to consultation and compensation.”39 The
court sent the case back to the trial court because of the Crown’s failure to
lead evidence as to justification in support of the infringements the court
identified. Further, in R. v. Nikal, the court, again confronting a case
where the Crown had not led any evidence to justify its infringement of
aboriginal rights, commented on the essential role of consultation in the
assessment of whether aboriginal rights are being legitimately considered
by the state:
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So long as the infringement was one which in the context of the circum-
stances presented could reasonably be considered to be as minimal as
possible then it will meet the test. The mere fact that there could pos-
sibly be other solutions that might be considered to be a lesser infringe-
ment should not, in itself, be the basis for automatically finding that
there cannot be a justification for the infringement. So too in the aspects
of information and consultation the concept of reasonableness must
come into play. For example, the need for the dissemination of informa-
tion and a request for consultations cannot simply be denied. So long as every
reasonable effort is made to inform and to consult, such efforts would suffice
to meet the justification requirement. This is no more than recognizing
that regulations pertaining to conservation may have to be enacted
expeditiously if a crisis is to be avoided. On occasion, strict and expedi-
tious conservation measures will have to be taken if potentially catas-
trophic situations are to be avoided. The nature of the situation will
have to be taken into account in assessing the conservation measures
taken. The greater the urgency and the graver the situation the more
reasonable strict measures may appear.40
The jurisprudential history of the concept of consultation in aboriginal
law was traced in recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Haida41 and Taku.42 These cases held the duty to consult and accommodate
aboriginal interests flows from the legal requirement that the Crown act
honorably in their relationship with Aboriginal peoples. The court distin-
guished “honor” from the “fiduciary duty” and explained the latter was
limited to situations when a specific aboriginal interest has been established
as requiring the Crown to act in the aboriginal group’s best interest in exer-
cising discretionary control over the subject matter of the defined or proven
aboriginal right or title.43 Honor, by contrast, is ever-present as an obliga-
tion. This means that the duty to consult can be triggered relatively simply
by the assertion of aboriginal claims that meet a minimum threshold of
legitimacy. The consultation must be meaningful and may generate a duty
to accommodate by governments, though it does not necessarily mean that
as a result of the process an agreement will or must be reached.44 While
there is no aboriginal veto over government decisions based on asserted
rights, there may well be a veto with respect to established rights that are
shown to be validated.45
The foregoing is the birth story of the constitutional duty to consult with
Aboriginal peoples. It was analytically located within the justification stage
of s. 35 cases involving proven violations, but its conceptual basis is the
broader “honor of the Crown,” and thus it is triggered by the assertion of
claimed rights of which the government has knowledge, whether actual or
constructive. Before turning to the topic of aquaculture, and our review of
important operational aspects of the duty to consult cases, we offer a quick
assessment of the outcomes in s. 35 cases.
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The language of s. 35 requires that rights claimed under it be “existing.”
Any rights previously existing, but extinguished by state action prior to
1982, cannot be revived.46 Of the various s. 35 claims, title cases are the
strongest in law. But title is hard to prove,47 and such cases more likely to
succeed in the more recently settled parts of Canada than on the east coast.48
The second set of cases involves treaties, and these have been quite successful
as a source of rights protected under s. 35. Indeed, the most controversial s.
35 decision from the Supreme Court of Canada involved interpretation of a
1751 treaty as supporting a contemporary right to access and trade tradi-
tional resources in order to earn a moderate livelihood.49 As for ancestral
rights, which we will call aboriginal rights to maintain consistency with the
jurisprudence, these are very difficult cases. It is hard to find evidence to
prove a practice “at the time of contact,” again more so in the parts of the
country where there was early exposure to European settlement. However,
when that evidence exists, it can support economically significant rights,
including commercial rights to exploit resources.50 The concept of priorities
then applies to protect aboriginal access to rights (though if it is a commer-
cial right it will not be exclusive access) after conservation goals are secured.
The key point is that before there is a duty to consult, there must be a
rights claim, whether based on title, treaty or on aboriginal customs, prac-
tices and traditions. There is no “at large” duty to consult. More import-
antly, there is no free-standing right to engage in – or not engage in –
aquaculture development. This cannot be addressed in the abstract. If there
is an established aboriginal title claim, then aquaculture development will
be protected, as will the right to refuse to allow it on aboriginal lands. If
there are no aboriginal title claims, and the claim depends on a treaty provi-
sion, then that provision must support the interpretation that the treaty
incorporates aquaculture development.51 If the source of the right is based
on ancestral practices, cultures and traditions, then there must be evidence
to support the view that fish farming was an activity that was a defining
feature of the aboriginal community in question at the time of contact with
Europeans and that has continued.52 Finally, levels of development have to
be considered. The level of development of the resource completely turns on
the evidence in the specific case. The evidence may or may not support pro-
duction to the levels of large-scale commercial trade (e.g. Gladstone), but
rather be limited to food or sustenance (e.g. Sparrow) or to a moderate liveli-
hood (e.g. Marshall No. 1).
Having provided this historical and analytical overview of the larger
framework within which the duty to consult needs to be understood, we are
now in a position to delineate the specific dimensions of the duty to consult.
However, before we do, it will be necessary to consider the degree to which
contemporary government policies on aquaculture manifest an understand-
ing of their duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples.
302 R. Murphy, R. Devlin and T. Lorincz
Federal and provincial policy on aquaculture and the
duty to consult
Introduction
Aquaculture is a very new and evolving area of law and policy in Canada,
and operates within a complex legal and regulatory system. At present, a
patchwork of statutes, regulations and policies federally and provincially
administer this expanding industry.53 The basis of federal and provincial
legislative jurisdiction over the subject is complicated, and beyond the scope
of this chapter. At present, there are memoranda of understanding providing
for shared jurisdiction between the federal government and several of the
provinces.54
We have already noted that provincial laws cannot, in pith and substance,
be directed to Aboriginal people, as the topic is reserved to the federal
government. The legal context for aquaculture involves a variety of laws –
fisheries, industry, environmental – as well as laws that relate specifically to
Aboriginal peoples as such. It suffices to note that as far as Aboriginal people
are concerned, both levels of government may be pursuing aquaculture pro-
jects that have the effect of violating aboriginal rights. The relationship
between aquaculture law and the duty to consult is essentially undevel-
oped.55 While some governments have recently drafted policy documents on
consultation with Aboriginal peoples in the context of natural resource
development (often on land), they have not specified aquaculture. In this
section, we briefly review the available material on this topic. Because of a
lack of information, we are unable to offer any assessment of the status of
aquaculture in the Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut.
Federal
The main federal56 statutes that currently frame aquaculture are the Fisheries
Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act 1999, the Navigable Waters Protection Act and the Oceans Act.57
There are also a number of secondary federal statutes such as the Canada
Shipping Act, the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, the Food and Drugs Act, the
Pest Control Products Act and the Feeds Act58 that relate to specific aspects of
aquaculture. However, there is no federal aquaculture act at the present. In
1995, Cabinet endorsed the Federal Aquaculture Development Strategy
(FADS) and designated Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) as the lead
federal agency for aquaculture development. In 1997, the Oceans Act
expanded the DFO’s role in the development of ocean resources premised on
three guiding principles: sustainable development, precaution and integ-
rated management.59 Sections 32 and 33 of the Oceans Act refer to coopera-
tion or consultation between the minister and aboriginal communities.
Section 33 states:
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In exercising the powers and performing the duties and functions
assigned to the Minister by this Act, the Minister
(a) shall cooperate with other ministers, boards and agencies of the
Government of Canada, with provincial and territorial governments
and with affected aboriginal organizations, coastal communities and
other persons and bodies, including those bodies established under
land claims agreements.60
In 1999, the Prime Minister appointed a Commissioner for Aquaculture
Development to advise the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.61 The Office of
the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development (OCAD) is mandated to
determine the most appropriate and effective role of the federal government
in the development of the industry.62 In 2000, the DFO launched the
Program for Sustainable Aquaculture and developed a six-point action plan
to increase industry competitiveness and public confidence.63
The need for confidence became apparent when, later in 2000, the
Auditor General of Canada found that DFO was not fully meeting its
responsibilities to conserve and protect wild fish from the effects of salmon
farms in British Columbia.64 The 2000 DFO program focuses on the
research and development related to biological science, the environment,
human health, and improving the regulatory and management framework of
aquaculture in Canada, and is backed by a CDN$75 million investment by
the federal government for five years.65 The objective of the plan is to
“develop a sound and integrated policy and regulatory environment [that]
contributes to a stable and supportive business climate that will enable the
industry to continue contributing to Canada’s social and economic develop-
ment.”66 In particular, the Ministers of Aquaculture and Fisheries agree to
“resolve current legal and regulatory impediments and put in place a harmo-
nized legal framework that enables development of the aquaculture sector in
Canada.”67 To assist in attaining this goal, they also commit to “seek
opportunities to enable Aboriginal and other stakeholders participation in
aquaculture development.”68 The Office of the Commissioner for Aquacul-
ture Development subsequently released the Legislative and Regulatory Review
of Aquaculture in Canada in March 2001. In this document, thirty-six
detailed measures were recommended as “urgently” needed to serve the
development of aquaculture. However, we highlight that aboriginal inter-
ests, not to mention aboriginal rights, are barely mentioned in this other-
wise comprehensive review of the existing and proposed legislative
environment for aquaculture.69
In 2002, in response to FADS, the principles of the Oceans Act and the
Aquaculture Program and Action Plan, DFO prepared an Aquaculture
Policy Framework (APF). In it, DFO agrees to “clearly convey to other
federal government departments, the provincial and territorial governments,
the aquaculture industry, Aboriginal groups, and stakeholders the framework
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within which DFO is committed to taking action.”70 The framework also
states, “DFO will respect constitutionally protected Aboriginal and treaty
rights and will work with interested and affected Aboriginal communities to
facilitate their participation in aquaculture development.”71
Finally, in April 2003 the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans,
chaired by Member of Parliament Tom Wappel, submitted a report titled
The Federal Role in Aquaculture in Canada. The report is a comprehensive
review of the federal and provincial regulatory, political and legal develop-
ments in aquaculture. The report also includes a list of recommendations for
the federal government. These include passage of a federal aquaculture Act
and regulations that will “provide a clear set of standards for operators, other
stakeholders and the public,”72 and “promote communications between
stakeholders, reduce and mitigate potential user conflicts, and enhance
public awareness of the social and economic benefits of the industry.”73
There are, once again, no recommendations that refer specifically to Aborigi-
nal peoples or their rights, much less consultation. The report does note the
opposition to fish farming by some west coast First Nations communities,74
and we identify a recent case on this point (Heiltsuk Nation v. British Colum-
bia) in the last section of this chapter.
This review indicates that the federal government is aware of aboriginal
interests but the attention is sporadic rather than systemic, as we believe to
be required by the Constitution and in light of the “honorable” relationship
between the federal Crown and Aboriginal peoples of Canada. There is no
detail as to how DFO policies will work with respect to aboriginal and
treaty rights. It is unclear whether DFO and the Commissioner for Aquacul-
ture appreciate that the interests, indeed rights, of Aboriginal peoples are of
a different order from those of commercial stakeholders who cannot claim
any constitutional source for their desire to participate in resource develop-
ment. It is also obvious that the federal initiative is strongly in favor of
aquaculture development; not every aboriginal community shares that view.
Owing to the novelty of this framework, it is too early to judge its effective-
ness in engaging aboriginal communities on issues involving aquaculture
but, at a minimum, current federal policy reflects an opening for the articu-
lation of aboriginal interests and rights in this area of development and law.
British Columbia
British Columbia (BC)75 is the largest producer of aquaculture products in
Canada.76 The two main subdivisions of BC aquaculture are the salmon
farming and shellfish farming industries. In British Columbia, fish farms
provide more than 3,500 direct and indirect jobs, mostly in coastal
communities. According to the provincial Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries, the export value of farmed fish is approximately CDN$370
million, which accounts for 40 percent of the value of all BC seafood.77
A license is required to operate a fish farm in the province.78 Among First
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Nations in British Columbia, support for aquaculture is divided. There are
some First Nations, such as the Tlowitsis, Quatsino, Kwakiutl, Gwa’Sala-
Nakwaxda’xw, Kitasoo and Qwe’Qwa’Sot’Enox, that want aquaculture in
their coastal communities for economic development.79 However, there is
also vociferous opposition against aquaculture by First Nations, such as the
Heiltsuk, Nuxalk, Namgis, Tsawataineuk, Kwicksutaineuk-ah-Kwah-ah-
Mish, and the Gwawaenuk tribes, who fear that farmed salmon are causing
fatalities among wild salmon from sea lice.80 In the recent past, there have
been many protests and acts of civil disobedience organized by the aborigi-
nal groups opposing salmon aquaculture in the province.81
The British Columbia government has had numerous studies and policies
on aquaculture over the past decade.82 A controversial scientific study in
199783 led to a new policy in 1999 and the establishment of a committee to
bring together stakeholders, including aboriginal groups. First Nations have
been extensively involved in the governmental and public debates concern-
ing the development of aquaculture in that province.84 A moratorium was
imposed in 1995.85 No new farms sites were permitted until April 2002,
when the moratorium was lifted.86
In October 2002, British Columbia released its Provincial Policy for Con-
sultation with First Nations.87 The policy applies to all provincial min-
istries, agencies and Crown corporations. This is a comprehensive effort by
the British Columbia government to respond to the various court decisions
discussed in the second part of this chapter. It requires government to
engage in a “pre-consultation assessment” to determine whether a particular
activity or decision requires consultation and lists a series of factors to aid in
that inquiry while noting that it is rare that consultation would not be
required on the assertion of an aboriginal claim.88 Importantly, the docu-
ment recognizes that consultation is always required whenever there is a
“sound claim” of aboriginal interests, and does not only arise when those
claims have been upheld in a court of law. This is consistent with the
decisions from that jurisdiction’s appeal court, which we will discuss in the
next section. Finally, the document notes that the nature of consultation
will vary depending on the strength or “soundness” of the claim being
asserted.89 We explain shortly why this is an appropriate understanding of
the law on the duty to consult. Two final points are worthy of note. First,
this is a policy document, not a legislative enactment. Second, there is no
specific mention of aquaculture.
It is clear that the government of British Columbia acknowledges that
Aboriginal peoples are readily implicated in the aquaculture industry and
require engagement. In April 2003, the federal and British Columbia gov-
ernments launched a “Salmon Aquaculture Forum” that is designed to bring
all parties together to help “strengthen fisheries management” at the request
of “governments, stakeholders, First Nations and concerned British
Columbians.”90 The accompanying press release stated that the Forum “will
provide an opportunity for interested parties to discuss current issues in
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aquaculture as they arise, including scientific and public policy questions.”91
Consultation with respect to aboriginal rights is now clearly stated as neces-
sary in s.8.1.8 of the most recent Aqualculture Land Use Policy document,
dated 5 October 2005.92
Alberta
In Alberta, aquaculture is regulated by the Alberta Agriculture, Food and
Rural Development (AAFRD) department.93 The main cultured freshwater
species in the province are rainbow trout, tilapia, goldfish, koi and Arctic
char.94 The provincial Fisheries Act provides the licensing provisions for cul-
tured fish. There is nothing in the Fisheries Act or the Fisheries Regulations95
that requires public hearings or consultation with affected stakeholders, such
as Aboriginal peoples in Alberta. In 2000, the provincial government
released a report, entitled Strengthening Relationships: The Government of
Alberta’s Aboriginal Policy Framework, to address socio-economic disparities
between aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. In terms of consulta-
tion with aboriginal communities on resources development, the report
states:
The Government of Alberta encourages a “good neighbour” approach
based on respect, open communication and co-operation. It expects
those who propose natural resource developments to consult with and
consider the views, values and experiences of communities and people
that could be affected by their developments.96
This may require consultation with aboriginal communities on aquaculture
projects, but that is not specified in the Strengthening Relationships report.
Unlike British Columbia, it seems as if Alberta goes out of its way to mini-
mize any special significance attaching to the presence and rights of Aborig-
inal peoples with respect to resource development.
Saskatchewan
In Saskatchewan, aquaculture is regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food and Rural Revitalization.97 There is nothing in the Fisheries Act or the
Fisheries Regulations that requires public hearings or consultation with
affected stakeholders, such as First Nations. In 2000, the Saskatchewan
Environment and Resource Management (now Saskatchewan Environment)
released its Aboriginal Consultation Guidelines.98 This document provides a
basic overview of the case law on the duty to consult, and in 2001 the same
department issued the Aboriginal Consultation Field Guide.99 This document
details the consultative obligation of the government in a practical manner,
covering a wide range of activities while not mentioning any specific inter-
ests of the Aboriginal peoples in the province or aquaculture.100 As with
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British Columbia, this initiative represents a good effort by the government
to honor its obligations to Aboriginal peoples through a clear and public
commitment to the duty to consult whenever aboriginal interests may be
adversely affected. Again, however, these documents do not have the force of
law and function rather as policy determinations.
Manitoba
The aquaculture industry in Manitoba is small and dominated by the pro-
duction of rainbow trout.101 The industry is governed by the Ministry of
Conservation and is regulated by the Fisheries Act and the Fisheries
Regulations.102 A license is required to operate a fish farm in the province.103
There is nothing in these pieces of legislation that requires public hearings
or consultation with affected stakeholders such as First Nations. A recent
report prepared for Manitoba’s Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commis-
sion, entitled Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples, presented results from a
survey conducted with Aboriginal peoples in that province:
[A] series of questions was about whether respondents [aboriginals] had
noticed any weaknesses in the province’s capacity to communicate,
administer programs and develop policies in relation to Aboriginal
peoples. There was a resounding yes to all segments of this question
from all respondents.104
Ontario
Ontario is the leading producer of rainbow trout in Canada.105 In 2001,
Ontario produced 4,100 tonnes of rainbow trout worth CDN$16,900,000.
This represents approximately 63 percent of the entire amount of rainbow
trout produced across Canada.106 The Ministry of Agriculture and Food
(OMAF) oversees aquaculture development in the province. The principal
legislation is the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, and a license is required
to culture fish in the province.107 There is nothing in the Act that requires
public hearings or consultation with affected stakeholders such as First
Nations.
Québec
In Québec, the main species used for commercial aquaculture are also trout,
with certain regions dominating the production.108 Production in Québec
was valued at CDN$5,299,000 million for 1,267 tonnes of aquaculture
products for the year 2001.109 The industry is regulated under the Act
Respecting Commercial Fisheries and Aquaculture (Loi sur les pêcheries et l’aqua-
culture commerciales) and the Commercial Aquaculture Regulation.110 There is
nothing in the recently passed act or the regulations that requires public
308 R. Murphy, R. Devlin and T. Lorincz
hearings or consultation with affected stakeholders, including Aboriginal
peoples.
Newfoundland and Labrador
The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture governs the highly developed
aquaculture industry in Newfoundland and Labrador. The industry pro-
duced 4,263 tonnes of aquaculture products, valued at CDN$18.9 million
in 2001.111 Newfoundland and Labrador is one of the few provinces with a
dedicated Aquaculture Act and Aquaculture Regulations.112 However, there is
no reference to Aboriginal peoples or First Nations in the legislative scheme,
although the law contemplates regulations that prescribe procedures by
which “neighbouring land owners, municipalities, other affected or inter-
ested persons and the general public may participate in helping the minister
in his or her decision whether to grant an aquaculture license.”113 Current
regulations are, however, silent on this point.
New Brunswick
In New Brunswick, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture administers the aquaculture industry. Currently, there are approxi-
mately fourteen hatcheries, ninety-seven marine sites and nine processing
plants. The salmon aquaculture industry alone provides 3,005 direct and
indirect jobs.114 The industry is regulated by the Aquaculture Act and its
accompanying Aquaculture Regulations.115 Under the Act, public consultation
is anticipated;116 however, nothing in the Act or the regulations refers to
Aboriginal peoples.
Prince Edward Island
Prince Edward Island is the leading producer of blue mussels in Canada and
the famous Malpeque oysters.117 The Department of Fisheries, Aquaculture
and Environment oversees the aquaculture industry.118 The Fisheries Act
gives the Minister power to set regulations for the aquaculture industry.119
There is nothing in the act that requires public hearings or consultation
with Aboriginal peoples or other affected stakeholders.
Nova Scotia
The aquaculture industry in Nova Scotia is overseen by the Department of
Agriculture and Fisheries. Nova Scotia has one of the most diverse industries
in Canada. There are approximately 370 issued aquaculture sites in the
province that culture various species.120 The industry is regulated by the
Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act and the Aquaculture Licence and Lease Regula-
tions.121 A license is required to operate a fish farm in the province. Under
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the act, the minister may call for public hearings.122 There is a specific refer-
ence to mandatory consultations:
47 Before making a decision with respect to the application, the
Minister
(a) shall consult with
ii the Department of Agriculture and Marketing, the Depart-
ment of the Environment, the Department of Housing and
Municipal Affairs and the Department of Natural
Resources, and
ii any boards, agencies and commissions as may be pre-
scribed; and
(b) may refer the application to a private sector, regional aquacul-
ture development advisory committee for comment and recom-
mendation.123
In addition, the statute states:
56 (1) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in
Council, . . .
(2) Before recommending designation of an aquaculture develop-
ment area or conditions or restrictions to be applicable thereto,
the Minister shall
(a) consult with
ii the Department of Agriculture and Marketing, the
Department of the Environment, the Department of
Housing and Municipal Affairs and the Department of
Natural Resources, and
ii any boards, agencies and commissions as may be pre-
scribed.124
There is, however, nothing specifically related to aboriginal communities in
the act or the regulations.
Conclusion
The federal, British Columbia and Saskatchewan governments recognize
their legal obligation to consult with Aboriginal peoples. The frameworks in
place appear to map onto prevailing law that we reviewed at the beginning
of this chapter. Aquaculture in particular is a topic of concern at the federal
level and, most acutely, in British Columbia, and it will be useful to watch
developments in these jurisdictions closely. Our survey of law and policy in
the remainder of the provincial governments reveals a stunning lack of
attention to the issues of aboriginal consultation generally, or aquaculture
and aboriginal rights specifically. This stance may be useful politically, but
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it is not sustainable in law. In fact, it is illegal. In the next section, we
outline the emerging jurisprudence in various courts across Canada, which
give more detail to the pronouncements on the duty to consult from the
Supreme Court of Canada discussed in the second part of this chapter. This
analysis will suggest that the challenges posed by the duty to consult are
complex but also mandatory: governments must obey the constitutional
requirement to consult.
Recent developments on the duty to consult: who, what,
when, where and why?
To whom does the duty apply?
Once a case is litigated, and a court concludes that an aboriginal right is
infringed, the onus of proof is on the Crown to demonstrate that the
infringement is justified. It will fail to establish justification if the Crown
did not “consult” with Aboriginal peoples.125 The duty to consult applies to
the Crown – that is, both the federal and provincial governments – and in
particular it applies to civil servants, who, as agents of the Crown, are exer-
cising governmental authority that infringes aboriginal rights.126 In cases
where there is more than one ministry or government department involved,
the obligation will fall on the “responsible authority.”127 Courts are not
subject to such a duty, nor are all creatures of the executive branch of
government.128 Finally, as noted earlier, the duty does not mean the govern-
ment can only address aboriginal interests in making decisions;129 other
interests and rights, such as those held by non-Aboriginal Canadians, also
merit consideration, but some form of priority must be accorded to aborigi-
nal rights.130 As we have already explained, the duty does not exist at large,
but rather depends upon a triggering claim of a cognizable aboriginal inter-
est.131 In the context of aquaculture, such a claim to participate in the indus-
try, or a claim to prevent aquaculture developments, must be based on a s.
35 protected title, treaty or aboriginal right.
Cases may involve developers, and it is important to identify the existing
case law on the relationship between the Crown, aboriginal communities
and developers. This is a hotly contested political, economic and legal
concern, and current case law is in a state of fragility. We do know that the
Crown cannot delegate, devolve or divest its duty to consult onto interested
private parties.132 Consulting by such third parties does not relieve the
Crown of its duty under s. 35(1).133 Governments can, however, require
private developers whose projects might have an impact on aboriginal rights
to have direct consultations with affected First Nations and, in assessing the
extent of these consultations, courts can factor in the conduct of the private
developers.134 This is just an attribute of state power to condition its
approval of any activity.135 These lower court opinions on these points have
now been held to be correct by the Supreme Court of Canada.136
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In 2002, the British Columbia Court of Appeal radically expanded the
potential scope of the duty to consult to private corporations but this was
rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada on further appeal. In Haida Nation
No. 1, the Haida Nation applied for a declaration that the Minister of
Forests had breached his fiduciary duty when he renewed Tree Farm Licence
39 (T.F.L. 39) for Weyerhaeuser Company Ltd. on the Queen Charlotte
Islands/Haida Gwaii pursuant to s. 29 (now s. 36) of the Forest Act without
adequately consulting the Haida people, who claimed to hold aboriginal
title and ancestral rights over this land. Lambert JA, speaking for a unani-
mous court, declared that both the provincial Crown and the logging
company (as well as MacMillan Bloedel, Weyerhaeuser’s predecessor) were
subject to an enforceable legal and equitable duty to consult with and
accommodate the Haida with regard to their economic and cultural
claims.137 He did not expressly address the reasons for this apparent expan-
sion, except to note in passing that “Weyerhaeuser [were] aware of the
Haida claims to aboriginal title and aboriginal rights . . . through evidence
supplied to them by the Haida people and through further evidence avail-
able to them on reasonable inquiry, an inquiry which they were obliged to
make.”138 But Lambert JA never explicitly explained the source of such a
corporate obligation. Thus, it was unsurprising that Weyerhaeuser, and
several intervenors,139 petitioned the Court to reconsider its holding on this
point. To their undoubted dismay, in Haida No. 2, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, although this time only by a two to one majority (again
authored by Lambert JA),140 reaffirmed that third parties might owe a duty
to consult in good faith and endeavor to seek workable accommodations, and
that this is a duty separate from that owed by the Crown to Aboriginal
people.141
The Court of Appeal justified its decision on three grounds: the existence
of provisions within both the Forest Act and T.F.L. 39 that could be inter-
preted as requiring consultation with Aboriginal peoples; the equitable doc-
trines of constructive trust and knowing receipt; and a pragmatic argument
that in the day-to-day management of the resource the real and effective
capacity to consult and accommodate the concerns of Aboriginal peoples
rested with Weyerhaeuser.142
Rather than following the pragmatic and grounded analyses of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Haida No. 2, the Supreme Court of Canada
retreated to a formalistic public/private dichotomy in reaching the conclu-
sion that the duty to consult does not attach to third parties at all. This
flows from the court’s view that the Crown alone is responsible for third-
party conduct that affects Aboriginal peoples, and the Crown’s honor cannot
be delegated (though informational aspects of the consultation itself may be
delegated, and often are, to the industry developers).143 The court was crystal
clear on this point: “The remedy tail cannot wag the liability dog. We
cannot sue a rich person, simply because the person has deep pockets or can
provide a desired result.”144 However, the court also rejected the assumption
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that fed the holding on this point in the Court of Appeal below, namely that
if Weyerhaeuser were not held to the duty there would be no remedy for the
Haida Nation, pointing to recent legislation in British Columbia that claws
back 20 percent of all forest licensees’ harvesting rights partly to make land
available to Aboriginal peoples. It is hard to predict the effect of this reason-
ing, but much seems to turn on the assumption that the state is willing to
learn and meet aboriginal concerns, and not perpetuate the long-established
patterns of the past. The court sounds optimistic. It is too early to tell
whether that optimism is well placed. It requires a new relationship with
the state, and a state willing to seriously devote itself to that task by reining
in the legal power of corporations to unfairly undermine aboriginal claims to
resource distribution by the state.
Just as important as the question of who has the duty to consult, is the
question of “with whom must the Crown consult?” Aboriginal communities
can be complex political units with difficult issues of representative legiti-
macy.145 There can be personal and political differences within a band,
between band members and non-band members, between bands, between
First Nations, between local bands and regional organizations, etc. In any
given litigation, only certain parties may be involved, but other aboriginal
groups may have rights that would nonetheless be affected by decisions.146
To date, the courts have had little to say on this important issue, but
what they have said reflects the broader proposition that the components of
the duty to consult are highly fact dependent. In other words, the answer to
the “with whom” question is “it depends.” For example, in R. v. Jack, the
Court of Appeal of British Columbia indicated that is not necessary that
there be a vote by the band council, or that there be unanimous consent by a
band to a particular governmental policy, but it also indicated that there
may be situations where a vote will be essential.147 In R. v. Sampson, the same
court seemed to suggest that conversations with a band manager may be
inadequate consultation. Lambert JA, in his dissenting opinion in R. v.
Gladstone, indicated that consultations with the Native Indian Brotherhood
rather than the Heiltsuk band itself were not sufficient.148 In another case,
Alberta Wilderness Association v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), a
regional umbrella organization representing various First Nations was held
to be entitled to consultation.149 It is a complex issue. Clearly, however, the
prudent course of action is for the state to identify all aboriginal communit-
ies with a potential right, and to ascertain the legitimate authority within
each community before engaging in consultation proceedings that seek to
avoid infringements. The duty only falls on those infringing rights, but once
it attaches, it requires good-faith participation by everyone involved, includ-
ing aboriginal communities. In Haida, the Supreme Court of Canada
stressed this point:
At all stages, good faith on both sides is required. The common thread
on the Crown’s part must be “the intention of substantially addressing
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[Aboriginal] concerns” as they are raised . . . through a meaningful
process of consultation. Sharp dealing is not permitted. However, there
is no duty to agree; rather, the commitment is to a meaningful process
of consultation. As for Aboriginal claimants, they must not frustrate the
Crown’s reasonable good faith attempts, nor should they take unreason-
able positions to thwart government from making decisions or acting in
cases where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached.
Mere hard bargaining, however, will not offend an aboriginal people’s
right to be consulted.150
The nature of the duty to consult
In this section, we address the question of intensity: what must a govern-
ment do to fulfill the standard of legally sufficient consultation? The short
answer is, once again, “it depends.” Conventionally, legal rights have been
understood as either procedural or substantive, the right to a fair trial being
an example of the former, freedom of expression being an example of the
latter. In the context of aboriginal claims, the courts have, in our opinion,
resisted this dichotomy and instead created a hybrid right, one that is more
than procedural but, in most cases, less than a veto right.
The starting point for an inquiry into the nature and intensity of the duty
to consult is the famous dictum in Delgamuukw, where Lamer CJ announced
a context-sensitive proportionality test, which we reproduced in the second
part of this chapter. The British Columbia Court of Appeal has developed
the analysis further to suggest a twofold “adequate and meaningful” stan-
dard of consultation: (1) “a positive obligation to reasonably ensure that
Aboriginal peoples are provided with all necessary information in a timely
way so that they have an opportunity to express their interests and con-
cerns;” and (2) “to ensure that their representations are seriously considered
and, whenever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of
action.”151 More recently still, the same court has invoked a number of other
descriptors that appear to intensify the obligations of governments even
further: “ensur[ing] the substance of the concerns are addressed” and deter-
mining whether the “needs” and “concerns have been met or accommo-
dated”;152 and seeking “accommodation” and “workable accommodation.”153
In Haida Nation, the Supreme Court of Canada has employed similar lan-
guage: “accommodate,” “stringent duties,” “deep consultation,” “finding a
satisfactory interim solution,” “reconciliation” and “balance and compro-
mise.”154
This is a relatively full-bodied conception of consultation. However, this
raises a critical point, namely: what is the difference between a duty to
consult and a substantive right to a particular outcome – in other words, a
right to veto the state action in issue? As noted, several courts have held that
the duty to consult does not give a veto right to aboriginal claimants,155 and
this is surely correct as otherwise there is little point in characterizing some-
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thing as consultation, and little incentive for the state to engage in any
process at all. Equally, however, a duty to consult cannot mean that no
weight is given to the fact that the claims being made are not merely “inter-
ests,” but actual constitutional “rights” that exist independently of any spe-
cific consultative process. Thus, the confusion is over whether the duty to
consult is procedural only, or also substantive. If it is only procedural, it is
not sensitive to the fact that there are rights being claimed. If it is fully sub-
stantive, and as such requires recognition of the rights claims themselves,
then it is difficult to see what there is to “consult” about.
Haida clears up the law in this area. In a case where aboriginal rights are
asserted rather than proven, the fiduciary duty is not yet triggered so as to
require the Crown to act in the best interests of the aboriginal community
in the Crown’s exercise of discretionary control over the subject or the right
claimed.156 The notion of “honor” nonetheless dictates that even potential
rights must be “determined, recognized and respected” through a process of
consultation and, depending on the circumstances, reasonable accommoda-
tion.157 The court stressed, “To unilaterally exploit a claimed resource
during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim to the
resource, may be to deprive Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the
benefit of the resource. That is not honourable.”158 The duty is triggered as
soon as the Crown knows, or ought to know, of the potential existence of an
aboriginal claim and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect those
rights or title claim.159
The court emphasizes, as we do, that the intensity of the obligations to
consult and accommodate will depend upon the factual matrix of each case.
As we have noted in this chapter, however, good faith requires engagement,
not denial or deference, and this is exactly what the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded. There is no veto, but in situations where there is a strong
case that a significant right may be infringed, and the risk of non-compensable
damage is high, “deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim
solution, may be required,”160 and in the process the Crown is entitled to
consider other societal interests.161 The holding in Haida implicitly
acknowledges the hybrid nature of the rights of consultation and accommo-
dation, noting specifically that while the purpose of s. 35 rights is the
reconciliation, “[r]econciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense.
Rather it is a process flowing from the rights guaranteed by s. 35(1),”162 and
thus the duty is intended to require parties to make a good-faith effort to
understand and address each other’s concerns.163
The idea that the duty to consult is a hybrid right that is more than pro-
cedural, but less than fully substantive, makes sense of the judicial dicta that
impose reciprocal aboriginal obligations. Several courts have made it clear
that the duty to consult is a two-way street.164 While the primary obligation
is on the Crown to consult, there is also a reciprocal obligation on Aborigi-
nal peoples to participate fully and in good faith in the consultation
process.165 Courts have held, as we have noted, that the duty to consult
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cannot be used to give Aboriginal people a veto power; nor does it necessar-
ily require the “agreement,” “consensus” or “informed consent” of Aborigi-
nal peoples.166 Aboriginal peoples “cannot frustrate the consultation process
by refusing to meet or participate, or by imposing unreasonable con-
ditions”167 or by making unreasonable demands for further information.168
Nor can they, “in good faith, refuse to actively participate in the consulta-
tion process and then complain that [they have] not been consulted.”169 If
they initially participate in a process, they cannot abandon it and then com-
plain of a lack of consultation.170 In Haida, the court explained, “As for Abo-
riginal claimants, they must not frustrate the Crown’s reasonable good faith
attempts, nor should they take unreasonable positions to thwart government
from making decisions or acting in cases where, despite meaningful consul-
tation, agreement is not reached.171
Courts are articulating consultation as a right and duty to authentically
participate in solving the problem at issue. To the extent that this recog-
nizes that the duty to consult is a “democratic right,”172 this is clearly a
welcome development, as long as courts are sensitive to the realities of that
engagement. Often the cases involve disputes over scientific data or require
very specialized expertise. This is obviously true with respect to aquaculture
developments. Many aboriginal communities simply lack the resources to
hire the experts necessary to meaningfully participate in the discussion over
whether or not a proposed development has an adverse effect on aboriginal
rights and interests. In Kelly Lake Cree Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Energy and Mines), the Ministry of Energy and Mines refused to fund a spe-
cialist to advise a First Nation on the consultation process, but instead
offered to make available a member of the ministry to advise on the tech-
nical aspects of the project.173 A First Nation may legitimately not have con-
fidence that its interests will be adequately represented by a member of a
bureaucracy whose very purpose is to promote development of resources –
and this is very much the case with the Office of the Commissioner for
Aquaculture. R. v. Aleck held that the bands would have to prove that
funding for an independent analyst was “necessary,” but this may impose a
significant, perhaps insurmountable, burden on First Nations communit-
ies.174 However, in Taku River the Supreme Court of Canada noted with
approval the government’s decision to retain an independent assessment by
an expert approved of by the aboriginal community, and provide financial
assistance to allow the community to participate meaningfully in the consul-
tation process.175
The reciprocal nature of the duty to consult may cause concern for First
Nations for other reasons as well. As Lilles CJ of the Territorial Court in R.
v. Joseph has noted, “Native people are afraid that any information provided
could be used against them in the future.”176 This may explain why, not
infrequently, Aboriginal peoples state that their conversations and meetings
are not “consultations.”177 Their point is that they do not want to legitima-
tize or be complicit in a “consultation” record-keeping process that is not
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about meeting aboriginal concerns as much as relevant actors (state and
corporate) simply documenting compliance with a legally imposed duty to
consult.
It is impossible to predict what view a court will take of a specific consul-
tation process, though so far in the case law we can trace a fairly serious
effort by courts to ensure that the consultation is seriously undertaken, with
an openness to outcomes. Courts are displeased by aggressive aboriginal
positioning on consultation, and remind communities that consultation is
not a veto.178 At the same time, courts are unwilling to tolerate the all too
common Crown stance of a refusal to allow aboriginal claims to consultation
to derail government approval of development projects. As one court stated
recently, “On a legal basis, the shortness of time and economic interests are
not sufficient to obviate the duty of consultation.”179
Whether or not it makes sense to equate the position of the state and abo-
riginal communities by imposing a reciprocal requirement to participate, it
is critical that the specificity of the relationship remain central to the elabo-
ration of consultative duties. A clear and, we believe, appropriate recogni-
tion of this fact can be observed in the Mikisew case. There, the Crown
argued that because it had provided opportunities for public consultations
that are open to all stakeholders, the First Nations had a duty to participate
in such fora and not frustrate the consultative process. In Mikisew, however,
this argument was rejected and the judge went so far as to argue that “[a]t
the very least, [the First Nation] is entitled to a distinct process if not a
more extensive one.”180 This is important because it emphasizes the unique-
ness of aboriginal rights in Canadian legal and political discourse, and their
priority over generalized commercial development interests such as that of
the emerging aquaculture industry. In Taku River, the Supreme Court of
Canada explained that the key is that aboriginal concerns be taken seriously,
and this must be done, whether in a specialized process or otherwise. The
court explained:
The Province was not required to develop special consultation measures
to address TRTFN’s [Taku River Tlingit First Nation’s] concerns,
outside of the process provided for by the Environmental Assessment
Act, which specifically set out a scheme that required consultation with
affected Aboriginal peoples.181
When is the duty triggered?
At what time does the duty to consult kick in: early, at the moment when
Aboriginal peoples assert an aboriginal right, or much later, only after Abo-
riginal peoples have proved they have such a right? For twelve years
(1990–2002), the dominant view was that the duty to consult arose quite
late, only after the Aboriginal claimants had demonstrated an aboriginal
right. A decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal illustrates this point. In
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TransCanada Pipelines v. Beardmore (Township),182 plans were introduced to
amalgamate several rural municipalities over the objection of two local First
Nations bands who were claiming a violation of s. 35 rights to a particular
territory. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the
Ontario government owed a duty to consult on the basis of the potential
claim by the First Nations to aboriginal rights. In reaching this conclusion,
Borins JA drew on the logic of the three-point Sparrow test and held that the
duty to consult came into being “only after” the First Nations had established
(1) the requisite treaty right, and (2) infringement of such a right. The
Ontario Court of Appeal characterized the s. 35 claim as “speculative” and
therefore insufficient to trigger the duty to consult.183 The court’s concern
was that a requirement of consultation prior to proof of an aboriginal right
would impose too great a burden on government, and would encourage
frivolous claims.
In Haida, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected this analysis and
authoritatively held that the duty exists early and is triggered relatively
easily:
Neither the authorities nor practical considerations support the view
that a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate arises only upon
final determination of the scope and content of the right. . . . To limit
reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating reconciliation as a
distant legalistic goal, devoid of the “meaningful content” mandated by
the “solemn commitment” made by the Crown in recognizing and
affirming Aboriginal rights and title. . . . It also risks unfortunate con-
sequences. When the distant goal of proof is finally reached, the Aborig-
inal peoples may find their land and resources changed and denuded.
This is not reconciliation. Nor is it honourable. . . . There is a distinc-
tion between knowledge sufficient to trigger a duty to consult and, if
appropriate, accommodate, and the content or scope of the duty in a
particular case. Knowledge of a credible but unproven claim suffices to
trigger a duty to consult and accommodate. The content of the duty,
however, varies with the circumstances, as discussed more fully below.
A dubious or peripheral claim may attract a mere duty of notice, while a
stronger claim may attract more stringent duties. The law is capable of
differentiating between tenuous claims, claims possessing a strong
prima facie case, and established claims. Parties can assess these matters,
and if they cannot agree, tribunals and courts can assist. Difficulties
associated with the absence of proof and definition of claims are
addressed by assigning appropriate content to the duty, not by denying
the existence of a duty.184
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Where and why does the duty exist?
This chapter has explained that the Crown has an obligation to engage in
some degree of consultation upon the assertion of a prima facie aboriginal
right, but the greater the potential soundness of the right, the higher the
standard of consultation. We also know that the duty originates with the
honor of the Crown. The particular content of the duty and extent of any
attendant obligations will vary with the nature and importance of the right
claimed by Aboriginal people; it is not a general indemnity.185 We can state,
then, that the duty attaches wherever there are Aboriginal peoples who have
rights that are being threatened. That means that any decision-maker
involved in any area of development (including aquaculture) may find them-
self subject to the duty to consult and, thereafter, the duty to accommodate.
In our view, the purpose of the duty is to ensure that the parties to dis-
putes involving aboriginal rights claims learn to take each other seriously
and, in particular, to require the state to begin to treat Aboriginal peoples
with respect and equality. Courts have been somewhat progressive in this
area of law, at least in demanding engagement and meaningful communica-
tion. Some cases have gone further in holding the parties to a substantive
standard of addressing the needs and concerns of legitimately advanced abo-
riginal claims to protection under s. 35. To the extent that those involved in
the aquaculture industry ignore these judicial developments, they will likely
find themselves legally vulnerable.
Conclusion
The duty to consult holds potential and perils for Aboriginal peoples in the
context of aquaculture. On the one hand, it recognizes strong obligations that
might be owed to Aboriginal peoples by governments, both federal and provin-
cial. This review has indicated that to date many governments have not realized
the significance of this legal duty. On the other hand, it is important for those
concerned about the future of aboriginal communities not to buy into false
optimism. The idea, and ideal, of a duty to consult is contingent upon a
number of quite complex and technical legal relationships that require an
ability to dovetail constitutional vision with quite context-specific facts. It may
even have the possibility of intensifying the challenges faced by Aboriginal
peoples. In short, the duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples in the context of
aquaculture is still up for grabs. While recent decisions from the Supreme
Court of Canada have clarified several aspects of the doctrine, we believe that its
application will remain polyvalent: everything will depend upon the context.
Postscript
In March 2004, the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development issued a
Report to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans entitled Recommendations for
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Change.186 Filled with promises of jobs, money and stories of economic salva-
tion, four of the fifty-seven pages are devoted to “Aboriginal Opportunities in
Aquaculture.” However, the Report misses a central argument of this chapter:
that Aboriginal peoples in Canada have a potential constitutional right of con-
sultation that is distinct from that owed to other Canadians. For example,
• The report calls for “enhanced participation in the aquaculture sector by
Aboriginal peoples in a manner consistent with native culture, values
and traditions”187 but fails to elaborate upon what participation might
mean, and it manifestly does not contemplate participation as objecting
to aquaculture development.
• The Report acknowledges that “proto-aquacultural activities are
believed to have been practiced by Aboriginal peoples,”188 which may
support claims for the constitutional obligation of substantive consulta-
tion. Such claims are ignored by the Report.
• In Part III, “Getting the Policy Right,” the Report develops a “Vision
for Sustainable Aquaculture Development in Canada” with scarce
mention of the particular rights of Aboriginal peoples. Recommenda-
tions 7 and 8, dealing with “negotiat[ing] a New Aquaculture Frame-
work Agreement” and “funding” and briefly propose to “[d]evelop a
national strategy for Aboriginal aquacultural development with input
from the provinces/territories”189 with no reference to “input,” much less
“consultation” with the Aboriginal peoples themselves.
In 2005 in Homalco Indian Band v. British Columbia (Ministry of Agriculture,
Food and Fisheries)190 the British Columbia Supreme Court applied the prin-
ciples outlined above. The British Columbia government had amended
Marine Harvest Canada’s existing aquaculture licence to allow them to raise
Atlantic rather than Chinook salmon. The Homalco Indian Band claimed,
inter alia, that they had not been consulted. Following the Haida Nation and
Taku River decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court agreed.
However, the Court refused the Homalco’s application for an order that all of
the Atlantic salmon at the site be removed until consultation and, if neces-
sary, reasonable accommodation of their concerns had been achieved. This
case confirms the application of the duty to consult and, if necessary, accom-
modate Aboriginal concerns in the context of aquaculture. However, it also
raises further issues as to the most appropriate remedy for breach of the duty.
Notes
1 C. Macdonald, “Elder Loses Bid to Stop Seismic Testing off C.B.,” Chronicle
Herald, 12 December 2003, A3.
2 For example, as we will illustrate in our ensuing discussion, while there are
significant points of consensus between appeal courts and the Supreme Court
of Canada, there are also important differences. Compare, for example, Haida
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (2002) 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 209
320 R. Murphy, R. Devlin and T. Lorincz
(B.C.C.A.), [Haida Nation No. 1] with [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; and Taku River
Tlingit First Nation v. Tulsequah Chief Mine Project (2002) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 89
(B.C.C.A.) and [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River].
3 There are other relevant documents; this is just the most famous. The relevant
passage is:
[S]uch Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded 
to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them [Aboriginal peoples] or any of
them, as their Hunting Grounds. . . . We do, with the Advice of our Privy
Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to
make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said
Indians . . . but that, if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be
inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for
Us, in our Name.
See discussion in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at
para. 203.
4 British North America Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(24).
5 Although, in 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. Attorney General
of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313 held that aboriginal interests in ances-
tral lands constituted a legal claim that predated and survived European settle-
ment. See also Mitchell v. MNR [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at paras. 141–146.
6 Federal law on Indians is authorized by s. 91(24) and does not present a divi-
sion of powers problem. Provincial law is vulnerable, however, and thus appli-
cation is usually by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. Note
that treaties could also be extinguished: the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreement, infra, is an example, as we will discuss in the second part of this
chapter.
7 R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771.
8 See Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (2002) 210 D.L.R. (4th) 577 and, more
recently, Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission) [2003] 2
S.C.R. 585.
9 See Diana Ginn, Chapter 8 this volume.
10 Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
11 Ibid. at 382.
12 Ibid. at 387.
13 Ibid. at 389.
14 R. v. Horseman [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 932.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. at 934. See also R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 815: “The Federal
government, as it was empowered to do, unilaterally enacted the NRTA. It is
unlikely that it would proceed in the same manner today.”
17 The power of the fiduciary duty concept can be readily appreciated in compli-
cated case of Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344. The
Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown violated the fiduciary duty by
selling potentially valuable mineral rights of a reserve land and not reacquiring
the rights upon realizing a mistake had been made.
18 See, generally, P. Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
19 R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow]; R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R.
723 at paras. 71, 72 [Gladstone]; R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para.
39; R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 at para. 57 [Adams]; Haida Nation No. 1,
supra note 2 at paras. 16, 17.
20 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw]. See also
Diana Ginn’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 8).
Aquaculture law and policy in Canada 321
21 An excellent summary of the principles of treaty interpretation can be found in
the dissenting (not on this point) opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin in R. v.
Marshall No. 1 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 456.
22 See, for example, maritime versus the numbered treaties in western Canada,
and new treaties in British Columbia, Québec and Labrador.
23 The leading case on ancestral rights remains R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R.
507.
24 Adams, supra note 19 at 117: “[W]hile claims to aboriginal title fall within the
conceptual framework of aboriginal rights, aboriginal rights do not exist solely
where a claim to aboriginal title has been made out.”
25 See Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1100; and R. v. Nikal [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at
1057 [Nikal].
26 Sometimes this is a fairly easy step. For example, in Sparrow the government
net length restriction for fishing was found to violate the ancestral right to
fish. However, mere licensing may not constitute an infringement. See Nikal,
supra note 25 at 1059, where it did not, but the court noted that the conclu-
sion may turn on whether the license is one that could only be obtained at
great difficulty or expense. If this is the situation, an infringement may be
established.
27 As in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
28 Adams, supra note 19 at para. 54.
29 For example, in Nikal, supra note 25 at para. 92, the court rejected the argument
that no government regulation was legitimate once a right was established:
It has frequently been said that rights do not exist in a vacuum, and that the
rights of one individual or group are necessarily limited by the rights of
another. The ability to exercise personal or group rights is necessarily
limited by the rights of others. The government must ultimately be able to
determine and direct the way in which these rights should interact.
Absolute freedom in the exercise of even a Charter or constitutionally guar-
anteed aboriginal right has never been accepted, nor was it intended.
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is perhaps the
prime example of this principle. Absolute freedom without any restriction
necessarily infers [sic] a freedom to live without any laws. Such a concept is
not acceptable in our society.
30 Initially the test seemed rigorous: Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1113, announced:
If a prima facie interference is found, the analysis moves to the issue of justifica-
tion. This is the test that addresses the question of what constitutes legitimate
regulation of a constitutional aboriginal right. The justification analysis
would proceed as follows. First, is there a valid legislative objective? Here the
court would inquire into whether the objective of Parliament in authorizing
the department to enact regulations regarding fisheries is valid. The objective
of the department in setting out the particular regulations would also be scru-
tinized. An objective aimed at preserving s. 35(1) rights by conserving and
managing a natural resource, for example, would be valid. Also valid would
be objectives purporting to prevent the exercise of s. 35(1) rights that would
cause harm to the general populace or to aboriginal peoples themselves, or
other objectives found to be compelling and substantial.
But in several more recent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated
an incredibly expansive list of potentially valid government objectives. See
Gladstone, supra note 19 at para. 64, and Marshall No. 2 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 532 at
para. 41 and again in Delgamuukw, supra note 20. In the last-mentioned case,
the court stated at para. 165 (citations omitted):
322 R. Murphy, R. Devlin and T. Lorincz
The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow, and
embellished by Gladstone, operate with respect to infringements of aborigi-
nal title. In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can
justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these
objectives can be traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of
North America by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sover-
eignty, which entails the recognition that “distinctive aboriginal societies
exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic
community”. In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry,
mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the
interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign popula-
tions to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent
with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aborigi-
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Indigenous rights to resources in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and other
jurisdictions have been major domestic issues over the past thirty years. The
leading judicial decisions have dealt with land rights. Additionally, there are
important decisions on hunting and fishing. Very recently, cases and settle-
ments have dealt with rights to rivers, lakes, foreshore and offshore.1 No
significant decision on indigenous rights in the field of aquaculture has
occurred, though there has been some activity on the issue in Canada and
New Zealand. Any indigenous claims in relation to aquaculture would build
on the judicial rulings on land, fish and water.
Land
In Canada, the changes in law and policy date from the 1973 Calder land
rights decision,2 which prompted the country to begin a land claims settle-
ment process that continues more than thirty years later. The first compre-
hensive settlement of indigenous claims was the 1975 James Bay and
Northern Quebec Agreement, recognizing, among other things, subsistence
and commercial harvesting rights to fish and wildlife. The Constitution Act
19823 introduced s. 35, recognizing existing aboriginal and treaty rights.
Substantive judicial recognition of rights began with the decisions in Guerin
in 1984, Sparrow in 1990 and Delgamuukw in 1997.4
Australian developments date back to the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act,5 which began a land claims settlement process in the
Northern Territory. Some extent of land rights was extended to the whole
country by the 1992 Mabo decision.6 A national system for determining sur-
viving native title was established in the 1993 Native Title Act.7
Nordic developments began with the Alta dam fight in northern Norway
in 1978. New Zealand judicial activism began with the State Owned Enter-
prises decision in 1987.8 Malaysia applied Canadian and Australian decisions
to Orang Asli traditional lands in the 1997 Adong decision.9 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights upheld indigenous territorial rights on
the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua in the Awas Tingni case in 2001.10 Land
rights were recognized in South Africa for the Khomani San (Bushmen) in
an agreement in March 1999 prompted by the Restitution of Land Rights Act
1994. The Supreme Court of Appeal, on 24 March 2003, upheld a “custom-
ary law interest” in land based on a system of indigenous law for the
Richtersveld Community, again giving force to the rights under the 1994
legislation, which was designed to redress the loss of land as a result of
apartheid.11 The Supreme Court of Appeal cited leading decisions from Aus-
tralia and Canada, and the 1975 International Court of Justice decision in
relation to Western Sahara.
Hunting and fishing
Rights to hunt and fish have featured in pioneering cases. In Canada, the
lead fishing rights decisions are Sparrow in 1990, the commercial fishing
rights trilogy in 199612 and the Marshall decision of 1999.13 Also notable
are the fishing rights provisions in the James Bay Agreement of 1975 and the
Nisga’a Treaty of 2000.14
The first hunting case in Australia was the 1999 Yanner decision, which
ended the idea that aboriginal rights there might be limited to land.15 The
New Zealand settlement of Maori fisheries claims was dramatic. It was
upheld by the New Zealand courts16 and by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee in the Mahuika decision.17 In the United States, the most
important fishing rights litigation occurred in United States v. Washington,18
upholding treaty-protected rights in Washington State both of a commer-
cial and of a subsistence character (including fish stocks resulting from
enhancement programs).
Water
Rights to inland, foreshore and offshore waters are much less clearly articu-
lated. Fishing had been associated with ownership of waters in the early
common law, but that link passed into history as governments regulated
fishing by licensing systems. Provincial regulatory roles in fisheries in
Canada, however, remain based on provincial claims to the ownership of the
beds of lakes, rivers and coastal waters. Indian reserve boundaries may or
may not include the property in lakes, rivers and foreshore. Such issues have
not been treated in a consistent way in Canada over time, and very little liti-
gation has occurred.
The pioneering claims to offshore waters in Canada were made by Inuit,
who traditionally hunted and fished in coastal waters and on sea ice. Their
claims have largely been settled in the Inuvialuit, Nunavut and Northern
Quebec agreements. Current claims on the west coast include the long-
standing Musqueam First Nation claim to the foreshore, the Nuu-Chah-
Nulth claim to the offshore as far as the eye can see, and the Haida claim to
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the waters within Canada’s territorial limit. There have been no judicial
determinations of any of these claims.
In Commonwealth v. Yarmirr,19 the Australian High Court upheld certain
offshore rights, based on the 1993 Native Title Act. The later decision in Risk
v. Northern Territory20 ruled that such claims could not be handled under the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976. Rights to waters,
rivers and seas were upheld in Lardil Peoples v. State of Queensland.21
In New Zealand, the 2003 decision of the Court of Appeal in Ngati Apa
v. Attorney General upheld the possibility of Maori ownership to foreshore
and offshore areas in the Marlborough Sounds.22 The litigation was triggered
by a dispute over aquaculture. The matter was sent back to the Maori Land
Court for a determination of rights under customary Maori law. Parliament,
in a highly controversial move, declared any customary Maori rights to these
areas to now be “public domain.”
Aquaculture
We have only the beginnings of litigation on aboriginal rights in relation to
aquaculture. One inconclusive judgment has been given in British Columbia,
and important litigation in New Zealand on ocean rights, referred to above,
was prompted by aquaculture initiatives. Litigation in the jurisdictions dis-
cussed in this chapter is recent and has tended to focus on “traditional” activ-
ities. It has not yet caught up with the rapid expansion of aquaculture.
Canadian developments
The Sparrow decision
The 1990 fishing rights decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina
v. Sparrow23 interpreted the provision on “existing aboriginal and treaty
rights” in s. 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 for the first time. The joint
judgment of Chief Justice Dickson and Mr. Justice LaForest began by refer-
ring to s. 35 as a “promise” to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Later in the
judgment, s. 35 was described as “the culmination of a long and difficult
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional
recognition of aboriginal rights.” This language signaled that the court did
not regard Indian rights cases as routine litigation, but as opening the possi-
bility for redress for a regrettable history.
The key ruling held that the word “existing” in s. 35 refers to “unextin-
guished” rights, with a new rule that aboriginal and treaty rights could only
be extinguished by state actions that were “clear and plain.” A hundred
years of virtually complete regulation of aboriginal fishing rights by federal
legislation had not “extinguished” those rights. Now they could only be
extinguished or limited by legislation that met certain standards. Clearly,
there were now new ground rules for old rights. And the old rights were not
Indigenous rights 333
“frozen,” as of some particular date. They continued and evolved as aborigi-
nal economies changed. This approach has obvious implications for rights in
relation to aquaculture.
In the court cases, aboriginal plaintiffs first have to establish that they
have an aboriginal right to fish, based on traditional usage, and that the
right has been interfered with. Establishing the aboriginal fishing right was
easy in the Sparrow case. An anthropologist had testified that for the
Musqueam people, “the salmon fishery has always constituted an integral
part of their distinctive culture.”
If there is interference with an aboriginal right, then a three-part test
determines whether the interference is justified.24 There must be a valid
legislative objective. In the context of fishing rights, conservation of the
species is obviously a valid objective. Second, there must be a concern with
the honor of the Crown and the special trust responsibility of the Crown.
Finally, the infringement should be as limited as possible and should
proceed only following consultation with the group in question. Any extin-
guishment of rights would require fair compensation. Previous decisions
limiting aboriginal fishing rights because of Fisheries Act provisions were
now “inapplicable” as a result of s. 35.
The 1996 commercial fishing trilogy
In three decisions in 1996, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on an aborig-
inal right to sell fish in British Columbia.25 There were strong reasons to
assume that the Court would find in favor of upholding the aboriginal right.
First, Sparrow had upheld aboriginal rights against a century of regulation of
the food fishery, and all that was necessary now was to apply the same rea-
soning to the commercial fishery. Second, aboriginals in Washington State
and Maori in New Zealand had gained commercial fishing rights through
treaty rights. Third, Canada had already conceded that commercial fishing
rights could come within land claims settlements, and had begun an “Abo-
riginal Fisheries Strategy” that authorized special commercial openings for
Aboriginals (though there had been public protests over this development).
Fourth, commercial hunting rights had been upheld by the Supreme Court
of Canada as a treaty right in the Horseman decision,26 reduced to subsistence
rights only by express constitutional wording in the Natural Resources
Transfer Agreement of 1930. Finally, commercial fishing rights would alle-
viate some of the poverty that still plagued aboriginal communities.
While victory seemed the most likely outcome, there were at least five
factors that clouded the issue. First, the Fisheries Act had always recognized
aboriginal food fisheries, but never expressly an aboriginal commercial
fishery.27 While there had been programs to promote the Indian presence in
the commercial fishery, there had been nothing parallel to the Department
of Fisheries policy to give priority to the Indian food fishery, an established
policy that had been given legal force in Sparrow. Second, aboriginal rights
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argumentation naturally looks to rights established in the past. Chief Justice
Lamer marshaled quotations from leading pro-aboriginal decisions and used
those statements to restrict aboriginal rights to those enjoyed prior to
contact with Europeans. It was the past that informed Lamer’s analysis, not
the forward-looking language that characterized the judgment in the
Sparrow case. Third, management of the commercial fishery was probably
much more complicated than management of the food fishery. Canada
argued that there was no natural limit to an aboriginal right to a commer-
cial fishery, but there obviously was to a food fishery. Fourth, the commer-
cial fishery was experiencing difficult times, with reduced runs and
management problems. Aboriginal commercial fishing rights would be at
the expense of non-aboriginal commercial fishers. Fifth, Justices Dickson
and Wilson, who wrote the key earlier decisions, were no longer on the
court. Chief Justice Lamer, with a rather different approach in both sub-
stance and style, wrote the judgments.
Chief Justice Lamer limited aboriginal rights on what he held out to be a
logical, objective basis. Aboriginal rights were limited to elements of pre-
contact Indian societies. By Lamer CJ’s rulings, aboriginal rights only
include the commercial sale of fish if sale had been an integral part of the
distinctive culture of the Aboriginal grouping at the point of contact with
Europeans. While this may sound like an impossible standard to meet, in
one of the cases, the Gladstone decision, it was held that the Indian tribe had
the right to sell a large quantity of herring roe on kelp, a lucrative special-
ized product much sought after by the Japanese.
If the judgment in the Sparrow case had used expansive, celebratory lan-
guage, the Van der Peet, Gladstone and NTC Smokehouse decisions were tightly
structured and deliberate in their reasoning. In passages elaborating on the
basic test, Lamer CJ ruled that it required more than demonstrating that a
practice, tradition or custom was an aspect of, or took place in, the aborigi-
nal society. The rationale behind the recognition of aboriginal rights was to
reconcile aboriginal rights and Aboriginal peoples to the rights of the
dominant society.
Aboriginal rights have their basis in the prior occupation of Canada by
distinctive Aboriginal societies. To recognize and affirm the prior occu-
pation of Canada by distinctive Aboriginal societies it is to what makes
those societies distinctive that the court must look in identifying Aboriginal
rights. The court cannot look at those aspects of the Aboriginal society
that are true of every human society (e.g. eating to survive), nor can it
look at those aspects of the Aboriginal society that are only incidental or
occasional to that society; the court must look instead to the defining
and central attributes of the Aboriginal society in question. It is only by
focusing on the aspects of the Aboriginal society that make that society
distinctive that the definition of Aboriginal rights will accomplish the
purpose underlying s. 35(1).28
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The idea that fishing for salmon is peculiarly “Indian” seems ridiculous. Any
people who live on the west coast of Canada, Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal,
will fish for salmon. Not to fish would be peculiar.
Lamer CJ then went on to discuss the purpose of s. 35:
[T]he Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1) are best
understood as, first, the means by which the Constitution recognizes the
fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America the land
was already occupied by distinctive Aboriginal societies, and as, second,
the means by which that prior occupation is reconciled with the asser-
tion of Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory. The content of Abo-
riginal rights must be directed at fulfilling both of these purposes.29
This passage comes after eight pages of citations from judicial decisions in
Canada, the United States and Australia, and references to the writings of
several academics. All these references cite the prior existence of Aboriginal
peoples as the basis for aboriginal rights. Those passages were written in
support of aboriginal rights. Their description of the historical origins of the
rights was not written to define limits, but that was how Lamer used the
quotations.
The Marshall decision
In Marshall,30 the Supreme Court upheld the commercial sale of eels as a
treaty right. The decision was one of the most controversial decisions in the
court’s history. It triggered a native lobster fishery that pitted Aboriginals
against non-Aboriginals. Bitter conflict and violence captured the national
news for weeks.
In the 1760 treaty at issue in the Marshall case, the Mi’kmaq promised
not to
traffick, barter or Exchange any Commodities in any manner but such
persons or the managers of such Truck houses as shall be appointed or
Established by His Majesty’s Governor at Lunenbourg or Elsewhere in
Nova Scotia or Accadia.31
This recognized that the Mi’kmaq would sell to non-Aboriginals, but the
particular arrangement, the use of “truck houses,” was soon abandoned.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Binnie turned to the “underlying negoti-
ations” and concluded that they supported a treaty right of the Mi’kmaq to a
commercial trading right, sufficient to allow them to secure “necessaries,”
which would amount to gaining a “moderate livelihood.” He observed that
[t]he British certainly did not want the Mi’kmaq to become an unneces-
sary drain on the public purse of the colony of Nova Scotia or of the
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Imperial purse in London, as the trial judge found. To avoid such a
result, it became necessary to protect the traditional Mi’kmaq economy,
including hunting, gathering and fishing. A comparable policy was
pursued at a later date on the west coast where, as Dickson J. com-
mented in Jack v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294, at p. 311:
What is plain from the pre-Confederation period is that the Indian
fishermen were encouraged to engage in their occupation and to do so
for both food and barter purposes.
The same strategy of economic aboriginal self-sufficiency was pursued
across the prairies in terms of hunting: see R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 90.32
This approach gave legitimacy to upholding commercial rights. Mr. Justice
Binnie was reversing the spirit and the reasoning of the 1996 commercial
fishing decisions, but not, technically, the actual decisions.
Rights to waters
What of rights to the waters? Reserves in British Columbia do not include
the foreshore or rights in relation to internal or adjacent waters. They do not
include the beds of lakes, streams or rivers. But the reserves do not consti-
tute a comprehensive settlement of land issues. Negotiations for treaties are
ongoing in British Columbia.
Some dealings with coastal areas and coastal waters have occurred in con-
nection with the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the
Nunavut land claims settlement in the eastern Arctic. The Nisga’a Treaty in
British Columbia did not depart from the tradition of excluding rights to
rivers, streams and foreshore from recognized Indian lands. But it did define
an important extent of fishing rights, both subsistence and commercial, for
the Nisga’a people.33
The Nuu-Chah-Nulth people, on the west coast of Vancouver Island,
assert claims to the territorial sea as far as can be seen from land. There has
been no settlement of their claims, and litigation on the issue is not
expected in the near future. The Haida have claimed Hecate Strait and the
full territorial sea in the claim they have filed in British Columbia Supreme
Court.34 A trial on the issues in the case is probably a couple of years away.
Aquaculture
To date, the only Canadian judicial decision relating to aquaculture is that
of Madam Justice Gerow of the British Columbia Supreme Court, a trial-
level court, in Heiltsuk Tribal Council v. British Columbia.35 The litigation
challenged provincial licenses authorizing a hatchery designed to raise
Atlantic salmon fry for use in aquaculture. Between 2001, when the
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Heiltsuk Tribal Council first knew of the project, and March 2003, the
company invested CDN$9.5 million in the hatchery site. Meetings had
occurred between the company and the Heiltsuk. The Heiltsuk denied that
those meetings constituted any “consultation.” Madam Justice Gerow con-
cluded that the Heiltsuk were opposed to Atlantic salmon aquaculture and
were unwilling to consult or seek accommodation. She ruled that the hatch-
ery would not interfere with Heiltsuk aboriginal rights, including their
non-exclusive rights to use land and their rights to fish. The strident opposi-
tion of the Heiltsuk to the hatchery and aquaculture was seen as unreason-
able. The decision upholding the licenses was not appealed.
Australian developments
The first significant Australian rights case was the 1970 decision in
Milirrpum v. Nabalco,36 challenging a bauxite mining permit on aboriginal
reserve land in the Northern Territory. The judgment found a detailed
system of land law on the part of Aboriginal people. But Justice Blackburn
concluded that the doctrine of native title had never formed part of the law
of Australia. He placed some reliance on Canadian judgments, in particular
the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Calder case
(later decided on much different grounds by the Supreme Court of Canada).
Gough Whitlam and the Labor Party came to power in a national elec-
tion in the latter part of 1972 promising a national land rights policy.
Whitlam appointed Mr. Justice Woodward to conduct an inquiry on how to
recognize native title in the Northern Territory, an area where the national
government had full jurisdiction.37 The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Ter-
ritory) Act was enacted in 1976.38 It gave Aboriginal people a veto over
mining, though the veto could be overridden by the national government.39
It also established an effective land claims process under the Aboriginal
Land Commissioner, Mr. Justice Toohey (who later sat in the High Court).
The 1976 legislation established something of an Australian model on
land rights, involving (1) the transfer of existing reserves to aboriginal
ownership; (2) the creation of an aboriginal management body; (3) (some-
times) the establishment of a land claims process for unextinguished tradi-
tional land rights outside the reserves; and (4) (sometimes) the creation of a
fund to acquire land for aboriginal communities. South Australia copied
quite a bit of this model in the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act in 1981. The
Pitjantjatjara scheme was challenged on the basis of racial discrimination,
but upheld in 1985 by the Australian High Court in Gehardy v. Brown.40
New South Wales established a land fund and added a limited claims
process. Also, Queensland introduced a statutory claims process.41
The 1992 High Court decision in Mabo (No. 2) v. Queensland 42 estab-
lished some extent of land rights nationally. The Native Title Act43 followed,
designed to confirm non-aboriginal titles, and to provide an orderly process
for determining where native title survived. As in Canada and New Zealand,
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a national land claims process had been established. The process has proven
complex and slow, with the country being badly divided on a set of amend-
ments to the Native Title Act in 1998 designed to mitigate somewhat the
effects of native title rulings.
Rights to waters
In Commonwealth v. Yarmirr,44 certain Aboriginal groups claimed native title
to the seas and seabed around Croker Island, off the north coast of the North-
ern Territory. Croker Island and adjacent islands were recognized under the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976, and were included in
the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust for the benefit of the traditional
owners. The claimants sought a determination for waters, reefs and lands that
had not been granted under the 1976 legislation. Australia argued that no
native title existed in relation to the sea and the seabed. Section 6 of the
Native Title Act states that the legislation applies to a number of areas,
including application “to the coastal sea of Australia and of each external Ter-
ritory, and to any waters over which Australia asserts sovereign rights under
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973.” The majority commented:
The reference to “sea” in this definition, taken both with the other ele-
ments of the definition of “waters” and with the provision of s 6 of the
Act, indicates clearly that the Act is drafted on the basis that native title
rights and interests may extend to rights and interests in respect of the
sea bed and subsoil beyond low-water mark and the waters above that
sea bed.45
It was necessary for the High Court to determine what extent of sea rights
fell within the traditional laws and customs of the claimants. A limited
right to the sea and seabed was recognized. It was limited in two ways.
First, the court found that when sovereignty was asserted over the seas,
some qualifications on any existing rights were imposed (para. 61):
[T]he recognition of public rights of navigation and fishing and,
perhaps the concession of an international rights of innocent passage.
Those rights were necessarily inconsistent with the continued existence
of any right under Aboriginal law or custom to preclude the exercise of
those rights.
The various actions of Australia relating to the territorial sea, which led to
these imposed rights held by others, were not, however, inconsistent with
the common law of Australia recognizing native title rights in relation to
the sea and seabed.
Second, the trial judge had ruled that under traditional law, the claimants
had not enjoyed exclusive possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the
Indigenous rights 339
waters of the claimed area. Each clan allowed members of other claimant
clans to use their areas, with permission, and this seemed to extend to other
Aboriginal people from outside the claimed area. Evidence established that
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, large numbers of fishermen from
Macassar, in what is now Indonesia, came for four to seven months each year
to gather sea cucumber in the claimed area. The trial judge held that under
aboriginal law and custom there was no right to exclude such people. Per-
mission was required for other Aboriginal groups, but not for such out-
siders.
In Risk v. Northern Territory,46 claims had been filed for the seabed of bays
and gulfs within the limits of the Northern Territory. The area claimed was
large and included the port area of the city of Darwin, the largest settlement
and capital of the Northern Territory. The legislation invoked was the Abo-
riginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976. Under it, extensive
claims to lands outside reserves had been heard, and native title rights
recognized for large areas. The Aboriginal Land Commissioner, established
under the legislation to hear claims, had ruled that sea claims fell outside
the Act and could not be considered. The majority of the Full Court of the
Federal Court of Australia, with one dissent, affirmed that decision. That
was affirmed by the High Court, which added that there might be a claim
under the Native Title Act.
The reasoning was textual. The legislation dealt with claims to “land in
the Northern Territory.” An examination of the wording of the legislation
led the various levels to conclude that it did not envisage claims to the
seabed:
First, there are strong textual indications in the Land Rights Act that
“land in the Northern Territory” does not include the seabed. Secondly,
the nature of the interest which is granted to a Land Trust suggests that
the seabed is not “land in the Northern Territory”. Thirdly, any remain-
ing doubt about the matter is put to rest when regard is had to relevant
extrinsic material and the legislative history which lies behind the Land
Rights Act.47
The Northern Territory was authorized to create a 2-kilometer “buffer zone”
of sea adjoining aboriginal land. This very provision, the High Court said,
confirmed the distinction between land and sea in the legislation.
The ruling was not based on aboriginal law, which does not distinguish
between land and waters in understanding traditional “country.” There can
be “sea country”; that is, coastal maritime areas that are part of native title
according to aboriginal law.
In March 2004, the Full Federal Court decided the case of Lardil Peoples v.
State of Queensland.48 At issue were native title rights to rivers and seas in the
Wellesley Island region. In a detailed judgment, the following rights were
upheld:
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1 The right to access the land and waters seaward of the high-water line in
accordance with and for the purposes allowed by and under their tradi-
tional laws and customs.
2 The right to fish, hunt and gather living and plant resources, including
the right to hunt and take turtle and dugong, in the intertidal zone and
the waters above and adjacent thereto for personal, domestic or non-
commercial communal consumption in accordance with and for the pur-
poses allowed by and under their traditional laws and customs.
3 The right to take and consume fresh drinking water from freshwater
springs in the intertidal zone in accordance with, and for the purposes
allowed by and under, their traditional laws and customs.
4 The right to access the land and water seaward of the high water line in
accordance with and for the purposes allowed under their traditional
laws and customs for religious or spiritual purposes and to access sites of
spiritual or religious significance in the land and waters within their
respective traditional territory for the purposes of ritual or ceremony.
The rights upheld are circumscribed. They do not allow the exclusion of all
others and do not extend to mineral or petroleum rights. They are subject to
common law rights of fishing and navigation, and to the right of innocent
passage.
Aquaculture
In November 2003, the Aboriginal native title holders in the area around
Croker Island, whose rights had been the subject of the Yarmirr litigation,
signed an agreement authorizing the establishment of three aquaculture
pearl farms. The operators of the farms also held Crown leases for aquacul-
ture under the Northern Territory Fisheries Act.49
New Zealand developments
The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed the Maori the continuation of
rights to their lands and fisheries. A special tribunal or court was established
to handle the transfer of Maori lands to settlers. The direct enforceability of
the treaty in domestic law was denied.
In response to the large 1975 land rights march to the capital, Welling-
ton, the government established the Waitangi Tribunal as an advisory body
to hear Maori claims. Gradually, with the support of certain judicial
decisions, a land claims process came into being. The first comprehensive
settlement was with the Tainui tribe in the Waikato area, south of Auck-
land. By June 2003, settlements had occurred with fourteen tribes (iwi),
with three additional settlements awaiting legislative implementation.50
Also, there has been a comprehensive settlement of commercial fisheries
claims.51
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A minority of Maori opposed the comprehensive settlement of commer-
cial fisheries claims. A challenge to the settlement in the New Zealand
courts failed.52 The matter was taken to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee in the Mahuika case.53 The settlement was again upheld. By the
settlement, some 23 percent of commercial fisheries quota in New Zealand
is held by a Maori fisheries commission.
The Ngati Apa decision
The most significant recent litigation in New Zealand on Maori rights dealt
with the waters of the Marlborough Sounds.
In 1997 some iwi [sub-tribes] from the top of the South Island were
concerned about the way marine farming was developing in the Marl-
borough Sounds and its impact on their customary fishing rights and
what they considered their more general customary interests.
They took a test case to the Maori Land Court asking it to determine
that areas of the foreshore and seabed in the Sounds were Maori customary
land. This case challenged the assumptions that there was little if any scope
for customary rights that amounted to a full title to remain in the fore-
shore, and that there was no ability for a customary claim to the seabed.54
The case went to the Court of Appeal in Ngati Apa v. Attorney General,
decided in June 2003, on preliminary questions of law. No determination
has yet taken place on traditional Maori rights to the areas in question.
The Crown argued that the 1963 decision In Re Ninety-Mile Beach meant
that Maori interests in the foreshore had been extinguished when customary
rights ended for the adjacent onshore land (which would probably defeat all
Maori claims in the Marlborough Sounds).55 Second, the Crown argued that
various statutes had extinguished any Maori customary property rights in
the area by vesting rights to the foreshore and the seabed in the Crown. A
judge in the High Court ruled that lands below the low-water mark were
beneficially owned by the Crown at common law, blocking any Maori
claims.56 All five judges in the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and
ordered the Maori Land Court to proceed to hear the claims.
Chief Justice Elias of the Court of Appeal stressed the preliminary charac-
ter of the court’s ruling. While she upheld the Maori’s legal arguments, she
emphasized that the Court of Appeal could not determine whether any
Maori customary land rights existed in the foreshore and seabed. There was
no factual record in the case on which to make such a determination. Cus-
tomary rights vary from case to case, depending on the customs and usages
of the specific communities involved. Madam Justice Elias noted that such
rights could vary from usufructory rights, on the one hand, to exclusive
ownership, as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia.57
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There are clear suggestions in the judgments of the Court of Appeal that
any Maori rights to foreshore and seabed would probably be of a limited
character, and would be subject to certain statutes. Only Mr. Justice Gault
described the claims in what we may assume was the full strength of the
plaintiff’s assertions: “The claim is essentially that the whole of the foreshore
and seabed of the Marlborough Sounds, extending to the limits of New
Zealand’s territorial sea, is Maori customary land as defined in the Act.”58
He was also the only judge to refer to the Marlborough Sounds Resource
Management Plan of 1995, which perhaps was the government move that
prompted the Maori litigation.59
The Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, unlike the North American Indian
treaties, did not extinguish native title. Instead, Maori ownership was con-
firmed. The history of land dealings in New Zealand is the history of a spe-
cialized court with the statutory authority to convert Maori customary land
rights into fee simple titles, bringing the land, parcel by parcel, onto the
open market.60 Non-indigenous settlers took over the land, as they did in
North America, but through a different formal process.
Because the statutory scheme dominated, the common law recognition of
customary land rights was, in Chief Justice Elias’s words, “little
developed.”61 Some fundamentals were clear, she ruled. For example, it was
clear that the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over New Zealand did not,
in itself, affect customary property rights.62 Those interests were preserved
by the common law until extinguished in accordance with law, as held in
rulings from New Zealand, the United States and Canada.
Over the years, Elias commented, there have been some good decisions
and some bad decisions. The 1877 decision in Wi Parata v. Bishop of
Wellington, which denied Maori customary land rights, was wrong, she
declared.63 Its reasoning had been rejected by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council.64 Yet it had influenced New Zealand thinking for most of a
century. The 1963 decision in Ninety-Mile Beach was also wrong.65 The idea
that there were no enforceable Maori customary land rights had “proved
hardy.”66 Elias CJ even found a culprit for the heresy: Sir John Salmon, who
drafted the Native Lands Act of 1909.67
The modern shift in judicial and political attitudes meant that there was
now a clear contradiction between the recognition of customary rights to land
and the de facto lack of recognition of customary rights to the foreshore and sub-
surface. This contradiction gave rise to the Marlborough Sounds litigation.68
The Court of Appeal ruled that if Maori custom and usage recognized
rights to the foreshore and seabed, that would prevail over the English
common law rulings, which rejected any such private ownership in the
United Kingdom. The case had to go back to the Maori Land Court for a
determination on Maori customary rights, based on evidence of Maori
customs and usage. Only after that determination was made could the legal
question be addressed as to whether legislation had extinguished some or all
of the rights involved.
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A set of general national statutes was cited, dealing with harbors and ter-
ritorial seas. While many provisions seemed to assume there were no Maori
rights to foreshore or seabed in existence, the statutes failed to demonstrate
any intention to extinguish pre-existing Maori customary rights. Madam
Justice Elias examined the various statutes and concluded that no “confisca-
tory effect,” “expropriatory purpose” or act of “appropriation” could be dis-
cerned in the legislation.69 Mr. Justice Keith specifically quoted the rule of
extinguishment now adopted in Canada and Australia in the leading cases of
Sparrow and Mabo. The onus of proving extinguishment lies on the Crown,
and the intent to extinguish must be “clear and plain.”70 Mr. Justice
Tipping required extinguishment by express words or necessary implication.
“Parliament would need to make its intention crystal clear.”71
The Court of Appeal ruling, while preliminary, proved highly controver-
sial. The government, after a year of public disputes, enacted legislation
declaring any possible Maori interests in Marlborough Sounds to be “public
domain.”
International law developments
International law developments on indigenous rights include: (1) the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (currently being considered
by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights);72 (2) the study on
indigenous peoples and their relationship to land by Special Rapporteur
Erica Irene Daes;73 (3) the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in 2001 in Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua;74 (4) the decision of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee in Mahuika v. New Zealand in 2000;75
and (5) the reports of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues, the first
issued in 2002.76
These texts see indigenous rights not so much in specific historical-legal
terms (the framework for domestic litigation) as in terms of a general history
of the loss of economic base by various indigenous communities. They are
concerned with the survival of indigenous collectivities. As part of that
minority rights concern, they address the issues of the resources that
Indigenous peoples need to gain or regain in order to survive and develop.
The texts do not address aquaculture specifically, but would see it as a
significant potential economic resource for Indigenous peoples in various
parts of the world.
The decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in
Mahuika v. New Zealand
In Mahuika v. New Zealand, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
considered a settlement of Maori claims to fishing rights, under the provi-
sions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.77 The
Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 guaranteed to the Maori the “full, exclusive and
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undisturbed possession of their lands, forests, fisheries and other
properties.”78 But the treaty could not be directly enforced in New Zealand
law, and most commercial fishing passed into non-Maori hands.
A settlement of Maori fishing rights claims occurred, placing around 23
percent of total commercial fisheries quota in the hands of a Maori fisheries
commission. While this was a clear compromise of the provisions of the
treaty, it was upheld by the New Zealand courts, having been put into place
by effective settlement legislation.79 The committee did not re-examine the
settlement in terms of the Treaty of Waitangi promise, interpreting instead
Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language.
A large minority of Maori, claiming to represent seven (out of eighty-one)
iwi (tribal groups) challenged the settlement. If the iwi were considered as
separate claimants, then an analysis would have to be undertaken of the
impact of the settlement on each iwi. Instead, the committee proceeded to
consider the Maori as a single minority group. The committee found that
the Maori had been consulted and had agreed to the settlement. That
consent prevailed over the interests of “individuals who claim to be
adversely affected.” The dissenting iwi were groups of individuals, not separ-
ate rights-holding collectivities. The committee did not discuss whether the
proper minority entities were the eighty-one iwi or the Maori as a pan-
iwi/pan-tribal entity.
The committee ruled, as it had before, that economic rights could come
within Article 27. The exercise of fishing rights, the Committee said, was “a
significant part of Maori culture.”80 It also confirmed its established posi-
tion, especially in the case of Indigenous peoples, that the enjoyment of the
right to one’s own culture may require positive legal measures of protection
by a state, and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of
minority communities in decisions that affect them.
The committee noted that the settlement gave Maori “access to a great
percentage of quota, and thus effective possession of fisheries was returned to
them.” The committee understood that the New Zealand government saw
the settlement in developmental terms, not simply in terms of Treaty of
Waitangi claims. In other words, the settlement was a good thing, which
was to the economic benefit of Maori as whole, and should not be derailed
by minority dissidents.
The committee ruled that the settlement did limit the rights of the
Maori to enjoy their own culture, but held that the limitation was justified
in the particular case, without discussing the factors that justified the limi-
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tation. The history of the non-recognition of Maori fishing rights had led to
a situation where non-Maori were well established in the industry. It seems
that the committee was not going to order the expropriation of all or part of
those rights, but neither was it willing to discuss the problem of the non-
indigenous rights, which now meant that only a compromise or settlement
of Maori claims was possible, not a full vindication of treaty rights.
While the outcome supported indigenous economic rights, the reasoning
is weak and, in parts, non-transparent. But given the limited background of
the committee members on indigenous resource claims, the decision was
commendable.
The Awas Tingni case in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights
In 1995, a petition was submitted to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights by the Indian Law Resource Center, based in the United
States, on behalf of the Awas Tingni Indian community on the Atlantic
coast of Nicaragua.81
Timber harvesting rights had been granted to a Korean-owned company
over traditional lands of the Awas Tingni without community consultation,
consent or compensation. A challenge to the timber concession in the
Nicaraguan courts was unsuccessful. The commission attempted friendly
settlement procedures, but without success.82 It issued a report on the case,
ruling that Nicaragua was in breach of the American Convention on Human
Rights in failing to demarcate the traditional lands of the Awas Tingni
community and the other indigenous communities. In 1998, the commis-
sion submitted the matter to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.83
In August 2001, the court ruled in favor of the Awas Tingni community,
ordering Nicaragua to begin the process of demarcating the Indian lands
and issuing titles in accordance with local indigenous customary law.
The commission had gradually built up jurisprudence around the recog-
nition of Indigenous peoples and their territorial rights. The decision of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Awas Tingni case confirms
this jurisprudence, and stands as the most important decision of an inter-
national court or tribunal on the issue of indigenous rights:
149. Given the characteristics of the instant case, it is necessary to
understand the concept of property in indigenous communities. Among
indigenous communities, there is a communal tradition as demonstrated
by their communal form of collective ownership of their lands, in the
sense that ownership is not centered in the individual but rather in the
group, and in the community. By virtue of the fact of their very exist-
ence, indigenous communities have the right to live freely on their own
territories; the close relationship that the communities have with the
land must be recognized and understood as a foundation for their cul-
346 Douglas Sanders
tures, spiritual life, cultural integrity and economic survival. For
indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely
one of possession and production, but also a material and spiritual
element that they should fully enjoy, as well as a means through which
to preserve their cultural heritage and pass it on to future generations.
. . .
151. The customary law of indigenous peoples should especially be
taken into account because of the effects that flow from it. As product of
custom, possession of land should suffice to entitle indigenous
communities without title to their land to obtain official recognition
and registration of their rights of ownership.
The Court said that guaranteeing respect for territorial rights required the
issuance and registration of formal titles to the land.
Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed developments on indigenous rights to lands, fish-
eries, foreshore and offshore to provide a context for analyzing indigenous
claims to aquaculture. The analysis demonstrates the recent character of the
present framework of indigenous rights. While national land claims systems
exist in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, in each case they are no more
than thirty years old and are far from completing their work. The process of
settling claims and working out a new system of indigenous rights has
proven more complex and much more time-consuming than observers
expected. This is a work in progress. The same is true in relation to indigen-
ous fishing rights, now being resolved in Canada largely in the context of
land claims settlements. It is striking how recent the cases dealing with
waters, foreshore and offshore are. The most important judicial decisions are
in 2001 and 2003.
At the time of writing, we have only one trial level decision in Canada
relating to aquaculture. The New Zealand litigation in Ngati Apa v. Attorney
General was prompted by a dispute about aquaculture, though aquaculture is
not directly addressed in the decision of the Court of Appeal. Further litiga-
tion is certain on these issues.
Postscript
After I had completed this chapter, three items came to my attention: (1)
The Maori Commercial Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act of 2004 guaran-
teed 20 percent of commercial aquaculture space in New Zealand to Maori,
in settlement of aquaculture claims. (2) The Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islanders Commission published Water and Fishing: Aboriginal Rights in Aus-
tralia and Canada (2004), which covers a number of matters discussed in
this chapter, but has no section titles specifically referring to aquaculture.
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(3) The British Columbia Supreme Court has issued two decisions relating
to indigenous objections to an aquaculture farm in Bute Inlet that planned
to introduce Atlantic salmon.
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11 Aquaculture and the multilateral
trade regime
Issues of seafood safety, labeling and
the environment
Ted L. McDorman and Torsten Ström
Introduction
Global aquaculture production in 2000 was estimated at 45.7 million
metric tons (mt) and valued at US$56.5 thousand million.1 Over 91 percent
of the aquaculture production by weight and 82 percent by value originated
from Asia. The top nine aquaculture-producing states are Asian: China,
India, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Bangladesh
and Vietnam. Seven of these producing states are developing countries. The
most spectacular growth in aquaculture production from 1995 to 2000 has
been in Africa, where production has gone from 100,000 mt to nearly
400,000 mt with a value just shy of US$1 billion. Overall, since 1991 there
has been a tripling of global aquaculture production.2
Numbers are lacking on the quantity and value of aquaculture products
traded internationally, since farmed fisheries products are not segregated
from non-farmed seafood, but the assumption is that at present the amount
is small and concentrated on two products: shrimp and salmon.3 Further, it
is assumed that as aquaculture production grows and the harvest from wild
fisheries declines, international trade in aquaculture products will expand.
Shrimp is the most traded seafood product internationally, with about 26
percent (1.1 million mt) coming from aquaculture.4 The major markets are
Japan and the United States, and other developed states. The major
exporters of farmed shrimp are developing states such as Thailand, Ecuador,
Indonesia, India, Mexico, Bangladesh and Vietnam.5 The second most
traded aquaculture product is salmon. The 2001 figures put the quantity of
internationally traded farmed salmon at 1 million mt,6 with most of that
being Atlantic salmon and a small amount of Coho salmon. Norway is the
principal exporter of Atlantic salmon, with the European Union the main
market.7 Chile is another major exporter, with Japan and the United States
the principal markets. Other internationally traded aquaculture products of
interest include crab, tilapia, mollusks, sea bass and sea bream. The major
exporters of these farmed species tend to be developing states and the major
importers tend to be developed states.8
Canada is not without an interest in aquaculture matters. Aquaculture
production in Canada in 2002 was estimated at CDN$640 million.9 This
figure has been growing quickly and in 2000 constituted 22.8 percent of the
total value harvested from living aquatic resources.10 In 2002, Canada
exported aquaculture product worth approximately CDN$474 million, of
which nearly 90 percent was farmed salmon destined primarily for the US
market.11
This snapshot of global production and trade volumes and values reveals
that developing states, rather than developed states, have the most at stake
economically, environmentally and socially (in terms of food supplies)
regarding aquaculture matters. Approximately 91 percent of aquaculture
production and 84 percent of value originate from low-income food deficit
countries (LIFDCs).12
Of particular significance is the fact that the growth of aquaculture pro-
duction within developing countries and LIFDCs has been steadily
increasing. In the last decade, the aquaculture sector within LIFDCs has
been growing over seven times faster (over the period 1970 to 2000)
than the aquaculture sector within developed countries.13
The purpose of this modest contribution is to look at one small part of
the global aquaculture picture: the manner in which the rules and disci-
plines of the World Trade Organization (WTO)14 apply to the international
trade in aquaculture products. While the international trade in aquaculture
products raises a host of issues, the principal focus here will be the applica-
tion of the WTO trade regime to government laws and regulations affecting
trade in aquaculture products. The key areas for examination are the general
trade rules set out in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994,15
which apply to environmental measures that affect international trade in
aquaculture products; the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement),16 which is the principal WTO
agreement that deals with the health and safety issues that arise regarding
internationally traded food/aquaculture products, including labeling directly
related to food safety; and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(the TBT Agreement),17 which deals with other forms of labeling. It is first
useful, however, to provide some background regarding the WTO trade
regime.
The World Trade Organization: institutional issues18
Structure and membership
The World Trade Organization is the international institution administer-
ing the rules and principles that constitute the multilateral trade law
system. It was created at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilat-
eral negotiations and, on 1 January 1995, replaced the General Agreement
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been the framework for inter-
national trade law among its adherents since its inception in 1947.19 There
is continuity between GATT 1947 and the WTO as the principal set of
rules to be applied by the WTO are still those originally set out in the 1947
GATT Agreement, although they have been recreated as part of the WTO
Agreement and renamed GATT 1994.20 Over thirty agreements and under-
standings relating to trade in goods, services, trade-related intellectual prop-
erty and dispute settlement that emerged as part of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations must be added to GATT 1994.21 Together,
GATT 1994 and the Uruguay Round agreements and understandings
administered by the WTO constitute the multilateral trade law regime.
As with any international treaty, the rules and principles of the WTO are
only applicable between those countries that are contracting parties to the
WTO Agreement. Unlike most other international treaties, however, the
WTO does not provide for automatic “membership” through direct state
ratification. The WTO, like GATT 1947 before it, is an organization where
the existing contracting parties determine “membership.” Those countries
that were contracting parties to GATT 1947 at the time of entry into force
of the WTO in 1995 joined the WTO by designating their acceptance.22
Other countries may accede to the WTO “on terms to be agreed between it
and the WTO,” with the accession agreement requiring a two-thirds major-
ity vote of the members of the WTO.23 As of April 2003, there were 146
members of the WTO.24 The most recent high-profile member is the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), which became a WTO member in 2001.
At present, there are twenty-five states in the process of negotiating their
entry into the WTO.25
A key institutional component of GATT 1947 was the willingness of
states to engage in intensive periods of negotiations in order to promote and
enhance trade liberalization. These formal negotiating sessions, which can
last years, are referred to as rounds. Including the initial negotiation of
GATT 1947, there have been eight negotiating rounds. The most recent
was the Uruguay Round, which commenced in 1986 and was completed in
1994. In 2001, the WTO launched a new round of comprehensive trade
negotiations referred to as the Doha Round.26
Dispute settlement
The WTO has a well-defined dispute settlement process to assist countries
to resolve differences arising from the interpretation or application of GATT
1994 and the other Uruguay Round Agreements.27 A state that feels an
obligation owed it under GATT 1994 or that the other Uruguay Round
Agreements is being breached by another WTO member may, after a period
of consultations, request a panel of experts to decide on the consistency of
the alleged offending measure with the WTO rules. The request for a panel
goes to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is composed of
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the WTO membership. The DSB is to establish a panel of experts to
examine a complaint unless “the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a
panel.”28 Where a panel is established, and it issues its findings and recom-
mendations, it is possible for a party to the dispute to appeal those findings
and recommendations to the WTO Appellate Body.29 The Appellate Body,
an innovation introduced as part of the Uruguay Round, is a seven-person
permanent court-like structure with jurisdiction to review issues of law and
legal interpretations arising within panel decisions.30 It has become the prac-
tice of states to refer almost all or parts of panel reports to the Appellate
Body. Unappealed findings and recommendations of panels and results from
the Appellate Body only become binding on the disputing parties when
they are adopted by the DSB. Both panel reports and Appellate Body reports
must be adopted unless “the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
report.”31
The WTO dispute settlement process recognizes that it is not always fea-
sible for countries to implement immediately the results of adopted panel or
Appellate Body reports. States are to be given a “reasonable period of time”
to comply with adopted decisions.32 Where it is not possible for the disput-
ing states to reach agreement on what constitutes a “reasonable period of
time,” binding arbitration is used to make the temporal determination.33
A failure by a WTO member to implement the findings and recommen-
dations of an adopted panel or Appellate Body report can lead to the
adversely affected state seeking compensation from the recalcitrant state.34
The aggrieved state may also seek the approval of the DSB to impose pro-
portionate retaliatory trade measures against a state that does not implement
the results of an adopted panel or Appellate Body report.35
Two additional comments are useful regarding the WTO dispute settle-
ment process. First, unless disputing parties agree to the contrary, the juris-
diction of the panels and the Appellate Body is to interpret and apply the
WTO-administered treaties and not to adjudicate other questions of inter-
national law or consider other factors such as environmental politics.36 The
WTO dispute settlement process is not a general court of international law.
However, the WTO Appellate Body in the Turtle/Shrimp Report37 made
extensive reference to both the relevant regional treaty on turtle protection
and the work undertaken as part of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in contextualizing the trade
dispute. Second, the WTO dispute settlement process is not required to
listen to or provide access to non-state actors.38 Nevertheless, the WTO has
opened a dialogue with non-governmental organizations, particularly those
with an environmental focus, in order to meet mutual concerns.39 Moreover,
in the Turtle/Shrimp Report the Appellate Body decided that briefs originat-
ing from non-governmental organizations could be appended to the written
submissions of the principals in an appeal.40 Finally, in the Asbestos appeal,
the Appellate Body interpreted its own rules of procedure to enable it, as a
matter of discretion, to accept and consider unsolicited briefs submitted by
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non-governmental organizations and others.41 Accordingly, it established an
ad hoc procedure whereby prospective “friends of the court” could apply for
leave to submit such briefs. Although the Appellate Body ultimately
declined to grant leave to any of the seventeen applications received, its
initiative touched off a firestorm of protest among some WTO members,
mainly from developing countries.42
International trade law and the environment: issues for
aquaculture
Main issues
The environmental concerns raised by aquaculture production and the inter-
national trade in farmed product are of either a local or a regional nature
(degradation of land, water, vegetation, fish diseases, genetics) or trans-
national in nature (alien species, fish diseases, genetics). Without unduly
simplifying the issues, it can be said that the environment/trade law issues
raised by internationally traded aquaculture products are encapsulated by
three concerns:
• first, the trade law consistency of measures taken by an importing state
to protect its environment from possible adverse effects from imported
aquaculture products such as the introduction of alien species, fish dis-
eases or unwanted genetically modified marine species;
• second, the trade law consistency of measures taken by an importing
state against imported aquaculture products because the production of
the aquaculture products is having an adverse environmental effect
within the producing state such as land, water and vegetation degrada-
tion and undesirable fish diseases or genetically modified marine species;
and
• third, the trade law consistency of measures taken by an importing state
against imported aquaculture products because the production of the
aquaculture products is having an adverse environmental effect on the
global commons beyond the national jurisdiction of both the producer
and the importer, such as the introduction of undesirable fish diseases or
genetically modified marine species.
It is the second and third concerns that attract the most attention. One
spin on these concerns is that trade measures (market access) can and should
be used to promote sustainable aquaculture development. A second, more
common spin is that a producer in one state has to meet more stringent
environmental concerns than the producer in another state and that the
unlevel playing field requires or justifies trade measures against the foreign
product in order to address concerns about “unfair” competition. Another,
more conspiratorial spin is that importing states use such measures to
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interfere in sovereign decisions by exporting states as regards their domestic
environmental policies. In less polite terms, this is sometimes referred to as
eco-imperialism or eco-colonialism.43 The “Plan of Action” adopted at the
United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development held in South
Africa in 2002 indicates the concern about such unilateral trade measures in
paragraph 101:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international
economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable
development in all countries to better address the problems of environ-
mental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade. Unilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing trans-
boundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible,
be based on an international consensus.44
For these and other environmental matters that arise from internationally
traded aquaculture products, it is necessary to turn to the obligations within
GATT 1994.
Primary obligations of GATT 1994
Within GATT 1994, which deals with trade in goods, the principal obliga-
tions that place constraints on a state party’s actions as regards both the
import and the export of goods are found in Articles I, III and XI. The main
exceptions to these obligations are set out in Article XX.
Article I contains the obligation on state parties to respect the principle
of most favored nation (MFN). MFN means that an importing state is not to
discriminate by the use of tariffs or other measures between like products
coming from different WTO members.45 The essence of this is that an
exporter’s product is guaranteed the same treatment as another exporter’s
goods in access to a market of a WTO member, provided the goods are like
products, as regards tariffs and similar measures. More simply put, an
importer cannot discriminate in its use of tariffs or market access on the
basis of the country of origin of a product.
Article XI contains the obligation on state parties not to use quotas or
embargoes (quantitative measures) on either the import or the export of
products. As regards imports, while a state may impose tariffs, provided
non-discrimination between countries of origin exists under Article I, a state
may not utilize import embargoes as a means to provide protection to
domestic producers.
Article III contains the complex obligation on state parties of national
treatment that means that a state is not to utilize internal measures (for
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example, a tax) which result in discrimination against foreign-produced
products to the benefit of locally produced like products. Together, Articles
III and XI are designed to prevent a state from implementing measures that
impede the import of foreign goods in order to benefit domestically pro-
duced like goods.
While there a number of thresholds as regards the application of Articles
I and III, one of the most critical is that of “like products.” Under Article I,
an importing state is not to discriminate in tariff application as between
“like products” from differing countries. Under Article III, once a foreign
product is “over the border,” the importing state must not treat imports less
favorably than it treats domestically produced products. While there is no
definition of “like product” within GATT 1994, dispute settlement
decisions generally have confined “like product” analysis to the physical
properties of the goods and the substitutability of the products, and declined
to be seduced by arguments regarding attributes not directly related to the
goods in question.46
While Articles I, III and XI favour non-discrimination and unrestricted
market movement of goods, Article XX establishes a series of exceptions
that provide state parties with the justification to take measures inconsistent
with their GATT 1994 obligations. The two most important exceptions are
Article XX(b), respecting health and safety, and Article XX(g), respecting
exhaustible natural resources:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
. . .
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.
Basics of the trade law and environment relationship47
Using trade measures to protect one’s own environment
It has long been understood, and the GATT–WTO trade dispute settle-
ment panels have endorsed the notion, that the Article XX exceptions
allow a state to utilize trade measures, otherwise inconsistent with Articles
I, III or XI of GATT 1994, that are bona fide for the purposes of the pro-
tection of the health, safety and protection of its citizens and environment.
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In direct terms, Article XX assures that a state can prevent or condition
the imports of goods where there is a bona fide risk that the goods will be
or are harmful to the environment or to human, animal or plant life or
health.
Using trade measures to further sustainable development, to ensure a level
playing field or as eco-imperialism
The controversial issues of environment/trade law arise when a state utilizes
trade measures against a product from another state where the justification is
that the product is being produced in an environmentally unfriendly manner
or that the production methods have environmentally unfriendly con-
sequences either within the producing state or for the global commons.
As a generality, the application of multilateral trade law is to the prod-
ucts in the flow of international trade. It is understood that differing pro-
ducers utilize differing methods for the production of goods. Economists
often characterize this as an element of the concept of comparative advant-
age, one of the central theoretical principles that underlie international
trade. As noted above, one of the thresholds in Articles I and III is the treat-
ment of “like products” and that importing states are not to discriminate as
between countries of origin where the products are like, and, once having
entered the flow of domestic trade, like products are to be treated alike
regardless of their domestic or foreign origin. The like product analysis
generally has been about the good itself and not engaging the product
process that created the good, except to the extent that the production
process affects the good itself. Thus far, the argument that a measure which
discriminates between a good produced in a more environmentally friendly
manner than another is consistent with Article I or III has not been success-
ful, primarily because looking behind the good would require an inquiry
into the issues of national policy and thus be an interference in national sov-
ereignty.
Article XI does not rely on like products but is categorical in that quanti-
tative controls (quotas, embargoes) are prohibited. The high-profile environ-
ment/trade cases before the GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels have
involved US embargoes against tuna and shrimp because of concerns over
dolphin and turtles.48 In these cases, attention was placed on the Article XX
environmental exception.
Summarizing the “state of the law” of Article XX, subparagraphs (b) and
(g), is a challenging undertaking.49 Clearly, the trade measure in question
must “fit” the wording of subparagraphs (b) and (g), and then the chapeau
wording must be applied. The key words in the “fit” examination of (b) is
that the measure in question must be “necessary” to protect human, animal
or plant life or health and in the case of (g) that the measure must be “relat-
ing to” conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The WTO Appellate
Body has looked at the qualifiers “necessary” and “relating to” on several
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occasions50 and tended not to give either term a restrictive or narrow inter-
pretation. For the purposes of this contribution, the key bedevilling issue is
whether (b) and (g) are restricted only to measures that apply to protect
one’s own environment or whether (b) and (g) can be applied so as to protect
the health of citizens and environment beyond the borders of the enacting
state. Subparagraphs (b) and (g)
had been traditionally applied to rule out environmental laws that pro-
tected the environment outside the enacting country’s borders, though
the 1998 WTO Appellate Body ruling in the shrimp–turtle case may
have changed this by requiring merely a “sufficient nexus” between the
law and the environment of the enacting state. Although the ruling did
not fully explore what constituted a sufficient nexus, it appears that
transboundary impacts on air and water, or impacts on endangered and
migratory species, for example, might provide such a nexus.51
The second step of Article XX application involves the chapeau. The
three tests in the chapeau to be met are whether, in its application, the
measure is arbitrarily discriminatory, is unjustifiably discriminatory or con-
stitutes a disguised restriction on trade. The clearest statement to date on
these tests in an environmental context comes from the 1998 shrimp–turtle
case. Although the Appellate Body did not try to define these terms, it
arguably defined a number of criteria for not meeting the tests, including, for
example, the following:
• A state cannot require another state to adopt specific environmental
technologies or measures; different technologies or measures that have
the same final effect should be allowed.
• When applying a measure to other countries, regulating countries must
take into account differences in the conditions prevailing in those other
countries.
• Before enacting trade measures [with an extraterritorial reach], countries
should attempt to enter into negotiations with the exporting state(s).
• Foreign countries affected by trade measures should be allowed time to
make adjustments.
• Due process, transparency, appropriate appeals procedures and other
procedural safeguards must be available to foreign states or producers to
review the application of the measure.52
The Appellate Body in the 1998 Turtle/Shrimp Report concluded that the US
measure in question did not meet the wording of the chapeau and thus was
not covered by the Article XX wording.53 Without altering the US legisla-
tion, the United States undertook actions to implement the law in a differ-
ent manner, which, according to the Appellate Body in 2001, met the
criteria of the chapeau.54 A reasonable conclusion is that states seeking to use
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trade measures directed at environmental concerns beyond its borders may
have scope for action but the hurdles for such action are significant and
include attempting to reach international accords and maintaining a non-
discriminatory approach. In sum, although the final outcome of the dispute
demonstrated that it is possible for states to impose trade-related measures
to protect exhaustible natural resources beyond their territorial limit, the
turtle–shrimp results cannot be read as providing carte blanche to states to
utilize trade measures against states that have differing environmental
standards from themselves.
Subsidies55
The only direct mention of fisheries in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion launching the new round of multilateral trade negotiations is respecting
fisheries subsidies, an issue that has been seen as an important component of
the overcapacity of the world’s fishing fleets and the consequent decline in
marine catches.56 Subsidy questions have frequently been raised as regards
aquaculture products with a pre-WTO case involving a Norwegian chal-
lenge of US countervailing duties applied against subsidized farmed
salmon.57 In addition to the Norwegian situation, Chilean farmed salmon
was targeted unsuccessfully, in the late 1990s by US countervailing duty
legislation58 and there are current rumors of a case regarding farmed shrimp
being on the horizon.59 The European Union has also used countervailing
duties (see below) against Norwegian farmed salmon.60
All states provide subsidies in some manner. It is recognized that in most
cases, subsidization causes trade distortions for the competitors of the prod-
ucts subsidized. Balancing these two realities has always been a major chal-
lenge for the international trade regime. It is important to recognize that
part of this balance is that a subsidy for the purposes of international trade
law is not to be confused with what is referred to in common parlance as a
subsidy, and that only certain categories of subsidies are subject to scrutiny
under international trade law.
The key WTO document on subsidies is the Uruguay Round Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.61 The Uruguay Round Subsidies
Agreement and its GATT precursors recognize that in certain situations
there is a domestic remedy available to states faced with the importation of
subsidized products. The domestic remedy is countervailing duties, which,
in certain circumstances, can be applied against products that have benefit-
ted from subsidization where the imported subsidized goods cause material
economic injury to the producers of like domestic goods. The Uruguay
Round Subsidies Agreement also creates an international remedy attainable
through the WTO dispute settlement process where states utilize certain
categories of subsidies.
The Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement has created different categories
of subsidies. First is the category of prohibited subsidies. In simple terms, a
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prohibited subsidy is a financial benefit62 available contingent on the
product in question being exported.63 Second is the category of actionable
subsidies. An actionable subsidy is any governmental financial benefit avail-
able to a specific company or industry64 that results in injury to the domestic
industry of another country or that creates “serious prejudice” to the inter-
ests of another member of the WTO.65 A state can only utilize a countervail-
ing duty against an imported product that has received either a prohibited
or an actionable subsidy. If the government financial benefit does not fit
either of these two categories, then no countervail can be levied. Where the
alleged subsidized product is not being imported – another condition for the
application of a countervailing duty – but it is a product that has had
the benefit of a prohibited subsidy or an actionable subsidy, then the com-
plaining state must make use of the WTO dispute settlement process in
order to have the subsidy removed.
While it is usually taken as axiomatic that reduction and removal of sub-
sidies in the marine fisheries sector would enhance both the maximum eco-
nomic return for harvested fish and resource conservation, it has been argued
that for certain small developing states, fisheries subsidization is critical in
the development of a viable economy and necessary to ensure that a coastal
state reaps the benefits of the living resources within its 200-nautical mile
economic zone.66 While the argument would be slightly different for aqua-
culture development, the so-called infant industry justification – subsidizing
until the industry develops a certain strength – has both an economic and a
political resonance.
Another issue regarding subsidies is whether a state that has lower
environmental standards than another state can be said to be providing a
subsidy to the produced products. It is easy to argue that the existence of
lower environmental standards in one country amounts to a subsidy on
products entering a state with higher environmental standards, and therefore
a countervailing duty may be appropriate against the imported product.67
However, the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement definition of a subsidy
requires that a government take positive action to provide a financial benefit
or to forgo the collection of revenue.68 Differing environmental standards
would not easily meet the requirement of the giving of a financial benefit or
the forgoing of government revenue.69 Ultimately, the principal reason dif-
ferential environmental standards should not be considered as a subsidy is
that states have the right to establish their own domestic environmental
measures and standards, and must have this autonomy without fear of trade
action by another state.
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The agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
food safety and aquaculture products70
The general picture
The trade issues regarding food safety standards are easily understood. Coun-
tries, consumers and producers rely upon the free flow of food and food prod-
ucts across national borders, a flow that benefits both cost-efficient producers
and cost-conscious consumers. In theory, if not always in practice, the free
flow of food and food products makes more food available to more people at
lower prices. Countries and consumers desire that food be safe to consume,
and therefore countries must be able to impose food safety requirements to
protect their consumers. Such food safety standards, while clearly legitimate,
can interfere with the free flow of food and food products. There is also the
concern that national food safety standards, in some situations, are or can be
adopted to protect not domestic consumers from health concerns, but
domestic producers from unwanted foreign competition. Aquaculture prod-
ucts raise many of the same consumer safety issues as wild fish, plus some
different ones because of transmittal of unwanted substances through feed
and the use of veterinary drugs.71
It is the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement that is most
directly relevant to internationally traded aquaculture products because it
applies to government measures (including import requirements) whose
purpose is to protect human and animal health from food-borne risks.72 For
example, the SPS Agreement applies to national regulations that address
microbiological contamination of food, pesticide levels, permitted food addi-
tives, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) requirements,
and packaging and labeling requirements directly related to the safety of the
food.
The goal of the SPS Agreement is to impose certain disciplines on the
development and implementation of food safety-related requirements “so as
to ensure that these measures can continue to be properly employed to
protect human, animal or plant life and health but cannot be employed as
unjustifiable non-tariff barriers, protecting domestic production from
import competition.”73 Simply put, in the food context the SPS Agreement
is about trying to ensure consumer protection while preventing unwarranted
market protection.
While the SPS Agreement is related to obligations in GATT 1994, the
WTO US/Canada/EU beef hormone dispute determined that the SPS Agree-
ment stands alone from the obligations in GATT 1994.74 Thus, an import
requirement that falls within the scope of the SPS Agreement must be con-
sistent with the obligations set out in the SPS Agreement. The measure
must also be consistent with GATT 1994, although a measure that meets
the requirements of the SPS Agreement is also very likely to meet the
applicable disciplines in GATT 1994.
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Application of the SPS Agreement
Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that states are free to impose SPS
requirements for the protection of human, animal and plant life and health
subject to the measures not being inconsistent with the SPS Agreement.
This raises two critical questions: (1) when are measures consistent with the
SPS Agreement; and (2) who has the burden of showing the consistency or
inconsistency of a measure?
Consistency with the SPS Agreement: Codex international standards
Article 3.2 indicates that an import requirement covered by the SPS Agree-
ment “which conforms to” international standards, guidelines or recommen-
dations is deemed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement and thus
permissible. Respecting food safety, it is the work of the Codex Alimentar-
ius Commission (hereinafter Codex)75 that is to be taken as the international
standards, guidelines and recommendations set out in Article 3.2.76 As one
author has summarized, “The objectives of the Codex programme are to
protect the health of consumers, to ensure fair practices in the food trade and
to promote the coordination of all food standards work undertaken by
national governments.”77
In this regard, Codex has had some remarkable successes and it is the
principal international organization mandated to develop common food
requirements. However, Codex is both a voluntary organization and one that
seeks voluntary adoption of its guidelines, codes and standards (voluntary
harmonization). Moreover, the Codex “common requirements” may be seen
as being set at the lowest common denominator (the minimum standard of
seafood safety) and may be aspirational rather than technical, the result
being that states have some degree of flexibility in applying the Codex
“common requirements.” Thus, state conformity with the internationally
agreed requirements is far from uniform. Also, there have been concerns
expressed that developing countries have been unable to participate and have
their views expressed and considered at Codex because of a lack of funds, the
multiplicity of committees and lack of technical capacity.78 Nevertheless,
the SPS Agreement gives prominence to Codex by taking the work of Codex
to be the internationally agreed-upon requirements respecting food. This
was clear in the WTO US/Canada/EU beef hormone dispute, where both the
dispute settlement panel and the Appellate Body accepted that it was the
Codex hormone standards which were the internationally agreed-upon
requirements.79
It should be noted that there is no obligation on states to have import
requirements that conform to Codex. States are not obligated to have food
safety requirements at all. The SPS Agreement does not elevate the Codex
voluntary guidelines and recommendations to ones with obligatory force and
effect.80 At best, Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement directs that states should
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seek to harmonize their import requirements on the basis of the work of
Codex, which is not the same as conformity with Codex.81 Nevertheless, the
work of Codex is a “benchmark” for the application of the SPS Agreement.
Consistency beyond or in the absence of international standards
The SPS Agreement specifically acknowledges that a state can impose food
requirements that exceed or result in a higher level of human, animal or
plant protection than that afforded by internationally agreed standards.
Moreover, states can impose food requirements where no internationally
agreed standards exist. For import requirements in these situations to be in
compliance with the SPS Agreement, the import requirement must be based
on “risk assessment.”82 The “risk assessment” is to take into account scient-
ific evidence and demonstrate the “potential for adverse effects on human or
animal health” of the risk.83 While the importing state has the opportunity
to determine what is its “appropriate” level of protection from the risk of the
hazard and the appropriate measure to accomplish that level of protection
(risk management), the state is also to take into account the objective of
minimizing trade effects.84
Codex has achieved a level of agreement of the formalized definitions of
risk assessment and risk management within the context of food safety risk
analysis. The larger challenge is to develop principles and guidelines for risk
analysis (risk assessment, risk management and risk communication) such
that the food safety risk analysis done is based on good science and achieves
transparency and consistency.85 A common understanding of the manner in
which risk assessment is to be carried out and the range of risk management
choices associated with the risk would assist in addressing the key SPS
Agreement issue of whether a food import requirement was “scientifically
justified” or a disguised trade barrier.
Overall, one is left with the situation under the SPS Agreement that
import requirements related to food must have a relationship with or be
based upon a “real risk” of adverse health effects as demonstrated by scient-
ific evidence. As one author summarized, “As long as there is a scientific jus-
tification for a particular . . . [import requirement], a member is free to
choose its own level of protection after determining that the health or safety
risk is genuine.”86 The Appellate Body in the Japan/US fruit dispute stated:
[T]he obligation . . . that an SPS measure not be maintained without
scientific evidence requires that there be a rational or objective relation-
ship between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence. Whether
there is a rational relationship between an SPS measure and the scientific
evidence is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.87
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Burden of showing that an import measure is consistent/inconsistent
The manner in which the SPS Agreement is worded appears to indicate that it is
the importing state that has the burden of showing that an import requirement
is consistent with the SPS Agreement where the import requirement is not
based upon an internationally agreed standard. The dispute settlement panel in
the WTO US/Canada/EU beef hormone dispute accepted that this was correct.
However, the Appellate Body indicated that the panel was incorrect on this
point and that both the complaining state and the importing state had eviden-
tiary obligations. The burden is first on the complainant to prove a prima facie
case that the import requirement is not consistent with the SPS Agreement. If
this can be shown, then the burden shifts to the importing state to disprove the
complainant’s case and show that the import requirement is consistent with the
SPS Agreement.88 From this, one can infer that import requirements covered by
the SPS Agreement are presumed valid unless it can be shown to the contrary.
This burden is consistent with the burden that applies generally to other WTO
Agreements such as GATT 1994.
In the seafood trade context, the burden issue is supportive of import
requirements (developed countries) at the expense of exporters (developing
countries) and puts an additional impediment on the use of the SPS Agree-
ment as a means of questioning possible trade distorting measures. From a
consumer protection perspective, it allows an importing state more latitude
in imposing seafood safety requirements.
Minimal scientific information (precautionary approach)
Respecting food, it is not an unreasonable argument that a particular import
requirement is important since the state wants to be cautious in protecting
consumer health. The idea of a precautionary approach to justify import
restrictions has a certain appeal. The European Union characterized its
concern respecting hormones in beef as involving reliance on precaution,89 as
did the Japanese respecting quarantine and test measures for imported fruit
and the codling moth. However, the Appellate Body in the WTO
US/Canada/EC beef hormone dispute did not accept the precaution argu-
ment of the European Union and, as yet, has not had to comment on a more
robust articulation of precaution as a justification for stopping the import of
certain food products.90 The Appellate Body noted that there was a relation-
ship between the precautionary principle and the SPS Agreement, and that
it was both Article 3.3 and Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement where the pre-
cautionary principle “finds reflection” in the SPS Agreement.91
WTO jurisprudence on the SPS Agreement
Thus far, there have been four dispute settlement cases involving the SPS
Agreement:92 the US/Canada/EU beef hormone dispute,93 the Japan/US fruit
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dispute,94 the Canada/Australia salmon dispute95 and the Japan/US apples
dispute.96 In all four cases, the import requirements under review were
found to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. Only the US/Canada/EU
beef hormone dispute was directly concerned with human health issues; the
other three disputes were concerned with transported diseases or pests that
might affect local plants or animals.
In the US/Canada/EU beef hormone dispute, there were Codex standards
for the hormones in question. However, the EU measures sought a higher
level of protection than that afforded by the Codex codes. One reviewer
summarized the final result as follows:
The EC measures on hormone-treated beef failed to satisfy the SPS
Agreement on two counts: 1) all available scientific evidence, as well as
experts consulted by the panel, stated that the hormones in question are
safe when used in accordance with good practice; and 2) the EC failed to
conduct a risk assessment that satisfied the provisions of the SPS Agree-
ment.97
On the last point, it appears from the record that no risk assessment based
on scientific information existed, or, at least, information arising from such
an assessment was not presented to the WTO dispute settlement bodies. As
a consequence, the dispute settlement bodies had no recourse but to con-
clude that the import requirement was “not based on a risk assessment” as
required by Articles 5.1 and 5.2 (and Article 2.2) of the SPS Agreement.
The requirement that a proper risk assessment be carried out was the
central question in the Appellate Body decision in the Canada/Australia
Salmon Dispute. The import regulation concerned salmon from Canada, and
the risk at issue was the risk of diseases for native Australian salmon. As
concluded by one writer,
Because the 1996 Final Report [risk assessment report done by the Aus-
tralian government] did not contain an evaluation of the likelihood of
entry, establishment, or spread of the diseases of concern nor an evalu-
ation of the likelihood of entry, establishment, or spread of the diseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied, the 1996 Final
Report could not qualify as a risk assessment.98
Finally, in the Japan/US fruit dispute, one of the issues was that there did
not appear to have been a risk assessment undertaken as required under
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.99 In the Japan/US apples dispute, the
panel identified a number of inadequacies in the risk assessment methodol-
ogy used by Japan, and concluded that the pest risk analysis did not meet
the requirements of Article 5.1 taking into account the definition of risk
assessment found in Annex A of the SPS Agreement.100
The four Appellate Body cases demonstrate the legal requirement to
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support import regulations, which are not based on international standards
and where the health and safety risk is not obvious, with risk assessment
studies. It can be surmised in all four cases that the inability to produce ade-
quate risk assessment studies by three states or groups of states (the Euro-
pean Union, Australia and Japan) was because there existed no scientific
basis for the import requirements. The situation could be different for a
developing state that may not have the resources for conducting its own of
risk assessment and would, therefore, have to rely on risk assessment done by
other countries or through international organizations. However, it appears
from both the SPS Agreement and the four decided cases that the threshold
for whether a risk exists is relatively low.
The technical barriers to trade agreement and 
eco-labeling101
The general picture
Correlated with food safety matters are issues concerning product standards,
specifications, description and labeling. As regards the international trade in
aquaculture products, the major issues in this area arise with respect to
product labeling, particularly whether a fishery product is farmed or wild,
organically produced, grown or harvested in an environmentally sound
manner, or contains genetically modified organisms.102
The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement is an important companion
to the SPS Agreement regarding food-related issues and is, as regards label-
ing for non-food safety reasons such as environmental matters and other
issues, the principal WTO agreement.
The TBT Agreement is based upon its predecessor agreement, the GATT
Standards Code, which was created as part of the Tokyo Round and came
into being in 1980.103 The development of the Standards Code by the
GATT Contracting Parties was principally a response to two developments.
First, government regulation during the 1960s was increasingly focusing on
product standards and specifications, in part to protect consumer safety and
to guard against deceptive and fraudulent practices. Products were also
becoming more complicated, and government-mandated standards were part
of an effort to ensure uniformity and to preserve the integrity of the market-
place. Second, as tariffs declined as a result of successive GATT negotiating
rounds, governments began to look for other means to control imports.
Using product standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade became an effective
substitute for the formerly high tariff walls.
Scope of the agreement
As has been mentioned, the TBT Agreement establishes disciplines that,
among other things, govern the use of labeling measures other than those
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directly related to food safety. These would include both mandatory and vol-
untary eco-labeling schemes, although, depending on whether a labeling
program is mandatory or voluntary, different rules will apply.
Article 1.3 specifies that the TBT Agreement covers all products, includ-
ing industrial and agricultural products, but it does not apply to govern-
ment procurement or to SPS measures.104 It can, however, apply to products
that are also subject to SPS measures, as the reference to agricultural prod-
ucts makes clear.105 In any event, it is clear that the TBT Agreement extends
to aquaculture products.
The TBT Agreement divides measures into “technical regulations” and
“standards.” These are defined, respectively, as
Document which lays down product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods . . . with which compliance is manda-
tory. It may also include or deal exclusively with . . . labeling require-
ments as they apply to a product, process or production method.106
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with . . . labeling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.107
In other words, measures – such as regulations – that fall within the defini-
tion of either a “technical regulation” or a “standard” are subject to the
requirements of the TBT Agreement108 and must be consistent with those
requirements.
There are a couple of distinctions to note in the two definitions. First,
technical regulations are measures that are mandatory, while standards are
measures that are voluntary. “Mandatory” means that the requirements of
the measure must be met in order for the product to be allowed market
access. “Voluntary,” on the other hand, means that the measure restricts the
manner in which a product is marketed but does not preclude market access
entirely. For example, a voluntary labeling measure might establish criteria
that must be met in order for the product to carry a particular label, but the
label itself is not a prerequisite for market access. In contrast, a mandatory
labeling requirement would require the product to carry a particular label in
order to have market access.109
Technical regulations are subject to Articles 2 and 3, while standards are
subject to Article 4 and the Code of Good Practice set out in Annex 3 to the
TBT Agreement. This distinction will be examined in greater detail later in
the chapter.
The second distinction to note is the reference in the first sentence of the
definition of a technical regulation to “their related processes and production
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methods,” and the corresponding reference in the second sentence to “a
product, process or production method.” This may be an important dif-
ference in terminology, with respect not only to determining whether a
particular measure meets the definition of a “technical regulation” or a
“standard,” but also to its potential implications in the context of the deter-
mination of “like products” in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, particu-
larly in relation to labeling programs. This issue will also be explored
further in what follows.
Technical regulations and eco-labeling
Article 2 contains the main provisions that govern technical regulations.
These include non-discrimination, avoidance of unnecessary obstacles to
trade, the use of international standards, notification and transparency, and
mutual recognition or equivalence.
Non-discrimination
Article 2.1, like Articles I and III of GATT 1994, requires technical regula-
tions to accord MFN status and national treatment to imported products.110
This means that such products must be treated no less favorably than “like
products” of national origin, and “like products originating in any other
country.”
As with GATT 1994, a key issue is determining whether the imported
and domestic products are “like.”111 The jurisprudence indicates that this is
to be done on a case-by-case basis. It is conceivable that, in addition to a
number of other considerations, whether two products are considered “like”
will be influenced by the nature of the measure being challenged. For
example, it may be that two products that are considered like – and there-
fore subject to the obligation in Article 2.1 – for the purposes of a technical
specification relating to the products’ performance characteristics may not be
considered like for the purposes of a labeling regime. Each case must be con-
sidered on its own merits, taking into account all relevant factors.
Unnecessary barriers to trade
Article 2.2 imposes a requirement on all WTO members that their technical
regulations not create “unnecessary obstacles to trade.”112 This requirement
raises several considerations. First, it means that the purpose underlying the
measure must be a “legitimate objective.” Article 2.1 includes a non-exhaus-
tive list of legitimate objectives, including the protection of human health
or safety, animal or plant life or health, and protection of the environment.
Second, it means that the measure chosen must be the “least trade-restric-
tive”; that is, it must obstruct trade as little as possible while also achieving
the objective. Third, in preparing, adopting and applying the measure, the
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risks created by the non-fulfillment of the objective must be taken into
account.113
Although no jurisprudence exists to confirm it, a reasonable interpretation of
Article 2.2 suggests that, in contrast to the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agree-
ment does not contain a legal obligation either to conduct a risk assessment or
to base a measure on such an assessment. At the same time, the wording of
Article 2.1, including a reference to the assessment of risks, suggests that a risk
assessment may be a practical necessity in many cases – particularly for meas-
ures involving the protection of human health or the environment – in order to
defend such measures effectively if a challenge were to arise.
International standards
Like the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement favors the use of international
standards wherever possible and appropriate. To this end, Article 2.4
requires WTO members to use such standards as a basis for their technical
regulations “except when such standards . . . would be an ineffective or inap-
propriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued.”
This bias is also reflected in Articles 2.5 and 2.6. Article 2.5 states that a
technical regulation that “is in accordance with relevant international stand-
ards” is presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to trade. Article 2.6
strongly encourages, without requiring, WTO members to take an active
role in international standardizing bodies, particularly in relation to inter-
national standards for products where they have adopted, or expect to adopt,
technical regulations.
Standards and eco-labeling
Disciplines on the use of standards are set out in Article 4 and the Code of
Good Practice found in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. However, the
obligation placed on WTO members regarding use of standards is slightly
different as compared to technical regulations.
Article 4.1 requires WTO members to “ensure that their central govern-
ment standardizing bodies accept and comply with the Code of Good Prac-
tice,” but in the case of local and non-governmental standardizing bodies,
members are only obliged to “take such reasonable measures as may be avail-
able to them” to ensure such acceptance and compliance. WTO members
must also refrain from taking any measures that would require or encourage
standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the Code. In other
words, standardizing bodies and agencies that the central government con-
trols directly must comply, and the central government is obligated to
ensure that they do so. However, with respect to all other standardizing
bodies, the central government likely cannot be held responsible for their
actions, although it must exert whatever authority might be available to it
to ensure compliance.
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The Code of Good Practice sets out several requirements that more or less
parallel those found in Article 2, including non-discrimination,114 avoidance
of unnecessary obstacles to trade,115 and usage of international standards.116
WTO jurisprudence on the TBT Agreement
There have been few WTO panel or Appellate Body reports that have dealt
with the TBT Agreement in detail. In the EC asbestos dispute,117 the Appel-
late Body examined the definition of a “technical regulation” in order to
determine whether the measure in question in that dispute constituted a
technical regulation. Although the Appellate Body found that the measure
was a technical regulation, it declined to examine whether the measure met
the requirements of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement on the grounds that it
had an inadequate factual foundation upon which to base its analysis.
In the EC sardines dispute,118 the measure in question was clearly a tech-
nical regulation in the form of a requirement that a particular trade descrip-
tion – the term “sardines” – be used only on the packaging of a particular
species of fish.119 However, the findings of both the panel and the Appellate
Body focused almost exclusively on the use of international standards, in
particular whether an international standard existed, and whether the EC
measure met the requirements of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.120
The outlook
As has been noted, the TBT Agreement does not apply to measures covered
by the SPS Agreement. This raises the question of what types of measures
relevant to aquaculture are likely to be considered TBT measures; that is,
“technical regulations” or “standards.” The simple answer to this question is
that it will depend on the measure. Measures that prescribe product
characteristics or process and production methods that affect product
characteristics, or measures that prescribe labeling requirements,121 are likely
to be captured as technical regulations.
A central issue that has arisen in the context of the “like product” test is
whether it is legitimate for regulators to distinguish between products –
that is, treat them as being different rather than “like” – on the basis of how
they are produced or manufactured even where the production or manufac-
turing process does not affect the characteristics of the products themselves
(called non-product-related processing and production methods, or
nprPPMs).122 An example might be shrimp caught at sea versus farmed
shrimp. Assuming that there are no differences with respect to taste, texture
or the relative health risks arising from their consumption, is it nevertheless
legitimate for the regulator to differentiate between these shrimp from a
regulatory standpoint, and, if so, in what respects? The answer to these
questions will likely depend on the type of measure that is involved, and the
basis for the differentiation.
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Another question has arisen, this time in the context of Article 2.2, con-
cerning labeling requirements that are driven by the desire of the public for
certain information about the product, in particular information relating to
the manner in which the product was produced or manufactured. Is it
legitimate for a government regulator to require a producer or importer to
include information regarding the environmental impact caused by the har-
vesting, manufacture or production of the product?
Because the jurisprudence dealing with the TBT Agreement is sparse and
fairly narrow in its consideration of TBT-related issues, there is currently
little guidance on how these rules are likely to be interpreted in practice. In
particular, the precise relationship between nprPPM-based measures and the
“like product” test – be it for labeling or other types of regulations – has yet
to be defined with any degree of precision. Likewise, the ambit of the term
“legitimate objective,” and the likelihood that it can encompass the idea of
“consumer information,” and, if so, under what conditions, is currently
unclear and therefore the subject of much debate.
Conclusion
The international flow of trade in aquaculture products, which is increasing
rapidly, provides important export markets and economic development
possibilities for developing states. Thus, it should always be borne in mind
that the application of the WTO international trade regime to aquaculture
products is of utmost concern to developing states.
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the general contours of
the existing multilateral trade regime that falls under the administrative
authority of the WTO. For international trade in aquaculture and the issues
of seafood safety, labeling and the environment, the principal agreements, as
discussed above, are GATT 1994, the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agree-
ment. While the rules contained in these agreements are complex, the
general thrust of them is not: discrimination for the purposes of market pro-
tection is not tolerated, and a state cannot dress up a protectionist measure
as environmental or related to food safety as a means of evading the trade
rules. Bona fide concerns of an importing state about potential food safety or
domestic environmental degradation are generally respected by the trade
rules. Unsubstantiated fear or unicultural ethical concerns about imported
aquaculture products are not.
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12 Food safety and farmed salmon
Some implications of the European
Union’s food policy for coastal
communities
John Phyne, Richard Apostle and Gestur Hovgaard
Introduction
“Mad cow disease,” “foot and mouth disease,” dioxin scares and genetically
modified organisms are but a sampling of the food concerns that have
emerged over the past decade. Ulrich Beck argues that we have entered a
period where science and the industrial products of science are impacting
upon human social organization in unforeseen ways. Because of this, risk
science and risk management have become intrinsic to the regulation of
social life.1
The European Union (EU) is at the forefront of human institutions
engaged in risk science and risk management. The EU has come a long way
from a food policy based upon security to one that is increasingly based
upon safety. In the process, the consumer has replaced the producer at the
center of food policy agendas. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a
policy instrument that still is contentious, has been superseded in ways
unimagined within the EU itself. Beginning in the early 1990s, the EU
began reducing funding to the CAP in favor of structural measures aimed at
diversifying rural Europe. A policy canopy that embraced measures as wide-
ranging as eco-tourism, organic agriculture and aquaculture emerged as
“long-term” alternatives to the subsidies that generated the notorious
“mountains” of butter and beef.
However, the consequences of agricultural overproduction were visited
upon European consumers in several ways in the 1990s. “Mad cow disease”
was an early concern, and this problem emerged periodically for the balance
of the decade. There were also concerns over dioxin in food products and
“foot and mouth” disease; the latter devastated British agriculture and con-
tributed to Continental demands for restrictions on British food exports. By
this time, an integrated food policy was emerging to deal with the assess-
ment and management of food risks. The EU also moved to protect con-
sumers from the “risks” of food imports from non-EU nations.2 In the
process, the EU shifted its priorities from import duties used to protect
“producers” to food safety laws to protect “consumers.” Nevertheless, the
former remain an important dimension of EU policy.
The central objective of this chapter is to trace the evolution of EU food
policy and show its potential consequences for farmed salmon exports from
coastal communities. To that end, we will focus upon coastal communities
in Norway and the Faroes as case studies. Both nations stand outside the
EU, but are significant suppliers of fisheries products to EU consumers.3
Scottish and Irish salmon farming concerns do not produce enough to satisfy
EU demand and, as a result, significant imports come from Norway and the
Faroes. However, since the early 1990s, Scottish and Irish producers have
lobbied the EU in Brussels for duties against farmed salmon imports from
Norway. The Irish view the Norwegians as “price-makers” who are in a posi-
tion to flood the EU with cheap imports and thereby undermine Irish and
Scottish production.4 While duties and minimum import prices on farmed
salmon imports were central in the 1990s, the food scares mentioned above
also entered the picture. By the turn of the century, these scares affected
farmed salmon imports into the EU, in addition to other food commodities.
For our purposes, concerns over dioxin and genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) have begun to impact heavily upon farmed salmon imports from
outside the EU.
In this chapter, we discuss the impact of dioxin and GMO regulations
upon feed producers and fish farming operations in Norwegian and Faroese
coastal communities. We also examine the impact of the Faroes’ recent food
and feed agreements with the EU. These regulatory concerns, in addition to
pre-existing Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points (HACCP) and Codex
Alimentarius Commission regulations,5 and the current pattern of economic
concentration and globalization in the salmon farming industry, potentially
have negative consequences for small-scale producers and marginal salmon
farming regions.
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, we briefly review the
EU’s transition to a food safety regulator. This not only follows in wake of
the food scares over “mad cow” disease, “foot and mouth” disease and
dioxins in food products, but also dovetails with recent global trends in the
role of food safety laws as substitutes for import duties in the trade in food
products.6 Second, we assess the impact of EU food safety laws for farmed
salmon imports from Norway and the Faroes. We argue that international,
national and firm-level food regulations structure the export of farmed
salmon to the EU. The impact of regulations on animal feed – a critical
input for farmed salmon – is emphasized. The final section of the chapter
explores the ways in which food safety regulations reinforce “buyer-driven”
chains in the global food industry. We argue that by acting as “lead drivers”
in the setting of food safety standards, international, national and firm-level
players can contribute to social stratification at the points of production and
processing. Nevertheless, we point to the role of state regulations and
community embeddedness in fostering the ability of coastal communities to
survive the current intersection of food safety trends and economies of scale
in the salmon farming industry. These are countervailing forces to the full
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impact of standardized globalization. We conclude with some reflections on
the consequences of the EU’s food safety policies for Canadian coastal
communities.
From security to safety: evolution of the EU’s food policy
The EU has become synonymous with the CAP. This policy is part of a
package of measures used to redistribute wealth from richer to poorer
regions within the EU. Although the CAP’s expenditures became controver-
sial in the 1980s (after the 1973 and 1985 rounds of expansion), the initial
impetus of EU agricultural policy was to provide food security in post-
World War II Europe.7
With the entry of Ireland (1973) and Spain and Portugal (1985) into the
EU, the importance of agricultural funding increased. The CAP includes a
Guarantee Section used to provide price supports for a number of agricul-
tural commodities and a Guidance Section to improve agricultural produc-
tivity. Despite the decline in overall agricultural funding, by 1998 the CAP
still constituted over 54 percent of the entire EU budget. Nevertheless, in
an effort to reduce overproduction, the funding within the CAP has shifted
from price supports to income assistance. In 1992, market supports and
export assistance constituted 82 percent of CAP funding; by 1998 this
figure was reduced to 29 percent.8 The stereotype of the CAP supporting
only small and inefficient agricultural units is belied by the fact that large-
scale farmers and processors have achieved their economies of scale with the
assistance of EU price supports.9
By the early 1990s, the EU had moved to diversify the structural meas-
ures that included the CAP. The objective is to deal with both the resistance
for continuing agricultural supports that generated overproduction and the
need for the diversification of rural areas. Together with reforms to the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), rural areas witnessed a diversification of
regional policy in the form of assistance to rural manufacturing, tourism and
environmental initiatives. These measures, which fell under the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), were also associated with training
initiatives under the European Social Fund (ESF).10
By the 1990s, the industrialization of agriculture was bearing witness to
environmental and food safety problems. Prominent among the latter were
the scares over BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), foot and mouth
disease, and dioxins. The BSE or “mad cow disease” scare was particularly
notable, as it affected British agricultural exports to other EU nations. Con-
cerns emerged over the contamination of animal feed. The BSE crisis was
related to the mixing of animal waste in feed provided for animals for
human consumption.11 In addition to this, a dioxin scare emerged in
Belgium in the late 1990s. Dioxins are present in industrial products and
waste and accumulate in the food chain. By the late 1990s, the EU was con-
cerned about dioxins in animal feed.12
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During the 1990s, the EU shifted its food policy from “security” to
“safety” in order to deal with consumer fears and the retailer concerns over
food safety. A key measure was the need for traceability of food from the
farm to the table. This required checks at each of the points in which conta-
mination could occur. Banks and Marsden argue that with the deregulation
of the British dairy industry in the 1990s, a re-regulation occurred under
the guise of market power. Processors developed closer linkages with pro-
ducers in order to provide high-quality and traceable dairy products for
British retail giants. The latter replaced home delivery as the main outlet for
dairy goods.13 The EU was also concerned with food imports from outside
the common market. Thus, in the 1980s and early 1990s, controversies
emerged with the United States over beef hormones and bovine soma-
totropin (BST). The latter is a naturally occurring substance used to increase
milk production.14
In the wake of an early BSE crisis, the European Commission (EC) formed
the Office of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control (OVPIC)
in 1991 under the auspices of the Directorate General – Agriculture. Thirty
inspectors were hired to conduct on-site inspections pertaining to food
safety. However, OVPIC had to compete with other EC agencies for
funding. As the EC was in the process of transforming OVPIC into an
independent agency with its own source of funding, controversy erupted in
1996 over the British government’s position that it could not rule out a con-
nection between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. The ensuing
crisis over “mad cow disease” involved accusations by the British beef indus-
try that the EU was attempting to ban British beef from EU markets.15
OVPIC remained inside the Directorate-General – Agriculture until the
food scares of the late 1990s. Despite concerns in the 1990s over 
the growing power of the EC bureaucracy in Brussels, member states and
the European Parliament did not oppose the continued maintenance of the
OVPIC (renamed the Food Veterinary Office [FVO]) under the authority of
the EC, especially in the aftermath of more food scares in the late 1990s.
The FVO maintains a risk management function and operates to enforce
enhanced food safety laws. In 1997, the number of inspectors in the FVO
increased to 200 and the agency was transferred to the Directorate General –
Health and Consumer Protection (DG – SANCO).16 This removed the
enforcement of food standards from the EC Directorate-General – Agricul-
ture and separated the production and regulatory components of EU food
law.
At this time, the food scares resulted in the development of a White Paper
on Food Safety that proposed the establishment of a European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA).17 This agency was launched in 2002 as a risk assessment
and communication agency under the control of the European Parliament.
The White Paper on Food Safety states that the EC, “in establishing agree-
ments with third countries that recognise the equivalency of food safety con-
trols under the WTO/SPS agreement, calls on the FVO for an evaluation of
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the health situation in the third countries concerned.”18 This entailed the
continuance of border inspections for non-EU states exporting goods to the
EU. The White Paper’s concern with food safety is reiterated in the legisla-
tion that established the EFSA.19 What is central is the need to preserve
safety measures in feed for animals used for human consumption and to trace
the nature of feed back to its point of origin. The end result is a traceability
system that covers items ultimately bound for human consumption. The
feed manufacturing sector would be subject to the same checks for dioxin as
the human food sector. The EFSA would be responsible for further testing
for BSE.20 In addition, feed for animal consumption and food for human
consumption must not exceed permissible levels of GMOs. The labeling and
authorization of GMOs, a highly contestable issue for major GMO produc-
ers such as the United States, Canada and Argentina, became intrinsic to EU
food policy.21
In September 2003, the EU passed legislation making the labeling of
genetically modified food for human consumption and feed for animal con-
sumption mandatory.22 The only exception is for food “containing materials
which consists of or is produced from GMOs in a proportion no higher than
0.9 percent of the food ingredients considered individually or food consist-
ing of a single ingredient, provided that this presence is adventitious or
technically unavoidable.”23 A similar exception exists for feed.24 However, in
cases where the food or feed exceeds that 0.9 percent threshold, mandatory
labeling is necessary, and the legislation requires the use of clear labeling.25
While no explicit mention is given to genetically modified fish or fish
feed, Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 is significant in that it effectively acts
to “identify” any transgenic fish imports into the EU, and any fish feed that
contains genetically modified products such as soybeans. Both are significant
for our purposes because of the current move by feed companies to decrease
their dependence on pelagic stocks by using more vegetable-based materials
in their feed. In light of this situation, one of the world’s largest fish feed
companies announced that it will not use genetically based materials in its
feed.26 This is clearly an attempt to prevent the occurrence of significant
traces of GM products in farmed salmon imports into the EU.
With EFSA authority for risk assessment science and communication and
FVO authority for risk management, the EU has further extended its regula-
tory scope. Concerns over BSE, dioxins and GMOs have resulted in a regula-
tory regime that aims to provide a full traceability system for all food
imports. Although the implications for salmon farming are not fully clear,
we are in a position to provide a tentative evaluation. Norway and the Faroes
stand outside the EU, which is the biggest farmed salmon export market for
each nation. Salmon farming is a good test of the degree to which EU regu-
lations can impact upon third countries.
Vogel argues that trade liberalization is associated with more, and not
less, food safety and environmental regulations. Declining tariff levels are
being replaced with increasing levels of product harmonization.27 A key
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empirical question, for our purposes, is the degree to which the “retreat of
the state” in the era of globalization is occurring in the context of an inter-
national salmon aquaculture industry and supranational food regulations. As
we shall see, food regulations in the context of declining export prices and
economic consolidation in the international salmon farming industry pose
challenges for the salmon farming industries of Norway and the Faroes.
Nevertheless, we show that Norway and the Faroes are not totally subject to
international regulatory and market forces, and have some scope in structur-
ing the continued participation of salmon farming companies in export
markets.
Food safety and farmed salmon exports to the European
Union
Norway
Unlike Danish farmers, who enthusiastically advocated EEC member-
ship, the rural populations of Norway saw EEC membership as a colos-
sal threat to their survival and as a direct contradiction to the powerful
localism and regionalism espoused on the periphery.
(Esping-Anderson on the reaction of rural Norwegians to the
1973 referendum on EEC membership28)
Norway is not part of the EU, but it is part of the EU.
(Observation by interviewees and contacts in Norway)
Despite Norway’s rejection of EEC (1973) and EU (1994) membership, the
EU remains its largest trading partner. In 2000, nearly 77 percent of
Norway’s exports went to the EU and nearly 62 percent of its imports were
from the EU. Over 37 percent of Norway’s GDP is based upon its exports to
the EU.29
While oil and gas constitute the main engine of Norway’s economy,
fishery products are still intrinsic to the well-being of the country. During
the 1990s, Norway and Chile emerged as the two largest producers of
farmed Atlantic salmon. By 2000, 883,558 tonnes of farmed Atlantic
salmon was produced on a global basis. Norway produced 49.4 percent of
this total. Chile (18.9 percent), Great Britain (14.6 percent), Canada (7.7
percent) and the Faroes (nearly 3.2 percent) were the next four largest pro-
ducers.30 The EU stands as Norway’s largest seafood export market. Seven
out of the top ten export markets for Norway’s farmed salmon in 2001
were EU countries. In 2002, Norway sent to the EU nearly 50 percent of its
total production of 2,109,323 tonnes of seafood exports (farmed and
harvested).31
Furthermore, in contrast to Chile, which moved quickly to establish
economies of scale and vertical integration in salmon farming,32 Norway had
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a late move towards vertical integration in salmon farming. This dates back
to a concerted effort by the state to decentralize production in the 1970s and
1980s. Firms were restricted to one license and one site. While this allowed
production to increase throughout the country, it hindered the establish-
ment of large firms. In the early 1990s, overproduction and the cold-storage
freezing strategy of the Fish Sales Organization (FSO) contributed to bank-
ruptcies and the restructuring of the industry. The government changed the
license rules enabling producers to have more than one license and one site.33
By 2001, six companies had over 30 percent of all salmon farm licenses.34
During the past decade, food safety laws and various import restrictions
have been used to structure Norwegian seafood exports to the EU. Farmed
salmon production from Norway has acted as a lightning rod in trade dis-
putes with the EU. In the mid-1990s, the small Irish salmon farming indus-
try was concerned over the “dumping” of Norwegian salmon in the
European salmon market.35
In 1992, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (which includes
Norway as a member) signed a free trade agreement with the EU. This rein-
forced the abolition of income supports to the fishery that was agreed to
within EFTA in 1989.36 In the 1990s, a minimum import price (MIP) was
imposed on Norwegian farmed salmon. This price, which is negotiated in
salmon agreements between Norway and the EU, establishes a “market”
price that has to be maintained in order for Norwegian imports to gain
access to EU markets. Irish and Scottish salmon producers demanded this so
that the Norwegians cannot “dump” low-priced salmon on EU markets.
Nevertheless, the Norwegian Federation of Fish and Aquaculture Industries
(NHK) feels that the current MIP is inflated and it would like it abolished.
Reports in 2002 indicated that the EU would replace the MIP with a 14
percent duty.37 One official with NHK noted in an interview that “the
biggest problem is that we are outside the big trade blocs.” This has hin-
dered access to markets.
Import duties in the 1980s and 1990s may have also impacted upon ver-
tical integration. Nearly 70 percent of farmed salmon is exported fresh.38 For
Norway’s EU exports, a typical pattern is for value added processing (such as
smoking) to occur in Denmark. From Denmark, Norwegian salmon travels
to the large EU markets. Prior to being shipped to the EU, most Norwegian
salmon is handled by an export agency that acts on behalf of a given number
of producers. Sea Star International and Lerøy are two of the bigger Norwe-
gian export agencies; the former markets directly for one of the largest pro-
ducers in southern Norway. Some producers bypass Danish processors and
deal directly with supermarket chains such as Carrefour in France and Mer-
cadona in Spain.
Although the abolition of tariff barriers and the ongoing negotiations
over the MIP concerned Norwegian salmon farmers during the 1990s,
quality controls also became crucial to food products produced for consump-
tion in the EU. The FVO inspects member states and third-party countries
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such as Norway. Although the 2001 FVO report shows meat and dairy
product inspections for Norway,39 this does not mean that fish products are
free of regulatory concerns. EU policies on dioxins and GMOs impact upon
the entire food chain. Maximum dioxin levels in animal flesh sold to EU
countries came into effect in July 2002, and DG – SANCO wants to reduce
dioxin levels by 25 percent.40
Since pelagic stocks are used in fish pellets for farmed salmon, feed pro-
ducers have to take this into account. Although dioxins are diminishing in
the food chain, it is possible for feed to be produced with dioxin levels above
acceptable EU levels. Moreover, dioxins accumulate in fats, and, as a result,
can concentrate in the oil of pelagic fish. A fish veterinarian with Norway’s
Directorate of Fisheries noted that fish from the Baltic Sea have high levels
of dioxin, and the challenge for feed companies is in the reduction of such
levels.41 Marine oil can be purified in order to lower dioxin levels. In addi-
tion, marine oil can be partially substituted with vegetable oil in order to
lower dioxin levels. Nevertheless, he noted that the dioxin levels in effluent
fell by 70 percent from 1985 to 1995.
The concern over dioxin levels makes the current forward integration
strategy of some large feed companies a risky proposition. The existence of
high dioxin levels in feed has potential implications for one feed company’s
recent global acquisitions of grow-out sites in Norway.42 Moreover, an offi-
cial noted that the company must buy feed from other companies because it
does not have enough feed to supply all of its grow-out sites.43 One implica-
tion that we can draw from this is that if there is a convergence of diminish-
ing stocks for fish feed and high dioxin levels in the remaining feed, the
global strategies of this feed giant may be undermined. Grow-out sites may
have to increasingly turn to vegetable-based feed supplies in order to main-
tain operations. And, with this, firms will have to ensure that vegetable oils
in fish feed do not exceed GMO levels accepted by the EU.44 An official with
another large feed manufacturer noted that there may be a horizontal
integration of terrestrial and sea-based feed companies in the future due to
the need for fish farming companies to decrease their reliance on pelagic
stocks.45
While the reliance on vegetable oils will not result in a “vegetarian
salmon,” a new soya–pelagic synthesis is being produced as a feed supply.
The EU requires the harmonization of standards, coupled with the labeling
of GMOs in feed and final food products.46 The ultimate objective is to have
significantly reduced levels of GMOs in the food supply.47 Shortly after the
EU announced its proposed food policy for GMOs, one of the world’s largest
feed companies stated that it would not use GMOs in its feed. An official
from Norway pointed to the role of the major Japanese and European
markets in structuring his firm’s decision:
Japan wants the salmon naturally fed. Japan and Europe have questions
about GMOs. . . . So, the question is if the oil is coming from GMO
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plants. [This is] difficult to measure. The oil profile is mirrored in the
salmon. Protein doesn’t change. Oil you do change. If we use vegetable
protein in the feed, it will not be shown in the salmon, but the oil
profile does [show in the salmon]. [In] the US and Canada, there are no
questions at all. Vegetable oil is used in feed for salmon production. In
Chile – in terms of producers – this question is not an issue at all. But,
there the feed companies follow the rules and expectations of the super-
markets in Europe. They want to keep the possibility to sell in Europe.
In Europe they don’t want any GMO or land animal products in the
feed. In Chile and Peru the price level for fish oil is relatively cheap.
Vegetable oil is expensive. In the future there will be a shift to veget-
able oil in Europe.48
In addition to regulating the feed supply beyond its borders, the EU also
impacts upon the harvesting and processing of farmed salmon. This is
through measures that predate the FVO and EFTA, namely HACCP and the
SPS Agreement of WTO. Nevertheless, these polices are endorsed by the EC
and are taken into account by the Directorate of Fisheries – the regulatory
body for the Norwegian fishing and fish farming industries.
While it is not surprising that recent EU legislation on food safety
emphasizes the issue of feed,49 HACCP regulations impact heavily upon the
use of fish feed, as well as upon the harvesting and processing of salmon. In
Norway, HACCP and other quality regulations are based upon the incorpo-
ration of EU regulations into Norwegian law.50 The “critical control points”
in the HACCP are originally based upon US regulations, and these deal
with various “points” from the “fertilized egg to the table” that can impact
negatively upon human health concerns.51 To that end, fish processing estab-
lishments use a check guide to inspect for hazards at each of the “critical
control points.”52 A fish veterinarian with the Directorate of Fisheries in
Bergen noted the importance of abiding by the HACCP system, which is
based upon the Codex Alimentarius rules adopted by the WTO.53 Most per-
tinent here is the SPS Agreement, which aims for harmonized global stand-
ards in the assessment of food safety for items subject to international
trade.54 The fish veterinarian added that Norway’s HACCP regulations have
“more descriptive and stronger requirements than EU regulations.”55 While
we have no direct evidence to confirm this statement, this regulatory pro-
cedure is extremely plausible. If Norway does have more stringent HACCP
requirements than the EU, this may give food inspectors leverage so that
“permissible deviance” within Norwegian law will enable producers to
adhere to EU rules.
Another issue that impacts upon salmon farming interests is the role
played by retailing giants in the EU. In the western Norwegian community
of Austevoll, two supermarket giants were noted as being major players.56
Carrefour of France is one of the largest supermarket chains in the world. It
has a contract with an Austevoll salmon farming company that is one of the
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largest fish farming companies in Norway. An official with this firm noted
that in addition to EU concerns, the company had to deal with an eighty-
five-page manual from Carrefour.57 He stressed that this company has an
inspector who visits their processing plant on a regular basis. This inspector
is not a seafood specialist.58 This particular individual inspects a wide variety
of food products for Carrefour. An official with the salmon farming company
indicated that it was “easier dealing with the Japanese” because, although
the Japanese were quality conscious, they sent over people who specialized in
fish products.59
Two Austevoll firms sell to Mercadona, one of Spain’s largest retailing com-
panies. One of these firms sells seventy tonnes of fresh salmon a week. The
salmon is sent to Valencia and redistributed to the 1,200 stores in the Mercadona
chain. The manager of this firm noted that “two to three times a year we have
visits from this chain – delegations that come to talk about quality and prefer-
ences for salmon.”60 He added that although the EU market was a stable market,
it will not be one where increasing prices can be expected. He noted that
[T]he main challenge for the industry in the future will be to produce
fish more cheaply and integrate towards the market . . . to increase the
margin it is important to produce cheap. It is more likely that we will
be able to produce two kroner cheaper than selling the fish two kroner
more expensively.61
The implication of this is that labor and input costs will have to be secured
at a cheaper rate. We will return to this issue later.
In addition, some of our respondents noted that in the latter half of 2002,
the strong Norwegian krone (NOK) hindered export growth in EU markets
for many Norwegian salmon farming companies. Thus, the need to meet
quality controls was converging with pricing and currency trends that cut
down on export volume. A fish-sourcing manager for Carrefour had no sym-
pathy for the plight of salmon farming companies facing low profit margins:
[A]ccusations of retail giants squeezing margins doesn’t really apply to
Carrefour. I don’t have much sympathy for salmon farmers who are
finding their profits low at the moment. High prices a couple of years
ago almost put a great deal of French smokers out of business and no
one was complaining about profits then.62
In summary, the Norwegian salmon farming industry faces challenges on
a number of fronts. In addition to the MIP, food safety regulations govern-
ing feed, harvesting and processing have acted to govern the nature of
farmed salmon production. The power of retail giants in the European food
chain also reinforces quality demands. These firms also influence the ex-farm
gate price for salmon. Next, we consider the impact of EU food safety regu-
lations upon farmed salmon exports from the Faroes.
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The Faroes
EU membership or an extended fisheries zone under Faroese jurisdiction
were mutually exclusive options. The strong internal demand for
Faroese self-determination in issues concerning access to the fisheries
settled the issue.63
When Denmark joined the EU in 1973, the Faroes elected to remain outside
of the EU. Like their Norwegian counterparts, the Faroese feared the entry
of EU vessels into their waters.64 Despite being a small nation in the North
Atlantic, the Faroes share common ground with Norway on the EU. Like
many Norwegians, Faroese residents oppose entry into the EU, but at the
same time, these residents live in the midst of fishing and aquaculture
industries that are heavily dependent on EU markets. Fisheries and aquacul-
ture constitute 90 percent of the value of the nation’s exports.65 The Faroes
are the fifth largest global producer of farmed Atlantic salmon.66 Most of
this production is exported to the EU.67
The early period of aquaculture development on the Faroes was witness to
government attempts to use this new industry as a development strategy for
the country as a whole. This resulted in an early spatial dispersion of the
industry. Nevertheless, disease problems due to the overcrowded site loca-
tions in areas with poor water exchange, as well as bankruptcies, ushered in
a period of social change in the industry. In 1990, the government allowed
mergers, and the industry reduced from sixty-five grow-out sites in 1990 to
thirty locations by 1999. At the same time, production increased from over
12,000 tonnes (round weight) to over 36,000 tonnes.68
The EU is the largest market for Faroese exports and, as is the case for
Norway, much of the product enters the EU through Danish ports. While
Faroese firms deal with Danish processors, a large Faroese government-
owned marketing firm facilitates the entry of Faroese fish products into the
EU. It provides a multiplicity of product lines and outlets for groundfish,
shellfish and farmed salmon. The firm has linkages with processing plants,
trawlers and small vessel owners in the Faroes.69 It also has marketing
outlets in the northern Danish port of Hirtshals, Boulogne-sur-Mer in
France and Preston in the United Kingdom, and marketing arrangement
with Rainbow Seafoods in Gloucester, Massachusetts.70
As is the case for Norway, the Faroes have to meet the food safety require-
ments of the EU. This applies to issues such as feed, the import and export
of livestock and the slaughtering of diseased salmon at sea. In the case of
feed, we noted above that feed must meet the EU’s requirements on dioxin
and GMO levels in order to gain entry to EU markets. In the case of the
Faroes, a large local firm accounts for 36 percent of the feed, with 46 percent
accounted for by Ewos (the world’s second largest feed producer) and 18
percent by Skretting (a Nutreco concern, Nutreco being the world’s largest
feed producer). The Faroese feed company sources 80 percent of its feed
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requirements from local catches. In contrast, the Ewos plant brings feed
from Norway.71 In fact, approximately 50 percent of the feed used on the
Faroes comes from Norway, Denmark and Iceland.72 This raises the issue of
the extent to which feed from non-Faroese sources (especially from the Baltic
Sea near southern Norway and Denmark) has appropriate levels of dioxin for
EU purposes. While there is no evidence to date of Faroese salmon being
banned from EU markets because of high dioxin levels, the issue of dioxin
levels in farmed fish may intensify as the EU collects more data and estab-
lishes new permissible levels in 2006.73
In February 2001, the Faroes signed a Veterinary and Hygiene Agree-
ment with the EU.74 This facilitated the importation of EU livestock into
the Faroes, as well as the exportation of livestock from the Faroes to the
EU.75 However, in this case, “livestock” means fish, because the Faroes does
not have a substantial agricultural industry. For the Faroes, this means that
the country can no longer prevent the importation of EU-approved ova and
smolts for grow-out sites. Nevertheless, (as of 2003) there has been “no
smolt importation because local production suffices to meet Faroese
demand.”76 The Faroes are concerned about importing diseases. Despite this,
the Faroes may have to accept ova and smolts from the EU if increased pro-
duction is going to occur. In addition, the Veterinary and Hygiene Agree-
ment formalizes the border inspection process and thus enables the Faroes to
meet EU standards when it comes to exports to that market.77
Beginning in 1996, the Faroes maintained a compensation fund that
enabled producers to defray the costs of slaughtering diseased animals at sea.
The salmon farming industry and the government each contributed 50
percent of the costs of the fund.78 This has to be discontinued for farmed
salmon if the Faroes want to maintain access to EU markets. It will be
replaced by a privately funded insurance program.79
Keeping in line with the EU’s food policy, Faroese producers must main-
tain checks throughout the entire production cycle for farmed salmon. In the
event of diseases that require the slaughtering of salmon at sea, salmon
farmers will have to draw from their stock insurance fund.80 This is another
example of EU legislation that requires the elimination of subsidies on the
part of nations that export food to the EU.
As is the case for Norwegian salmon farmers, Faroese producers not only
are witness to EU regulations, but also are facing national legislation that
must abide by EU requirements in order to maintain access to EU markets.
Moreover, they also depend upon European processors and retail giants in
order to gain access to EU markets. Only 25 percent of Faroese farmed
salmon are value added prior to export.81 An official with a large Faroese
salmon farming company has an arrangement with a Danish smokehouse.
The smokehouse sells its product to an Italian supermarket chain that dis-
tributes smoked salmon to Italian and French restaurants. In commenting
on food safety requirements and its relation to the Faroese salmon farming
company, an official with the Danish smokehouse noted:
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The big challenge for a company like [ours] is to manage to follow up
on public demands on food safety and other regulations. This is the
main reason that many of the small ones [smokeries] are forced to go
down; they don’t have the resources to follow these demands. Plus the
fact [is] that customers and deliverers are growing bigger. . . . [W]e have
integrated with [the Faroese firm] because of: (1) traceability, because
there is easy access to their provider; and (2) to buy salmon for the prices
of the day is difficult, and makes partners like [the Faroese firm] a good
investment.82
The Danish smokehouse official added that while there is “free trade”
between the Faroese salmon farming company and his firm, the EU’s
dumping investigation against the Faroes may change this. He was referring
to the recent EU decision to investigate Norway, Chile and the Faroes for
dumping farmed salmon on EU markets below the MIP.83
An official with the Faroese salmon farming firm (discussed above) noted
the importance of the Danish smokehouse in order for his firm to have access
to the EU market.84 But he added that dependence on this market is lessen-
ing, owing to increasing levels of local consumption. He stated, “[N]ormally
around 30 percent is sold domestically, but it is a more safe business to sell
on the Faroes. You get better prices here compared to export, but only small
changes on the market may change this.”85 This company currently sells
more than 50 percent of its output on the Faroes. The company official
noted this to be unusual.86
The Faroese salmon farming company in question also has no HACCP
system in place. Every worker on each of the firm’s grow-out sites is required
to work according to the company’s fish quality handbook.87 The company
official indicated that customers (such as the Danish smokehouse) know
where the fish is coming from and do not ask for food quality inspections.88
He added that, despite the EU food policy, he has not seen anyone at “any of
his sites doing any kind of inspection.”89
Nevertheless, EU inspections of Danish seafood processing plants would
most likely involve farmed salmon imports from the Faroes. These com-
ments by the Faroese salmon farming company official may point to some
limitations in the reach of EU food policy, but an official with a seafood
marketing company stated that their new processing plant in the town of
Fuglafjørður is the first in the Faroes with HACCP approval.90 He also
noted that the firm is asked about dioxins and GMOs in salmon and trout,
but such quotations are more likely to come from the Japanese.91 The
important point is that the entry of HACCP through this seafood marketing
company may entail a greater push by the EU to use this as a standard
required by other Faroese producers. Yet this remains to be seen.
In comparison to Norway, the absence of a greater EU presence in the
Faroes may be due to the much smaller production that the Faroes places on
EU markets. These comparative differences mean that we may need to
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question the degree to which the EU’s supranational “state” is contributing
to the erosion of national sovereignty as trade liberalization increases.92
Next we examine the contribution of the EU’s food safety regulations to
“buyer-driven” global food chains. While these pose structural constraints
that act to confine producers, we provide evidence that shows how a combi-
nation of national regulations and resilient communities in Norway and the
Faroes continues to provide possibilities as salmon farmers seek to maintain
access to EU markets.
Food safety, global food chains and coastal communities
Food safety and global food chains
The food safety requirements in national, EU and WTO rules are not
“neutral” criteria. While these requirements establish a “level playing field”
in international trade, food safety legislation stands testimony to an axiom
in the sociology of law that legal equality can have unequal consequences.
Henson and Loader argue that SPS requirements impose harsh burdens on
developing countries. They lack the resources necessary to meet food safety
laws, and face the possibility of having their exports rejected in the markets
of developed countries. Developing countries single out the EU as a particu-
larly difficult market when it comes to food safety requirements.93 To that
end, the EU’s new food safety legislation is taking into account the need to
assist developing countries when it comes to fully incorporating food safety
laws into their national legislation.94 However, this does not entail that all
of the players in industrialized nations necessarily have equal access when it
comes to meeting food requirements. To that end, some firms and peripheral
regions within industrialized states may need “upgrading assistance” in
order to secure better access to markets such as the EU.95
The need to upgrade is not exclusively determined by national and inter-
national food standards. Such standards work in conjunction with other
trends. First, as many analysts have noted, power has shifted to actors in the
food chain further removed from direct production. This includes processors,
but especially retailers. Global food chains are now “buyer driven.” This
means that pricing and food quality standards are determined by retail
giants that transfer their demands downstream to processors and produc-
ers.96 Retail firms and international standards such as HACCP, SPS and the
EU’s food policies act as “lead drivers” in the governance of food chains.
These set standards that must be met by other actors in the chain. Such
standards also include sanctions. National producer associations often act as
“chain upgraders” by providing industry members with technical support in
order to meet international requirements.97
The concentration in power upstream in global food chains often influ-
ences economies of scale among downstream producers and processors. This
is especially true for the Chilean salmon farming industry, which operates in
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a neoliberal environment.98 First, in the midst of low retail prices in the
mid-1990s, the world’s two largest feed companies moved forward in the
farmed salmon commodity chain and acquired grow-out sites. One feed
company absorbed firms in Norway, Scotland, Ireland, Canada and Chile.
Another acquired one of Chile’s largest salmon farming companies. This was
matched by greater concentration among the owners of grow-out sites. For
example, Fjord Seafoods acquired two large vertically integrated salmon
farming companies in Chile.99 It also made investments throughout Norway
and made linkages with Pieters, a large Belgian food retailer. Pan Fish, a
company formed in the aftermath of the collapse of the Fish Farmers’ Sales
Organisation (FOS) in 1992, also made huge investments in Norway and in
other salmon farming jurisdictions.100 Pan Fish invested in pelagic vessels in
Norway and the Faroes.101 Our Norwegian interviewees noted that Pan Fish
also invested in a “failed” feed processing facility. The obvious objective in
Pan Fish’s strategies was to secure control of a salmon farming chain that
connected pelagic vessels, fishmeal companies, feed plants and salmon
farming firms in order to compete in global markets.
It appears that this combination of international and national food stand-
ards and growing concentration in “buyer-driven” food chains places both
small-scale firms and more peripheral communities in a precarious position.
Yet a combination of state supports and “embedded communities” act as
countervailing trends to these globalizing forces.
Norway
In Norway, the state relaxed ownership requirements in the wake of the
1992 collapse of the FOS, but still maintained rules that discouraged exces-
sive concentration. The acquisition strategies of Pan Fish and Fjord Seafoods
are limited by rules that cap the concentration of licenses at both the
national and county level. In an August 2002 interview, an aquaculture offi-
cial with the Directorate of Fisheries noted:
The maximum number of concessions for salmon and trout is 15 percent
of the [national total]. There are actually three levels. If you want to
have more than 10 percent of the maximum total you need a special
application. It will be very difficult to get this through. But if that is
OK, you need a new application. The government has to approve if you
pass 15 percent. But you cannot have more than 50 percent in a
county.102
As a result, salmon farming companies and concessions are dispersed
throughout Norway. In 2000, 194 firms held rights to 854 grow-out sites in
Norway.103 Although fifteen firms controlled nearly 40 percent of all conces-
sions, there were 154 firms with five or fewer concessions.104 In addition, the
less populous northern counties of Troms and Finnmark held nearly 17
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percent (n144) of all grow-out sites.105 According to two officials with the
NHK, the dispersion of licenses to the northern counties is a deliberate
strategy on the part of the Norwegian state.106 Moreover, the official with
the Directorate of Fisheries noted that in the northern counties there is more
room, which facilitates the separation of sites by a distance of 3–5 kilome-
ters.107 In the south, the minimum distance is one kilometer, and this is
often difficult to enforce, owing to the concentration of sites. For example,
populous Hordaland County has 139 sites – almost the same number as the
thinly populated northern counties.108
The rules on ownership and minimum site distance between salmon
farms act as forces that can minimize the impact of globalizing food safety
trends and economic concentration in the food industry. First, the already
economically troubled fish farming giants have to limit their investments in
each of the Norwegian counties. This means that they cannot completely
undermine the efforts of small-scale producers. Second, the minimum dis-
tance requirements between salmon farms entail that farms further north
have a better chance to avoid the diseases that come with overcrowding.
Thus, the disadvantages of distance potentially can be overcome by having
fewer disease problems and better fish quality. And given the lower prices of
salmon in international markets, firms that concentrate on production may
be better situated than those that pursue an integrated strategy.
But challenges do exist for communities in the northern counties of
Troms and Finnmark. In an August 2002 interview, an official with the
Directorate of Fisheries noted that these northern counties are where the
bulk of forty new licenses would be allocated in the fall of 2002.109 These
cost nearly NOK5 million. The cost is NOK4 million in Troms and Finn-
mark counties.110 An IntraFish reporter noted that ten licenses allocated to
Finnmark county were “redeemed in the first round, and companies had to
decline in the counties of Troms, Rogaland and Møre og Romsdal. Exorbi-
tant license duties and high risks were given for the refusals.” Officials with
the Norwegian salmon farming industry did not approve of this latest round
in license allocations. They were especially concerned with the expiry of the
EU–Norway Salmon Agreement and the implications that a new round of
licenses would have for the MIP in a new agreement.111
While consistent with Norway’s decentralized aquaculture policy, these
new investments may create more anxiety in EU markets over the
“dumping” of salmon. The north suffered greatly during the overproduction
crisis of the early 1990s, and many small-scale firms collapsed. Some
attribute this to overproduction and the cold storage policy of FOS.112
In short, EU food safety laws in the context of the current crisis in the
global salmon farming industry will make it difficult for new salmon
farming companies to emerge in peripheral Norwegian communities. A
better strategy may be enhancing the prospects of existing firms. Moreover,
the “shakedown” in large companies that is on the horizon may create
opportunities for more solvent smaller-scale players. But in the context of
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the regional divisions between north and south in Norway, the allocation of
existing licenses is politically an expeditious strategy.113
In addition to state policies, embedded communities can act to buffer the
consequences of globalization. Despite the pressures of economies of scale in
Austevoll, Norway, most of the firms there are embedded in the local
community. While these firms feel the effects of the “cost-price” and regula-
tory squeeze, the history of entrepreneurship in this community is a pivotal
dimension that cannot be ignored. A municipal official, echoing Weber,
speaks of the role of “Pietism” and learning about the fishing industry at a
young age as being critical to Austevoll’s well-being.114
In addition, there is a network of aquaculture, fishing, fish processing and
fish supply firms. Aquaculture, in conjunction with pelagic fisheries, gives
Austevoll a diversity of fish products that are marketed to places as wide-
ranging as Spain, Poland and Russia. Further, two of the larger aquaculture
firms have investments throughout Hordaland county.115 These are coupled
with investments abroad. Business operators espouse competition, but note
that “informal ties” are important in that they assist other businesses during
times of need. This pertains to issues such as the “exchange of equipment”
necessary for day-to-day operations in the event that a competitor has equip-
ment in need of repair. Another Austevoll salmon farmer noted that salmon
farming companies also have a collective tradition of working together in
negotiating a deal for fish feed in order to ensure that all firms received the
best possible price. Yet he indicated that the impact of economic concentra-
tion by outside forces has resulted in changes to the community whereby the
two largest local producers are no longer interested in cooperating with the
smaller salmon farms in securing a common agreement on feed purchases.116
Thus, while EU and corporate food safety laws present challenges in the
short term, the local business community may be embedded enough to
survive in the long term. The question is the degree to which food safety
laws in conjunction with the international restructuring of the salmon
farming industry may undermine the balance between “competition” and
“intracommunity” cooperation in Austevoll.117
Austevoll depends upon imported labor in processing plants. In
Austevoll, young Swedish (largely female) workers come to work in the pro-
cessing of pelagics. These processing plants operate on a seasonal basis. An
official with a large salmon farming company stated,
[I]t is pretty easy to find workers for the processing plant. It is more
popular than for instance Gilde [the meat company], because you get
the opportunity to work a lot of hours in the fishing industry. The
payment per hour is about NOK100 [CDN$20], but there are a lot of
extras like overtime.
Austevoll residents are more likely to work in farmed salmon processing
plants that operate on a yearly basis.118 In 2001, there were 2,254
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individuals employed (ages 16–74) in Austevoll, and nearly 16 percent
(n358) were from outside the community. Over one-third of all the latter
(n124) came from another country.119
If the current trend of low market prices continues, and if there are addi-
tional costs associated with meeting food safety requirements, we may
witness changes in the Austevoll labor market. As noted earlier, an owner of
an Austevoll salmon farm indicated that it is easier to save on production
costs than it is to increase market prices. Two of the main production costs
in salmon farming are feed and labor. Given that the feed in Austevoll is
purchased from one of the three large fish feed companies, this means that
production savings are equivalent to reducing labor costs. If this is the case,
the labor-saving costs will come from increasing “efficiencies” either on
grow-out sites or in plants that process farmed salmon. One result could be
the gradual substitution of higher-priced local labor with lower-paid immi-
grant labor. Thus, immigrant labor may increase in year-round salmon pro-
cessing lines, as is the current case for seasonal pelagic processing lines.
Another result could be the substitution of labor by increased automation in
fish processing plants. If either scenario occurs (or both), this will change the
nature of the labor market. While these are possibilities, the critical point is
that food safety regulations combined with low market prices can have local-
ized impacts on labor markets. Furthermore, there is consolidation in the
Austevoll salmon farming industry, and with this may come the need for
reduced labor costs. Firms may be able to adjust to these realities of global-
ization, but the adjustment may come at the expense of the life chances of
local workers.
The Faroes
EU food safety laws and economic concentration in the international salmon
farming industry arguably pose greater challenges for the Faroes. Faroese
producers are more distant from EU markets. However, as we have argued
above, EU regulations have not fully impacted upon Faroese production. In
addition, the Faroese version of social democracy and community embedded-
ness underscores the resilience of this nation in the face of globalizing forces.
Like Norway, the Faroes imposes limitations on salmon farming conces-
sions. Ownership rules restrict voting and “decisive influence” “in all grow-
out sites to 25 percent of the grow-out licenses, as well as 25 percent of the
total shares and voting rights in all grow-out licenses in the Faroes.”120 In
addition, no outside firm is allowed more than one-third of the voting rights
and shares in a Faroese fish farm.121
The end result is that while the number of firms declined after the eco-
nomic crisis of the early 1990s, there are both local and external limitations
on the concentration of capital. Since 1990, the restructured aquaculture
industry has been characterized by a diverse spatial and industrial structure.
This ranges from firms that are spatially concentrated and vertically integ-
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rated to ones that are spatially dispersed and horizontally integrated.122
Thus, while mergers occurred after 1990, vertical integration became only
one of a number of strategies. Nevertheless, one of Austevoll’s largest firms
and Pan Fish have investments in Faroese pelagic vessels.123 These invest-
ments may be within the letter of Faroese law; however, in the long term the
question is the leverage that a substantial concentration of minority owner-
ship may have upon the Faroes.124
In the Faroes, aquaculture is an example of “embedded entrepreneurship,”
in that investments made are “nested” in the communities in question. The
industry easily adapts to the traditional lifestyles of Faroese coastal
communities. The vertical integration in the Faroese fishing and aquaculture
industries reached limits in the early 1990s.125 The result was the threat of
widespread closures of fishing plants, in addition to rising unemployment
and out-migration (especially to Denmark). However, a combination of
institutional and community investments in the 1990s turned the Faroese
economy around. In place of “Faroese Fordism,” a more diversified industrial
and service sector was created. Vertical integration was replaced by more
flexible contractual relationships between harvesting, processing and mar-
keting firms. Firms such as Faroe Seafoods link harvesters, fish farms and
processors to EU markets.126 Intracommunity ties, and networks with “out-
siders,” improved the life chances for residents on the islands of Sandoy and
Vágoy.127 Hovgaard argues that a networking economy is slowly emerging
on the Faroes. This builds on a tradition “of community entrepreneurship
and locally derived supporting structures . . . supplemented and strength-
ened with direct and multifaceted global linkages.”128 This networking is
occurring in several Faroese coastal communities.129
What are the implications of this for meeting the challenges of food
safety laws and economic concentration? Faroese law has acted to maintain
local ownership over grow-out sites. Moreover, this control, combined with
interfirm networking and linkages to global markets, shows that vertical
integration is not a necessary condition for interfacing with the global
economy. A major challenge may come with the need to accept the importa-
tion of ova and smolts from the EU. This will occur if Faroese farmed
salmon production is to increase. The importation of ova and smolts from
the EU raises the safety threshold for all producers. It is here that the
Faroese government may have to intervene with resources to ensure that
imported ova and smolts pose minimal risks for producers.
Faroese ingenuity weathered the economic storm of the early 1990s and
there is no reason why it cannot address further challenges. One of these
challenges is the need to mitigate disease problems. To date, Faroese pro-
ducers have wisely monopolized the better grow-out sites, and the riskier
sites (those with poorer water exchange and disease problems) have invest-
ments by foreign firms.130 Nevertheless, all Faroese producers (local and with
foreign investments) are facing the consequences of an outbreak of infectious
salmon anemia (ISA). Officials with two local firms view this as one of their
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biggest challenges.131 An official with a large salmon farming company
noted that while his firm can withstand the current low price for farmed
salmon (around CDN$5 in 2002), ISA is a serious problem that will nega-
tively impact upon all salmon farming businesses in the Faroes.132 An official
with another firm indicated that “[t]he quality of Faroese salmon has
decreased since the problem with the ISA started. The producers are forced
to slaughter at certain times, which makes the quality various even within
the same site.”133
After our field research (2002 and 2003), the ISA crisis intensified and
spread throughout the Faroese archipelago. This disease, which is not pecu-
liar to the salmon farming industry, was unknown on the Faroes until
2001.134 At the time of the outbreak, the Faroes was producing 30,000
tonnes; this rose from 56,000 to 58,000 tonnes in 2003. In 2005, the pro-
duction is estimated to be 10,000 tonnes. One of the remaining success
stories is the locally owned feed company Havsbrún. A Norwegian interest
is currently (January 2005) attempting to acquire majority ownership of this
company.135
Føroya Banki, the largest shareholder in Faroese aquaculture, expects
salmon exports to further decline because of the continuing ISA crisis and
low export prices. The bank anticipates that exports of salmon will be zero
tonnes in 2006; a few thousand tonnes of trout are expected to be
exported.136 On the latter note, one of the Faroes’ largest aquaculture com-
panies (Vestsalmon) exports 2,000–3,000 tonnes of trout to Japan. A direc-
tor with that company expects the salmon aquaculture industry to rebound
once diseases have run their course. He noted that “[t]he Faroe Islands has a
marine environment that is ideal for aquaculture, and the balance between
supply and demand will improve in the future.”137 Despite the pessimism of
Føroya Bank; and the optimism of Vestsalmon, in order for the Faroese
salmon aquaculture industry to rebound, it needs to use a vaccine in order to
minimize the impact of further outbreaks of ISA. The EC gave clearance to
use that vaccine in August 2004.138
Finally, as is the case for Norway, the Faroes experienced low unemploy-
ment levels in the early part 2000s. At the time, the country depended on
imported labor for some of its salmon processing establishments. An inter-
esting irony here is that the southern island of Suðuroy, which experienced
high unemployment and rivalry between its two largest towns in the early
to mid-1990s,139 imported female Thai workers to process farmed salmon.
At the time, these women were employed elsewhere in the Faroes in the salt
fish industry. Some of these women married locals and integrated into the
day-to-day life on Suðuroy. However, with the rise in unemployment levels
in the wake of the ISA crisis and other problems in the seafood sector, the
“guest workers” have become part of the “political debate” on where the
Faroes is go next. The fish factory that employed these women has closed. As
a result, the long-term prospect for these immigrant women remains to be
seen.140 The key is how these immigrants will be treated in the midst of eco-
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nomic decline. The future of Faroese social democracy may be partially
judged on how such workers are treated, as the nation’s farmed salmon is
processed for global markets.
Conclusion
We have argued that the EU’s food safety laws have implications for Norway
and the Faroes. Exports to EU markets are increasingly judged by food
safety criteria that impose traceability throughout the food chain. As a
result, the EU’s international standards are incorporated into national legis-
lation. On the surface, this seems to fit with arguments that growing trade
liberalization is being matched by a greater integration of environmental
and food safety standards. The end result is a further contribution to global-
ization.141 This is matched by greater power in food chains by feed giants,
grow-out giants and international food retailers.
Globalization is not simply an all-encompassing force that diminishes the
power of nation-states and buttresses the power of supranational institu-
tions. Nation-states still have considerable leverage in structuring both the
shape of their civil societies and the ways in which actors participate in the
global economy.142 Norwegian and Faroese versions of social democracy
instituted policies that have limited the powers of large-scale interests in the
salmon farming industry. To be sure, there have been economic crises (espe-
cially in the early 1990s) that resulted in the decline in small firms and
greater economies of scale, but a great degree of decentralization (geographic
and economic) is part of the aquaculture industry in both nations. In fact,
the recent problems of Pan Fish and Fjord Seafood bear testimony to the
limits of economies of scale.
Firms that avoid the forward integration complexes of feed giants are in a
better position to weather economic downturns. Economies of scale, coupled
with international regulatory pressures and low prices on export markets, are
a recipe for disaster. Firms with loose connections to feed companies and
exporters avoid being caught in a food chain that leaves them with little
leverage. A perpetual lesson in seafood industries is that monopolies based
upon single product lines have a precarious existence.143
In addition, a closer examination of coastal communities shows that
community entrepreneurship and interfirm networking gives communities
the ability to maintain linkages with export markets even in the face of
international food standards and economic concentration. This is true for
both Norway and the Faroes. In fact, a more immediate challenge for the
latter is the need to revitalize aquaculture in the aftermath of the current
ISA outbreak. Food safety laws only matter if farmed salmon can survive the
grow-out period.
The EU’s food safety laws will present a constant challenge for Norway
and the Faroes. The Norwegian fish farming industry favors EU member-
ship, if only to avoid the constant negotiations of the MIP and border
Food safety and farmed salmon 405
inspections to guarantee food safety. Furthermore, while the enlargement of
the EU from fifteen to twenty-five members may temporarily stretch EU
food inspection resources, the expanded EU includes nations with coastal
resources (such as Estonia and Poland) that may want to challenge the
seafood exports of Norway and the Faroes.
The precautionary principle at the heart of EU food policy has social costs
that need to be attended to by Faroese and Norwegian policy-makers. If
existing and new firms need to upgrade to HACCP and other food safety
requirements, institutional assistance may be required. In the current
context of low market prices, the absence of such assistance may mean that
upgrading costs will be downloaded on the labor forces of coastal
communities. If this becomes the case, the forces of globalization will under-
mine the redistributive benefits of social democracy. Nevertheless, Norwe-
gian and Faroese policy-makers have faced similar challenges in the past, and
one should not underestimate their ability to provide localized benefits in
the midst of standardized globalization.
Prior to concluding this chapter, it is pertinent to ask about the possible
consequences of the EU’s food policy for coastal communities in other
nation-states. The coastal communities of Canada serve as a good example.
While the current mandatory labeling policy for GM foods is of more
concern to Canadian agricultural producers, given Canada’s position as one
of the world’s largest producers of GM foods,144 the EU’s GMO policies have
consequences for Canadian seafood producers too. They may reinforce Cana-
dian dependence on the US market.
Although Norwegian and Faroese farmed salmon producers have a
significant presence in EU markets, Canadian production is overwhelmingly
exported to the United States. In 2002, 70 percent (85,400 tonnes) of
Canada’s farmed salmon production (Atlantic and Pacific) was in British
Columbia, and 95 percent of this was exported to the United States.145 The
remainder of Canada’s production of farmed salmon (all Atlantic) is largely
in New Brunswick (with smaller quantities in Nova Scotia, and Newfound-
land and Labrador).146 These provinces also send significant shipments to the
United States. In addition, access to the US market is being structured by
adherence to the Anti-Terrorism Act. This bio-security provision is of concern
to Atlantic Canadian seafood exporters, given that the original wording
included a twenty-four-hour notification period for seafood exports to the
United States. This had negative implications for the just-in-time delivery
process that is crucial for seafood exporters. This was reduced to two hours
on 12 December 2003.147
Given this dependence on the US market, one would think that farmed
salmon producers, especially those in eastern Canada, would have a large
interest in securing access to EU markets. However, while food safety stand-
ards such as HACCP are emphasized in recent aquaculture policy pro-
posals,148 this may not be enough to secure entry into EU markets. Chile has
signed a free trade deal with the EU, and farmed salmon from that country
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has already (albeit in small quantities) secured a foothold in EU markets.149
Perhaps only increased expansion of farmed salmon consumption in the EU
may provide an avenue for farmed salmon exports from Canada. Further-
more, with the possibility of transgenic fish being produced in commercial
quantities in Canada in the next decade, such production will most likely be
centered on the American market. This is the case even if fish farmers volun-
tarily adopt labeling.150 While eastern Canada is best positioned geographi-
cally to enter EU markets, its colder waters make it a likely candidate for
transgenic fish that can survive at subzero temperatures. If there is a rapid
shift to such fish in order to enhance survival capabilities and thereby reduce
losses from “flash freezes,” this will reinforce a continuing dependence on the
US market.151
In summary, while the Norwegian and Faroese states have the necessary
leverage to continue exporting to EU markets, even in the midst of more
stringent EU food policies, the same cannot be said for Canada. The future
direction of farmed salmon production Canada will most likely reinforce
that country’s dependence on the US market. This is at a time when major
farmed salmon producers such as Norway and Chile are actively diversifying
their export markets.152
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13 Transgenic fish
Some Canadian regulatory issues
Douglas Moodie
Introduction
We live in a world inundated with transformative technologies. One of
those is the genetic modification of living organisms for food purposes.
Huge increases in the acreage of genetically modified (GM) crops have
occurred since the mid-1990s.1 More than 175 million hectares worldwide
have now had GM crops grown on them at one time or another.2 This “first
generation” of GM food crops has consisted of plants with few and relatively
straightforward trait changes. But this is likely to change soon.3 It has been
estimated that “the global market for biotechnology applications will reach
[CDN]$50 billion annually by 2005 . . . and the strongest growth is pro-
jected for the agri-food sector.”4
The research and production emphasis in the international sphere, as in
the domestic one, has so far been heavily geared to GM plants and the
human food and livestock feed derived from those plants. Work involving
GM animals lags far behind that involving plants.5 Technical issues, includ-
ing the greater complexities of animal biological systems, are in part
responsible for this. The development of transgenic fish6 represents some-
thing of an exception to this situation. Research on transgenic fish com-
menced several decades ago and “has occurred at a very rapid pace.”7 By
2000, as many as thirty-five different species of fish had been the subject of
genetic manipulation.8 The first transgenic fish research in Canada was
focused on an antifreeze protein gene to permit the rearing of Atlantic
salmon in the icy waters off Canada’s east coast.9 The majority of Canadian
research, however, has been on increasing growth rates, with almost all the
effort directed at Atlantic and Pacific salmon.10 This research has produced a
genetically altered Atlantic salmon that has a growth rate reputed to be as
much as 600 percent greater than its non-GM counterpart.11 Technological
breakthroughs hold out the promise of revolutionizing the commercial pro-
duction of salmon, and perhaps numerous other species. So far, though,
transgenic fish remain at the pre-commercial stage.12
GM foods have fueled significant discourse, in Canada and abroad, in
recent years. Two major contemporary Canadian studies of biotech food
regulation have resulted. First, in August 2002 the Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee (CBAC)13 issued a report on the regulation of GM
foods in Canada. The CBAC Report followed almost two years of research,
stakeholder and public consultations, and public comments on specific draft
recommendations presented in an interim report published in August of
2001. Second, the Royal Society of Canada (Royal Society)14 in early 2000
assembled an Expert Panel (Royal Society Expert Panel) to provide advice on
certain food biotechnology15 regulatory issues. The Royal Society Expert
Panel issued its report in January 2001. The federal government published
an action plan16 in response to the Royal Society Report, as well as six (to
January 2005) progress reports17 on that action plan.
The CBAC and Royal Society Reports, together with the action plan and
progress reports, represent intensive Canadian government-sponsored initi-
atives to study the issues swirling around GM foods.18 The heightened
attention paid to GM foods in Canada in the past three years or so has been
prompted by several factors. First, as already mentioned, recent leaps in
biotechnology have the potential to make available a much greater array of
GM foods, with more complex characteristics, than the world has previously
known.19 Second, there are growing economic20 and social21 forces urging
the broad acceptance and usage of GM foods and food products. Third, there
is a fast-evolving awareness among the consuming public of the presence of
GM foods and food products in their diets, of the potential for significant
increases in that presence, and of the health, environmental and
social/ethical issues connected with GM foods and food products.22
The purpose of this chapter is to examine aspects of the Canadian regula-
tion, present and prospective, of transgenic fish. The emphasis of the exami-
nation is on three interconnected regulatory areas: food safety,
environmental protection and consumer choice.23 Transgenic fish regulation
in Canada represents a discrete and valuable area of study for several reasons.
The first is that research organizations with strong Canadian ties have been
at the forefront of global efforts to develop the commercial potential of
transgenic fish.24 The second is that Canada has an already significant aqua-
culture industry that is poised, some predict, to grow exponentially in
future decades.25 Third, the emergence of an explicit, broad discourse
regarding GM foods creates a backdrop that inevitably will influence, one
way or another, any integration of transgenic fish into Canada’s traditional
aquaculture industry. This combination of factors suggests that the Cana-
dian experience, and the decisions ultimately made by Canada vis-à-vis com-
mercial production of transgenic fish, will be both intrinsically interesting
and of instructional value to other nations traveling similar paths.
The first part of this chapter considers the international background and
the laws, policies and mechanisms developed and continuing to be
developed by the global community to address food safety, environmental
protection and consumer choice issues relating to GM foods (and, particu-
larly, transgenic fish). The second part of the chapter looks at the domestic
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situation. What regulatory structures and procedures are currently in place?
How have international initiatives and directives been incorporated, or hold
promise to be incorporated, in the Canadian context? To what extent has the
recent governmental and extra-governmental attention paid to GM food
issues so far shaped Canada’s regulatory structures and procedures? How
might one expect those structures and procedures to be affected, both by the
formal government-sponsored discourse and by broader societal forces and
opinions? How might the answers to the foregoing “GM food” questions
vary, if at all, for transgenic fish?
The chapter ultimately attempts some conclusions on the sort of regula-
tory regime commercial transgenic fish producers might expect to face in
Canada in three to five years, and beyond. It also offers some thoughts on the
critical factors that may make the difference between a future multi-billion-
dollar industry and one that never gets off the proverbial drawing board.
International laws, policies and mechanisms
Overview
The international context of GM food regulation is a complex one, involving
various organizations each with its own unique mandate and agenda. The
CBAC Report identifies several international bodies that are currently
involved in “the coordination and regulation of biotechnology products.”26
These include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World
Health Organization (WHO), the Codex Alimentarius Commission,27 the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Secretariat of the Convention
on Biological Diversity.28 These bodies “cover a spectrum of functions from
. . . set[ting] science-based standards to . . . broader objectives such as food
security, trade facilitation, environmental protection, and other social and
political goals.”29 It is the stated view of the CBAC that Canada demon-
strates active participation in all these international bodies, and “at times
lead[s] the efforts to develop international consensus on matters of science,
governance and/or policy.”30 Over the past three or four years, this plethora
of international organizations, along with several expert panels and commis-
sions in various states, has produced numerous reports on regulatory issues
related to GM foods.31 Of the several international organizations involved
with GM food regulation, three seem to be particularly conspicuous. They
are the FAO, WHO and WTO.
Food safety
The existing international regimes and procedures for monitoring and regu-
lating food safety are extensive and well established, though they do not
much differentiate between GM and non-GM foods. It can be anticipated,
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therefore, that transgenic fish will be treated, at the international level, in a
manner similar to that applied to any novel food product. International food
safety regulation seems to have two facets: one is centered on the develop-
ment and dissemination of food standards and guidelines; the other has a
strong trade orientation. The precise interaction of these two facets is not an
easy thing to discern.
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) is at the heart of the food
standards/guidelines facet of the international regulatory effort. Codex has
been at its task for more than four decades. Its secretariat is provided by
the FAO and WHO. Codex is an intergovernmental body with 165
member countries.32 Its primary functions are stated to be “protect[ing]
the health of consumers, ensur[ing] fair practices in food trade and
promot[ing] the coordination of food standards.”33 The explicit “food
trade” function indicates that the Codex Alimentarius Commission’s
mandate may blur into those of the WTO and its related bodies. It is not
abundantly clear what Codex does, independent of the WTO regime, to
ensure “fair trade practices in the food trade.” It may be that this trade
aspect of Codex’s mandate is a holdover from a period before the WTO
took primary jurisdictional control over trade-related matters in the inter-
national forum. On the other hand, with the involvement of Codex in the
establishment of global food labeling rules,34 there exists an inextricable
connection with trade issues. Whether or not a product is labeled, and
what the content of that labeling is, have a direct bearing on the inter-
national trade in that product.
The FAO and WHO have furnished to the international community
“expert scientific advice on the food safety aspects of foods derived from
biotechnology since 1991.”35 The FAO and WHO, through Codex in 1999
established the ad hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from
Biotechnology (the CAC Task Force). The stated objective of the CAC Task
Force is to consider the health and nutritional implications of biotech foods
and, in particular, to
develop standards, guidelines or recommendations, as appropriate, for
foods derived from biotechnology or traits introduced into foods by
biotechnology, on the basis of scientific evidence, risk analysis and
having regard, where appropriate, to other legitimate factors relevant to
the health of consumers and the promotion of fair trade practices.36
Again one sees the “fair trade practices” angle occupying a central place. The
CAC Task Force submitted reports to Codex in 2001, 2002 and 2003.37
The joint FAO/WHO work on the human health evaluation of GM foods
uses for its scientific foundation a series of expert consultations on the safety
and nutritional aspects of such foods. These expert consultations are stated
to be “completely independent from the inter-government negotiation
process, and treat the subject from a pure scientific perspective.”38 They aim
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to furnish scientific advice, to review existing GM food assessment strategies
and to offer recommendations on further research and evaluation needs.39
The structure of Codex’s approach to the assessment of biotech foods
starts with science-orientated output from various expert consultative
bodies. That output typically moves to the CAC Task Force, which uses it to
help mold standards, guidelines and recommendations for ultimate
consideration by the Commission as a whole. The overall process seems com-
prehensive, if somewhat lumbering. And it is directed at constantly moving
targets, as different foods with different characteristics produced through
different means stream onto the stage. Ultimately, Codex does no more than
gather and disseminate information about the “potential benefits and pos-
sible risks associated with the application of modern technologies to increase
plant and animal productivity and production.”40 It is left to the govern-
ments of individual states to create and implement their own policies
regarding these technologies. They can wholeheartedly embrace the Codex’s
standards, guidelines and recommendations, disregard them completely or
use them with whatever modifications they consider appropriate.
Notwithstanding the non-binding status of Codex’s efforts, they are
significant for a couple of reasons. First, the scientific information generated
has a great deal of value for developing states that do not have the financial
and/or technical means to do their own science. Even for states that do, the
scientific information emanating from Codex can serve as the basis for policy
decisions or, at the least, for further independent research efforts. Second,
the standards and guidelines set by Codex have persuasive international force
because of the multilateral process involved and the level of expertise drawn
upon. States that set up standards that substantially exceed those recom-
mended by Codex do so at the risk of incurring domestic and/or inter-
national criticism for “overdoing it.” Conversely, states that have standards
markedly below those suggested by Codex greatly increase the chances of
domestic complaints and/or of actions abroad to block entry of their “sub-
standard” products. To the extent, therefore, that the Codex food safety
assessment process is viewed as scientifically legitimate and independent of
distorting factors (such as political ones) – and that, by and large, seems to
be the case at the present time – what it has to say about biotech foods will
carry serious weight.
Environmental protection
From an environmental perspective, the difficulty with transgenic fish is
that no one yet has much idea what impact they might have on natural
ecosystems. Regulatory initiatives are therefore to a large extent “grasping at
shadows.” Some environmentalists suggest scenarios of catastrophic propor-
tions. Greenpeace Canada, presently the most active Canadian environ-
mental non-governmental organization (ENGO) on the topic of GM food,
considers the genetic alteration of fish to be “high risk technology with
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potentially disastrous consequences if the GE fish escape into the environ-
ment.”41 Citing past experience with invasive species and specific research
findings on transgenic fish, Greenpeace Canada has suggested that “even a
single fertile GE fish could be sufficient to destroy a local population under
certain circumstances.”42 The Royal Society Expert Panel, not so dramati-
cally disposed as Greenpeace, nevertheless underscored the serious dearth of
information available. It concluded that “[b]ased on the limited research
that has been published to date . . . there is little, if any, empirical basis
upon which one can reliably predict the outcome of interactions between
wild and GM fish.”43 The complicating factor with this issue is the difficulty
involved in achieving a satisfactory level of assurance, given that the only
real way of doing so is to engage in comprehensive field trials – inherently
risky business.
The research to date on the overall effects of transgenesis of fish shows
“deleterious consequences to fish morphology, respiratory capacity, and loco-
motion associated with the introduction of growth hormone (GH) gene con-
structs in some transgenic variants of salmonids, notably Pacific and
Atlantic salmon.”44 The concern here is that transgenic fish that cannot
swim, forage or breathe properly not only may have difficulty thriving in a
fish farm setting, but, if released into the environment, intentionally or not,
could have detrimental effects on native populations through the exchange
of genetic material (“introgression”). Escapes from aquatic fish farms are
common,45 and so any rearing of transgenic fish in sea-based open net-cages
can be anticipated to result in environmental incursions of significant
numbers of those fish. In addition to the concerns surrounding introgression,
escaped transgenic fish might also have more direct and immediate ecosys-
tem impacts through “hyper-predation” (eating everything in sight) and
migration to novel habitats.
The international concern with protecting the environment from adverse
effects of GM fish has both general and specific aspects. On the general side,
since at least 1992 the concept of “precaution” has guided the international
approach to environmental stewardship. What is now commonly referred to
as the “precautionary principle” or “precautionary approach” was enshrined
as, and seemingly popularized by, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development.46 While the Rio Declaration was not the
first time the idea of a principle of precaution found its way into an inter-
national agreement,47 it certainly seems to have been energized by Rio. The
broad acceptance of the Rio Declaration among states and the steady perco-
lation of its concepts and principles downward into the strata of citizenry of
those states lends support to the suggestion that the Rio Declaration
represented a kind of international “codification” of the precautionary prin-
ciple. In the decade since Rio, reference to the precautionary
principle/approach in the international environmental arena has become
increasingly common. Academics have noted the precautionary principle’s
incorporation “in virtually every recently adopted treaty and policy docu-
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ment related to the protection and preservation of the environment.”48 Even
some members of the international judiciary have taken “precaution” into
their lexicon.49
Notwithstanding the broad international acceptance of the precautionary
principle, there remains uncertainty as to precisely what it embodies. It is
said to represent a “better safe than sorry” attitude and approach. It has
generated voluminous literature, with legal scholars toing and froing on its
precise meaning and utility. There is no consensus; indeed, the views of
academia on the precautionary principle seem to span the spectrum. Some
commentators have categorized it as a tool of great import in ongoing efforts
to protect the environment; others have dismissed it as being too loose and
ambiguous to be of any real use.50
Specific rules and standards aimed at protecting the environment from
possible negative ramifications of transgenic fish have emerged and/or
evolved in the international forum. Bodies charged with creating and pro-
mulgating these rules and standards have adopted “precaution” as their
mantra. The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO),51
the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES),52 and the
FAO have all become directly involved in the business of safeguarding the
seas from unwanted infiltration by GM fish.
In 1997, the Council of NASCO, its governing body, agreed to certain
guidelines relating to the development of transgenic salmon.53 The NASCO
Guidelines obligate convention parties to, among other things, “take all pos-
sible actions to ensure that the use of transgenic salmon, in any part of the
NASCO Convention Area, is confined to secure, self-contained, land-based
facilities” and to “advise the NASCO Council of any proposal to permit the
rearing of transgenic salmonids and provide details of the proposed method
of containment and other measures to safeguard the wild stocks.”54
In September 1995, ICES enacted its Code of Practice on the Introduc-
tions and Transfers of Marine Organisms,55 which requires that “wherever
feasible, initial releases of GMOs be reproductively sterile in order to mini-
mize impacts on the genetic structure of natural populations.”56 The Royal
Society Report noted that
the Working Group of ICES that deals specifically with transgenic
organisms issued, in 1997, a qualifying recommendation that “[u]ntil
there is a technique to produce 100 percent sterilization effectiveness,
GMO[s] should not be held in or [in] connection with open water
systems.”57
The ICES Code also imposes a requirement to notify member countries prior to
the intentional environmental release of a genetically modified organism
(GMO), encourages establishment of strong domestic measures to protect
ecosystems from harmful effects of releases of GMOs and urges members to
undertake research to evaluate the effects on the environment of released GMOs.
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The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries58 (FAO Code) was
adopted on 31 October 1995 by the Conference of the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization. A segment of the FAO Code relates specifi-
cally to aquaculture development. Article 9.3.1 speaks directly to the issue
of protection of the environment from the potentially adverse effects of
genetically altered organisms.59
The NASCO Guidelines, ICES Code and FAO Code constitute non-
binding general obligations on the Canadian government to defend ecosys-
tems and biodiversity from any possible negative implications of transgenic
fish. They do not have “the force of law” behind them in the sense they
would if they were embodied in a convention. That said, there exists not
insignificant moral compunction on Canada to adhere to these rules and
guidelines in shaping its domestic approach to regulating transgenic fish.
The Biodiversity Convention60 and the Cartagena Protocol made pursuant
to the convention,61 unlike the NASCO Guidelines, ICES Code and FAO
Code, upon ratification by a state do constitute legally binding obligations
on that state.62 The primary purposes of the convention, as set out in Article
1, are “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of
the utilization of genetic resources.” The convention, in Article 8, imposes
several general obligations that impact on possible future releases of trans-
genic fish into the environment. Paragraph 8(d) commits convention parties
to “[p]romote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the mainte-
nance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings,” and para-
graph 8(h) has parties agreeing to “[p]revent the introduction of, control or
eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species.”
It is paragraph 8(g), however, that is a “direct hit” in terms of transgenic fish
and the environment. It reads, in part:
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate . . .
[e]stablish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks
associated with the use and release of living modified organisms result-
ing from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental
impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of biolog-
ical diversity, taking into account the risks to human health.
This provision, directly on topic as it may be, is nevertheless so vague as to
be capable of multiple interpretations and a wide range of implementary
measures.
The Biodiversity Convention, being (and intended to be) a framework
agreement, is noteworthy, at least as far as the present discussion is con-
cerned, not so much for itself as for the biosafety protocol developed under
it. The objective of the Cartagena Protocol, stated in Article 1, is to try to
insulate the environment from genetically engineered organisms that might
cause harm to it.63 To what extent does the protocol affect transgenic fish,
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particularly their development and production within Canada? The impact
is not, at least not directly, that significant. In the view of this author, the
protocol is something of a “red herring” when it comes to transgenic fish.
First, the protocol is a trade-based agreement, aimed at controlling the
“transboundary movement . . . of all living modified organisms that may
have adverse effects on . . . biological diversity.”64 The preamble of the pro-
tocol, at paragraph 9, specifically acknowledges that “trade and environment
agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustain-
able development.” The protocol is not much concerned with domestic
aspects of biotechnology.65 Its real focus is the regulation of transboundary
shipments of living modified organisms (LMOs) and the impact of those
LMOs on recipient states. Second, the protocol’s orientation, though it does
not say so expressly, is to LMOs of the plant world. Plant seeds have the
significant feature of being capable of “transferring or replicating genetic
material” long after having been detached from their host. They have a post-
harvest period during which their categorization as “living modified organ-
isms” is preserved, and they therefore are squarely caught by the protocol.
Transgenic fish, on the other hand, are not “living modified organisms” after having
been harvested. Post-harvest, they cease to be “living,” as they no longer have
the capability of “transferring or replicating genetic material.” They become
a non-living commodity that is outside the ambit of the Biosafety Protocol.
They maneuver around the protocol’s net. This makes sense, given the focus
of the Biosafety Protocol on protecting biodiversity from unwanted and
uncontrolled infiltration by GM organisms. A dead fish is not a threat to
ecological balance. If this view of the application of the Biosafety Protocol is
correct,66 from the Canadian perspective it likely exempts the bulk of future
transgenic fish production, certainly at least transgenic salmon, since the
industry by all accounts would be geared to the domestic grow-out of fish to
market maturity, rather than just the development and production (and
transboundary shipment) of eggs, fry and smolt.
To be clear, though, the Biosafety Protocol would have full application to
the export of living transgenic fish, regardless of the stage of maturity, from
Canada to another country.67 The protocol is also applicable should Canada
be designated as the “Party of import” of living transgenic fish.68
Notwithstanding that the protocol may have limited relevance to the
internal rules regarding the rearing and handling of transgenic fish, Cana-
dian regulators will still have to be cognizant of its framework and require-
ments. Article 2(1) obligates each “Party” to the protocol to “take necessary
and appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement its
obligations under this Protocol.” Beyond this overarching legal duty, practi-
calities will probably dictate a substantial degree of conformity between spe-
cific protocol obligations (assuming eventual ratification) and Canada’s
domestic regulatory regime.69
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Consumer choice
Embedded in many of the debates regarding GM food products, both inside
and outside Canada, are concerns about the consuming public having full,
accurate and readily available information about those foods. The concerns
often seem to be vocalized in demands for mandatory labeling of GM foods.
Labeling, however, is only one aspect of the “consumer choice” side of GM
food regulation. Indeed, labels come only at the end of a much larger process
of scrutinizing a particular GM food for health and environmental safety.
Both the CBAC Report and the Royal Society Report put substantial emphasis
on regulatory transparency and public involvement in the GM food approval
process, and on improved information dispersal to support consumer
choice.70 These areas of emphasis seem to reflect international trends. The
CBAC Report comments that “[i]nternationally, biotechnology regulatory
systems are evolving toward increased transparency, often with enhanced
opportunities for public input.”71
Public notification and request for comments procedures are in place,
although they vary somewhat, in the United States, Australia and New
Zealand.72 The situation in the United States is noteworthy because it seems
to be somewhat skewed in favor of the proprietary interests of biotech devel-
opers. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States has
control of both the food safety and the environmental implications of com-
mercialization of transgenic animals.73 The FDA’s review process has
attracted some criticism for being excessively “closed.”74 At the other end of
the spectrum is the European Union, which has more of a focus on openness
and public involvement, and less on protecting commercial rights. By way
of example, the European Parliament, in February 2001, “adopted a direc-
tive concerning the deliberate environmental release of GMOs that requires
assessment reports to be made public and that the public be given an
opportunity to comment before the field trials and market approval.”75
Notwithstanding the differences in current national approaches, at least
in principle, there does not seem to be too much debate at the international
level on the value, vis-à-vis GM foods, of increasing the role of citizen par-
ticipation in policy formulation, of regularizing and making more transpar-
ent the functions of government, and of improving public awareness and the
quantity and quality of information made available. These are all viewed as
worthwhile objectives, with details of implementation to be worked out
state by state depending on cultural idiosyncrasies, funding availability and
similar factors. It is labeling that stirs up the real dust when one assesses
“consumer choice” issues related to GM foods.
As of mid-2002, thirty-five states had mandatory labeling laws in place
for GM foods.76 These states included China, Australia, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland and the fifteen states then comprising the European Union.77
The addition of China, as of 1 July 2002,78 to the list of states requiring
compulsory labeling of GM food and food products is notable because of the
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large Chinese population and the resulting implications for its trading part-
ners.79
While some ENGOs declare that labeling of GM foods “is fast becoming
the de facto international standard,”80 this in fact is something of an exagger-
ation. There exists powerful international opposition to the drive to force
mandatory labeling for all GM foods and food products. The Greenpeace
organization points to the United States as the ringleader of the anti-label-
ing countries. There is no doubt current US policy stands staunchly opposed
to mandatory labeling. In response to a draft document (tentatively called
Proposed Draft Guidelines for the Labeling of Foods and Food Ingredients Obtained
through Certain Techniques of Genetic Modification/Genetic Engineering) circulated
for a 2002 meeting of the Codex Committee on Food Labeling (CCFL), the
United States went on the record as saying:
[F]oods derived from biotechnology are not inherently less safe than
other foods . . . [and] the United States strongly believes that the Com-
mittee should hold in abeyance any further discussion on mandatory
process-based labeling until more comprehensive information is avail-
able regarding the implications of such labeling, particularly informa-
tion relating to the costs and impact on international trade.81
The position of the United States on mandatory labeling is supported by
Argentina and Canada.82 Those three countries account for 96 percent of the
world’s transgenic crop production.83 Some environmental interest groups
assert that the US/Argentina/Canada triumvirate opposes mandatory label-
ing primarily to protect domestic producers/exporters of GM foods.84 Of
course there is truth in this. There are real, significant costs and trade
implications associated with mandatory labeling. Most biotech foods cur-
rently in commercial production are of the first-generation variety and have
been on the market for years. What is the point, the triumvirate asks, of
forcing producers to spend large amounts of money to relabel? Not only
that, the warning label perception would be likely to drive down consump-
tion of explicitly identified GM foods. The common position of the United
States, Argentina and Canada is not bereft of logic. In the absence of actual
health and environmental risks, they say, there is no compelling reason to
mark GM foods, and several good reasons (all commercial) not to.
There are clearly deep divergences of opinion in the international forum
in connection with the need for mandatory labeling of GM foods. They
reflect the complexities of the larger GM food debate. Once a GM food
product is assessed and determined to be safe (both for human consumption
and for the environment), it may be asked why then differentiate between
that food and its non-GM equivalent? The answer is framed firmly as a
“right to know.” Labeling advocates suggest that any adverse implications of
GM foods, notwithstanding the most rigorous contemporary testing, may
only be identifiable after a long period of time. Consumers who want to
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avoid those possible implications altogether, it is argued, have the right to
do so. There are also members of the public who oppose GM foods on
ethical, religious or similar “conscientious objector” grounds. They, too,
labeling proponents say, have the right to choose not to consume GM foods.
The consumer choice regulatory issues vis-à-vis GM foods are essentially
reducible to a classic contest between commercial interests, on the one hand,
and the right of the consuming public to complete information so as to
enable thoroughly informed decisions, on the other. The more expansive the
information requirements, the higher the costs and the lower the profits of
the GM food producers. And those GM food producers are, at present, con-
centrated in a very small number of countries, led by the United States. This
has caused a split in the international community between those states
favoring full consumer information (including mandatory labeling) and
those in opposition. The latter camp includes the GM food producers, such
as the United States, as well as countries heavily dependent on the GM pro-
ducing states. The former camp includes the non-GM food producers, who
have the luxury of being able to promote consumer rights without having to
face serious adverse economic consequences from taking such a policy posi-
tion.85 Consumer mobilization, often sparked by efforts of ENGOs, also
plays a part in the policy-making decisions of states.86
The GM food discourse in the international community highlights two
significant conclusions relative to issues of consumer choice. First, there is
currently gridlock within the Codex Alimentarius Commission as to how to
proceed with mandatory labeling. This situation is likely to continue for the
foreseeable future. The CCFL87 “operates by consensus according to general
Codex rules that remain surprisingly undefined.”88 The United States,
Argentina, Canada and others have taken advantage of this situation to drag
out labeling discussions year after year. There is no reason to believe this
will soon end. The United States at present has little incentive to change
tactics. The CCFL process permits, almost encourages, interminable pro-
cedural maneuvering. Even if that process was amended so as to permit
CCFL to formulate recommendations on labeling of GM foods, and the
Codex Alimentarius Commission accepted those recommendations, it would
not necessarily mean that uniform global labeling practices would follow.
No enforcement mechanisms exist for Codex standards. States and non-state
entities are free to adopt them, or not. Yet the standards promulgated by
Codex, as indicated previously in this chapter, do have substantial persuasive
force in the international community, and may be adverted to in trade dis-
putes. There exists, as a consequence, a strong incentive on the part of GM
food-producing states to defer for as long as possible the day when Codex
becomes directly seized of the issue. That certainly seems to be the strategy
of the United States and like-minded states as they continue to hamstring
the CCFL process.
The second conclusion about the consumer choice issues highlighted by
the contemporary international GM food discourse is that there is still insuf-
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ficient overall concern about GM foods to bump that discourse to the next
level of intensity. First-generation GM food products have been with us for a
substantial period of time, and have so far presented themselves as nothing
other than benign. No broad-based cause for concern therefore exists. This
may change when more advanced GM food products, including transgenic
fish, near market entry. This approaching wave of next-generation GM foods
is one of the factors prompting the many studies, internationally and domes-
tically, of regulatory issues. The level of debate over mandatory labeling and
other consumer choice issues will undoubtedly heighten as the next-
generation GM food wave grows nearer. For the present, however, govern-
ments generally seem to have ample leeway to formulate domestic policies
to accommodate their respective states’ commercial interests with “softer”
demands for enhanced consumer information and input.
Domestic regulatory structures and procedures
Existing regime
Canada’s existing structures and procedures relating to food regulation
involve several federal departments and agencies, each with its own general
area of responsibility (although there is some overlap). There is presently no
separate and distinct responsible body or procedural approach for GM food
products. Health Canada occupies the central role in assuring the safety of
Canada’s food supply89 and has charge of labeling matters relating to health
and safety issues.90 The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)91 and
Environment Canada also play key roles in the regulation of food.
The current human food safety assessment process used by Health Canada
apparently is unique. The CBAC Report states that Canada “is the only
country where regulatory oversight is triggered by ‘novelty’ rather than
‘process’.”92 By “novelty” is meant that a particular food product has novel
characteristics compared to existing approved food products. The fact that
those novel characteristics are the result of genetic modification is irrelevant.
Process, in other words, does not matter. The Canadian approach is therefore
anomalous. In contrast to this, “some form of ‘process-triggered’ regulation
is the rule in all other countries that have developed regulatory systems for
GM foods.”93 Because the initial stage of the Canadian approach to food reg-
ulation is fairly sweeping, regulators have invoked “unique terminology and
definitions.”94
Health Canada’s regulatory jurisdiction regarding food safety and related
matters comes from the Food and Drugs Act95 and the regulations made
thereunder. The three primary foci for food assessments, whether GM or
non-GM foods, are toxicity, allergenicity and nutritional content.96 GM
foods fall under the Novel Food Regulations.97 These regulations establish
“important background criteria,”98 but the “more instructive document is
that entitled Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods (Health Canada,
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1994).”99 The Guidelines expressly adopt a threshold test based on compara-
tive analysis. The Canadian approach to the safety assessment of a novel food
product therefore starts (and may end) by examining certain attributes of
that product against “those of its traditional counterpart.” The technical
jargon for this is “substantial equivalence.” It is identified as lying “[a]t the
heart of Health Canada’s safety assessment process,”100 and it comes in for
considerable scrutiny and commentary in both the CBAC Report and the
Royal Society Report.101
Environment Canada, under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
1999102 (CEPA), maintains “overall responsibility for performing environ-
mental risk assessments of new substances manufactured or imported into
Canada, including organisms produced through biotechnology.”103 If,
however, an equivalent environmental assessment is mandated by other leg-
islation, Environment Canada is relieved of its responsibility under CEPA.
This is how CFIA became responsible for assessing GM plants and their
effects on the environment and biodiversity. In a similar usurpation of
Environment Canada’s role as the overseer of environmental assessments,
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is in the midst of developing new regu-
lations under the Fisheries Act104 to permit it to conduct assessments of all
“transgenic aquatic organisms.”105
Environment Canada administers the CEPA regulations (the New Sub-
stances Notification (NSN) Regulations106) that pertain to GM organisms. The
NSN Regulations require that “all ‘new’ substances, including products of
biotechnology, are reported and assessed for their potential to adversely
affect human health and the environment before being manufactured in
Canada or imported across its borders.”107
The NSN Regulations “call for information to be provided by the propo-
nent about many aspects of the modified organism’s biological and ecolo-
gical niche, and concerning potential or actual environmental impacts of its
unconfined release.”108 The Royal Society Report assesses the “information
requirements as listed in the CEPA regulations [as] quite substantial.”109
However, it qualifies that comment further on by concluding, “based on
interviews with Environment Canada officials . . . [that] the CEPA Regula-
tions have no explicit data requirements for information pertaining to the
potential effects on conservation and biodiversity posed by GM animals.”110
The Royal Society Expert Panel categorized this as “a significant weakness in
the current legislation”111 that leaves the “existing regulatory framework . . .
ill-prepared, from an environmental safety perspective, for imminent appli-
cations for the approval of transgenic animals for commercial production.”112
As things currently stand in Canada, then, any application for the
environmental release of transgenic fish would be processed by Environment
Canada under the NSN Regulations, such as they are. But until a release
into the environment is actually intended, the existing environmental protec-
tion regulations do not kick in.
As has already been mentioned, DFO is drafting new regulations under
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the Fisheries Act specific to “transgenic aquatic organisms.” That work was
still ongoing at the time of writing this chapter.113 The work follows two
major regulatory initiatives undertaken by DFO in the late 1990s. They are
the: (1) the National Code on Introductions and Transfers of Aquatic Organisms114
(DFO National Code); and (2) the Draft Policy on Research with, and Rearing
of, Transgenic Aquatic Organisms (DFO Draft Policy). The DFO National
Code was disseminated in January 2002. However, that final version appears
to have been made inapplicable to transgenic aquatic organisms.115 And
indications are that the DFO Draft Policy has been left to wither, as present
effort is directed to completion of the Fisheries Act regulations.116 The DFO
Draft Policy was, in any event, intended only “to be used on an interim
basis, until specific Regulations are enacted.”117 The motivation for the
quick preparation of the DFO Draft Policy, according to the Royal Society
Report, was the expectation of imminent application for approval of produc-
tion of transgenic fish, which was premised on the application filed in the
United States in early 2000.118 Given its status as the precursor to the Fish-
eries Act regulations-in-progress, the DFO Draft Policy retains some rele-
vance despite its current dormant state.119 The primary criticism of the DFO
Draft Policy leveled by the Royal Society Expert Panel was in respect of
DFO’s recommendations therein in support of the possible use of steriliza-
tion techniques to protect the environment from transgenic fish.120
The domestic regime in place in respect of consumer choice aspects of
Canadian food regulation has already been touched on. It is intertwined with
food safety, reduces for the most part to labeling matters, and is in the hands
of Health Canada and CFIA.
So how do transgenic fish fit into the existing Canadian regulatory
regime, especially in respect of food safety, environmental protection and
consumer choice? The answer is relatively straightforward. At this point,
little in the way of special arrangements has been made for transgenic fish.
The new Fisheries Act regulations will address the environmental implica-
tions associated with research on and rearing of transgenic aquatic organ-
isms. Precisely how that is done remains to be seen. Aside from this activity
specific to transgenic fish in the area of environmental protection, no other
aspect of the Canadian regulatory regime applicable to GM foods differs
materially for transgenic fish. That regime is geared to plants and seeds. But
relatively little tweaking likely would be necessary for the current regime to
accommodate food products made from transgenic fish. Such products would
have to undergo the same food safety and nutrition assessments, based on
whatever standards are ultimately accepted for GM foods generally, as other
GM foods, and would also be affected by the same consumer choice issues.
As has already been alluded to, however, the current Canadian regulatory
regime is likely headed for substantial modification.
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The current GM food discourse in Canada: what is being said
and how might it affect regulation of transgenic fish?
With attitudes evolving and initiatives developing around GM foods at the
international level, as well as domestically, the big question for Canadian
transgenic fish producers is: how will all this affect existing regulatory struc-
tures and procedures, and to what extent can and will those structures and
procedures, in turn, be adapted to accommodate commercial production of
transgenic fish? The previous section of this chapter, for example, made ref-
erence to new Fisheries Act regulations being drafted for transgenic aquatic
organisms. The precise shape those regulations take will reflect the level of
Canada’s commitment to safeguard the environment from such organisms.
The discussion in this section returns to each of the regulatory areas of food
safety, environmental protection and consumer choice to offer some specific
comments on what may be in store for transgenic fish farmers in Canada.
Food safety
The issue of GM food safety is a deceptively complex one. At its heart is the
question: “How safe is ‘safe’?” The answer to that ultimately depends on the
perspective of the poser of the question. As indicated in the first part of this
chapter, there is no international consensus to use for guidance. Viewpoints
span the spectrum, ranging from the FAO, which endorses “substantial
equivalence”121 and generally promotes the careful use of GM foods to help
address the immediate needs of global hunger, to some developed states that
use a broad brush in categorizing GM foods as inherently risky and unneces-
sary.122 Canada, as an active member of the international community, must
factor in these viewpoints in shaping its own approach to regulating the
safety aspects of GM foods.
Canada is a “major importer and exporter of primary, intermediate and final
food products,”123 and the gradual infiltration of GM products into the global
food supply therefore has significant ramifications for Canadian producers and
consumers. As the world continues to shrink, Canada cannot, even if it wanted
to, insulate its internal policies from those developing outside its borders. The
astute tactic is therefore to use all reasonable means to affect what is evolving
on the international scene. There appears to be broad recognition and accep-
tance of this approach in government. The indications are everywhere. A good
example is Canada’s very active involvement in the efforts of the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission to develop internationally accepted standards for the
safety and identification of GM foods. In the labeling context, the CBAC has
noted the importance of taking this type of internationalist approach.124 Indeed,
the significance of aligning Canada’s domestic GM food policies with those of
the rest of the world is a recurring theme in both the CBAC Report and the
Royal Society Report. International trends, approaches and initiatives are continu-
ally referred to and examined for relevance to Canada.
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The emergence of the precautionary principle is perhaps the most note-
worthy of those international developments.125 The CBAC Report and the
Royal Society Report advocate the employment of considerable caution in
Canada’s development of standards of assessment for “next-generation” GM
foods.126 The Royal Society Report recommends “the precautionary regulatory
assumption that, in general, new technologies should not be presumed safe
unless there is a reliable scientific basis for considering them safe.”127 The
CBAC Report recommends that “regulatory authorities take a precautionary
approach to all stages of development and commercialization of a GM food
(laboratory research, confined field trials, pre-market risk assessment and
post-market surveillance . . .).”128 Both reports support the maintenance and
strengthening of a risk-based approach to the assessment of GM foods based
on rigorous scientific testing and evaluation, and pre-scheduled reviews of
product approval decisions.129 The Royal Society Expert Panel recommends
that CFIA “develop detailed guidelines describing the approval process for
transgenic animals intended for . . . food production.”130 All of this suggests
more demanding and regimented assessment procedures for new GM foods
than have been applied to “first-generation” products.131 Also, the reports
recommend that the developers of biotech foods bear the burden (and cost)
of “carry[ing] out the full range of tests necessary to demonstrate reliably
that they do not pose unacceptable risks.”132
Transgenic fish producers will be caught by this toughened future
regime. Canadian policy-makers face difficult choices ahead.133 There will be
a natural predilection to look to broadly accepted international standards.
The Codex Alimentarius Commission will be key. Canada undoubtedly will
continue its strong participation in the work of Codex, and will probably
adopt standards for GM foods as sanctioned by that organization. The
reasons for this prediction are twofold. First, given the competing mandates
of Codex itself (protection of human food safety and promotion of fair, free-
flowing international trade and, indirectly through FAO, of world food
security), the GM food standards it advocates are likely to strike a reasonable
balance. For Canada, faced with similar pressures, the path of least resis-
tance, and the one easiest to justify to domestic parties with interests in the
regulation of GM foods, may be one that runs parallel to that of Codex.
Second, as a leading global producer and exporter of GM foods, Canada will
be strongly influenced to go with safety standards that are at least as rigor-
ous as those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. That strategy will
probably keep Canada “on side” in respect of its own international trade
commitments, and provide to it serious ammunition in any trade disputes
that may arise with states taking extreme protectionist stances.
Environmental protection
The great uncertainty regarding the environmental effects of transgenic fish
has led to a relatively high degree of consensus among all interested parties
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on the need to take meaningful steps to protect marine ecosystems. Fish
obviously live in an environment very different from, say, that of a plant
such as canola. They also reproduce differently, self-propel and are carni-
vorous. A host of unique environmental issues consequently come into play
for fish. This prompted the only recommendations in either the CBAC
Report or the Royal Society Report directed specifically at transgenic fish.134
The central recommendation of the Royal Society Report, at least insofar as
transgenic fish are concerned, is that it would be “prudent and precautionary to
impose a moratorium on the rearing of GM fish in aquatic facilities.”135 This
recommendation is based on: (1) “the paucity of scientific data and informa-
tion pertaining to the environmental consequences of genetic and ecological
interactions between cultured and wild fish”; (2) “the difficulty . . . in being
able to use laboratory research to predict environmental consequences reli-
ably”; and (3) “the unpredictable nature of complex pleiotropic effects of
gene insertions.”
In addition to the moratorium, the four other substantive recommenda-
tions of the Royal Society Report relating directly to transgenic fish, all of an
environmental protection nature, are that: (1) “[a]pproval for commercial
production of transgenic fish be conditional on the rearing of fish in land-
based facilities only”; (2) “[r]eliable assessment of the potential environ-
mental risks posed by transgenic fish can only be addressed by
comprehensive research programs devoted to the study of interactions
between wild and cultured fish”; (3) “[p]otential risks to the environment
posed by transgenic fish must be assessed not just case-by-case, but also on a
population-by-population basis”; and (4) “[i]dentification of pleiotropic, or
secondary, effects on the phenotype resulting from the insertion of single
gene constructs be a research priority.”136
Canada’s existing international commitments, both moral and legal, serve
only to reinforce the positions vocalized by the Royal Society Expert Panel.
It would be very difficult for Canada to adopt anything but an environmen-
tally protectionist position on transgenic fish. To do otherwise would run
foul of the obligations encapsulated in the Biodiversity Convention, the
Biosafety Protocol (assuming ratification), the ICES Code, NASCO Guide-
lines and FAO Code. From the perspective of transgenic fish developers,
much energy must surely now be focused on creating efficient and foolproof
sterility techniques. To the extent those developers can offer 100 percent
sterile GM smolt and fry to rearing facilities, many of the environmental
concerns unique to transgenic fish melt away. Guaranteed sterility also puts
back into play the possibility of raising transgenic fish in ocean-based nets or
cages, a more economically attractive alternative to fish farmers.137
It will be interesting to see what emerges in the new Fisheries Act regula-
tions. If those regulations should take anything but an ultra-cautious
approach to protecting the environment, the ire of many will be aroused and




Both the CBAC and the Royal Society Expert Panel grappled extensively
with the new reality of how best to uphold the consuming public’s right to
full information and choice when it comes to GM food products. One of the
four themes of the CBAC Report is “Information and Consumer Choice.” The
Royal Society Report similarly includes a discussion on the pros and cons of
mandatory labeling. Indeed, the whole “consumer choice” issue, for practical
purposes, very much boils down to a matter of labeling. To label or not to
label is the question. The CBAC Report suggests that it would be premature
for Canada to adopt a mandatory labeling scheme prior to “an agreed-upon
Canadian standard [being] developed and tested.”139 The report also reiter-
ates that, whether voluntary or mandatory, a “single internationally accepted
standard is highly desirable and perhaps essential in the longer run.”140 The
CBAC Report recommends that Canada “establish a voluntary labeling
system for foods with GM content based on a set of clear labeling criteria,
derived from a broadly accepted standard.”141 The report further recom-
mends enhancement of Canada’s “continuing effort, in concert with other
countries, to develop a harmonized approach to labeling in regard to GM
foods.”142 The Royal Society Expert Panel also supported a voluntary system
of GM food labeling.143
The labeling debate is not simply a matter of having the “right to know,”
as some environmental groups (such as Greenpeace Canada) argue.144 It is
intimately connected to both trade and food safety issues. On the one hand,
detailed labels have the potential to obviate some food safety issues. For
example, a GM food product to which a small section of the population may
be allergic could be properly identified as such and still allowed to enjoy
broad market distribution (similar to how nut products are currently
handled). On the other hand, to the extent that Canada’s labeling laws are
out of step with those of its major trading partners, serious economic woes
will certainly ensue. In this respect, the position of the United States is crit-
ical. It is difficult to imagine Canada adopting labeling rules different than
the rules of the United States.
The CBAC recommended that any voluntary labeling system be sub-
jected to review in five years to determine whether it has in fact given con-
sumers an adequate degree of choice.145 If it has not, other approaches,
including mandatory labeling, would then be assessed. The Canadian
Council of Grocery Distributors and the Canadian General Standards Board
are apparently in the process of together developing a Canadian standard for
the voluntary labeling of GM foods.146
All things considered, it seems quite probable that Canada will see a vol-
untary labeling system in place for GM foods within the not-too-distant
future. Mandatory labeling is liable not to happen for many years, if ever,
unless there is some drastic and unforeseen occurrence, such as the United
States changing its stance or the Codex Alimentarius Commission deciding
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to support mandatory labels (and, given CCFL politics, the latter is
extremely unlikely without the former). There is no good reason to believe
that the approach to labeling for transgenic fish will be any different than
that generally applicable to GM foods. As transgenic fish will be a new
product, its producers will have no recourse to the argument that they
cannot absorb the costs of relabeling. In fact, it can be anticipated that GM
fish farmers may, from the outset, embrace labeling as a means of pre-emp-
tively defusing at least one of the controversies associated with their
product.
Conclusion
The one thing that can be said with certainty about the existing regulatory
regime for GM foods in Canada is that it will see many significant changes
in the next few years. Technological advances, if nothing else, will compel
change. Other forces are at play, though, besides technology. There is
growing consumer awareness at home and GM conservatism abroad. There
is the reality of economic gain and the potential of enhanced world food
security (forces sometimes, oddly enough, running on parallel courses in the
GM food debate). There are concerns about ethics, religion and globaliza-
tion. There is a broad commitment to ensure that human-made organisms
do not run amok in the natural world, causing perhaps irreparable damage.
Canadian policy-makers must sort through all this and come up with a plan
that strikes a balance between the protection and promotion of multiple
domestic interests and the honoring of multiple international commitments.
The task is a formidable one.
Transgenic fish, whose technology is just emerging from the pipeline,
find themselves in the middle of the GM food fray. Such fish, or products
made from them, will be treated with at least as much caution and trepida-
tion as “next-generation” GM foods derived from plants. A Canadian pro-
ducer of transgenic fish can therefore anticipate encountering difficulties on
many fronts – so much so, in fact, that it seems doubtful such a product will
land on grocery shelves anytime soon.
The main impetus to commercial production of GM fish is economic: the
promise of hefty profits. Lined up in opposition are the various non-eco-
nomic factors discussed in this chapter. To the extent the economic incen-
tive is strong, some or all non-economic factors may be mitigated or
overcome. It is like bowling: the larger and more powerful the economic
ball, the more readily non-economic pins can be scattered. That seems to be
the way of the modern regulatory state. Humans follow their innovative
urges (often tied in with profit-seeking) far and wide, usually reined in only
by laws designed to buffer their fellows and the (shared) environment from
the worst consequences of those urges. If it were not for those urges, of
course, most of us would still be leading “short and brutish” lives. Improve-
ment of the human condition is a laudable and never-ending quest, but care
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and consideration are necessary counterbalances – particularly when pursuit
of profit is the central motive underlying a specific “improvement” effort.
The primary economic attribute of transgenic fish is their extraordinarily
enhanced growth rates.147 The raw profit potential is enormous. That expe-
dited growth, though, does not necessarily translate into pure profit. Faster-
growing fish bring significantly higher costs: fish feed, labor and
transportation, to name just some. And then there are the capital start-up
costs. Land-based rearing facilities, if mandated, do not come cheap (even if
government helps out, which is the Canadian way). The cost of research and
development has to be recouped, and the costs associated with obtaining
regulatory approvals must be offset. When the product goes to market,
chances are it will have a “GM” label on it. Sales may, as a result, not be as
robust as hoped. And the price fetched for GM fish, compared to the
“natural” counterpart, is likely to be lower, perhaps substantially so. Then
there are the costs and headaches of dealing with the export of such a
product to recipient states that may be just as happy not to have it. Ulti-
mately, the economic “ball” represented by transgenic fish may not be large
enough, or have sufficient steam behind it, to knock over many (or any) non-
economic “pins.”
There are two big “wild cards” for the nascent Canadian transgenic fish
industry. One is essentially technological, the other geopolitical. On the
technology side, it has been noted that GM research has the potential to
make fish that have positive attributes other than enhanced growth. The
growth-enhanced salmon already developed apparently are more efficient
feeders than their non-GM cousins.148 This has important environmental
implications, since most fishmeal is made from small wild fish without
much market appeal. It is generally accepted that it takes more than a
pound of wild fish, reduced to feed, to produce every pound of farmed fish.
That raises “concerns that aquaculture might fail to yield a net gain of fish
protein for the world.”149 There is obviously something inherently disturb-
ing about this. If it is accurate, it means the fish farm that is often viewed as
friendly to the wild fishery is actually directly contributing to its ongoing
depletion. GM fish, if they are more efficient at feed conversion than non-
GM fish, could help reverse this negative impact on wild stocks (assuming
that overall production remains constant, which, of course, is not what GM
fish producers have in mind – expedited growth cycles are supposed to bring
large increases in the total amount of farmed fish brought to market).
Aside from the feed conversion factor, GM technology could result in fish
that are in several ways truly more benign vis-à-vis the natural environment.
A GM fish could be made that efficiently uses grain-based fishmeal, thus
resulting in a very positive impact on wild fish. A GM fish could be made
that is disease resistant, thus reducing or eliminating the need to feed
antibiotics to farmed fish and thereby rendering them more “organic.” Sim-
ilarly, a more “organic” fish would be one that is genetically programmed to
handle pests (such as sea lice), bringing about a reduction or the elimination
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of the application of pesticides to farmed fish. The right combination of
genetic tinkering could, hypothetically, create a fish that is something of an
environmental “superhero.” If such a scenario should unfold, it would surely
strengthen the position of transgenic fish proponents.150
On the geopolitical side, the key word is “America.” For Canadian GM
fish producers, the United States has the potential to add much critical mass
to the economic “ball,” and to propel it down the lane with considerable
force.151 The size of the US market, the apparent lack of widespread aversion
to GM foods on the part of US consumers (unlike those in Europe) and the
existing degree of integration of the two economies make the US consuming
public the logical target of the Canadian-based GM fish producer. After all,
Americans already account for the bulk of Canada’s annual aquaculture
exports.152 And the FDA application submitted in 2000153 means that US
approval may predate any Canadian approval eventually sought. In fact, with
a green light for transgenic fish in the United States, full Canadian approval
perhaps becomes secondary. Transgenic fish-rearing facilities in Canada
could service the US market, turn a healthy profit and be disinclined to get
caught up in a Canadian system that is not as “producer-friendly” as the
American one. That, however, would generate even more pressure for Cana-
dian regulatory authorities to align themselves with the US approach. Such
pressure would become particularly acute with the passage of time and no
evidence of significant adverse effects by transgenic fish on human health or
the environment.154
The US situation therefore seems to be central both to Canada’s future
transgenic fish production industry and to the tone and content of its evolv-
ing regulatory regime for transgenic fish.155 The Canadian market is not
large enough to overcome the many issues attached to GM fish. Other
potentially lucrative markets, such as those of Europe, are presently too
problematic. The regulatory path in Canada is strewn with numerous
impediments. Policy-makers can equivocate around “precaution” indefin-
itely, and may do so. Only political will can clear the path. Political will is
most often fueled by economics. Without a strong push from the economic
side, which in all likelihood must be an American push, Canadian-produced
transgenic fish probably will be swimming in many circles for years to come.
This may be seen as a good or bad thing, depending on one’s perspective
and the relative weight one assigns to economic versus non-economic
factors. If a guess had to be ventured, it would be that economics (perhaps
strengthened by GM food’s promise to enhance global food security and any
future technological breakthroughs) ultimately will come out victorious,
and transgenic fish will leap into the North American food supply. A
finding of adverse health implications would stop this process in its tracks.
Otherwise, faith in human ability to self-regulate and control risks likely
will prevail. Of course, history shows that humankind is not particularly
adept at self-regulation. The ecosystem threats possibly presented by trans-
genic fish represent an area of focused concern. Regulation can never fully
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corral human greed, ignorance and carelessness. With only a few transgenic
fish perhaps having the capacity to cause serious, irreversible disruption in
the world’s oceans, it seems that environmental protection may in the long
run be the one significant piece of the regulatory puzzle that proves the most
difficult to fit snugly into place. Canadians, who at least in principle tend to
give environmental issues relatively high priority, will likely not be easily
deflected from the general sentiment that meaningfully protective steps are
essential.
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portions of the file. The practical effect is that even after the FDA approves an
application, much of the information submitted as part of that application, or
any earlier underlying information from an investigational application,
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tory labeling legislation (or consumed in the state of production). To the
extent that a particular state’s food exporters have to make their product labels
conform to the requirements of recipient states, the government of that state
must consider the relative costs and benefits of adopting similar requirements.
Greenpeace Canada, ibid., reported that, in connection with the Chinese move,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines were all discussing the com-
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94 Ibid.
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95 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, as amended.
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99 Ibid.
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component in question.” Finally, using data supplied by the applicant,
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a product is “toxic” to the environment and human health.”
Ibid.
100 CBAC Report, supra note 1 at 8.
101 The “substantial equivalence” concept apparently was “formulated by the
[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)] in 1993
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104 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, as amended.
105 CBAC Report, supra note 1 at 7. To the extent that transgenic fish remain at
the research and development stage, all work done
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[although the] Canadian Institutes of Health Research have guidelines
designed to prevent the environmental release of GMOs [and] [m]ost
research institutions – both public and private – have their own codes of
conduct and oversight committees.
Ibid.
106 SOR/94–260 [NSN Regulations].
107 CBAC Report, supra note 1 at 9.
108 Royal Society Report, supra note 3 at 38.
109 Ibid. at 39.
110 Ibid. at 165.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Personal communication, 21 November 2003, from I. Price, DFO, Ottawa.
Ms. Price advised that the “hard science” base for the risk assessment process
relative to transgenic aquatic organisms was still being created. As of early
2005, no new Fisheries Act regulations had been made regarding transgenic
aquatic organisms and, so far as the author is aware, no draft regulations had
been released to the public.
114 Supra note 6.
115 This notwithstanding the fact that early versions of the DFO National Code,
including the one critiqued by the Royal Society Expert Panel, covered GM
fish. Evidently DFO had a late change of heart, or a realization that the DFO
Draft Policy or pending Fisheries Act regulations would be the better place to
deal with transgenic aquatic organisms. Section 1.1.4 of the final version of the
DFO National Code states that “[i]ssues related to . . . transgenic aquatic organ-
isms are not covered by this Code” (emphasis in original).
116 Personal communication, 2 December 2002, from L. Stewart, Communica-
tions Adviser, Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development,
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa: “I understand . . . that the policy
document ‘Research with, and Rearing of, Transgenic Aquatic Organisms’ is
no longer in use as it is out of date and . . . we are moving to regulations
instead.”
117 Royal Society Report, supra note 3 at 163.
118 Supra note 12.
119 DFO will not, however, release the DFO Draft Policy for public viewing. Its
content can therefore only be discerned, and then not in any comprehensive
fashion, through comments offered by the Royal Society Expert Panel.
120 The Royal Society Expert Panel compared the DFO Draft Policy position
against the ICES Code and NASCO Guidelines, as well as making its own
assessment of the practical risks of using sterility techniques as the sole means
of insulating the environment from transgenic fish. The Royal Society Report
expresses skepticism about the “mitigative utility of rendering GM fish sterile
in aquatic facilities” (at 170) largely because “existing techniques for effecting
sterility are not 100 percent effective” (at 166), but also because of the
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“considerable uncertainty associated with . . . the consequences of ecological
interactions between [sterilized fish] and wild fish” (at 160). Its conclusion is
that sterilization is an insufficient means, at this point in time, of ensuring
environmental protection from transgenic fish.
121 The debate around the virtues and shortcomings of substantial equivalence
symbolizes much of the larger debate about the degree of scrutiny appropriate
for GM foods. Substantial equivalence essentially stands for the proposition
that if a GM food product looks, feels, tastes and acts the same as its non-GM
counterpart, no more need be done. It is a relatively simple procedure that
appeals both to commercial producers of GM food products and to inter-
national agencies focused on global food security issues. The CBAC Report,
supra note 1 at 54 and accompanying text, cites several joint FAO/WHO
reports, and an OECD report, which apparently endorse substantial equiva-
lence as an assessment tool. The CBAC Report, at 26, states that “[t]he most
recent FAO/WHO joint expert consultation on GM foods from plants con-
cluded that the proper application of substantial equivalence contributes to a
robust safety assessment framework and that it is the best strategy for safety
assurance currently available” (footnote deleted). The problem with substantial
equivalence as an assessment technique is that it is perceived by some as
“subjective, inconsistent and pseudo-scientific” (CBAC Report at 25 – footnotes
deleted), in effect a shortcut endorsed by those who, for whatever reasons, want
to avoid the application of “hard science” in assessing GM foods. This criticism
led the Royal Society, in its Recommendation 8.1, to reject the use of substan-
tial equivalence “as a decision threshold to exempt new GM products from rig-
orous safety assessments” and, in its Recommendation 7.1, to advocate that
“testing should replace the current regulatory reliance on ‘substantial equiva-
lence’ as a design threshold.” The CBAC does not come down quite so hard on
the concept of “substantial equivalence.” The CBAC Report states, at 27, that,
“notwithstanding its inherent limitations . . . substantial equivalence remains
a useful approach to structuring the environmental and food safety assessment
of GM foods and crops.”
122 For example, in Norway not only must a proposal to produce GM fish guaran-
tee no adverse effect on the environment, but any such production must also be
able to show tangible positive results. See s. 10 of The Act Relating to the Pro-
duction and Use of Genetically Modified Organisms (Gene Technology Act), Act No.
38 of 2 April 1993.
123 CBAC Report, supra note 1 at 41.
124 “The development of an international labeling standard, accepted by all of
Canada’s trading partners, is the surest way to obviate the negative con-
sequences of mandatory labeling while providing meaningful consumer choice.
It would be highly advantageous for Canada to actively promote the develop-
ment of such a standard.” Ibid. at 42.
125 Recognition of the growing international development and application of the
precautionary principle prompted the federal government recently to complete
a broad interdepartmental consultation process regarding the principles that
should underpin the application of the precautionary principle by Canadian
regulators. Those consultations generated a “Discussion Document” in Sep-
tember 2001. Privy Council Office, 2001, A Canadian Perspective on the Precau-
tionary Approach/Principle, Discussion Document. Online. Available
http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/raoics-
srdc/docs/precaution/Discussion/discussion_e.htm (accessed 9 March 2004)
[Discussion Document on Precaution]. The Discussion Document on Precau-
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opment of options and the decision phases, and is ultimately guided by judg-
ment, based on values and priorities” (at 4) (references deleted). Vague as this
is, the Discussion Document on Precaution does offer some comments that
suggest development of a pragmatic Canadian approach to the precautionary
principle. One comment (at 5), recognizes that it is “legitimate for decisions to
be guided by society’s chosen level of protection against risk.” This suggests
the possibility of broad commercialization of GM foods, so long as risk assess-
ment has been done to a level that is acceptable to society generally, and/or
that identification standards are adopted that provide consumers with a real
ability to choose (and so avoid potential risks). Another series of comments
repeatedly stresses the need to apply a “sufficiently sound or credible scientific
basis” (emphasis added) (ibid. at 10–11) in the decision-making procedures
relating to GM foods. This suggests an inclination to promote a scientific
approach to assessment of GM foods that is reasonable, but not perversely
stringent. Again, though, where the precise lines are to be drawn is open to
debate. The Discussion Document on Precaution also makes a point of carefully
emphasizing that the precautionary principle is an international phenomenon
that is constantly evolving and, importantly, affects Canada’s vital interests
(economic and otherwise). Canada should, it says, therefore make it a high pri-
ority to try to shape the precautionary principle to ensure it fits Canadian
reality, including in the area of GM foods.
126 The CBAC Report, supra note 1 at 5, notes the relatively large number of “first-
generation” GM approvals to the time of the report:
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marketing in Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has
authorized 39 plants with novel traits (31 transgenic) for unconfined
environmental release. Forty GM crops (31 transgenic) have been approved
for use in livestock feeds, including some not grown in Canada, such as
cotton.
The CBAC also noted, however, at 27, that it “found no evidence to indicate
that substantial equivalence has been used as a decision threshold to exempt
GM foods from appropriate regulatory oversight.” The implication from this is
that assessment of first-generation GM products has been, overall, adequate –
but the level of assessment for next-generation products will have to be
intensified.
127 Royal Society Report, supra note 3, Recommendation 8.1.
128 CBAC Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 3.2.
129 Recommendations 3.1 and 3.6, and Royal Society Report, supra note 3, Recom-
mendation 7.1.
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Society Report confirms the support of the government for a precautionary
approach to biotech food consistent with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
One wonders what else the federal government could possibly have said. Of
course it is cautious about approving products that might possibly hurt Cana-
dians and/or their environment. But is that traditional caution equivalent to
application of the “precautionary principle”? That is the core question.
132 See, for example, Royal Society Report, supra note 3, Recommendation 8.2.
133 Because of the divergent interests involved in the GM food debate, and the
fact that government is pulled in multiple directions, many of the recommen-
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ence, transparency and accountability in the future regulation of GM foods.
Two of the CBAC Report’s eight categories of recommendations, for instance,
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must be absolute public confidence that those standards be applied fully and
consistently in every case.
134 The CBAC Report, supra note 1, has little in it pertaining directly to transgenic
fish. It is, overall, very much plant and crop orientated. It also followed the
Royal Society Report, temporally speaking, and the CBAC therefore consciously
endeavored not to duplicate what had been covered in the Royal Society Report.
One CBAC Recommendation (3.4), supra note 1, may have implications for
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work with genetically modified organisms in laboratories and greenhouses . . .
with a view to determining the need for national guidelines or statutory meas-
ures.”
135 Royal Society Report, supra note 3, Recommendation 6.13 (emphasis added).
136 Ibid. Recommendations 6.14–6.17.
137 It does not, however, completely clear the way for ocean-based facilities.
Environmental concerns still exist regarding sterile fish released into natural
ecosystems:
Even if sterility could be assured, release of triploid fish into the environ-
ment presents certain hazards. Triploids of some species, while sterile, still
have enough sex hormones in their bloodstream to enter into normal
courtship and spawning behaviour. Escaped sterile triploid fish could inter-
fere with the reproduction of wild relatives by mating with fertile wild
adults. The most severe consequence would be reproductive interference of
declining, threatened, or endangered species.
(Future Fish, supra note 73 at 27–28)
138 The Government of Canada Action Plan in Response to the Royal Society Report,
supra note 16, indicates agreement with the expressed need to keep reproduc-
tively capable transgenic fish and transgenic aquatic organisms in secure land-
based facilities.
139 CBAC Report, supra note 1 at 42.
140 Ibid.
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include perceived or potential health risks or benefits, perceived or potential
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etal concerns (such as globalization, food security issues and concentration of
corporate power), and lack of confidence in the regulatory system.” CBAC
Report, supra note 1 at 38.
145 Ibid. at Recommendation 7.2.
146 Ibid. at note 95 and accompanying text.
147 Genetic engineering can be used to alter any number of traits. In fish,
however, the focus of research has been on growth enhancement and cold-
water tolerance. To the extent that transgenic fish are restricted to controlled
land-based facilities, the ability to tolerate cold water becomes irrelevant. It is,
in any event, the trait of greatly enhanced growth that has generated most of
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factor relative to a Canadian transgenic fish industry is the perfection of a prac-
tical and effective mass sterilization technique. Such a technique not only
would neutralize much (though not all – see supra note 137) of the concern on
the environmental side, thus removing from the lane one of the stickier non-
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152 Aquaculture Statistics, supra note 25.
153 Supra note 12.
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safety applied to them. Cross-border shopping would, practically, make it
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The core concern seems to be that there exists some built-in bias in favor of
rights of property and profit. That is, the big business interests pushing GM
fish may bulldoze over other “lesser” interests. One of the recommendations of
Future Fish is, therefore, increased public participation and accountability
regarding the US regulatory approval process.
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The state of mariculture policy development in the United States as of
December 2004 is aptly described in the following passages:
[A]quaculture in the United States lacked coherent support and direc-
tion from the federal government. Poor coordination, lack of leadership,
and inadequate financial support have traditionally characterized pro-
grams related to aquaculture.1
[N]o formal framework exists to govern the leasing and development of
private commercial aquaculture activities in public waters. A pre-
dictable and orderly process for ensuring a fair return to the operator
and to the public for the use of public resources is necessary to the
development of marine aquaculture. It is recommended that Congress
create a legal framework to foster appropriate development, to antici-
pate potential conflicts over proposed uses, to assess potential environ-
mental impacts of marine aquaculture, to develop appropriate
mitigation measures for unavoidable impacts, and to assign fair public
and private rents and returns on such operations.2
[T]he absence of a well-defined and efficient policy framework which
fulfills public trust responsibilities in public waters while offering a
predicable review, permitting, leasing, and monitoring process . . .
hinder[s] the development of this industry.3
Perhaps surprisingly (or unsurprisingly?), the three passages quoted were
written respectively in 1978, 1992 and 2000. By sharing their sentiments, I
intend to imply neither that a framework for mariculture in the United
States is non-existent nor that the existing framework is unworthy of study,
but rather, only that it is poorly defined. Thus, one goal of this chapter is to
review the present framework for mariculture in the United States, focusing
on legislative, administrative and judicial developments. In addition,
ongoing developments in the United States allow us to sketch out where
mariculture policy in the United States may be heading should it eventually
mature beyond its current embryonic state. Specifically, an ongoing effort by
a research team to devise an operational framework for US mariculture in
conjunction with the work of two Ocean Commissions4 – one sponsored by
the US government, the other by a non-governmental organization (NGO) –
provides a roadmap for mariculture policy development.
Background
Aquaculture production is increasing around the globe (excluding Africa
and the countries of the former Soviet Union),5 and now represents more
than 28 percent of the total global seafood supply.6 In the United States,
aquaculture production has increased steadily over the course of the past
decade and, in the near term, is projected to continue to grow, both
absolutely and as a percentage of seafood consumption.7 The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) documented more than 4,000 aquacul-
ture farms in United States in 1996, the vast majority of which were pro-
ducing fish for food.8
Aquaculture is practiced as a commercial venture in all fifty US states and
in US territories, commonwealths and freely associated states, from the
farming of Atlantic salmon off the Maine coast, to mussels in Washington’s
Puget Sound, to catfish in Mississippi, to alligators in Louisiana, and to
giant clams in the Federated States of Micronesia. While as many as thirty
species are commonly aquatically farmed in the United States, fewer than
ten of these comprise the bulk of US aquaculture food production: catfish,
crawfish, hybrid striped bass, salmon, tilapia, trout and various mollusks.9
The annual value of US aquaculture now approaches a market value of
US$1 billion and about 500,000 metric tons.10 Although the increase in
North American production has not been as rapid as the overall increase in
global production,11 US consumption patterns influence global production:
while the United States ranks eleventh in aquaculture production, it ranks
third in seafood consumption.12 As a result, the US fish trade deficit stands
at US$7.1 billion.13
The trend towards increased aquaculture production in North America is
more pronounced if one focuses solely on mariculture production. From
1988 to 1997, North American mariculture production increased from
45,000 to 209,000 metric tons, an increase of more than 450 percent.14 As
of 1997, mariculture production in North America accounted for more than
40 percent of the total North American aquaculture production. The prime
mariculture species reared in the United States are cupped oysters, hard
clams and Atlantic salmon.15
In the United States, state and federal government advocacy has played
and will continue to play an important role in aquaculture development. In
the United States, as in other nations, aquaculture is viewed not only as an
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answer to the seafood shortage, but, in addition, as an attractive revenue
stream and employment base. In the State of Maine, for example, where the
US Atlantic salmon mariculture industry is based, Atlantic salmon maricul-
ture alone generates annual revenues in the neighborhood of US$18 million
and provides nearly 700 jobs in two Maine counties.16 Given that economic
footprint, it is perhaps not surprising that the US Department of Commerce
is promoting a fivefold increase in US aquaculture production by year
2025.17
Yet, mariculture will have difficulty developing further in the United
States without successfully negotiating a variety of environmental, social,
political and technological obstacles that affect both its public perception
and economic viability. For example, mariculture facilities discharge efflu-
ents that are difficult to quantify, monitor and control, and can provoke
high-profile conflicts over use of ocean space. Moreover, one of the most
lucrative segments of US aquaculture – Atlantic salmon mariculture – rests
high in the food chain and thus requires environmentally damaging acces-
sory fisheries.
The current regulatory framework for mariculture in the United States is
characterized by a patchwork of state and federal laws that was not conceived
of with mariculture in mind. Indeed, for the most part it was not envisioned
that ocean space would be an engine of economic development. For example,
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the discharge of
aquaculture facility effluents, the US Army Corps of Engineers (Army
Corps) regulates the placement of any obstruction in US navigable waters,
while the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
which is part of the Department of Commerce, has asserted jurisdiction over
aquaculture, given the potential for aquaculture operations to negatively
impact wild fish stocks.18 Interestingly, no agency has authority to lease
ocean space for the purposes of aquaculture, although the Minerals Manage-
ment Service (MMS), which is housed within the Department of the Inte-
rior, has comparable authority to lease ocean space for the purposes of oil and
gas exploration.19
The lack of a coherent regulatory framework for mariculture development
in the United States is a major constraint on its expansion, as both regula-
tors and culturists lack a clear blueprint on how to navigate the present
maze. Given the inevitability of aquaculture development in the United
States and the potential environmental and other problems associated with
expanded mariculture, the most important questions currently surrounding
mariculture in the United States are: In which areas of the sea will develop-
ment20 occur? And under what regulatory framework?21
Mariculture and federalism in the US system
As an initial matter, it is useful to have an understanding of how federalism
impacts natural resource management in ocean space over which the United
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States asserts jurisdiction. As is well known, the United States has yet to
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Nonetheless, customary international law likely supports US claims to a
twelve-nautical mile territorial sea, a twelve- to 200-nautical mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), and other maritime zones recognized by UNCLOS. In
addition, by presidential proclamation, the United States extended its terri-
torial sea to twelve nautical miles and, as early as 1976, legislatively
extended its fishery zone to 200 miles.22
The international maritime zones do not dictate the state role in natural
resource management. Rather, for most purposes the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA)23 controls, having granted title to the states to submerged lands
extending three miles from the low-water mark and provided the states with
control over natural resources within that three-mile belt. Somewhat sim-
ilarly, state jurisdiction under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (a.k.a.
the Clean Water Act, CWA)24 is limited to three nautical miles, yet the
CWA definition of state jurisdiction is not entirely consistent with the
SLA.25 For these reasons, I refer to those areas where the states predominate
as state offshore waters26 and those areas (generally 3–200 miles) where the
federal government predominates as federal offshore waters.
To the extent that mariculture operations are conducted in federal off-
shore waters, they may affect states in a couple of ways. First, they may
require onshore infrastructure, such as staging areas and base yards, to
support offshore operations. Second, escapes, should they occur, may impact
state fisheries. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)27 and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto,28 to the extent that a proposed maricul-
ture operation will affect a land or water use or natural resource of a state’s
coastal zone, the applicant is required to certify that the operation “complies
with and will be conducted in a manner consistent with the [state coastal]
management program.” If a state objects to the consistency certification, an
applicant cannot proceed further, although under limited circumstances it
may appeal to the Secretary of Commerce.29 Nonetheless, in most cases,
inconsistency might be difficult to find, particularly if a state authorizes
aquaculture in state offshore waters. However, because Alaska and California
do not permit finfish aquaculture in their respective coastal zones, they may
be able to use the consistency provisions of the CZMA to bar commercial
finfish mariculture in federal offshore waters off their coasts.30
Major legislative mariculture developments
In 1980, Congress enacted the principal aquaculture-specific US legislation,
the National Aquaculture Act (NAA).31 In the NAA, Congress declared it to
be “in the national interest, and . . . the national policy, to encourage the
development of aquaculture in the United States.”32 While Congress recog-
nized that the primary responsibility to develop aquaculture in the United
States fell to the private sector, it also noted that three federal agencies in
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particular – the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Interior – had a
role to play in the industry’s advancement. Yet Congress left each agency’s
role somewhat ill defined. Interestingly, some six months earlier, the Secre-
taries of those same departments recognized that their efforts related to
aquaculture development could be mutually reinforcing.33 They had thus
entered into an interagency agreement that specified their respective roles
and responsibilities.34 The interagency agreement required all three depart-
ments to designate an aquaculture coordinator. And while it recognized that
some issues would cut across jurisdictional lines and designated responsibil-
ities, for the most part Agriculture would focus on freshwater research and
support activities, Commerce on marine, estuarine and anadromous species,
and Interior on freshwater finfish research.35
In an attempt to address the fact that aquaculture development in the
United States had been “inhibited by many scientific, economic, legal, and
production factors,”36 Congress also established an interagency coordinating
body – the Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture (JSA) – within the Office of
Science and Technology Policy. The JSA is made up of a number of cabinet-
and subcabinet-level members, including the Secretaries of Agriculture, the
Interior, Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human Services, as well as the
EPA Administrator and the Chief of the Army Corps. Although initially the
chair of the JSA rotated, in 1985 Congress passed the National Aquaculture
Improvement Act (Public Law No. 99-198), establishing the Secretary of
Agriculture as its permanent chair.
The primary mission of the JSA is “to increase the overall effectiveness
and productivity of Federal aquaculture research, technology transfer, and
assistance programs.”37 The means chosen by Congress for the JSA to imple-
ment that mission was the development of a National Aquaculture Develop-
ment Plan. As noted by Cicin-Sain et al.,38 the plan, which covered about
thirty programs in twelve federal agencies, and was completed in 1983,
created a National Aquatic Information Center, and a network of
Regional Aquaculture Centers. The plan also identified the major prob-
lems facing the industry: inadequate credit, diffused legal jurisdiction,
lack of management information, lack of supportive government pol-
icies, and lack of reliable supplies of feed stocks. To date, inadequate
resources have been directed towards addressing these issues, and they
remain concerns for the industry today.
Despite these efforts at improving interagency coordination, in 1995 the
Office of Technology Assessment noted: “[D]espite a long history of debate
over Federal agency roles in aquaculture, and establishment of a
coordinating body, specific agency roles and responsibilities remain
unclear.”39
In 1996, the National Aquaculture Development Plan was revised in
draft form,40 but that draft has yet to be finalized. The draft amended plan
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calls for federal action related to (1) research and technology development
and transfer; (2) education and training; (3) information and data collection,
dissemination and exchange; (4) sustainability and environmental compati-
bility; (5) aquatic animal health; (6) seafood safety and quality assurance; (7)
financial services and incentives; (8) marketing and international trade; (9)
coordination and partnerships; and (10) improvements in the federal regula-
tory framework.
One other development at the national level that is notable, although not
mariculture specific, was the adoption of the Oceans Act 2000 (Public Law
No. 106-256), which established the US Commission on Ocean Policy. Con-
gress assigned the commission the task of developing a national ocean policy
and to report its findings to the President and to Congress. This was a tall
order, given the historic sector-by-sector (e.g. oil and gas, fisheries, and
marine mammals) management of ocean and coastal resources in the United
States and lack of coordinated planning in federal offshore waters, as well as
a number of potential new uses of these waters that would need to be con-
sidered in addition to mariculture, including wind farming and bioprospect-
ing.41 The US Commission on Ocean Policy released its final report, which
will be discussed later in the chapter, in September 2004.
Administrative developments related to aquaculture
Regulation as a fishery
The Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson–
Stevens Act”) governs fishing in federal offshore waters.42 This Act confers on
the NOAA, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and a
series of regional fishery management councils (FMCs) the power to regulate
capture fisheries. There is no explicit authorization in the Magnuson–Stevens
Act to regulate aquaculture, and the legislative history of the Act is silent
on that question. While the Magnuson–Stevens Act defines fishing to
include “catching, taking, or harvesting of fish,”43 it does not define “har-
vesting.” It does, however, define “United States harvested fish” as “fish
caught, taken, or harvested by vessels of the United States within any fishery
regulated under this chapter.”44 Because “harvesting” connotes bringing in a
crop, the NOAA asserted in 1993 that it has jurisdiction over mariculture
in those instances when a mariculture facility includes a vessel.45 The
NOAA’s position was apparently in response to a contrary position advoc-
ated by the US Department of Justice, which had asserted that
Magnuson–Stevens Act jurisdiction was limited to “naturally occurring
stocks.”46
The NOAA position could be read as asserting jurisdiction in any
instance when a maricultured specimen is removed from a facility and
placed on a vessel. Because the Magnuson–Stevens Act imposes restrictions on
the total allowable catch, seasons and ownership, the NOAA’s interpretation
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may amount to a substantial impediment to development of aquaculture in
federal offshore waters.47
Regulation of traditional effluents by the EPA
The CWA prohibits the discharge of a pollutant from a point source to US
waters without a permit.48 These permits require compliance with techno-
logy-based effluent limitations and state water quality standards. To the
extent a person wishes to discharge effluent to the territorial sea,49 contigu-
ous zone or ocean, s. 403 of the CWA50 requires that the discharge also must
be in compliance with any ocean discharge criterion adopted by the US
EPA.51 These criteria are primarily directed at protecting the ecological
health of the marine environment.52
More specific to aquaculture, an implementing regulation53 requires an
aquaculture operation (referred to as “Concentrated Aquatic Animal Produc-
tion Facility,” CAAPF) to obtain a permit if it discharges on at least thirty
days in a year and exceeds certain production limits.54 In addition, the EPA,
on a case-by-case basis, may otherwise require a permit after finding that an
aquaculture operation is a significant contributor of water pollution. The
CAAPF rule is often confused with another discharge regulation related to
aquaculture,55 which regulates the discharge of pollutants into an aquacul-
ture project. This latter provision, however, has no bearing on discharge from
aquaculture facilities.
The EPA and the regulation of escapes
Recently, EPA took a cautious step56 towards distinguishing which farmed
fish should be regulated as pollutants and which should not. Specifically, in
proposed aquaculture effluent guidelines, EPA stated that persons operating
net-pen systems above a specified production threshold (greater than the
threshold for regulation of conventional effluents) must “develop and imple-
ment [best management] practices [BMPs] to minimize the potential [unin-
tended] escape of non-native species.”57 These practices – such as installing
double netting in a net-pen operation – would be embodied in a non-native
species escapement plan.58 In its final rule, however, the EPA decided against
including this provision. Instead, the final rule includes a “narrative effluent
limitation that requires facilities to implement operational controls,” with the
goal of assuring that those facilities are properly maintained.59
Despite the EPA’s decision not to include any direct measures to limit
escapes, there are several interesting aspects to its abandoned proposal. First,
nothing in the final rule suggests that the EPA concluded that it did not
have authority to regulate escapes; the EPA has thus implicitly determined
that an escape constitutes the “discharge” of a “pollutant” from a point
source. Previously, the EPA had only gone so far as to indicate its “under-
standing” of the judicial interpretation of the term “biological materials.”60
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Second, the EPA’s proposal was limited to the escape of non-native fish
rather than any farmed fish, despite the fact that subtle genetic distinctions
may exist between wild and captive-bred populations.61 Third, by relying on
BMPs, the draft effluent guidelines failed to take into account the potential
biological impact of an escape. Thus, whether or not wild populations
potentially affected are endangered was immaterial. Fourth, the EPA indi-
cated that it was considering banning the intentional release of farmed fish,
which can occur if, for example, the fish are not “growing rapidly enough to
justify continued feeding.”62
Code of conduct
The NOAA has recently taken steps to establish guidelines for aquaculture,
with the publication of a draft code of conduct for mariculture operations.63
While potentially far-reaching in some respects, unlike the EPA’s proposed
effluent guidelines, the proposed code of conduct is “soft” law; that is, even
if the code of conduct is finalized, compliance will be voluntary. In pertinent
part, the draft code calls for (1) mariculture operations to be guided by “pre-
cautionary” and “adaptive” management and BMPs; (2) adoption of siting
criteria as well as monitoring, assessment and enforcement sufficient to
ensure the conservation of genetic diversity, the maintenance of the func-
tional integrity of ecosystems, and the protection of endangered species; (3)
regulation appropriate to the status of the organism as native, non-indigenous
or genetically altered; (4) minimization of disease incidence; and (5) escape
prevention, combined with remedial action to address significant escape
incidents.
Relationship between aquaculture and wild populations
Expert agencies and an expert panel of scientists in the United States recently
examined the relationship between aquaculture and wild populations in a
particularly compelling milieu: the farming of non-native stocks of Atlantic
salmon in Maine, which is also home to endangered populations of wild
Atlantic salmon. In particular, a joint review of the status of wild Atlantic
salmon stocks by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) (jointly referred to as the “Services”) concluded
that despite 128 years of stocking, “hatchery fish have not substantially intro-
gressed with the remnant populations and genomes” of the Gulf of Maine
population segment.64 At the same time, three of the factors cited in support
of the endangered species listing decision were (a) the presence of a “large
number of aquaculture hatchery origin juveniles” in the Pleasant River; (b)
the possibility of disease transmission from cultured to wild stocks; and (c)
the discovery of escaped farmed salmon in five Maine rivers.65
The Services’ demarcation of wild Atlantic salmon found in the seven
Maine rivers as a distinct population segment (DPS) led to a call for the
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National Academies of Science (NAS) National Research Council to review
that finding.66 In the course of its review, which was supportive of the DPS
finding, the National Research Council’s Committee on Atlantic Salmon in
Maine concluded that farmed Atlantic salmon differ in genetic makeup from
the Gulf of Maine DPS as a result of the use of non-native strains, selection
by breeders (for growth rate, fat content, disease resistance and delayed
maturity) and “inadvertent selection by the novel environment (e.g. reduced
fright response, disease resistance, and altered aggressive behaviors).”67 It did
note, however, that those “same traits may not be adaptive in the wild.”68
Recent judicial developments regarding the regulation of
mariculture facilities69
In US Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG) v. Atlantic Salmon, Inc.,70 a
federal district court (trial-level) found that various materials added by the
Atlantic salmon mariculture operations to the waters of the United States
were “pollutants” within the meaning of the CWA.71 The CWA defines the
term “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into
water.”72 Specifically, the court73 held that (1) salmon feces and urine “con-
stitute ‘biological materials’ or ‘agricultural wastes’ ”; (2) the uneaten pig-
ments canthaxanthin and astaxanthin, and the antibiotic oxytetracycline,
which “flow [. . .] out of the pens or fall [. . .] through the net pens . . . are
subsumed in the category of ‘chemical wastes’ ”; (3) cypermethrin, which is
used to kill sea lice, and the chemicals Finquel and Parasite-S, “released into
the water after their use,” are included “within the category of ‘chemical
wastes’ ”; (4) copper, a component of an antifoulant that is applied to the
nets to reduce marine growth, is specifically listed by the EPA as a toxic pol-
lutant;74 and (5) fish that “do not naturally occur in the water, such as non-
North American salmon,” fall within the term “biological materials”75 and
are therefore “pollutants” under the Act. Because the defendant did not have
a CWA permit allowing it to discharge those pollutants, the court found it
to be in violation of that Act.
Although the concern with possible genetic pollution of wild stock from
mariculture escapees was well articulated in a number of fora before the
USPIRG cases, the court did not mention possible genetic pollution of
native stocks by escapees as a basis for its decision. Nor did it rely on the
endangered status of wild Atlantic salmon stocks. Rather, the court focused
solely on the fact that the escapees were of different origin than the wild
stock and distinguishable from wild stock by external markers.
In a companion case, USPIRG v. Heritage Salmon, the defendant, Heritage
Salmon, settled with USPIRG after a preliminary decision from the court.76
In pertinent part, the settlement requires Heritage, prior to receiving any
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applicable permits from the United States or the State of Maine, to: (1) forgo
the use of non-North American stocks and transgenic salmonids; (2) limit
the stocking densities in its net pens; (3) fallow its salmon farms; and (4)
take precautions and institute measures so that cultured fish do not escape.77
The settlement also requires Heritage to undertake measures to ensure water
quality and prevent benthic impacts,78 as well as to pay a total of
US$750,000 to fund wild Atlantic salmon restoration efforts and to reim-
burse the plaintiffs for the cost of litigation, including attorney fees.79
Another case involving the regulation of Atlantic salmon operations
under the CWA arose in the State of Washington. That case, Marine
Environmental Consortium v. Washington Department of Ecology, proceeded
under state law because Washington had been delegated authority to admin-
ister the CWA permit program within its boundaries.80 The Washington
case was a judicial appeal of a decision by the Washington Pollution Control
Hearing Board (WPCHB) – a quasi-judicial state administrative body –
upholding the issuance of discharge permits. The focus of the administrative
proceeding had been on the extent of risk posed to native Pacific salmon by
farm-raised Atlantic salmon, particularly the risk that Atlantic salmon
might colonize the rivers of Puget Sound. The WPCHB had before it evid-
ence of two escape incidents – 105,000 and 369,000 escapees, respectively
in July 1996 and July 1997 – as well as evidence of the presence of at least
twelve Atlantic salmon smolts in the Tsitika River. The WPCHB con-
cluded, inter alia, that, “while undesirable,” the accidental release of Atlantic
salmon did “not pose a significant threat to native salmon” nor “degrade
water quality,” yet at the same time identified substantial evidence in the
record to support a finding that “regular and large releases such as those that
occurred in 1996 and 1997 could constitute a threat to Pacific salmon.”81
On the issue of spawning, the WPCHB concluded that while there “may
have been successful spawning” of escapees, there was “no evidence to
support that Atlantic salmon was ‘self-sustaining,’ ” and thus the WPCHB
took a middle ground, ordering the Washington Department of Ecology
(WDE) to “take the Tsitika findings fully into account when it considers
and reissues” the permits.82
The state court, deferring to the administrative interpretation and appli-
cation of the law by the WPCHB, held that the inadvertent release of
Atlantic salmon is neither “pollution” within the meaning of Washington
law nor, at current level of escapement, a “nuisance”; nor does it “render
[state] waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to salmonid species”; nor
violate water quality standards.83 In other words, to demonstrate that
escaped Atlantic salmon are “pollution” under Washington state law, a com-
plainant must establish not only a biological alteration of, or discharge of a
substance into, state waters, but, in addition, that such alteration or dis-
charge causes a “nuisance” or otherwise renders the waters “harmful, detri-
mental or injurious” to native salmonid species. No similar showing of harm
is required under federal law. The court also affirmed the WPCHB’s find-
472 Jeremy Firestone
ings with respect to the Tsitka River and its decision to require the WDE to
modify the permits accordingly.
Another case out of the State of Washington, Association to Protect Ham-
mersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Resources, Inc., addresses CWA regula-
tion of mussel harvesting facilities.84 In mussel farming, unlike Atlantic
salmon farming, which adds fish food and other chemicals to the water,
mussels are nurtured exclusively by the nutrients within the water; that is,
nothing is added. Nevertheless, as a by-product of their metabolism,
mussels generate particulates, feces and pseudo-feces, ammonium, and inor-
ganic phosphate – and mussels shells are released from the nets as well. The
US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after concluding that the term “biologi-
cal materials” is limited to waste products of some human [or industrial]
process,” held that mussel shells and mussel feces and other by-products,
although released into the environment, “come from the natural growth and
development of mussels” rather than from the “waste product of a trans-
formative human process,” and as such are not regulated by the CWA.85 The
court nonetheless implied that the escape of live fish from mariculture facili-
ties would constitute a discharge of biological materials (and hence the dis-
charge of a pollutant).86
Developments outside of government
Numerous studies have addressed policy and legal issues that arise in off-
shore aquaculture. Many of those studies are catalogued in Cicin-Sain et al.’s
2000 report.87 The major shortcomings identified in the current regulatory
regime by those studies include (1) redundant regulations; (2) ill-defined
property rights; (3) the failure to reconcile conflicting uses and to mediate
among conflicting users of ocean space; and (4) questionable assertions of
jurisdiction over aquaculture by a number of federal agencies.88
In 2000, the Center for the Study of Marine Policy at the University of
Delaware (with a team of internal and external ocean and policy law special-
ists as well as aquaculture scientists and an aquaculture industry member)
completed a study and issued a report that began to lay the groundwork for
a policy framework for aquaculture in federal offshore waters.89 The research
team, like those before it, identified several gaps and problems that were
hindering mariculture development in federal offshore waters: (1) the long-
heard critique that aquaculture lacked a well-defined policy framework; (2)
concern over environmental impacts; and (3) the often-seen clash between
private rights and public expectations; that is, finding the appropriate
balance between the need of aquaculturalists to gain a sufficient degree of
exclusivity in the ocean space and the desires of other users.
Drawing lessons from nineteen existing studies of US aquaculture policy,
six case studies, experiences in twenty-two coastal states and territories and
eight other countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom), and the efforts of international
Offshore marine aquaculture in US waters 473
organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
report90 set forth a broad policy framework that was to be guided by the
following policy criteria:
• encourages responsible mariculture in federal offshore waters;
• promotes a decision-making process that is efficient, coordinated and
predictable;
• employs a precautionary approach;
• addresses the use of native and non-native species separately;
• is consistent with existing laws and agency responsibilities;
• is equitable and fair to offshore aquaculture and to other US users of
federal offshore waters;
• is consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the coastal, water,
environmental and aquaculture policies of adjacent coastal states;
• is consistent with US obligations under international agreements;
• fits within the context of an overall framework for sustainable use/non-
use of federal offshore waters;
• produces a fair return to the public for the use of federal ocean space;
• is conducted in a transparent manner with opportunities for public
involvement; and
• is adaptive and promotes opportunities for innovation, data collection
and learning.
The desire to flesh out a more specific policy framework for mariculture
in federal offshore waters led Cicin-Sain and her collaborators to reconstitute
themselves and to expand their research team in order to bring to bear addi-
tional expertise to the question. The federal offshore waters aquaculture
policy project research team now includes a wider range of perspectives and
comprises of voices from industry, academia, coastal states, the environ-
mental community, and aquaculture coordinators from the US Sea Grant
program, which specializes in education, training and outreach on ocean and
coastal matters.91 The goals of the present effort are twofold. The first goal is
to operationalize and build on the earlier framework by providing specific
recommendations on the management structure that needs to be constituted
in the federal government in order to make mariculture development in
federal offshore waters feasible and to devise a detailed operational frame-
work for the actual siting, leasing, permitting and environmental review of
mariculture facilities, as well as monitoring and enforcement related thereto,
including the drafting of proposed legislation.
The second, related goal is to build consensus among national and
regional stakeholders on specific aspects to include in such a framework
through the convening of national and regional workshops. In September
2002, the research team convened a national workshop with federal officials
from agencies that have regulatory responsibilities over or related to the
development of aquaculture in federal offshore waters, staff of Congressional
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members or committees likely to have jurisdiction over aquaculture, US
Commission on Ocean Policy staff, and other stakeholders to receive their
insights and feedback on some of the approaches then being considered by
the research team. Feedback also was sought regionally in the three regions
that are most active in the development of aquaculture in state offshore
waters: the Gulf of Mexico, New England and the Pacific coast/Hawaii.
Although the federal offshore waters aquaculture policy project has not
issued a final report, a May 2003 letter, with attached preliminary recom-
mendations, to the US Commission on Ocean Policy from the team sheds
considerable light.92 It is apparent from the letter that the endeavor has been
a difficult balancing act between attempting to specify a policy framework
specific to mariculture on the one hand, and placing mariculture within the
broader, multi-use governance scheme for federal offshore waters that has
been enunciated by the US Commission on Ocean Policy on the other hand.
Indeed, the bigger challenge is to
design an approach for the management of new uses of federal offshore
waters that encourages sustainable use, and that creates linkages
between new and already existing uses of the ocean, such as oil and gas
operations, fishing, habitat and ecosystem preservation, transportation
and recreation, among others.93
The approach to be advocated can be broken into six constituent parts.
1 New administrative functionalities. The team recommends the establish-
ment of a new high-level Office of Offshore Aquaculture (OOA) within
the NOAA, preferably as a component of a larger, higher-level Office of
Ocean Management, which would have as its charge oversight of the
“development of all new uses of federal waters” and “assessing, planning
for, and reporting on ocean and coastal areas, their conditions and their
uses.”94 It is envisioned that the OOA will work closely with the JSA in
“developing and implementing the offshore aquaculture planning,
research and outreach components of the National Aquaculture Devel-
opment Plan.”95
2 Systematic mapping and assessment of features, resources and uses of federal off-
shore waters. This effort would be undertaken to evaluate the suitability
of areas for aquaculture development. Although this work would pri-
marily fall to the federal government, it also would “involve region-spe-
cific assessment efforts by regional councils, States, or others.”96 The
following options for mariculture development in federal offshore waters
have been developed:97
• Sites that the federal government would “pre-permit” for marine
aquaculture. Under this option, the federal government would
secure necessary general permits to address state and federal regula-
tory requirements.
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• The federal government would designate areas for offshore aquacul-
ture, taking into consideration impacts to the marine environment
and potential conflicts with other uses and users.
• The creation of marine aquaculture parks that would “provide initial
infrastructure, environmental assessment information, and desig-
nated areas for pilot, research, and longer-term commercial pro-
jects.”98
• Map-based marine zoning of federal offshore waters, with areas
zoned for exclusive or multiple use, depending on site characteristics
and existing and desired uses.
• In the interim, until the above measures are a reality, leases would
be issued on a case-by-case basis for sites that would likely be identi-
fied by aquaculture firms.
Because of the potential for cumulative and/or synergistic effects of mar-
iculture facilities, OOA also would need to develop spacing guidance.99
3 Leasing authority. To successfully operate in federal ocean waters, a cultur-
ist needs to exercise sufficient control over the site. Creating a leasing
authority in NOAA OOA would convey some degree of exclusivity while
protecting the public’s interests in the resource by setting forth detailed
rights and responsibilities of the culturalist, including the obligation to
pay rent (and royalties, as appropriate) and to ensure proper closure of the
facility. A lease would need to address the following elements: (a) eligibil-
ity; (b) delineation of the three-dimensional space to be leased; (c) dura-
tion; (d) degree of exclusivity awarded; (e) compensation by the lessee
(user pay); (f) environmental monitoring; (g) access and information provi-
sion; (h) health and safety; (i) lease transferability; (j) performance bonds
to ensure site restoration; and (k) abandonment, revocation and termina-
tion.100 In addition, because leases would be the prime vehicle through
which to regulate ongoing aquaculture operations, each lease would need
to establish operational parameters that would place limits on operations
(e.g. stocking densities and feed rates) and/or to rely on environmental
discharge parameters, leaving it to the aquaculture firm to devise the most
efficient means to manage its operations given discharge limitations. Four
types of leases are being considered:
• Experimental. For scientific research and to further development of
gear or techniques.
• Short-term (or interim). To facilitate development of a facility’s opera-
tional plan.
• Long-term (or standard). For culturists with fully developed opera-
tional plans.
• Emergency. To provide facility operators with the capability to
respond rapidly to and temporarily relocate their facilities in the
event that conditions (such as extreme weather events) warrant relo-
cation.101
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4 Joint leasing and permitting. NOAA OOA should create a multi-purpose
lease/permit application to guide review by all relevant federal and state
agencies and to facilitate public input.102 Some agencies, such as the
EPA and the Army Corps have to consider whether or not to issue
permits; other federal agencies, such as the NMFS and the FWS, must
be consulted regarding potential impacts on essential fish habitat,
endangered species and marine mammals, while affected states need to
be brought into the loop to analyze whether the proposed facility opera-
tions would be consistent with their respective coastal zone manage-
ment plans. In addition to completing the application form, applicants
would be required to submit a detailed operational plan that would
include an environmental characterization of the area proposed to be
leased, a discharge monitoring plan, an emergency response plan, an
escape response plan and an abandonment/closure plan.103 The “purpose
of the joint permitting/leasing system is to simplify the existing jumble
of fragmented permitting processes and unclear authority and environ-
mental review procedures, and to attach, as appropriate, detailed con-
ditions and ongoing monitoring to the conduct of aquaculture
operations.”104
5 Guidelines, principles and procedures for environmental review and monitoring.
The OOA should conduct or direct environmental reviews and associ-
ated monitoring, with the extent of review required tailored to each
stage of the process (planning, leasing, monitoring). As the research
team notes, in order to ensure an effective environmental review process,
“Congress should clarify and confirm” that the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)105 “applies to activities in the territorial sea, in the
EEZ, and on the continental shelf.”106 Seven guiding principles for
environmental review of aquaculture in federal offshore waters have been
identified: (1) ecological sustainability; (2) the precautionary approach;
(3) environmental carrying capacity; (4) environmental impact assess-
ment; (5) adaptive management; (6) transparency/public participation;
and (7) promotion of integrated aquaculture, including polyculture.107
In addition, an eighth principle, “polluter pays,” informs the conclusion
that culturists should be responsible for addressing natural resource
damage in the event of significant adverse impacts to the marine
environment.108
6 Operation, monitoring, compliance and enforcement. BMPs and codes of
conduct should guide offshore aquaculture operations.109 In addition,
the NOAA OOA needs to establish procedures, practices and require-
ments to ensure that aquaculture activities do not exceed the carrying
capacity of the environment and that the site is returned to its pre-
leased state at project termination.110 For example, performance bonds
to ensure removal of aquaculture structures, site remediation, and
implementation of monitoring for ecological health, operational safety
and compliance with the terms of leases and permits are required.111 The
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federal government must dedicate sufficient financial and personnel
resources to monitor the offshore aquaculture industry, to ensure its
compliance with leases, permits and requirements of law, and to bring
the government’s enforcement authority to bear in the event of viola-
tions.112 In regard to the last item, additional enforcement authority is
needed to complement the proposed new leasing authority. Although
the executive branch could implement some of the actions detailed
above – that is, without congressional action, such as creation of the
OOA – other actions, such as leasing authority, would need specific
legislative authorization.
A month after Cicin-Sain and her colleagues had outlined their prelimi-
nary thoughts on marine aquaculture governance, the Pew Oceans Commis-
sion weighed in with its final report: America’s Living Oceans: Charting a
Course for Sea Change. In pertinent part, it recommends significant change in
the manner in which US oceans are governed. If adopted, the changes would
significantly impact the manner in which the federal government regulates
marine aquaculture. The report also makes specific recommendations regard-
ing offshore aquaculture. Turning first to issues of governance, the Pew
Commission recommends that Congress enact legislation providing a “uni-
fying set of principles and standards for governance,” including ecological
sustainability, maintenance of marine biological diversity and healthy
marine ecosystems, and precautionary action in favor of conservation.113 To
accomplish those objectives, the Pew Commission advocates implementing
ocean ecosystem governance at the regional level and adopting regional
ocean governance plans that employ zoning to reduce user conflicts and that
provide indicators of ecosystem health, measurable goals and enforceable
policies.114 The Pew Commission calls on Congress to consolidate federal
programs related to oceans and the atmosphere in a single independent
agency and to establish a national ocean policy council within the White
House.115 Turning to mariculture-specific concerns, the Pew Commission
recommends that Congress enact legislation establishing aquaculture siting,
design and operation criteria as well as standards that minimize adverse
impacts, promote species that are not overly dependent on fishmeal and fish
oil, and limit mariculture in federal offshore waters to native stocks.116
US Commission on Ocean Policy
In its September 2004 report – An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century Final
Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy – the US Commission on Ocean
Policy makes recommendations of relevance to marine aquaculture that are
broadly consistent with those put forth by the Pew Commission. To begin
with, the US Commission on Ocean Policy advocates management that is
participatory and based on the best available science and information; that is
adaptive, ecosystem-based and protective of marine biodiversity; that recog-
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nizes ocean–land–atmospheric connections and multiple uses; and that at its
core is sustainable and reflective of the notion of stewardship.117 To meet
this management objective, it calls, in pertinent part, for the establishment
of a National Ocean Council within the Executive Office of the President to
ensure that ocean issues receive high-level government attention,118 the
adoption of legislation that would clarify NOAA’s structure and align its
mission along the principle of ecosystem-based management, and the con-
solidation of ocean programs and functions.119 The US Commission on
Ocean Policy also seeks to devolve ocean governance to the regional level.120
Underscoring the importance that the US Commission on Ocean Policy
attributed to marine aquaculture, it devotes an entire chapter of its report to
this subject.121 The Commission recommends that NOAA be designated the
lead federal agency for marine aquaculture and that NOAA establish an
Office of Sustainable Marine Aquaculture.122 The new office would then be
charged with establishing a leasing and permitting regulatory regime to
streamline government review and to enhance coordination with other ocean
uses.123 The Commission recommends as well that aquaculturalists pay the
government a “reasonable portion of the resource rent generated from
marine aquaculture projects that rely on ocean resources held in the public
trust” and post a performance bond to assure performance and proper
removal of the aquaculture facility.124
Conclusion
Although the quotations that opened this chapter give one pause – a consis-
tent quarter-century clarion call for clarity and consistency has gone unan-
swered – several recent developments may provide the impetus for action.
To begin with, the findings of the US Commission on Ocean Policy should
place the issue of ocean management squarely on Congress’s plate. Moreover,
the operational framework for aquaculture in federal offshore waters should
complement the work of the Commission on Ocean Policy. In addition,
recent lawsuits against aquaculture firms under the CWA may mobilize a
constituency for change within the industry. And finally, aquaculture may
be able to piggyback the recent activity in another emerging use of federal
offshore waters, wind farming – a use that may find a more receptive ear in
Congress and in the White House.
Assuming that administrative and legislative action occurs in the aqua-
culture realm, what will that development mean to the aquaculture
community? Although a move from state to federal offshore waters may pose
some costs to the aquaculture industry in terms of higher operating costs
and increased risk of harm from weather events, such a move is likely to
have compensating benefits. To begin with, whatever regulatory framework
is eventually adopted for federal offshore waters, it will provide the industry
with a regulatory environment that is more consistent than presently exists
as it shifts or expands operations from one state jurisdiction to another, up
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and down the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and along the Gulf coast. Indeed,
states have such diverse mariculture rules as a blanket prohibition on finfish
farming in Alaska, a submerged lands lease from the Department of Agri-
culture and approval by the State Cabinet in Florida, and aquaculture siting
on a local and county level in Texas and Washington, respectively.125 More-
over, unlike in state offshore waters, where both state and federal law apply,
in federal offshore waters only federal law applies, and thus, to a greater
extent, mariculture firms that operate in federal offshore waters can avoid
potentially conflicting and duplicative laws and regulations.
For example, in state offshore waters, in addition to any state laws that
may be applicable, the discharge prohibitions of the CWA would be applic-
able, as would federal requirements related to the use of pesticides (the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, FIFRA)126 and antibiotics
(the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)127 the placement of an obstruction
in the navigable waters (the Rivers and Harbors Act, RHA)128 and the prohi-
bitions against taking an endangered species (the Endangered Species Act)129 or
marine mammals (the Marine Mammal Protection Act).130 In contrast, in
federal offshore waters, state regulation, for the most part, is likely to have
minimal effect. For example, s. 401 of the CWA,131 which would otherwise
require a federal permit applicant to receive certification from a state that its
discharge is in compliance with state water quality standards, is not applica-
ble in federal offshore waters because the jurisdictional reach of the states
under s. 401 extends only three miles offshore.132
It is true, however, that even if mariculture operations occur in federal
waters, some state laws and programs may still have bite. For example, s.
307 of the CZMA133 requires federal permit applicants to obtain state certi-
fication that any permitted action that will affect land uses, water uses or
natural resources of a state’s coastal zone is consistent with that state’s
coastal zone management plan. States also, for example, could require a
permit to transport live fish through state jurisdictional waters.134 Finally,
states may participate in permit and lease development through the environ-
mental evaluation and public participation process mandated by the NEPA.
The further mariculture operations move offshore, the more likely it is
they will be able to avoid conflicts with other uses (e.g., the conflicts
between wild and cultured salmon stocks and among mariculture, commer-
cial fishing, oil and gas, and preservation) and other users and interested
parties. Moving further offshore also should ameliorate some of mariculture’s
ecological impacts. For example, the capacity of the ocean to assimilate
nutrient loadings from mariculture operations should be greatly enhanced as
one moves from near-shore to the wide expanse of federal offshore waters.
Thus, when, and if, a regulatory framework is put in place for federal off-
shore aquaculture, firms will have to weigh the benefits of avoiding state
regulation against the costs of moving operations to federal offshore waters.
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Postscript
In 2005, an NOAA-drafted bill, the National Offshore Aquaculture Act of
2005 was introduced in the U.S. Senate, as bill S.1195. Shortly thereafter,
the Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which at section 388 (to
be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1337) authorizes the MMS to enter into leases for
offshore renewable energy production and for marine-related activities asso-
ciated with an offshore energy facility. Although this authority arguably
includes leasing for aquaculture, at present MMS is only considering allow-
ing platforms to be converted to aquaculture use provided that another
agency such as the NOAA approves the underlying activity. 70 Federal Reg-
ister 77346 (30 December 2005). The Cicin-Sain, et al., report on an off-
shore aquaculture framework, supra n. 4, was released to the public in early
2006 and follows the approach outlined above. Finally, the Pew Charitable
Trusts and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution established Marine
Aquaculture Task Force in July 2005; the Task Force is expected to
complete its work in early 2007 (http://www.whoi.edu/sbl/liteSite.do?
litesiteid=2790).
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Australia has responsibility for the fourth largest maritime jurisdiction in
the world. The Australian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and claimable
continental shelf is 16 million km2, extending from tropical to Antarctic
waters. While the Australian EEZ is not highly productive on a world scale,
it nonetheless supports a number of commercially lucrative fisheries, includ-
ing tuna and billfish, high-value shellfish and crustaceans, and increasingly
important mariculture of salmonids and southern bluefin tuna.1 Australian
fisheries have experienced a period of impressive growth in the recent past,
driven by significant developments in aquaculture. The gross value of Aus-
tralian seafood production in 2002–2003 was A$2.3 billion2 and is forecast
to reach A$5 billion by 2020. It is expected that aquaculture developments
will furnish the vast majority of this economic growth. Aquaculture produc-
tion has trebled in the decade to 2002–2003, and the value of this produc-
tion more than doubled in the same period. Exports of aquaculture have
grown in value from A$246.7 million in 1991–1992 to A743.5 million in
2002–20033 (see Figures 15.1 and 15.2). Moreover, aquaculture and associ-
ated processing are vital rural industries, sustaining regional communities
around the coastline.4
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the development of aquacul-
ture in Australia, followed by an outline of the legal and policy framework
governing Australian fisheries and aquaculture operations. Jurisdiction, and
resultant interaction between the Commonwealth and state governments,5 is
a key to this framework. This chapter focuses on the opportunities and chal-
lenges facing aquaculture operations in Australia as identified in the devel-
opment of a national Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda. The
Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda aims to achieve a vision of Australia
“being the world’s most globally competitive aquaculture producer,” with
an industry mission of “total commitment to economic, social and environ-












































































Figure 15.1 Australian aquaculture production (sources: Australian Bureau of Agri-
cultural and Resource Economics (ABARE); Australian Fisheries Stat-














































































Figure 15.2 Australian aquaculture: value (sources: as Figure 15.1).
-
Australian aquaculture: developments
Australian aquaculture began with the “culturing” of shellfish, most notably
oysters and mussels, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Pearl
production developed in the 1950s6 using Japanese-developed techniques.
Finfish aquaculture increased in significance with commercial development
of Atlantic salmon cage aquaculture in the mid-1980s and successful cage
“farming” of wild-caught southern bluefin tuna in the 1990s.7 Finfish opera-
tions are the mainstay of Australian aquaculture, with new species being
trialed. Shellfish aquaculture is also developing, with operations based on
scallops and abalone being established. These shellfish products are aimed
both at domestic markets and for export to north Asian markets. The Aus-
tralian aquaculture industry is diverse, comprising approximately 3,000
individual businesses8 and fifty aquaculture associations and councils. The
National Aquaculture Council represents 60 percent of the aquaculture
industry by value.9 The lack of a national peak industry body has been iden-
tified as a current constraint, with such a body seen as being able to
“improve the industry’s contribution to aquaculture policy and program
development.”10
The development of finfish aquaculture in Australia began with the suc-
cessful introduction of Atlantic salmon aquaculture into Tasmania. This
introduction occurred as the state pursued an aggressive developmental
strategy for its fisheries in the late 1970s, seeking out new opportunities and
niche markets. Salmon that had been imported into Australia as a sport fish
in the 1960s (into lakes associated with major hydroelectric developments in
the state of New South Wales) provided the original source of stock. This
had the advantage of quarantining the original stock from problems associ-
ated with transferring wild-caught fish into farming operations. Tasmania
had a long history of work with salmonids. Trout and trout eggs were
imported from England into the state in the mid-1880s to support an
angling industry in highland rivers. These fish provided the base of trout
hatchery material and led to regular introductions of fry into Tasmanian
rivers and lakes.
Atlantic salmon aquaculture in Australia is centered on Tasmanian
waters. The operations are based on cages located in estuaries and inshore
areas, with related onshore facilities close to the cages. As in other states,
management of aquaculture in Tasmania (including tenure and lease of sites,
fisheries husbandry and processing, environmental controls, occupational
health and safety, and marine farm planning) is regulated by state legislation
and regulations.11 In 2002–2003, the farm-gate value of Atlantic salmon
was approximately A$108 million, with more than 14,000 tonnes produced
for both the domestic and export markets.12 Profitability of Tasmanian
operations has been affected by climatic conditions (higher than average
summer water temperatures impact on the reproductive fitness of brood
stock13) and global oversupply of fish. This led to a further rationalization of
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the industry with the merger of Tasmania’s two largest salmon producers in
February 2003. This occurred when Tassal, the state’s largest salmon pro-
ducer, was in receivership, with debts of A$40 million. The merged
company traded out of financial difficulty, and the new entity had a success-
ful stock market launch on November 2003.
The “farming” of southern bluefin tuna has developed from an experi-
mental farm introduced in 1991–1992. A number of factors have con-
tributed to the development of this aquaculture operation. Substantial
reductions in quotas of wild fish caught between the three major harvesting
countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand,14 and reduced profitability of
Australian operations encouraged innovative approaches to returning the
fishery to viability. Initial experiments in Japan had indicated that bluefin
tuna (a fast-swimming, highly migratory species in the wild) could adapt to
cage conditions.15 Active support from Australian industry encouraged
Japanese interests to establish a larger-scale experimental cage operation in
the relatively sheltered waters off Port Lincoln, South Australia.16 This farm
attracted funding and technical support from the Japanese Overseas Fishery
Cooperation Foundation in a collaborative venture with the Tuna Boat
Owners Association of Australia.
Initial success and “proving up” of the farming operations led to a major
commercial focus of these operations from the mid-1990s. Australian oper-
ators gradually shifted operations from fishing to farming, supported by
their close links with Japanese importers. Australia targeted product for
Japanese supermarkets, which in the 1980s began to displace the fishmonger
as the point of sale of fisheries products.17 At present, over 95 percent of the
Australian catch18 of southern bluefin tuna is placed in cages and fattened for
processing and export to Japan. The Australian quota of 5,265 tonnes of
southern bluefin tuna is grown out to over 8,000 tonnes of high-grade
sashimi tuna.19 The tuna farming operation has been commercially success-
ful, with a gross value of production exceeding A$250 million in
2000–2001.20 The Australian operations have attracted considerable world-
wide interest. Australian technology is now utilized by, and Australian
interests are now linked to, tuna farms in Asia, Europe and North America.
The development of tuna farming has raised several issues. A major storm
in 1996 saw major losses of stock as a result of cages being located in
shallow water. As a result, cages are rotated more regularly and moved into
deeper water if weather conditions warrant. Ongoing environmental moni-
toring is undertaken around and in the cages. Research is continuing on
feeds (caged southern bluefin tuna are fed pilchards and other seafood, with
frozen pilchards imported from Chile21). In Tasmania, there has been criti-
cism of the environmental impacts of the tuna farming operations, and court
action over siting and operations of cage-based aquaculture.22
While tuna and salmon operations dominate the value of Australian
aquaculture, considerable efforts are being made with abalone. Shore-based
propagation of abalone is undertaken in Tasmania, Victoria and South
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Australia, with the farmed product aimed to fill a niche market for small fish
in North Asian markets. An innovative approach has been the use of a con-
verted freighter as an “at sea” abalone farm, reducing the costs associated
with land-based abalone farming.23
Australian fisheries and aquaculture management: the
legal and policy framework
Jurisdiction over Australian fisheries is shared between the Commonwealth
and the states.24 Commonwealth power is based on s. 51(x) of the Constitu-
tion (“fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits”) and state leg-
islation through provisions of each state’s constitution.25 Each of the states
and the mainland territories has a coastline and interests in coastal manage-
ment.26 The question of jurisdiction over fisheries increased in salience from
the late 1940s, with jurisdiction divided by a boundary established by the
three-nautical mile (nm) territorial sea. Resolution of jurisdictional conflicts
in the 1970s saw this boundary entrenched by the Offshore Constitutional
Settlement (OCS).27 The OCS established a series of “agreed arrangements”
affecting management of a variety of marine resource sectors, including fish-
eries. In effect, these arrangements entrenched the state or territory jurisdic-
tion over what became known as “state waters” – waters within a line drawn
threenm offshore of the territorial sea baseline. The OCS enables arrange-
ments to be established to “streamline” management of fisheries that tran-
scended the threenm boundary.28
The OCS has remained a major policy framework for Australian fisheries
and aquaculture, with aquaculture operations managed by the states. It
includes a range of environmental and planning instruments, as well as local
government planning controls. Despite this direct involvement by the states
and local government, the Commonwealth retains important influence in
Australian aquaculture. The Commonwealth controls quarantine (including
the importation of aquaculture feeds), regulates biosafety and gene techno-
logy, and increasingly provides environmental oversight of state fisheries. In
addition, the Commonwealth provides export market certification, is con-
cerned with the control and management of aquatic animal diseases, and
supports research and development, economic forecasts and trade informa-
tion.29
Management of Australian fisheries underwent substantial changes in the
1990s. A major turning point in the administration and management of
Australian (and particularly Commonwealth) fisheries occurred in early
1985, when the Australian Fisheries Conference was held in Canberra. Prior
to this conference, the Senate Standing Committee on Trade and Commerce
undertook a major review of the Australian fishing industry.30 This report,
presented to Parliament in 1982, made a series of recommendations related
to the development of the Australian fishing industry. The recommenda-
tions of the Fisheries Conference and the Archer Report heralded a new era
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in fisheries management. The 1980s ended with the release of a major Com-
monwealth policy statement, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Man-
agement in the 1990s.31 This new era was, as noted earlier, also marked by
increasing interest in aquaculture operations, following the successful com-
mercialization of sea-caged Atlantic salmon operations in Tasmania.
The New Directions statement provided the basis of major legislative and
administrative changes implemented by the Commonwealth government in
1991. These included the development of a statutory body, the Australian
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), to assume management
responsibilities previously undertaken by the Australian Fisheries Service
within the Department of Primary Industry and Energy. Government accep-
tance of the focus of the New Directions statement led to the development of a
package of laws in 1991 that, with amendments, provide the basis for
current management of Commonwealth fisheries.32
Developments in broader Commonwealth government policies, primarily
through the implementation of Australia’s Oceans Policy,33 reinforce the
requirement that fisheries policy and management (including aquaculture)
need to be reorientated towards an ecosystem-based approach.34 One of the
more significant challenges affecting Australian fisheries policy and manage-
ment has been the increasing external scrutiny of management.35 This is
reflected in the growing impact of Commonwealth environmental legisla-
tion on fisheries management, development of sustainability indicators, and
the extension in 1999 of schedule 4 of the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of
Exports and Imports) Act 1982 to fisheries. This scrutiny has extended to
state-administered aquaculture operations, with several cases being brought
before state courts over impacts and operations of aquaculture operations.
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC
Act) entered into force in July 2000 and gives domestic effect to the Biodi-
versity Convention and the Jakarta Mandate.36 Prior to the development of
this legislation, these commitments were met by the National Biological
Diversity Strategy, which, inter alia, endorsed the adoption of ecologically
sustainable fishing practices to achieve conservation of biological diversity in
fisheries. The EPBC Act provides protection for matters of national environ-
mental importance, including World Heritage properties, Ramsar wetlands
of international importance, nationally threatened animal and plant species
and ecological communities, internationally protected migratory species,
and Commonwealth marine areas.37 The EPBC Act protects the environ-
ment on Commonwealth land and regulates actions of Commonwealth
departments and agencies that may have a significant impact on the environ-
ment. It provides for a streamlined system for environmental assessment and
project approval through the establishment of bilateral agreements with the
states and territories.
The EPBC Act promotes ecologically sustainable development and estab-
lishes an integrated approach to biological conservation. It establishes the
Australian whale sanctuary and contains provision for public comment and
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consultation. The EPBC Act replaces the following Commonwealth legisla-
tion: the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974; the Endangered
Species Protection Act 1992; the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act
1975; the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983; and the Whale Pro-
tection Act 1980. The EPBC Act gives the Department of Environment and
Heritage a major role in reviewing management arrangements established
after July 2000. It also provides statutory support for management of by-
catch in Australian fisheries.38
In 2000, a review of Commonwealth fisheries policy was announced. This
review recognized that Australian fisheries have undergone significant
changes since the release of New Directions, and that a new policy statement
was needed.39 The increased importance and future potential of aquaculture
was highlighted as one “change driver” influencing the development of a
new policy statement. While progress was made in developing the state-
ment in 1999–2000, the federal election of 2001 and appointment of a new
minister responsible for fisheries after the re-election of the Liberal coalition
government postponed the completion of the policy review. Looking to the
Future: A Review of Commonwealth Fisheries Policy40 was released in June 2003.
This report noted the “changing policy environment” since the release of the
New Directions statement in 1989. One change that was identified was the
“rapidly growing aquaculture industry.”41 The report noted that while
“aquaculture in Australia occurs almost exclusively in state and territory
waters,”42 “there will be an emerging requirement for the aquaculture indus-
try to gain access to Commonwealth waters to cultivate and farm marine
species.”43 The failure of the Commonwealth’s Fisheries Management Act to
address aquaculture activities was seen to create uncertainty.44
As was indicated earlier, the state and territory governments have
responsibility for aquaculture in Australia, as these operations occur within
the three-nm state waters zone. Australian aquaculture operations generally
take place within state waters – that is, the area from low-water mark to
threenm offshore within the twelve-nm territorial sea, with the states
having primary responsibility for management and regulation of aquacul-
ture. The states administer aquaculture through a variety of legislation, such
as a section with a broader fisheries Act as in Victoria,45 or dedicated marine
farming or aquaculture legislation as in Tasmania.46 The development of
aquaculture operations in the 1980s and 1990s was one impetus for legis-
lative reviews of state fisheries; the other was the need to accommodate post-
Brundtland Report47 principles such as ecologically sustainable development
and precautionary approaches to management, which had been established as
broad policy parameters at both the Commonwealth and state levels of
government.
Local government has an important role in aquaculture development: it is
responsible for much of the terrestrial land-use planning and approvals for
land-based infrastructure for marine farming operations. Aquaculture opera-
tions have focused considerable community attention on uses of the coastal
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zone, and siting, or planned expansion, of operations has rarely occurred
without controversy over loss of access or amenity.
Notwithstanding the lack of formal Commonwealth jurisdiction within
state waters, Commonwealth–state relations form the framework for
ongoing development of Australian aquaculture. Indeed, there is currently
no legal recognition for aquaculture in Commonwealth waters, as aquacul-
ture in not recognized in the Fisheries Management Act 1991.48 Clearly, as
industry seeks to extend operations into Commonwealth waters, such
lacunae need to be addressed. The Commonwealth government has,
however, been active in fostering a national perspective on aquaculture
developments. This interest has been derived from a number of directions,
including the benefits of regional cooperation with Asian countries within
the Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA).49 The Com-
monwealth also has direct responsibility in areas such as quarantine, bio-
safety and regulation of the use of gene technology that directly impact on
aquaculture.50
Commonwealth, the states and intergovernmental
relations
Intergovernmental interaction is a significant feature of Australian federal-
ism. While the states retain significant jurisdiction, the Commonwealth
influences a range of policy areas though the process of judicial review, rein-
forcing Commonwealth jurisdiction in relation to the domestic implementa-
tion of international treaties, and its fiscal dominance gives it considerable
power to allocate funds to the states.51 These developments have increased
the policy reach of the Commonwealth but have not occurred in a zero-sum
manner. Increased influence by the Commonwealth has been matched by
increased activity by the states and a resultant increase in intergovernmental
institutions and processes. These institutions and processes are centered on
ministerial councils comprising relevant Commonwealth, state and territory
ministers, supported by committees of senior officials from each govern-
ment. These institutions have been described as “lubricating the federal
system”52 and are seen to provide an important “interface” between Aus-
tralian governments, enabling joint action in a vast number of policy areas.53
The importance of collaboration between Australian governments over
aquaculture development has been a common theme from the mid-1980s. In
1988, the Australian Science and Technology Council’s report Casting the
Net54 recommended preparation of an overview of the national status and
future potential of aquaculture. The 1989 report of the Review Committee
on Marine Industries, Science and Technology, Oceans of Wealth,55 recom-
mended undertaking “a study of government roles in the promotion of
effective development of aquaculture” and that “each state should make a
detailed review of the impact of the government regulatory framework on
aquaculture.”56 An intergovernmental Working Group on Aquaculture
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(WGA), with members from the states, the Northern Territory and the
Commonwealth, were commissioned by the Standing Committee on Fish-
eries and Aquaculture (SCFA) to respond to these reports. The WGA
response was approved by the SCFA and Ministerial Council in 1993, and
formed the National Strategy on Aquaculture in Australia,57 which was released
in March 1994.
The National Strategy outlined ten goals that would “overcome the
current constraints on the aquaculture industry” and “create an environment
in which the aquaculture can capitalize on its advantages.”58 Goal 3 was to
provide a “coordinated government framework to support industry develop-
ment.”59 A further example of the importance of intergovernmental rela-
tions, together with industry involvement, was the collaborative effort to
establish a national strategic plan for aquatic animal health (AQUAPLAN)
in 1999. AQUAPLAN, a five-year plan, concluded its first iteration in
2003.60 The need for long-term funding of this initiative has been recog-
nized by industry and is currently being addressed as part of a broader
government–industry agenda.
Government–industry relations
Unlike other primary industry sectors in Australia, fisheries and aquaculture
lack strong and united peak industry bodies. One key challenge is to create
effective industry bodies to engage with governments and help advance
industry’s interests. The diversity and spread of Australian aquaculture,
while providing significant opportunities, poses a major challenge and rein-
forces the need for a strong industry body.
The aquaculture industry is a major player in regional Australia, making
a significant contribution to regional economic and community develop-
ment. Aquaculture operations have provided employment and can provide
further economic multipliers in areas that have suffered significant economic
decline. Aquaculture is also seen as providing considerable benefits to Aus-
tralia’s indigenous communities.61 A major spin-off from the tuna farming
and salmon aquaculture in Port Lincoln and southern Tasmania has been the
range of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have developed to
support aquaculture operations. Initiatives such as the Kimberly Aquacul-
ture Aboriginal Corporation (KAAC), established in 2002 with an operation
focusing on trochus shell aquaculture but with opportunities to develop
prawn and pearl farming in the future, are seen as providing similar benefits
to aboriginal and islander communities.62 Development of community-based
and/or commercial aquaculture projects could support a host of related train-
ing and infrastructure development requirements that are central to the
well-being and survival of these communities.63
Governments (both Commonwealth and state) have recognized the bene-
fits of a sustainable aquaculture industry and have moved to ensure that
ongoing development takes the form of a strategic partnership with indus-
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try. This model recognizes that industry is driven by commercial realities
but operates within an environment shaped or bounded by government pol-
icies. This includes an important commitment to ecologically sustainable
use of marine resources. The development of such a strategic partnership –
the Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda – between 1999 and 2002 is a
major achievement. The agenda identifies both the opportunities and the
challenges facing Australian aquaculture.
The future: the Aquaculture Industry Action agenda
The Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda, comprising an industry-initiated
and government-supported vision, mission statement and outline policy
framework, arose from a national aquaculture workshop held in August
1999 that identified the opportunities and “impediments” to continued
growth in this industry sector.64 The workshop “delivered a clear commit-
ment and provided a sound basis for the development of a national action
plan for the Australian aquaculture industry” and “developed and endorsed
. . . a vision (including a growth target) and mission statements for the Aus-
tralian aquaculture industry.”65 The Agenda’s vision is that “[b]y 2010 a
vibrant and rapidly growing Australian aquaculture industry will achieve
$2.5 billion in sales by being the world’s most efficient aquaculture pro-
ducer.”66 Its mission is “total commitment to economic, social and environ-
mental benefits from aquaculture.”67
The workshop noted the importance of industry coordination and organi-
zation, promotion of industry, recognition of the significance of environ-
mental issues, markets and marketing, and research and development.68 One
outcome was an agreement among industry representatives to form a new
peak industry body – the National Aquaculture Council (NAC) – to replace
the Australian Aquaculture Forum. It was determined that NAC would be
industry driven and open to organizations, businesses and individuals
involved in aquaculture.69
In 2000, the Commonwealth government announced that it would work
with industry to achieve industry’s vision. An expert group, the National
Aquaculture Development Committee, with a majority of industry members,
was established to assist in the development of an agenda for action. The com-
mittee’s terms of reference included direct reference to the industry vision. As
part of the consultation process associated with the development of the action
agenda, the National Aquaculture Development Committee released a discus-
sion paper on June 2001 “to stimulate discussion on a range of issues during
the development of the aquaculture Action Agenda.”70
The Action Agenda is based on maximizing what Australian industry
sees as its competitive advantages:
its ability to produce a wide range of warm and cold water species
enabling us to access a wide range of niche markets. As a small producer
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by world standards, Australia relies on being able to target niche, high-
value markets with a wide range of premium-quality produce.71
The National Aquaculture Development Committee noted that Australian
aquaculture benefits from a “positive business environment, stable govern-
ment, a strong regulatory framework for ecologically sustainable develop-
ment, fish health, a highly skilled workforce, and world-class scientists and
educational institutions.”72
The report to government and industry by the National Aquaculture
Development Committee included a summary of proposed initiatives and
recommended actions.73 These actions included a national aquaculture policy
statement; implementing an industry-driven action agenda; growing the
industry within an ecologically sustainable framework; investing for growth;
promoting aquaculture products in Australia and globally; tackling research
and innovation challenges; making the most of education, training and
workplace opportunities; and creating an industry for all Australians.74 In
December 2002, the Commonwealth government announced that it sup-
ported the direction of the Action Agenda75 and that it was progressing to
implementing the recommendations from the National Aquaculture Devel-
opment Committee. This included the release of a National Aquaculture
Policy Statement and best-practice principles for the development and man-
agement of aquaculture. The National Aquaculture Policy Statement was
released on 25 July 2003,76 as part of a strategic direction and commitments
arising from the Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda.
The Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda is seen as “an important step in
[the] direction of ensuring responsible environmental management for long-
term success.”77 The sustainable aquaculture independent working group
reporting to the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation
Council (PMSEIC) noted that in addition to the critical issues of the indus-
try’s need for a sustained and focused research and development effort, two
major issues stand out for joint consideration by government and industry:
scale and marketing, and environment and sustainability.78 Addressing these
issues provides challenges as well as opportunities for Australian aquacul-
ture. The current focus on niche markets for high-value products needs to be
addressed and a strategy needs to be developed to expand markets and to
address increasing competition in these new markets. The need to adopt a
focused marketing strategy is also identified as a challenge, with the sugges-
tion to borrow from the lessons learned from the highly successful model
developed by the Australia wine industry.79
Conclusion
Australian aquaculture operations are significant, and targeted for continued
expansion over the next decade. This planned expansion raises a number of
opportunities but also challenges. The development and implementation of
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a National Aquaculture Policy, together with ongoing implementation of
the Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda, are important elements in ensur-
ing that opportunities are met and challenges confronted. The challenges
facing governments include issues related to jurisdiction (e.g. property
rights in aquaculture operations in Commonwealth waters) and ensuring
appropriate policy settings to guide development. For industry, the chal-
lenge is to maintain commitment to the world’s best practices and to ensure
effective industry linkages and communication. Conflicts over siting and
operations are likely to continue, and there will be increased importance
placed on environmental management in the sector. Growth in the involve-
ment of Indigenous peoples in aquaculture provides great opportunities for
these communities. To adopt an industry-based metaphor, Australian aqua-
culture has succeeded in ensuring “grow-out” and has achieved much in the
past decade. The challenge to ensure an ecologically sustainable industry
remains a priority for industry and governments.
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New Zealand’s aquacultural development is dominated by marine farming
(mariculture), especially shellfish farming. Since 1991, it has developed
within the context of world-leading, but substantively different, governance
regimes for fisheries and coastal resources. The rapid growth of mussel
farming and the associated “race for space” have posed considerable chal-
lenges to attempts to develop integrated coastal management regimes and,
in 2001, resulted in the imposition of a national moratorium on all applica-
tions for new farm sites. The challenges to its development have come pri-
marily from fishery rights holders and recreational and environmental
communities. The situation has been clouded further by controversial claims
to the foreshore and seabed by the Indigenous people, the Maori.1 The com-
bination of these situational factors makes New Zealand’s mariculture
experience of particular interest to nations seeking to implement new aqua-
culture policy or integrated coastal management regimes.
In comparing the New Zealand experience with that of other countries, it
is essential to recognize its relatively straightforward system of government.
Technically a monarchy with a Governor-General appointed by the Queen of
England, New Zealand is, in all respects, essentially governed by a democra-
tically elected House of Representatives. There are no state legislatures to
debate jurisdictional issues, nor is there a formal constitution, separate presi-
dential office or upper house of any type. There are, however, two forms of
local government authorities – regional councils and territorial authorities –
that have planning and by-law making capacity, but no ability to make
laws. The twelve regional councils are watershed-based elected authorities
that have assumed much greater importance in resource management since
1991. Their planning and resource management authority extends to the
twelve-nautical mile boundary of New Zealand’s territorial sea. The seventy-
five territorial authorities are the elected municipal and district councils, and
they have retained significant powers in determining land use within their
boundaries, which generally end at the mean high-water line of spring tides.
The legitimacy of the New Zealand government is underpinned by the
1840 Treaty of Waitangi between chiefs of most of the Maori tribes and the
Crown of England. Key aspects of the treaty are that it extended to Maori
the rights of British citizenship, and thereby the basis for recognition of cus-
tomary and aboriginal rights under British common law,2 and it guaranteed
to Maori their rights to their “treasures,” specifically including fisheries.
Any ancestral blood link to Maori enables one to claim to be “Maori,” and
14.7 percent of the four million people living in New Zealand claimed that
they were Maori at the most recent census. Interracial marriage is common,
the proportion of Maori is expected to continue to grow, and there has been
a cultural resurgence since the 1970s. This has been reinforced by significant
legal victories,3 reports from the Waitangi Tribunal4 and a process set in
place for the government, representing the Crown, to negotiate settlements
with individual tribes for past and present grievances. Although many
Maori still live in the rural areas where they have traditionally retained land
ownership to significant areas often held in common title, they do not live
on “reservations” such as those found in North America. Maori predominate
in the lower socio-economic statistics, but in other respects form an integral
part of the larger New Zealand society.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the significant political
changes in New Zealand over the past thirty years. This is followed by an
overview of the development of aquaculture and an outline of the legal and
policy frameworks governing New Zealand marine farming since the
1970s.5 The chapter concludes with a discussion of the industry response,
the moratorium and government proposals, and Maori responses to these
reforms. Ideological changes in government policy and associated devolved
mechanisms of policy implementation are the keys to interpreting the
frameworks. The focus is on the principles underlying the interactions
between the post-1991 governance regimes and the industry, and why that
led to the moratorium and the new governance regime being established in
the mid-2000s. An examination of these developments suggests that marine
farmers are being unfairly discriminated against.
Political context
Despite being essentially an island nation, New Zealand had a relatively
small inshore fishery until its 1978 declaration of a twelve-nautical mile ter-
ritorial sea and 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (Figure 16.1).
Government subsidies aided a boom in fishing industry development
leading to concerns over the sustainability of fish stocks and the subsequent
imposition of the quota management system (QMS), discussed below. The
1970s also saw New Zealand join the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) and the beginning of the end of its special
trading relationships with Britain as the latter joined the European
Community. The potential loss of British market access was a major blow to
New Zealand’s primary production-dependent economy and this was
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Figure 16.1 New Zealand and places mentioned in the text (source: Jan Kelly and
Brian Marshall, Atlas of New Zealand Boundaries 1996 (Auckland: Auck-
land University Press)).
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exacerbated by the 1970s oil crisis. The latter emphasized the cost of trans-
porting New Zealand’s commodities to its major international markets.
The well-established welfare state meant a high level of individual taxa-
tion and associated redistribution of wealth. Central government paid for
such things as health care and education, and was the major employer in the
economy, especially in the infrastructure and development areas. It provided
many subsidies to the primary and other sectors, and protected domestic
industries with tariffs against imports. In response to the worsening eco-
nomic and energy outlook, New Zealand’s government embarked on several
large, primarily energy-based projects to boost and diversify economic devel-
opment.
The incoming Labour government of 1984, however, found itself in a
significant monetary crisis. The energy projects had largely failed to deliver
the expected returns and had galvanized a strong environmental movement.
The new government’s response was to initiate across-the-board neoliberal
free-market reforms of the state, the country and the resource management
systems.6 Among the (usually explicit) underlying ideological principles
were the following:
• Governments should not distort the operation of the free market by pro-
viding subsidies or direction (that is, they should not “pick winners”).
• Governments should not be involved in business (this principle resulted
in a sell-off of state-owned infrastructure, such as railways and ports,
and its construction agencies).
• Landowners should be free to develop their property as they see fit, pro-
vided the environmental impacts are addressed (that is, the principles of
“the polluter pays” and internalizing external costs were to apply).
• Decision-making should be made by the consumer, and in terms of gov-
ernance this meant that resource management decision-making should
be devolved to local authorities more responsive to the local electors.
• Decision-making should be efficient, transparent and accountable.
The resultant upheavals in the New Zealand economy were accompanied by
a resurgent Maori culture seeking redress for a variety of grievances, many of
which related to control over natural resources and land. Under the Labour
Party, as a small nation still largely dependent on commodity exports, New
Zealand strengthened its staunchly multilateralist international position,
seeing the United Nations as a key to removing trade barriers on commodi-
ties. New Zealand played a leading role in international negotiations leading
to the establishment of the World Trade Organization and was also active in
Agenda 21 and subsequent international agreements. In many of these nego-
tiations, it aligned itself with Canada, Australia and the United States.
New Zealand claimed the high moral ground in international negotia-
tions on the basis of having removed its own subsidies to, especially, the
primary sector. The subsidies that it had removed included the hidden
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subsidies involved in cleaning up environmental negatives caused by
resource users, such as water pollution and overfishing. Its primary legis-
lative tools for achieving this were the Resource Management Act 1991 and, for
fisheries, the QMS, introduced progressively since 1984. Subsequent govern-
ments have maintained these approaches.
By the new millennium, income taxation had been substantially reduced,
but a tax on goods and services was introduced. Many formerly protected
industries have closed. The economy is much more diverse, and attention is
being placed on niche marketing of value added products such as wine and
mussels. The political rhetoric has changed from one of equality in outcomes
to equality in opportunities. This is linked to following a “free-market”
approach, with some affirmative action to ensure equality of opportunity for
those who have less fortunate starts. There is little apparent electoral support
for a return to the pre-1984 era, with the main, and most minor, elected
political parties now considered to be somewhat right of center. In
summary, there has been a significant change in the ideological positioning
of New Zealand politically and socio-culturally since 1984. Marine aquacul-
ture development reflects these changes in the larger socio-political
structure.
New Zealand mariculture development
Aquaculture can be categorized into marine (mariculture, which involves
farming flora or fauna in the sea or intertidal areas) and freshwater (land-
based, which includes freshwater farming and farming in facilities built on
land and using either salt or fresh water, but excludes ponds that are natu-
rally flushed by salt water). New Zealand has had legislation enabling aqua-
culture for over 130 years, and Maori have claimed an even longer tradition
of cultivating marine species.7 Trout and salmon were successfully intro-
duced over 100 years ago for sustenance and recreational fishing, and have
been augmented by hatcheries. However, commercial salmon and land-based
paua farming have only developed, and at a very modest level, in the past
twenty years.8
Despite the more than 15,000 kilometers of diverse coastline spread
across 20 degrees of latitude, very high water quality and good year-round
growing temperatures, marine aquaculture did not become established as a
significant industry in New Zealand until the latter part of the twentieth
century. The lack of growth before the 1960s reflected the distance to
significant markets and the cost of fuel. The development of appropriate
low-cost farming technology and management practices, the high-quality
environment and the establishment of unique niche markets for its mussel
industry have enabled New Zealand to overcome its relative isolation.
Some have argued, however, that the rate of growth of aquaculture over
the past forty years has been significantly constrained by its enabling legisla-
tion.9 The drive for new aquaculture legislation came from a Parliamentary
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Fishing Industry Committee in the early 1960s to enable would-be marine
farmers to acquire secure property rights without the need of a special Act of
Parliament for each farm.10 Previously, only temporary permits had been
obtainable owing to constraints in the Harbours Act 1950.11 The Rock Oyster
Farming Act 1964 (ROFA) was the harbinger of modern marine farming leg-
islation, but it was constrained to enabling leases of up to 2 hectares of fore-
shore and seabed for farming only the native rock oyster (Crassostrea
glomerata). In the late 1960s, partly as an industry-led attempt to establish
trout farming, but primarily as a government drive for regional develop-
ment and because of a failing mussel fishing industry, ROFA was replaced
with the generic Marine Farming Act 1968 (MFA68). MFA68 continued the
established regulatory practice limiting the size of a lease to no larger than 2
hectares, but farmers were allowed to own more than one lease from 1968
onwards. The criteria for reaching decisions gave considerable discretion to
the minister.
Rock oyster farming was fostered through the 1960s by a government
seeking to develop a new industry to compete in the export market. It
employed an Australian farmer to act as an extension officer, and he intro-
duced the intertidal, rack-based oyster farming system. The accidental
arrival in 1971 of the Pacific oyster (Crassostrea gigas) was initially treated as
an invasive threat to the industry, but subsequently became the dominant
species farmed. Initial experiments with oyster hatchery production of seed
were abandoned as non-commercial, and the industry continues to rely on
seed caught on-site.
The overexploitation and complete collapse of commercial mussel fishing
in the 1960s led to experiments in commercial mussel farming in 1965.12
The industry is based on the endemic green-lipped mussel (Perna canaliculus)
and commenced in former mussel fishing areas in the ria-like Hauraki Gulf
and, almost simultaneously, in the drowned river valleys of the Marlborough
Sounds. The Spanish raft system used initially was soon abandoned in favor
of the aesthetically more pleasing Japanese longline system introduced by
the Fishing Industry Board in 1974.
The mussel industry relies on spat caught on grow-out sites, on special
spat catching sites and, especially, spat harvested from seaweed cast up on
beaches. The industry’s development has been greatly aided by extension
services provided by industry organizations, including cooperative spat
catching sites. The mussel meat product’s early (1980) acceptance by the US
and European regulatory agencies was crucial in its development.13 As with
oysters, there is no need for a depuration period, and the industry has
developed sophisticated water quality monitoring and associated farm man-
agement systems. The mussels reach harvestable size in 12–18 months.
Recreation interests strongly, and ultimately successfully, opposed com-
mercial trout farming. Because salmon farming was linked with trout
farming, salmon were prohibited from being marine farmed commercially
until the two were delinked in 1983. Pacific salmon (Oncorhyncus tshawytscha)
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sea-cage farming commenced in 1982 on an experimental license in Stewart
Island by BP and subsequently spread to the Marlborough Sounds and
Banks Peninsula. Despite considerably expanding its production, its relat-
ively high cost and the ready international competition from Australia and
Chile for the Northern Hemisphere’s “off-season” market has constrained
the salmon farming industry’s growth (Table 16.1).
There have been experiments with farming other species, ranging from
finfish to seaweeds, rock lobsters and seahorses, and for a range of markets,
but the commercial industry remains essentially mussel, oyster and salmon
farming. There is, however, an important qualifier when comparing maricul-
ture in New Zealand with that overseas. Scallop enhancement, such as that
conducted in the Nelson–Tasman region of the upper South Island, does not
involve structures, containment or control of the reseeded scallops and is not
classified as either sea-ranching or aquaculture under New Zealand law. As
will be discussed later, this has posed significant difficulties for the aquacul-
ture industry.
Post-1970 legislative and policy frameworks
The passage of the Marine Farming Act 1971 (MFA71) paved the way for the
expansion of mariculture in New Zealand. The major changes introduced by
MFA71 were the provisions for a licensing system to complement the
leasing system, further refinement of criteria to be considered when issuing a
license or lease, greater freedom in the size of farms allowed, and provision
for the creation of marine farm plans.
The provisions on size were altered to provide the controlling authority
with discretion over the total farm size, which was to be “no greater” than it
considered the applicant could “successfully develop . . . within the term of
the lease or licence.”14 Environmental impact assessments have been required
to be carried out by the licensing authority before issuing a license or lease
since 1974.15
Licenses could be issued for up to fourteen years, and had a right of
renewal.16 An applicant would apply to the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries17 (MAF) for the license. The ministry would then seek concurrence
from the agencies responsible for navigation, physical structures, and the use
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Table 16.1 Production and value of New Zealand marine aquaculture, 2001 (FAO
data)
Species Production (metric tonnes) Value (thousand US dollars)
Green-lipped mussels 64,000 65,917
Pacific (Chinook) salmon 7,887 22,944
Pacific oysters 3,500 5,709
Total 75,387 94,570
and occupation of space. In addition, fish-feeding required discharge permits
under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, but this was overlooked
until the late 1980s. Interestingly, neither the applicant nor the ministry
was required to specifically notify adjacent landowners and Maori tribes of
proposals to develop marine farms.
There were no provisions for appeal of a MAF decision, except on points
of law. The criteria on which decisions could be made effectively gave prece-
dence to navigation, commercial fishing, mining, existing or proposed recre-
ational or scientific use, the adjacent landowners’ activities and the public
interest. Whereas leases provided the holders with the exclusive right to the
area, licenses provided only the right to undertake the mariculture activity
within that area. The public could continue to use and pass through licensed
areas. As a general policy, no leases for new areas were issued after MFA71.
Marine farm plans tended to create zones in which marine farming was
prohibited, rather than create zones for marine farming. By the early 1980s,
the minimum processing time for farm applications was of the order of
thirty months.18 Often the marine farm plans merely supported the out-
comes of consultative community planning exercises undertaken by local
authorities planning other coastal activities under other legislation.
The Town and Country Planning Act 1977 introduced provisions enabling
the establishment of “regional” councils on a voluntary basis and giving
them the responsibility for regional planning schemes covering the marine
area out to the boundaries of the territorial sea. Specified maritime planning
authorities could also prepare maritime planning schemes. Only a few areas
took up these opportunities, but those that did included rules in their plans
that addressed marine farming, usually by effectively prohibiting it either
generally or from selected places. Prohibitions were usually justified on the
grounds that farms would interfere with navigation, recreational use,
amenity values, or Maori fishing reserves and special places.
In 1986, the government introduced the QMS for twenty-seven commer-
cial species. The system is based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
ITQ holders have the “right to harvest” a proportion of the total allowable
commercial catch (TACC) of a particular species from a particular quota
management area. The actual tonnage may vary from year to year, depend-
ing on the TACC set. The TACC is based on an annual stock assessment
process that estimates the maximum sustainable yield for a species. The ITQ
is held in perpetuity and can be freely traded on the market. There has been
some consolidation of ITQ holdings into the hands of major fishing com-
panies since its introduction. Most major fishing companies and processors
have significant marine farm investments.
In the Tasman and Golden Bay areas, the government passed special leg-
islation enabling the quota holders of the scallop stock in the area to under-
take cooperative scallop enhancement and rotational fishing practices. These
have proved very effective in sustaining the fishery.19 Spat catching for 
these scallop operations includes using moored structures essentially
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indistinguishable from mussel spat collectors and requiring similar
approvals to those for marine farming, but with tighter restrictions on the
period covered by the license.
Unlike the fishing industry-based process used to introduce the QMS, the
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) represented the culmination of several
years of extensive public consultation and reviews of resource management
legislation. A desperate rearguard action by the Ministry for Agriculture and
Fisheries and the fishing industry kept fisheries out of the RMA’s control.20
The RMA did, however, replace the other legislation that governed the
gaining of marine farming permits.
The key aspects of the RMA reflected the general principles underlying
the “New Right” agenda. The purpose of the RMA was the “sustainable
management” of natural and physical resources. It set out a number of
matters of national importance and other matters that had to be taken into
account or had regard to by decision-makers working under the Act. It also
set in place a framework for policy and planning at national, regional and
territorial authority levels. The central government could produce national
policy statements, and a national policy statement on the coastal environ-
ment was mandatory. Regional councils had to produce regional policy
statements for their entire region, and regional coastal plans for the area
from mean high water at spring tides to the twelve-nautical mile limit. This
area is known as the “coastal marine area.” Regional councils could also
produce regional plans on other resources for which they were given author-
ity, for example water and air. Territorial authorities had to produce district
plans addressing land use for their territories. Each lower tier of government
plan or policy could not be inconsistent with a higher level.
The RMA also established a single process for granting permits to do
things that were discretionary under the plans. Decisions were to be made at
the relevant local authority level, depending on the nature of the resources
being affected. Decision-making was to occur within specified time frames,
although if appeals were lodged against decisions, then the Environment
Court21 was not constrained by the same time constraints. Ministers could
only “call in” or have final decision-making roles in particular cases of
national significance. Otherwise, they and their agencies were subject to the
RMA processes.
Importantly, the new RMA adopted the principle of “effects-based” plan-
ning. Rules in plans were to be based not on activities, but on environ-
mental effects. Thus, rules could not be made that prohibited the activity of
marine farming, but rules and zones could be made in plans on the basis of
thresholds of effects. Therefore, any discharges of specified contaminants
above specified rates might be prohibited.
Every activity, consequently, required some form of biophysical environ-
mental impact assessment. In contrast to the previous regime, the costs for
these are borne by the person wishing to carry out the activity. If the activ-
ity has effects that cross a threshold set out in plans or policy documents
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prepared under the RMA, then the permit process comes into operation.
The maximum term of a permit is thirty-five years, with no right of renewal
or preference, and the permits are transferable, but not divisible. There are
no size restrictions, but if public access is effectively excluded from areas of
ten hectares or greater, or effectively restricted from areas of fifty hectares or
greater, the application is heard by the regional council, but the final
decision is made by the Minister of Conservation on the council’s recom-
mendation.22 The criteria the minister considers do not differ from those of
the Environment Court or the regional or territorial authorities, and do not
allow consideration of trade competition (e.g. with fisheries). The process is
thus transparent and subject to judicial review, thereby providing public
accountability.
The RMA enabled people to carry out their activities provided they
addressed the effects their activities had on the environment. The market
was left to address the social and moral issues. This meant that socially or
morally incompatible uses could be located adjacent to each other unless
opponents could demonstrate that the biophysical effects of the activity were
such as to warrant the activity being prevented. Under the RMA, if a hotel
could be built in a particular location, say next to a school, then so too could
a casino or brothel, because those activities would have essentially the same
biophysical effects as the hotel. A church, however, might have greater diffi-
culty, as the activities undertaken might have significant noise effects
during bell-ringing or choir practice.
Seabed, foreshore and water column space in the coastal marine area were
not privately owned, but were administered by the government on the
behalf of the public. The occupation of space is an effect on the environment
in that it affects the capacity of the space to be occupied by another activity.
The RMA was therefore the means by which to gain the right to occupy
space in the coastal marine area.
The RMA epitomized the post-1984 neoliberal policy principles of suc-
cessive governments. Most importantly, governments at all levels were not
to pick winners through their zoning decisions; they could only decide the
effects that they wished to avoid. Decision-making had been devolved away
from the central government, clear criteria and transparent processes were in
place, and it was up to potential developers to invest in the technology to
avoid, remedy or mitigate their effects if they wished to proceed.
Marine farmers found themselves at the interface between two entirely
different pieces of legislation. They needed a coastal permit to occupy the
marine space and have the marine aquaculture facilities and, because fish-
eries were outside the RMA, they needed a “marine farm permit”23 to hold
and harvest the fish. This has become known as the dual permit system. The
marine farming permit is issued only after a coastal permit has been
obtained from the appropriate regional council.24 The Ministry of Fisheries
makes decisions on the marine farm permit based on the “undue adverse
effects” on commercial fishing and fisheries resources.
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The precautionary principle
The relative lack of scientific knowledge of marine resources and processes
meant that a “precautionary approach” was adopted as a guiding principle in
the RMA. All activities with environmental effects (except fishing) are pro-
hibited in the marine area unless otherwise permitted either by a rule in a
regional coastal plan or by a coastal permit obtained from the regional
council. The courts have found that the precautionary principle is implicit
in the RMA’s overall effects-based approach. Each effect of a proposed activ-
ity, such as a marine farm, is assessed qualitatively or, preferably, quantita-
tively in terms of the probability of occurrence and the force of the impacts.
Risk assessment is employed, and New Zealand and international standards
have been drawn on in court decisions on the appropriate processes to be
used, notably in the assessment of potential impacts of different forms of
farming on marine mammals.25 Implementation of the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity has resulted in an added emphasis on the maintenance of
indigenous coastal diversity.26 The introduction of non-locally endemic
species (e.g. Pacific oysters) from other parts of New Zealand has also been
prevented in some instances.27
In addition, the Biosecurity Act 1993 and the Hazardous Substances and New
Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) control the management of pests and the intro-
duction of non-indigenous species and genetically modified organisms
(GMOs). The HSNO has assumed particular importance as a consequence of
a heated national debate over genetic engineering and the field testing of
GMOs. It requires that anyone intending to import, develop, field-test or
release into New Zealand new organisms (including GMOs) must obtain a
permit from the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA).
ERMA must “take into account the need for caution in managing adverse
effects where there is scientific and technical uncertainty about those
effects.”28
Industry response to the different regimes
The industry has grown rapidly regardless of the regimes, but the RMA
freed the regulatory system immensely. The new coastal plans being
developed did not have prohibitions against marine farming, and areas pre-
viously prohibited to marine farming were now open at the discretion of the
local authorities. Even before the new RMA plans were developed, however,
applications were lodged for areas where the old plans had not put prohibi-
tions in place. Such areas were often without prohibitions, primarily because
of assumptions that the sites were not technologically or financially viable
and were not under significant pressure. Alternatively, there was an expecta-
tion that there would be such opposition to the use of some areas that
marine farms would not be allowed.
Marine farmers were concerned that the new regime would make it
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harder to get permits. They were concerned that local authorities would be
less likely to approve farms than MAF had been. Moreover, the Minister of
Conservation was given the role of approving regional coastal plans and
significant developments. The Department of Conservation had been estab-
lished in 1987 with the explicit purpose of advocating for conservation of
the environment,29 and by 1991 had become the major government depart-
ment opposing marine farm applications.30 Under the RMA, marine farmers
would bear the costs of the application process rather than pay the nominal
fee previously charged by MAF, and they would have to consult directly
with the community and potential opponents.
Consequently, immediately prior to the commencement of the RMA,
many applications were lodged, either to add approval for a wider range of
species to be farmed on existing approved licenses, or to extend existing
sites, or to obtain new sites. The race for space was most intense in the Marl-
borough Sounds, and allocation was based on first in, first served.31
In the Golden and Tasman Bays, issues became especially heated when
several mussel farmers applied for spat catching permits to extensive areas in
which the Tasman and Golden Bay scallop quota holders had been operating
the scallop enhancement scheme. The local council’s initial proposed
regional coastal plan suggested rules that would effectively push marine
farms out beyond 3 nautical miles to protect the environment and meet the
navigational concerns of recreational boaters. The resulting multifaceted
legal action involved a three-month court hearing, many millions of dollars
and a suicide. It became clear that the quota holders did not have rights to
occupy space as they held no coastal permits or marine farming permits.
Therefore, their argument against the applications was tenuous under the
RMA. The court proposed a solution whereby it identified large aquaculture
management areas (AMAs) in the coastal plan, and aquaculture would be
prohibited outside those areas.32
The proposed new plans gained weight in decision-making processes for
individual marine farm applications in other regions, depending on the
stage to which the plans had advanced through public processes and
appeals.33 Entrepreneurial site developers and existing marine farmers recog-
nized the opportunities to obtain sites in new places and at unprecedented
scales. Applications were made for several sites of almost fifty hectares, more
than ten times larger than the average marine farm site prior to the RMA.
As investors became familiar with the RMA, the requirement for the Minis-
ter of Conservation and local authorities to operate in accordance with the
criteria specified in the RMA became apparent. Developers invested in new
technology and developed proposals for offshore farms of up to 10,000
hectares.34
It has been the delays and imprecision of the criteria considered by the
Ministry of Fisheries that has proved the most significant impediment to
developments under the new regime. The problem for the Ministry of Fish-
eries lies partly in its lack of administrative resources for these types of
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developments, but primarily in the imprecision of the legislation that
requires it to consider intersector, or trade, competition. Specifically, the
Ministry is requiring much more extensive ecological assessments than pre-
viously, and is wrestling with the implications of the test for undue adverse
effect on the commercial fishing sector.35 This has caused many in the indus-
try now to indicate a preference for all marine farm permitting decisions to
be made entirely under the RMA and by local authorities.
Government moratorium and proposals
In response to the increased demand, and especially to the Tasman–Golden
Bay case, in November 2001 the government imposed a national morato-
rium on new applications. The primary initial purpose of the moratorium
was to provide regional councils with time to put specific AMAs in their
plans and for the government to pass legislation implementing the proposed
aquaculture reforms.36 The proposed reforms include only allowing new
applications for marine aquaculture within AMAs. Moreover, these areas
would be identified through community consultation processes (appealable
to the courts) and agreement from the Ministry of Fisheries. The local fish
quota holders would also effectively have a right to veto some areas where
they were considered by the ministry to be “unduly adversely affected”
unless suitable arrangements (e.g. financial compensation) could be reached.
It is proposed that once AMAs are established, they will be developed
progressively, allowing monitoring of the environmental effects in the
process. The default mechanism for allocating space will be by tendering.
Once the regional council has approved a coastal permit for a farm, the
farmer will register it with the Ministry of Fisheries. That registration will
be automatic and replace the requirement to obtain a marine farming permit
for holding and harvesting marine flora and fauna. A one-stop shop will have
been created, because the effects on fishers will have been addressed through
the creation of the AMA.
The legitimacy of these proposals has been thrown into doubt as a result
of court action by various Maori tribes claiming ownership of the foreshore
and seabed. Their initial success in the Court of Appeal created considerable
wider, continuing political turmoil.
Maori response
In the 1980s, Maori tribes successfully challenged the implementation of
the QMS and the allocation of ITQ on the basis that their common law cus-
tomary right to these resources had never been extinguished by legislation.37
Subsequent negotiations ended with the 1992 “Sealords Deal.”38 Aquacul-
ture and freshwater fishing were not included in the settlement.
Among other things, the deal guaranteed Maori up to 20 percent of the
quota allocated for commercial fish stocks brought into the QMS and half
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the ownership of Sealords, the largest fishing company in New Zealand. The
quota and the Sealords shares are held by the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries
Commission.39 The Commission, and Maori as tribal entities or as indi-
viduals, have also acquired quota through their own endeavors, and Sealords
has continued to expand. The actual Maori ownership of ITQ therefore prob-
ably exceeds, but does not replace, that required to be provided by the
government.
The RMA developed concurrently with the aftermath of the court cases
and key Waitangi Tribunal reports into grievances, and shows their imprint.
It requires that decision-makers consult with Maori; take into account the
(undefined) “principles” of the Treaty of Waitangi; have regard to kaitiaki-
tanga (guardianship); and recognize and provide for the relationship of
Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, wahi
tapu (special places) and other taonga (treasures). This potentially provides
Maori with considerable influence in decision-making. Some marine farm
developers have established partnerships with Maori tribes or individuals to
smooth the application process, and many Maori-owned organizations and
individuals have invested directly in marine farm ownership. Sealord and the
Commission have also become major players in marine farming, and Sealord
has recently helped create a benchmark standard for organic mussel farming,
believed to be a world first.40
Despite these provisions, some Maori were concerned over the govern-
ment’s new aquaculture proposals and discriminatory difficulties they
believed they had encountered from local authorities in trying to gain
marine farming rights. In 2003, they lodged claims against the proposed
aquaculture law reforms, and subsequently against the government’s fore-
shore and seabed ownership proposals, in both the Waitangi Tribunal and
the courts. The government and others opposed these claims. The Court of
Appeal overturned previous understandings of the unowned nature of the
territorial sea and found that Maori might still hold customary rights to
parts of the foreshore and seabed.41
This threatened to undermine the presumption in the aquaculture pro-
posals that the foreshore and seabed were not privately owned. The govern-
ment responded with a set of policy proposals that, if they became law, would
remove Maori customary ownership rights, but provide Maori with a veto
right over any proposed use of the water column, seabed or foreshore if and
where they could establish customary title. Moreover, Maori would be able to
gain an in perpetuity development right for such areas that would override the
thirty-five-year limitation on permits, but would still need to obtain coastal
permits. Provision might also be made for a preferential allocation to Maori of
a proportion of the sites within an AMA.42 Whether this would sufficiently
compensate Maori for removing their existing customary rights would prob-
ably depend on the location and nature of the customary rights lost.
The government’s proposals provoked considerable heated debate
throughout the nation. Two Waitangi Tribunal reports have found that the
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proposals breach both the Treaty of Waitangi and principles of fairness in
international and domestic law.43
Unfairly treated?
It is quite apparent that marine farmers too are being unfairly treated in the
development and use of marine resources in New Zealand. The RMA regime
placed them on a level playing field with all other marine users except
fishers. The property rights regime created by the ITQ system for fishers was
implemented long after the establishment of aquaculture as a viable indus-
try, and it was initiated because of the inability of fishers to sustain their
fisheries. Marine farming, on the other hand, has been seen as a sustainable
alternative to unsustainable fishing. Why should it be seen as an alternative
when it is arguably an equally valid industry, especially given the lengthy
historical period of aquaculture activities claimed by Maori?
Moreover, the moratorium on aquaculture developments has not been
matched with a similar moratorium on the development of marinas or other
activities that might occupy space that could have been used by aquaculture.
In addition, the government has continued to provide quota rights to new
species, and these ITQ holders may thereby gain a veto or compensation
right over proposed AMAs. This aspect of the proposals also provides the
fishing industry with an arguably unwarranted advantage in gaining permis-
sion for its own marine farms and may effectively exclude the type of non-
fishing people who initiated and developed much of New Zealand’s
aquaculture industry.
There is also an inherent unfairness in that the aquaculture industry has
responded to the challenge put to it by government to invest in technology
that addresses its environmental effects. Its subsequent growth should be
seen as a credit to the regime. The new proposals, however, essentially
restrict aquaculture to the technologies and species that have already been
established in New Zealand. The AMAs and associated prohibitions will
remove the incentives for the industry to farm new species and to develop
new technologies. Other industries, such as marine tourism developments,
will be allowed to proceed unencumbered by equivalent “tourism manage-
ment areas” and prohibitions. Efficient and environmentally sustainable uses
of marine space will be prevented, and less efficient and sustainable activities
might well take up the space.
Most galling of all for marine farmers is that they must undertake a thor-
ough environmental impact assessment of the sites sought, but the same
does not apply to fishers. An AMA, or a marine farmer, may therefore be
prevented from taking up a site above a particular benthic community, only
to see a scallop dredger destroy the same community the next day. Similarly,
while marine farmers are unlikely to be permitted to establish farms using
species not previously present in the area,44 recreational or commercial
fishers may easily discard unwanted by-catch in areas where those species
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have not previously been found. Discharges from recreational fishing boats
and others may also create lower water quality in particular areas than would
aquaculture activities.
Conclusion
New Zealand’s experience in mariculture development suggests that an
integrated system of allocating space to all activities is essential for the
achievement of efficient and environmentally friendly development. Such
concepts are fundamental in the language of integrated coastal management,
and it has been the failure to draw fisheries into that system that has become
a fundamental constraint on marine farming development. Moreover,
attempts to implement new systems of allocating space should not be
embarked upon before considering fully the existing rights to that space. In
issuing in perpetuity ITQ for fisheries, the New Zealand government had to
revisit its presumption of its ability to ride over Maori rights, and we have
seen a repeat performance with its proposals for the aquaculture sector.
While it has implemented such principles as precaution, transparency,
accountability, the maintenance of public access, public ownership of marine
space, and “polluter pays” for aquaculture and other activities governed
under the RMA, it has failed to implement all of these in the ITQ approach
to fisheries.
This in turn places other users, especially marine farming, at an unfair
disadvantage relative to fishers. Aquaculture has demonstrated that when it
is treated on a level playing field, fairly with respect to other marine users,
then it has the capacity to respond with innovative marine farming techno-
logy and management practices that are environmentally sustainable.
Seeking special provisions for aquaculture, such as AMAs, is more likely to
disadvantage aquaculture than advantage it. The recent proposals for aqua-
culture in New Zealand represent a subtle change from the laissez-faire, free-
market neoliberalist ideals of the 1980s reforms for coastal management,
and a return to a more interventionist central government approach to
picking individual winners. The winners here are not the aquaculture indus-
try or Maori, but the ITQ holders – fortuitous beneficiaries of the same
neoliberal reforms now being undermined.
Policy-makers, however, need to bear in mind that if they remove all
consideration of socio-cultural matters, then they may find the industry
becomes dominated by those with the capital to invest in the technology
and management practices that minimize their environmental effects. Fewer
capital resources may mean less environmentally sustainable outcomes. The
industry may become inaccessible for small entrepreneurs and sustenance or
subsistence farmers, and become the domain of those able to enlist major
capital resources. Whether such an inequitable outcome of ownership distri-
bution is preferable to accepting adverse environmental effects may be a
luxury only able to be afforded by developed and affluent countries.
New Zealand mariculture 519
Postscript
In November and December 2004, the New Zealand government rushed
into law controversial new statutes vesting ownership of the foreshore and
seabed in the Crown and implementing the new aquaculture regime. As
anticipated in this chapter, the new aquaculture legislation ended the mora-
torium on aquaculture, but has prohibited aquaculture development unless
it occurs within an aquaculture management area (AMA) identified as such
in a regional coastal plan prepared by the relevant local government under
the Resource Management Act 1991. An AMA cannot be established if the
Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries considers that it would unduly
adversely restrict or displace recreational or customary fishing. If it would
unduly restrict or displace commercial fishing, then a reservation is placed
on it, and those seeking to obtain space for aquaculture activities within the
AMA must have succeeded in reaching an “aquaculture agreement” with
those who own 90 percent of the quota of fish for that area. This essentially
provides a veto capability for large ITQ holders. The preferred mechanism
for allocating space to those who have aquaculture agreements is to tender
“authorizations.” Once authorizations have been allocated, then the autho-
rization holders can apply for coastal permits, which are considered in terms
of environmental effects. Before tendering, 20 percent of the available space
in the AMA is to be provided to a Maori aquaculture trustee to allocate to
iwi. The space to be provided to Maori is to be representative of the available
space and to be of an economically viable size. The allocation of this 20
percent does not prevent Maori from tendering for more space.
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17 Conclusion
Towards sustainable aquaculture




Aquaculture faces similar challenges in many parts of the world. While the
range of responses is quite varied, it can be expected that both operational
approaches and policies will continue to evolve, but likely with some degree
of convergence. Certainly, what has become everyday practice now is quite
different from practice a decade ago, and we are likely to see changes of even
greater magnitude in the coming years. Cultivation of more species will
present new operational needs and policy tensions.
For reasons of both social and environmental conflicts and economic
opportunity, aquaculture law and policy need to be cast into a context of
sustainable development. Sustainable development certainly can be ambigu-
ous, but it may well be the best concept we have. Yet there is no concur-
rence on the definition of sustainable aquaculture. And, looking ahead, our
vision of sustainability by 2020–2030 may be quite different from that of
today. Importantly, it will be characterized by transition to a “biological
economy.” A biological economy represents an outcome where innovation
produces very significant economic costs and benefits based on our increased
knowledge of biological factors such as genetics and ecology. In practical
terms, we will spend a lot of money trying to maintain ecological integrity,
and gain benefits from applications of biotechnology or other advanced inno-
vations. Issues such as trading rules and consumer acceptance will be crit-
ical; there is no guarantee that even superior methods of production will be
automatically accepted, in either rich countries or poor ones. That is the
lesson of the recent past.
Aquaculture today is on the cutting edge of this new, poorly recognized
shift to a new economy where sustainable development decisions prevail.
These decisions will be based on science and technology, policy, law and
regulations, economic incentives, and participatory approaches. We do not
have a good “institutional roadmap” of these for our management of ocean
use generally. And, while such a roadmap appears to be emerging for the
future of what we hope can be defined as sustainable aquaculture, it is still
very incomplete and open to debate.
Thus, no country has yet fully implemented a longer-term vision of sus-
tainable ocean use and development, or a satisfying sustainable aquaculture
program as part of it. Contributors to this volume have drawn out possi-
bilities of win–win strategies that would help to address problems faced by
the aquaculture industry as it continues along an expansionary, but arguably
unsustainable, pathway, identifying controls that would address environ-
mental, community and other issues.
However, we are stuck with designing the ship while sailing it. Since
aquaculture, and indeed many other ocean uses, continue to grow at a rapid
rate, we cannot presume that we have the luxury of time in dry dock to com-
plete our transition in law, policy and other needs. Instead, we must
presume that, having launched our efforts in somewhat stormy waters, the
building process must take place at sea, and possibly with hurricane-force
winds ahead. The job facing those truly interested in the future of this
industry must be to build a ship that can truly sail into the wind. These
nautical metaphors may be crude, but they underline that a decade of serious
and difficult work lies ahead in all parts of the world, and certainly in
Canada.
We likely have not even identified all the challenges. We can expect sur-
prises, and therefore the “learning by doing” approach makes a lot of sense.
That will not be enough, however, since sustainable aquaculture develop-
ment will depend upon trust-building of various sorts, and science upon
which some of the “big breaks” for the future are dependent. Adaptive plan-
ning and management, which treats development as an experiment, with
full participation of those involved directly, plus stakeholders, is an import-
ant means for preparing for uncertain times, and for introducing new ideas.
So far there are few rigorous applications of this approach to policy formula-
tion and implementation with respect to aquaculture.
Principled access and operations
The key principles guiding access to and operations of aquaculture need to
be strengthened in law and regulation.
Access
“Social license” involves the building of public confidence and legitimacy of
aquaculture. One issue is the role of coastal communities and riparian
landowners – how much power should they have that is enshrined in law?
Social license is also, in part, in the hands of international and national
stakeholders and consumers. Their role and influence is increasing but
often based on campaigns and choices, not necessarily supported by either
policies or laws. However, international legal regimes, including trade
laws, are further legitimizing their presence in debates over the right to
operate.
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Subsidiarity refers to the local role in aquatic use planning. The principle
is that decisions about access should be taken at the lowest level that is feasi-
ble rather than its always being assumed that they should be taken at the
national or provincial level. This approach requires local-level capacity-
building, local institutional development, impact assessment of policies and
practices on local economies, and strong decision support systems for local
levels. In Norway, local sea-use planning – done in advance of need – has
reduced conflict between ocean users.
Operations
Canada and other countries can learn much from international experiences
such as the US Operational Framework project mentioned in Chapter 14.
Operations-related issues for law and policy include the following:
Waste control
Waste control is a key concern that is already receiving much attention.
Indeed, some question whether cage-based culture will continue to be the
most viable choice, or whether land-based operations with advanced waste
treatment will eventually become more common. Much has already been
accomplished over the past decade on the issue of waste monitoring and
reduction. The assimilative capacity of receiving waters likely will be
reflected in the development and application of future operational standards.
Health
Health issues are characterized by complex approval processes, the possibil-
ity of international non-tariff trade barriers, and the potential for consumer
scares. Further attention to operational standards related to human health
may be expected, certainly in response to biotechnology introductions, cont-
aminants, etc., and, more generally, to reducing risk not only for human
consumption but also concerning both the risk of health to the aquacultured
species and diseases or pests that might affect wild stocks and other species
living in the surrounding waters.
Ecological integrity
The concept of ecological integrity, refers to the health of the whole ecosys-
tem. It is enshrined in law at present as the objective in management of
Canada’s national parks system. It will probably emerge as an operational
concern for marine ecosystems that have been altered dramatically through
fisheries, pollution and other uses. If it does, it will have important implica-
tions for aquaculture, since it will be a defined objective that will have to be
addressed through operational procedures that may be considerably different
526 Arthur Hanson
from today’s, and may require considerably more monitoring and develop-
ment of different indicators.
Three main ecological concerns associated with aquaculture are (1) genetic
mixing of farmed and wild stocks and the introduction of exotic species or
genetically modified fish to marine waters; (2) the spread of disease and para-
sites to wild stocks, for example sea lice in British Columbian waters; and (3)
the degradation of benthic habitats. We can ask ourselves whether or not the
law adequately regulates for ecological integrity – and, beyond that, whether
we know how to deal with this subject in policy and operational terms. So far,
the answer appears to be a qualified “no.”
Timely regulatory and communications action
Systems for timely regulatory and communications action are not keeping
pace with the current and anticipated rate of aquaculture development. This
is an important finding that is not limited to Canada. Unless this situation
changes, constraints on the right to operate, and the possibility of future
campaigns against various types of aquaculture, are inevitable. However,
considerable effort has been expended at all levels of government and within
the industry on addressing the need for better communication of the
changes occurring in how aquaculture is conducted, and on actual develop-
ment of new regulatory frameworks.
Law and regulation: problems and challenges
Without question, the legal and regulatory regime for aquaculture is
complex. Problems in law and regulation relate to legal pluralism, overlap-
ping permitting, limited capacity to implement, the need for greater incen-
tives for cohesion within sectors of the industry, and adequate funding to
address legal and administrative development and reform. In Canada, regu-
lation of aquaculture raises numerous interjurisdictional and constitutional
issues.
While the national aquaculture law and policy regime in Canada has
“hardly left port,” and significant gaps exist in provincial laws, there are
opportunities to use legal and regulatory tools to foster sustainable aquacul-
ture. Current laws can be flexible, shaped by both regulatory change and use
of administrative approaches. International standards and precedents indi-
cate that more coherent approaches are possible. There is some move to
incorporate market-based and voluntary approaches to facilitate aquaculture
operations, and these will become even more important internationally
during the years ahead. These voluntary approaches frequently are the pre-
liminaries to more binding laws and policies.
Law and legislation need to be based on smart regulation with a mix of
command and control and market-based incentives, fostering partnerships
and cooperation to make the system work. An enabling framework should
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make it easier, rather than more difficult, for the industry to meet specified
objectives. And a framework should be comprehensive enough to address all
major needs accepted as valid by governments and society. Elements of such
a framework, and key questions to ponder, include:
• Fairness. Is aquaculture being asked to meet a higher level of regulation
than other ocean users?
• Unified approach. Is a national Aquaculture Act or an integrated
approach, linking existing law and regulations and filling the gaps, a
useful approach?
• Coordination with other ocean uses. Does Canada’s Oceans Act adequately
address the needs for an overarching ocean users’ law and policy frame-
work?
• Adaptive management. What are the implications of adaptive resource
management for developing new laws and regulations, and for enforcing
existing measures?
• International trade. As international trade law and policies shift to a focus
on sustainable development, what are the implications for a trade-
dependent industry such as aquaculture?
Operational tools: precaution, risk management and
“sound science”
Precaution, risk management and “sound science” are concepts that can
greatly influence aquaculture law and policy and their implications for
environmental protection, economic opportunities, social and community
well-being, national sustainability branding, aquaculture industrial security
and development, investment, and even political careers. The questions are
whether these three concepts need to be addressed as a package, and how
they can be made operational.
As articulated in the Rio Declaration, the precautionary principle states that
lack of conclusive scientific evidence does not justify inaction, particularly
when the consequences of inaction may be devastating or when the costs of
action are negligible. The principle is enshrined in Canadian legislation (e.g.,
the Oceans Act and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act), and guiding
principles are in place across the federal government. Unfortunately, it is a
principle that is difficult to implement. The precautionary principle/approach
will not go away; Canada needs to learn how to make it work.
Questions regarding practical application relate to the link between risk
assessment and the precautionary principle, which is not very clear in opera-
tional terms, its application in setting reasonable standards, and the implica-
tions of legislated implementation against weaker statements of policy and
administrative procedure. If risk assessment is enshrined as a specific tool for
aquaculture policies and laws, it could prove to be a costly, technical busi-
ness if not applied appropriately.
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“Sound science” is not always a meaningful term for law. It is not clear
whom it serves, and how it may be linked to adaptive management. Rather, the
question is how international science, national scientific efforts and traditional
knowledge can be reconciled in addressing precaution and risk management.
Policy and planning tools
Planning is the proactive link to vision. However, within governments it is
difficult to establish planning frameworks when there are no or few current
applications awaiting approval. There are numerous planning tools available,
including geographic information systems (GIS), zoning and participatory
mechanisms. At present, land-use planning for the sea does not work well,
since zoning is incomplete, and the land-based principles do not encompass
the multidimensional aspect of the marine environment (e.g. “sour bottom,”
water flows creating conditions for algal blooms, movements of sea lice). In
general, planning has not caught up to the pressures of aquaculture develop-
ment anywhere, although Norway appears to be in a better position than
most. Integrated planning for ocean use is now in vogue, but will it do the
job? There are very practical limits to it, and we need to link integrated
planning more effectively to law, economics, and local ecological and
community needs.
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is an internationally applied
policy and planning tool that can be useful in assessing the impact of aqua-
culture operations in the marine environment. Specific issues relating to its
application include the level of detail (screening versus in-depth “class
screening”), consideration of integrated developments and cumulative
impacts, the link to other regulatory processes such as food safety, avoiding
excess burden of multiple jurisdictions/assessments, and integration of inter-
nationally acceptable standards. Strategic impact assessment of policies,
including those for sustainable aquaculture, could be useful.
“Learning by doing” implies that the first round of management applica-
tions will not get it right, but with increased experience, improved science
and stakeholder input, over time sustainable aquaculture management will
improve. Adaptive management requires a commitment to experimentation
and learning from the results. This approach should contribute to improved
environmental impact assessment, precaution and risk management applica-
tions, and the approach should be supported in laws and policies. At this
time, adaptive management is a technique not generally mentioned in laws.
Market-based tools include certification of environmental management
systems, codes of practice, and industry-based environmental monitoring.
All require adherence to high standards. The Scottish Assurance Scheme and
the Marine Stewardship Council offer examples of such approaches that are
being adopted around the world. Certification will become increasingly
important, and economists and lawyers need to talk more so that market
instruments can be used more effectively.
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Despite their best efforts, regulators, practitioners and the general public
continue to have disputes over various aspects of aquaculture development
and regulation. A range of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can be
incorporated in legislation, though it is not clear how successfully they can
be applied in comprehensive planning/zoning. Conflict can be reduced
through consultation before development occurs and through the establish-
ment of partnerships. Legislation can explicitly incorporate dispute resolu-
tion procedures, as is the case in Nova Scotia. In order to work, funding
needs to be available to bring together the full range of users and stakehold-
ers, and to provide the necessary information. Adaptive management may
help by leading to decentralized decision-making, leading to reduced levels
of conflict. In order to deconstruct conflict, we need to recognize that differ-
ent types of conflicts (e.g. data, interest, structural, value or relationship
conflicts) will need an array of responses. What policies and laws are needed
to resolve each of these types of conflicts?
Policy-makers must also address aquaculture industry concerns over the
complex and confusing maze of regulations, and also by inadequate regula-
tions, governing aquaculture operations. Industry representatives want reas-
surance that there is political will to address outstanding issues, and that
law and policy research is founded in good science. To this end, people in
the aquaculture industry need to be engaged by government regulators and
invited to participate in the policy-making process.
Aboriginal concerns and rights
Some First Nations perceive law as a mechanism to further colonize. They
see “sharing, reciprocity and respect” as the principles underlying utilization
and development of aquaculture resources. Traditional and spiritual con-
cerns are fundamental, and these do not translate well into legal perspec-
tives. To address social needs, aquaculture needs to link to the “real
economies” of First Nations communities.
Given the limited consultation of First Nations during the development
of current aquaculture regimes, some Aboriginal people are calling for full-
scale public review. There is a confirmed duty to consult, guided by law, but
some variability emerges in court tests. Consultation on resource issues will
have to increase and be meaningful. Domestic law has been used to resist
aquaculture; international law and United Nations forums may be used in
the future.
As the evolution towards greater recognition of First Nations’ rights con-
tinues, based particularly on court decisions, legal precedents have emerged
to govern First Nations’ participation in the development of aquaculture law
and policy. So far, the rights being tested primarily relate to upholding of
treaty obligations, land rights, and hunting and fishing. Future tests may be
expected to encompass offshore waters, the seabed, the foreshore, riparian
rights, freshwater access and the protection of ecological integrity. Aquacul-
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ture operations will cross over several types of rights (land, freshwater, ocean
space).
Conclusion
The Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in
Decision VII/5 on Marine and Coastal Biodiversity1 emphasized many of the
research challenges still confronting mariculture that complicate the further
formulation of laws and policies. Those research needs include, among
others:2
• development of criteria for judging the seriousness of biodiversity effects
of mariculture operations;
• development of criteria for when environmental impact assessments
should be required;
• studies related to impacts of mariculture on genetic, species and ecosys-
tem diversity, including the genetic effects of biotechnology develop-
ments and the effects of genetic pollution from farmed populations on
wild populations;
• comparative studies on legislative, economic and financial mechanisms
for regulating mariculture activities;
• development of quantitative and qualitative criteria for assessing mari-
culture impacts on the environment, including social and cultural
impacts.
As the chapters in this volume have documented, the strengthening of
aquaculture law and policy is an ongoing challenge in light of the many
conflicting interests that must be satisfied and the negative views and polit-
ical inertias that need to be faced. Key sustainability principles emerging
from international law, such as precaution, the ecosystem approach, public
participation, integration, and intergenerational and intragenerational
equity, offer hope in the global search for sustainable seas and healthy
coastal communities. However, best practices are still at the frontier of
being realized.
Notes
1 Online. Available htpp://www.biodiv.org/decisions/?decVII/5.
2 Ibid. at Appendix 5 (Research and monitoring priorities associated with Pro-
gramme Element 4: Mariculture).
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Aquaculture (JSA) 467, 475;
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